CALL FOR PAPERS: The editors of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict seek to publish a variety of scholarly articles, essays, poetry, and book reviews on topics such as war, peace, global cooperation, domestic violence, and interpersonal conflict resolution; including questions of military and political security, the global economy, and global environmental issues. We wish to promote discussion of both strategic and ethical questions surrounding these issues. Our audience includes scholars with a wide range of interests within the academy and educated members of the general public. Contributors should avoid discussions accessible only to specialists in their field. Submissions are normally due May 1. Contributors should first contact the office at wiinst@uwsp.edu for a style sheet.
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Editor’s Forward

As in previous issues of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict, the 2010-2012 issue contains a broad range of articles by scholars in a variety of disciplines. One of the journal’s goals is to promote effective teaching methods, and we begin with two essays that explore innovative techniques for classroom teaching of peace-related issues. Susan F. Carson describes how a simple change in a professor’s appearance may be used as an effective tool in peace education, encouraging students to examine their views of human rights, interpersonal relations, diversity, and social justice. Drawing from her own experience as well as a review of education research, Andria Wisler explores the use of humor in teaching classes on conflict resolution, demonstrating how it may be employed to engage students and encourage them to perceive conflict in new ways, and to build a culture of learning in the university classroom.

The remaining articles examine various topics in international peace and conflict. Steve Dobransky begins this section with a fascinating discussion of the memorialization of four American missionaries who were murdered in El Salvador in 1980, suggesting that this case may be used as a model for other efforts at memorialization to promote peace and justice. Tammy Murphy follows with an insightful analysis of legal efforts by indigenous peoples to reclaim their lands, highlighting cases in South America and Australia, and discussing how these developments might offer solutions to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Jacinta Chiamaka Nwaka and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba explore conflicts in Nigeria. Nwaka carefully traces the history of ethnic tensions in the northern Nigerian city of Kano between the indigenous Muslim Kanawa and migrants into the city, especially the Christian Igbo, and suggests methods to reduce conflict. Ibaba analyzes conflict and corruption in the Niger Delta region, stressing the need for greater democracy to reduce violence and encourage equitable development and resource allocation. Using statistical methodology, Muhammed Asadi explores the relationship between the level of military influence in a society and attitudes toward gender, suggesting that militarization tends to diminish women’s status and contribute to violence towards women. Yerlan Isakov follows with an examination of the effect of ethnic stereotypes in promoting and sustaining the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The journal concludes with a review of Kent Shifferd’s important new book, From War to Peace: A Guide to the Next Hundred Years, which examines the international culture of war and identifies trends which may be leading to the evolution of a stable global peace system.

As always, I would like to express gratitude to the authors and contributors to this issue, to the referees who read and carefully evaluated manuscripts, and especially to my co-editors, Kathryn Blakeman and Lynne Woehrle. Kathryn in particular did by far the lion’s share of the correspondence, editing, and formatting required to complete the issue.

William B. Skelton
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Locked Out: An Adventure in Teacher Perception

Susan F. Carson*

Abstract

This article traces themes found in the challenges of embracing a transformative peaceful pedagogy in three distinct educational settings. Insights are drawn that can potentially inform educational researchers involved in views of identity, agency, and social justice in teaching and learning. A transformative experience began with a change in traditional teacher identity. Using narrative analysis as the methodology, an innovative study of student response to traditional teacher identity was undertaken, based upon the author’s pronounced hair change from short and professional to long dreadlocks. The power of hair was used to bridge worlds and explore social responsibility with inter-related structures and attitudes respectful of human rights, high levels of acceptance and freedom, safe environments, positive relations, strong participation, and equitable sharing of resources. Identity and agency became a mirror for students to see themselves and reflect, empowering individual growth and independence while enhancing opportunities to successfully learn, lead, and care.

Winding down the 2008-2009 academic year, it was time for something different. After nine years in numerous administrative and teaching positions at the university level, in addition to ten previous years in K-12 teaching, I needed a change. My professional experiences had taken me around the world and back, winding from Ghana to New Mexico, Northern Ireland to Thailand, and numerous sites in between. I have dedicated much of my life to education, with few breaks to sustain and renew my spirit. It was beginning to show. The threads holding together my fabric as an educator were beginning to loosen and give way to the continual wear and tear.

Background

My teaching responsibilities in the College of Education at a Michigan regional teaching university have been based upon my expertise and willingness to learn. I have taught both undergraduate courses (Diversity in Education, Introduction to Education, Organizing and Managing Classroom Environments, and Remedial Procedures: Cognitively Impaired and Emotionally Impaired) and graduate courses (Survey of Urban Education, Teaching the At-Risk

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Student, Curriculum Development, and Foundations in Education). The common denominator within this broad range of topics and material has been a fundamental concept: caring.

Caring is a significant component of peace education, and it is one of the fundamental aspects of the pedagogy of peace. I believe it is essential to teach my students the importance of caring in education, to teach them how to care. It is a baton that is passed from me to them to be put into action with their students. This is quite a task because, among many other things, caring includes how we relate with one another, how we navigate through differences, and how we share power — all things that are best learned through experiences and activities, not just through reading texts.

Intricately connected to caring is the concept of social justice. If I didn’t care, social justice would not be an important aspect of my life. And if I wasn’t aware of social inequities, caring might not be such a dominant force. Caring and social justice often call upon different manifestations of the heart, mind, and body, all of which need to function in relationship with one another. This functioning union can be found in peace education when pedagogy is at its best, walking the fine line of reason, compassion, and action.

This paper is an exploration of how, with one simple change in physical appearance, I became an “other” in my environment. That experience ultimately became an exploration of the intersection between caring and social justice, gradually moving me and my students toward a greater understanding of what is needed for successful peace education.

Educational Context

The demands placed upon education are increasing at a rapid rate. Information technology continues to push the edge of the learning envelope. Economic pressures plague all aspects of schooling. Hiring practices for teachers, administrators, and support staff are being affected. Keeping up with curriculum development, adequate course materials, and technology stretches budgets that are having trouble maintaining adequate custodial staff.

If we look closely, all educators carry extra responsibility in this environment. How are we supporting education? How are we preparing our pre-service teachers? How can the university population of pre-service teachers learn to successfully navigate unfamiliar social structures? And, above all, how can our students be taught to care and still be effective? To begin to answer these questions and carry out my responsibilities as a twenty-first-century educator, I became part of a growing consortium addressing needs that arise from homelessness.

Currently, I teach the undergraduate course Diversity in Education out of struggling urban public schools that are part of a homeless services consortium. Diversity in Education is a prerequisite course for admission to the university’s College of Education; it also satisfies a university-wide general education requirement. The course enrollment is mixed, containing education, nursing, business, engineering, and social work students as well as those who have not declared a major. Diversity in Education is an edgy, sensitive course to teach, plunging into topics that require hard work and introspection. It is difficult to look at privilege, examine stereotypes and prejudices, and realize that professional mastery requires letting go of preconceived notions. This is amplified by the course’s location, a public school setting where there is a clear mismatch between my students and the population they are serving.
I am proud to be a teacher, an educator committed to learning and instruction and the transmission of knowledge to create a strong global citizenry. And I am very pleased to be involved in efforts like the Diversity in Education course. In fact, my dedication to education tends to reach into all aspects of my life. But at the end of an academic year I am exhausted. I need to refresh and balance my soul.

The 2008-2009 academic year was no exception. But my ability to bounce back, to regain focus and peace, had become harder. Then it dawned on me. I needed to do something that seemed quite simple but would reframe my life experiences in my never-ending quest for teaching and learning through peaceful pedagogy. Dreadlocks! I would grow out my hair from its typical one-inch-all-around length and get dreadlocks. Visions of renunciation and a refreshing, stronger spiritual commitment ran through my mind. In this case, renunciation would mean letting go of preconceived notions associated with the roles of women and my identity as a teacher. It would be an opportunity to allow me to express myself differently. I knew that hair is an integral part of personal identity, and dreadlocks are not the norm for a professional, white woman. The implications of this idea started growing, along with my hair. I knew the decision was not to be taken lightly, and I eventually made the commitment to keep my dreadlocks for a year and document the experience.

Literature Review

Hair is one of the most critical aspects of our identity, perhaps our most powerful symbol of individual and group identity. It is physical, extremely personal, and private; at the same time it is public (Synnott, 1987). Our hair is one of the first things people notice about us. Hair and its place in society have been well researched from anthropological, sociological, historical, and religious perspectives. Historically, anthropologists have researched the value placed upon hair, particularly in initiation rights and marriage and mourning rituals (Malinowski, 1922; Frazer, 1935; Firth, 1936). Hair symbolism has been researched in Nigeria (Houlbert, 1979); Kenya (Cole, 1979); Brazil (Turner, 1969); Mali (Griaule, 1970); and in relation to Hindu Punjabis (Hershman, 1974), the Powhatan Indians of early Virginia (Williamson, 1979), and early Christians (Derrett, 1973). In these and other societies, the meaning attributed to hair and identity has far-reaching implications.

Cultural identity and hair are prominent in the mass media, prompting strong internalization of what is perceived as beauty (Schooler, Ward, Merriwether, & Caruthers, 2004; Monroe, Hankin, & Van Vechten, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Societal and cultural pressures intensify this perception. For example, in one study African American women rated their hair as more important than lip and nose appearance or skin color. European American women also rated their hair as more important than lip and nose appearance, while hair and skin color ratings did not vary significantly (Jefferson & Stake, 2009).

It is important to note that hair and its place in the beauty industry are also big business. The value of the salon hair industry is annually worth $60 billion in the United States alone (Research and Markets, 2008).

Both ancient and modern societies have embraced many different expressions of religious meaning through hair. These range from the shaven heads of Buddhist monks and
nuns, to the matted hair of Hindu ascetic sādhus and sādhvīs (“good men” and “good women” who have chosen to live as renunciants) (Flood, 1996), to the dreadlocks of the Rastafarians.

Hair also plays an important role in the Israelite tradition (Beckwith, 2007). Mourning was historically symbolized by shaving the beard. Orthodox Jewish men continue to be distinguished by their beards and payot. Orthodox women have their hair cropped when they marry, with the understanding that the faithful woman does not show her hair. This attitude is exemplified in another manner by some practicing Muslim women who wear a hijab, symbolizing the veil that separates man or the world from God (Glasse, 2001). Hair is a shared thread woven through all of these organized religions, demonstrating its essential value to humanity.

Locked hair, or dreadlocks, has been part of the history of nearly every spiritual system. From Christianity to Hinduism, locked hair has been a symbol of a highly spiritual person who is trying to come closer to god(s) or intrinsic peace. In the Rastafarian dialect, “dread” means a person who fears the Lord (Naba, 2007).

It is known that many Pharaohs had locked hair, and dreadlocks can still be found intact on Tutankhamun’s mummy. There is evidence that the Celts wore dreadlocks. Germanic tribes, the Greeks, people of the land called Nazareth, Pacific peoples, Naga Indians (known also as the Serpent People) all wore dreadlocks (PerfectDreadlocks.com, 2010). Dreadlocks are also worn in and by: Ethiopians, Bahatowie priests of the Amhara nation, Senegalese, Sudanese, several small sects of Islam, the Akorino of the Kikuyu nation, the Oromo Beja, the Bono of Techiman, Fitish priests, Somalis, the Galla, the Maasai, the Mau Mau, Tanzanians, Australian Aborigines, and New Guineans (Synnott, 1987).

As this brief overview shows, the history and research of hair have many possible directions. However, this paper examines the social impact of hair by focusing on one person’s experience with one particular aspect – the value hair has as an expression of renunciation and its resulting larger societal and professional effect. In this research, the power of hair as an expression of renunciation was used to bridge worlds. Because having dreadlocks holds different meanings for different people, new doors of opportunity to dialogue and work together were open or shut, depending upon personal biases, beliefs, knowledge, and experiences.

Study Context

This research was designed to take place in three distinct settings: (a) an urban K-5th grade public school and (b) a rural 3rd-5th grade public school as part of a course offered through the College of Education, and (c) a traditional university classroom. It is important to note that the research was not limited to these environments, and it ultimately had far-reaching daily implications.

The College of Education’s faculty demographics are: 0.0 percent American Indian, 6.6 percent Asian, 8.8 percent Black, 2.2 percent Hispanic, and 82.2 percent White. (From the college’s institutional report; discrepancy due to rounding error.) The college’s undergraduate candidate demographics are: 0.4 percent American Indian, 1.4 percent Asian, 3.0 percent Black, 2.0 percent Hispanic, 92.2 percent White, and 1.0 percent other (Collins, 2006). Most of the students are from Michigan.
As to the demographics of hair at the university, there are thirty-five hair salons concentrated around the main campus. One athletic director has braided hair, the closest style to dreadlocks on campus. Homogenous blonde highlights are currently very popular among men and women.

According to State Education Data Profiles (2000), the population of most public schools in Michigan is typically 75.5 percent White, 19 percent Black or African American, less than 1 percent American Indian/Alaska Native, less than 1 percent Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, less than 1 percent Hispanic, 1 percent Other Single Race, and 2 percent Two or More Races.

In comparison, the demographics of the urban school we were working with are approximately 81.9 percent Black or African American, 7.0 percent Hispanic, 3.6 percent White, 1.2 percent American Indian/Alaska Native, and 6.3 percent Multiracial. Approximately 97 percent of the school’s population qualifies for free and reduced lunch (SchoolMatters, 2010). The rural school’s demographics were 73.4 percent White, 13.1 percent Black or African American, 10.9 percent Hispanic, 1.6 percent Asian, and less than .8 percent American Indian/Alaska Native and .2 percent Multiracial. Approximately 39 percent of the student body is eligible for free and reduced lunch.

Of course, schools do not exist in a vacuum. The city and the surrounding county are known for their conservative nature and strong tendency toward Christian Fundamentalist beliefs. Until recently, on Sundays, many businesses were closed and it was seriously frowned upon to work, even around the house. Teachers are expected to be orthodox.

Within this context, the College of Education’s undergraduate students initially shared remarks acknowledging their uncertainties, particularly about the diversity of the urban school setting they were working and studying in:

“Nervous, have never been in such diverse school, didn’t know what to expect, unfamiliar surroundings.”

“I am a white girl who grew up in a city that would be considered middle to upper middle class. I was given the resources I needed to help me succeed.”

“Teaching in a diverse school was originally one of my fears in becoming an educator.”

I wanted to change this dynamic and become a role model that broke the orthodox molds. I wanted to challenge my students to recognize immediately their own diversity and their contributions to diversity – to be prepared to spend one semester totally immersed in understanding the importance of education and their responsibility for it, whether in an urban or rural setting. I wanted them to experience that there is no “safety net” for difference.

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework employed, narrative analysis, relies on stories as a way of knowing (Polkinghorne, 1995; Coulter & Smith, 2009). Experience is rendered to examine everyday comprehension and offer “a degree of interpretive space” (Barone, 2001b, p. 150).
The frame of narrative analysis is used to “question our values, prompt[ing] new imaginings of the ideal and the possible. It can even stir action against the conventional, the seemingly unquestionable, the tried and true” (Barone, 2001a, p. 736). Multiple interpretations by multiple readers are expected and promoted (Coulter & Smith, 2009). This type of critical pedagogy creates an emancipatory and democratic function for education and research so that marginalized voices can be heard (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 2003).

This study’s focus was on identity and the changing nature of human interaction. Three frameworks in narrative analysis were used to embrace the nuances this study produced: identity, agency, and social justice.

**Identity**
Identity was a central component of this study. It has been defined as a path to discover how relationships are developed within culture and community (Gee, Allen, & Clinton, 2001; Wortham, 2003a, b; Moore, 2007). Teacher identities – either those brought to the process of learning to teach or developed while learning to teach – form a foundation that influences action in the classroom (Merseth, Sommer, & Dickstein, 2008). As noted by Bullough, Knowles, and Crow (1992), “Teacher identity . . . is of vital concern to teacher education; it is the basis for meaning making and decision making . . . teacher education must begin, then, by exploring the teaching self ” (p. 21). In this narrative analysis, identity is a means to greater self-understanding and mutual empowerment through acceptance.

**Agency**
Agency is the ability to act with intention and purpose to promote movement toward social change. Inden (2000) provides a definition of human agency as:

> The realized capacity of people to act upon their world and not only to know about or give personal or intersubjective significance to it. That capacity is the power of people to act purposively and reflectively, in more or less complex interrelationships with one another, to reiterate and remake the world in which they live, in circumstances where they may consider different courses of action possible and desirable, though not necessarily from the same point of view. (p. 23)

Inden (2000) adds that “people do not act only as agents” but they also “have the capacity to act as ‘instruments’ of other agents, and to be ‘patients,’ to be recipients of the acts of others” (p. 23). Agency is also the conscious role we choose to play in helping to bring about social change for the collective benefit of all, especially those in lower hierarchical power or disadvantaged positions (Calabrese Barton, 1998). In this narrative analysis, agency was action-oriented with the goal of influencing positive change for my students and myself.

**Social Justice**
Social justice is action that supports the creation of learning environments for the success of all students (Tate, 2001). Strategies to teach about social justice have typically sprung from multicultural education, a method and theory for the instruction of social responsibility and justice in urban classrooms. Banks (2004) emphasizes the importance of
“personal, social, and civic action that will help make our nation more democratic and just” (p. viii). Social justice is an expanding field in education that encompasses topics such as sustainability, equitable educational opportunities, service learning, human rights, and peace education. For this narrative analysis, social justice was defined by the challenges that arise in promoting acceptance.

Using these three elements as the lens for this narrative analysis, the point of this work was to:

- Allow readers to determine meaning in their own fashion.
- Show the subjective experiences of the participants.
- Understand that knowledge is constructed.
- Empower people to go beyond judgments and begin to care.

**Process of Change**

As previously discussed, dreadlocks represent renunciation in one form or another. Issues associated with the process of renunciation that I undertook were amplified by the conservative environment in which I live and teach. Being a white female teacher with dreadlocks changed not only my self-perception, but also significantly changed how people related to and with me.

**Ethical Considerations**

For this undertaking, I needed the support of my family. My partner had to be assured that my hair would be clean (i.e., no bugs in bed). Also, one of my daughters was going to the same university, and I did not want to alienate her. Both embraced the idea, with my daughter leading the charge and searching out friends to do the deed. My other daughters supported the idea while questioning its ultimate impact and its potential for further wear and tear on my soul. When I knew my family was behind me, I prepared myself— not only by growing my hair out, but also by facing the renunciation I was seeking, the resulting change in my image, and my responsibility for that change.

**Transformation**

Being a “wash and wear,” short-hair person, I found the process of acquiring dreadlocks quite staggering. First, the equipment had to be purchased. I found myself in hair aisles and beauty shops looking for some items that eventually had to be special ordered. I quickly discovered that I was devoting more time to hair goods than I ever had before, even with four daughters. Renunciation was taking on an entirely new meaning!

Finally, I had everything and my hairdresser got to work. She proceeded to section, back comb, wax, roll, and band beginning dreads with enough hair to be about the thickness of a #2 pencil. I did my best to sit still for three hours, taking very short breaks along the way. The result was roughly fifty-five dreads, spiking out in all directions. Looking in the mirror was almost a scary sight. My hairdresser reassured me that they would calm down over time.

Learning to live with tiny dreadlocks was another challenge. Sitting up was all right, but leaning back in a chair and lying down were lumpy experiences. Cuddling was an art that had to
be learned; I couldn’t move in too fast because my partner would get stabbed. It was a lot of work for renunciation. Although I knew they typically had long hair, I could not imagine sādhus and sādhvīs doing this in their practice. The maintenance was way beyond what I expected.

Findings

Teetering into the World

After I had the dreadlocks put in, it was easy to continue on with my daily routine because I was on break between academic terms. My time was spent getting caught up with everything that had been put on hold while I had been finishing a busy term. Life continued at home until the time came to re-enter the public domain with front-row seats at a university symphony concert. I dressed in appropriate evening clothes and then realized I wanted to do something with my untamed hair, still sticking out in multiple directions. Wrapping my head in a scarf commandeered from my daughter’s closet, with tentacles pushing their way out, it was off to the symphony.

I had my partner sit on the inside. I was sure that anyone coming in would sit next to her; she could engage them in conversation, and I could sit quietly to the side. A few moments before the beginning of the show, the university president and his wife walked in and chose to sit right next to me!

The president’s wife immediately began conversing with me about my family and who I was. Then my mentor – a senior faculty member who is a full professor and an extremely astute and frank individual – came in and sat next to the president. “Ah,” she said to me, “I like your scarf. You look wonderful.”

Adventures in the Wilderness

Shortly after this, we set off on a 10-day adventure to the Boundary Waters in Northern Minnesota. The outdoors has always been a refuge for me. Nature has a way of healing and supporting me. I can unwind, let go, and find peace once again. We were going camping and planned to spend our time kayaking, fishing, and relaxing surrounded by magnificent beauty.

As we drove, I would often forget how my hair looked until I stepped out of the car. Then the gas stations and rest areas became an opportunity to grow and remember my social responsibility to change negative attitudes. Initially, it was hard work. I found myself reacting to those who reacted to me. I wondered what people were staring at and would grimace back at them. The last stop before our destination was one of the hardest. The convenience store was packed with people, who seemed to stare and move away as if on cue.

This work did not lessen in the great outdoors; it simply changed. We were camping with friends from my professional life. One person commented that she liked my hair. Another wanted to know if it was just for the camping trip and appeared disgruntled when I told her it was for a year. In retrospect, I remembered that she has a biracial family. I wondered if she felt I was treading into an area that was “reserved.” (This thought was reinforced by a senior faculty member who, after my hair was cut, commented that some faculty members did not approve of my dreadlocks – that it was an African-American expression not to be used by white people.)

Walking into Ely, Minnesota, for a day on the town brought other opportunities to grow. I didn’t know it at the time, but Ely had been going through a difficult time reconciling its role as
a tourist town. The economy flourishes at the expense of the peaceful flow of isolated, small-town living. Several incidents had occurred that had compromised the village’s safety, so tourists weren’t welcomed by everyone.

Walking down the main street and ambling in and out of small shops generated a wide variety of reactions. Some shop owners ignored my hair and were very helpful. Some people wanted to touch it. Others had stories of shared dreadlocks experiences:

“I once had braids while I was living in Mexico. Cut ‘em off though, too hard to wash.”

“My son wanted dreadlocks and I helped him. He wore them for some time.”

At one point, a man and a woman stepped out of a bar as we were passing by. The woman shrieked and ran up to me, welcoming me to Ely. Before I knew it, she planted a hard kiss on my neck while talking about where was I from. “Oh, Michigan,” she said, “you must be from the Upper Peninsula!”

As I visited the town intermittently throughout our stay, I had many opportunities for interactions – from as simple as a smile to shopping and eating at restaurants. I eventually became a familiar figure, blending into the scenery of the village. My peace was emerging. The eagles, loons, and quiet waters beckoned me, allowing me to drop my defenses and breathe deeply of the surrounding serenity. At the time, I was not quite aware of the depth of the transformative process this Boundary Waters trip gave me. But when it was over, I knew that I was renewed.

**Family Reunion**

A family reunion, to take place that year, had been planned for some time. Family members were coming from California, Alabama, Wyoming, southern Kentucky, Indiana, and Michigan. My mother, very accustomed to my free spirit, simply looked at me and said, “Tell me when you want to cut them off and I will give you the name of my hairdresser.” My mother-in-law knows me as a diligent and hard worker, a soft-spoken homebody. Shaking hands, she cringed as she looked at me and let me know that she did not want any pictures of me with dreadlocks. Her sister touched my hair, interested in the process. The California cousins were relaxed; one told me about his dreadlock experiences. Finally, everyone got over their initial discomfort. I was the same person, just with a different hair style. Who I was, what I did, and how I related to them was far more important than my hair. I even ended up in a picture standing next to my mother-in-law.

**Professional Identities at School (The Elephant in the Room)**

*Graduate students.* Stepping into the spring and summer terms at school meant teaching graduate classes comprised mostly of primary and secondary education teachers. The courses were full, with thirty students each. Offered on weekends (Friday night and all day Saturday), the courses started toward the end of the teachers’ school year, and fatigue was in the air. Spring and summer term courses last for only six weeks at the university, so it was difficult to establish a classroom environment that had a strong sense of community and collaboration. Also, I mainly saw students and had few interactions with other faculty or staff.
I had already determined that I would go into my teaching that year with extra confidence and professionalism. I punctuated this by being very well dressed, with crisply pressed shirts and slacks. While not trying to offset my dreadlocks, I was attempting to reach my students where they were and walk with them into a classroom environment of acceptance, safety, and community.

Graduate classes typically fill up with multiple requests for closed class permits and the first class is mainly spent going over the syllabus. So it was surprising how many students dropped my classes after the first session in the spring and summer terms.

This was the only indication I had that might have been a reaction to my hair because very few students commented on it. Those who did resonated with my message of renunciation or shared some alternative, life-changing event. In fact, it was remarkable how a few students quickly found their voice in the class and spoke up. They added depth to our discussions, often countering with a different perspective than that held by most of the class members. I attributed this to the classroom community I established by being “different.”

It is difficult to generalize across other higher education settings because I have only taught at this university. However, there seems to be a pattern in classroom demeanor. If the majority of the students hold a conservative viewpoint, they politely wait until someone speaks up in opposition. Then they rush to disprove or minimize the minority perspective. I had not been conscious of this pattern. People did not immediately engage with differences, but responded with a polite deference characteristic of the local culture.

Chair of faculty. This was my first year as chair of the College of Education faculty. The position required that I navigate multiple personalities, some more fragile than others, and get business done. And that business was vast: a major reorganization into two units; institutional climate work; the hiring of personnel; accreditation; facility needs; technology workshops; and curricular, personnel, and university committee accountabilities. As I stepped into a local country club for a meeting, some of my colleagues stared. I could hear people gasp when I passed by, and there was abundant nervous laughter. When they had last seen me I had worn short hair, which I was obviously growing out.

The common sentiment was to not talk about my dreadlocks, but they became an elephant in the room. Later, I found out that my dreadlocks had been the topic of many a conversation behind closed doors and within groups of like-minded individuals. This silence actually afforded me a reprieve. My days were full and very busy. I soon became absorbed in the academic year and maintained a solid professionalism that was marked by conscious efforts to listen, care, and be present to my colleagues.

Undergraduate students. My teaching assignments that fall term included three sections of the undergraduate course, Diversity in Education. This course is a prerequisite for entrance into the College of Education and it also fulfills a general education requirement, so it is always full (thirty students). I taught two sections off site in schools that are part of the county’s school services network that serves homeless youth. The third section was in a classroom on my university’s campus, a stable environment where everything worked well, technology was available and dependable, and there were no “surprises” like fire drills and fights.

Undergraduates - rural environment. (All names have been changed.) One of the off-site environments, Maple Tree Elementary School (MTES), is located in farm country. I had taught undergraduate classes there for the previous two years. However, the school had recently gone
through vast demographic changes in the student body. A large apartment complex had been built, coded for low-income families. Most of the teaching staff employed there clearly stated, “I did not sign up to teach those students and work with those families.”

I taught one year at MTES with my dreadlocks. The class in the fall term met in the library. The class in the winter term met “closeted” in the teacher’s lounge amidst salt and pepper shakers and too many crumbs and spills left on the table.

At the beginning of the fall term Ms. Wall, one of the secretaries, greeted me and commented, “So you got dreadlocks.” That was the only comment I heard. But the majority of school’s teachers did not look me in the eye, and they barely spoke even when I cheerily greeted them. On one occasion I rounded a corner too fast, almost bumping into Ms. Geddings’s class as they were walking down the hall. “Good morning,” I said to many young fifth-grade students. A few students turned and stared, two smiled and nodded. Ms. Geddings rushed forward from the back of the line and, holding out her arms, she moved them to the wall, leaving me standing by myself in the middle of the hall. Only one teacher would share his overhead projector with me, and that took considerable effort to use and then return to his classroom.

My undergraduate students’ behavior at MTES was at one of two extremes of a continuum throughout the year. Half of the class spoke up, engaged in our work, was on time and attended consistently, dressed appropriately, worked well with their assigned students, and sat close to me. It was interesting to note that one of my students had started to put dreadlocks in her hair. We spoke about the process, and this helped to create an amicable atmosphere for half of the class.

The other half of the class that was often late, inconsistent in their attendance, engaged in sidebar conversations, dressed inappropriately, strayed off task, and sat as far away from me as possible. In fact, one of the students threw a book at me. When I asked him to leave, he left the room but not the school until the school’s security officer escorted him out.

I breathed a sigh of relief when the course was over at that site. The discrepancies in the students’ quality of the work were profound. This had been a first. I had never taught such a polarized class before, and no effort I could muster changed that dynamic. I do not know how much, if any, of that dynamic had to do with my dreadlocks.

Undergraduates - urban environment. My other off-site section of Diversity in Education was held at Go Arts Academy (GAA), located in a major city’s downtown area. I had been teaching undergraduate students out of the media center there for three years. My dreadlocks became topic number one. The secretary, nurse, teachers, and K-5 students had something to ask or say about my hair. One teacher, Ms. Frank, led the pack with, “Oh, you actually did do that to your hair!” Another teacher, Ms. Ernest, was more interested in the process: “My sister-in-law says they are hard to take care of; is that true?” A student I passed in the hallway asked, “Is that your real hair?” My dreadlocks opened opportunities to relate with one another in vastly different ways about diverse subjects and commonly held concerns about education and students.

The operating heart of GAA is the office – a tight ship run by Ms. Bliss, an extraordinary secretary, and Ms. Steadfast, a nurse who can multi-task like none other. The year with my dreadlocks, I noticed some subtle changes in our relationships. I learned more about Ms. Steadfast’s family and their amazing story of immigration from Mexico. Actions changed as
well, with more shared accountability. Ms. Bliss popped the lock on one of my student’s cars to retrieve the keys, and she assisted the mailman who helped with another of my student’s cars. She would help me with the Academy’s teachers when there was a problem. One day I walked into the office and Ms. Bliss was giving Annie, the science puppet that was on loan, braids. Ms. Bliss also came into the office wearing different wigs, a practice I had never seen her do before.

This openness spread throughout the school. Ms. Tome, the librarian, asked me for guidance about completing her schooling. A teacher whose class we had not been invited to mentor in volunteered to help me with a television interview about my work at GAA. More and more teachers requested that my students assist in their classes and participate in events like Black History Month programs.

*Undergraduates - university classroom.* My university-based on-site section of the course was successful. As usual, I worked very hard to create an open classroom community, where the students share their responsibility for learning, work hard to communicate respectfully and clearly, and create meaning in the process. Halfway through the semester I was asked about my hair, which prompted wonderful learning opportunities. Students opened up even more and shared profound experiences with prejudice and stereotyping. There were tears, anger, and laughter. Students moved away from one another, but toward eventual reconciliation. The course took on a life of its own, moving through the required curriculum but in a fashion I had never experienced.

One measure of the success of this section was based upon student evaluations; comments were positive with very little variance.

“This course did a great job of addressing diverse groups.”

“I thought the course was very inclusive of all types of people and the professor took great care in making sure that everyone’s voice was heard (of those who were willing to contribute).”

“This course in its entirety was very beneficial to my future career.”

*Undergraduates - service.* Students from all three of my Diversity in Education course sections worked together to raise money to run a mobile food pantry from the local branch of a national food bank. They helped to distribute 5,000 pounds of food on a Saturday morning.

The dynamics were fascinating. The students from Go Arts Academy had gelled as a class. They wanted to know what the food drive was about and how to create one in their schools. They showed up early and left late. These students truly understood that they were getting as much out of the experience as they were giving. However, some of the undergraduate students from the MTES section actually took food they should have been distributing and left early. The majority of the on-site (i.e., university-based) students had a hard time grasping the concept that they were not knights in shining armor coming to the rescue, but were participants sharing in the giving and receiving process.

At one point that day a young man with dreadlocks who was waiting in line for food asked me what hair products I used. We talked for some time about dreadlocks, the state of the economy, job opportunities, and school. A few of my students simply stared at us as we conversed. The driver of the truck appeared incredulous when he asked who was in charge. He
could not look at me and had trouble handing me the pen to sign for the receipt.

**Out in the Community**

Some of my most profound experiences while I wore dreadlocks were interactions outside of school. I have interacted with airport baggage handlers before, but never like this. In one case, I was late picking up my luggage at the Tampa, Florida, airport. When I finally made my way to the claims area, luggage was being stacked on a large cart to be removed for later claim. As I approached, a baggage handler turned to one of his coworkers and stated that he knew which bag was mine. They laughed as he pulled a bag out of the middle of the pile. It was nothing special, a black rolling suitcase, but sure enough it was mine. I smiled and thanked him, and he smiled back and thanked me. It was one of those inexplicable events, those surprises along the way that keep life fresh and simple.

Then there is my local meat market. I live out in the country, and the meat market carries amazing hot cheese and steaks. When I was first there several years ago, I was greeted by a robust woman behind the counter who told me if I needed help to just ask for her, JLo. (Her name is Jennifer Lopez.) There are many other workers there, including the owner’s wife, but I would always wait for JLo to help me. We even exchanged annual Christmas cards. Then one year she told me that she was going to leave her job to develop her own greeting card business.

While I was happy for her, the meat market was never the same for me. On one particular day, when I walked in with my signature sunglasses and dreadlocks, I wondered if I would ever go back. People glared at me, frowning and turning their backs. I was patient and waited beyond my turn to make my purchases, which were thrown across the counter at me. As I left, I heard the conversation turn ugly. People muttered about “who we serve at this store.” The door was pulled shut in my face by an incoming male customer. I quickly jumped into my car, and I haven’t been back since.

The workers of urban society seemed to resonate with me in my dreadlocks the most. When they found out I was a teacher and then—if pressed further—a university associate professor, I became a champion. Firehouse workers left their lunches to help me find my way to a town hall (one of them had an amazing mohawk). Some restaurant servers would smile and go out of their way to make sure my meal was what I wanted. The clerical staff at my financial planning firm and parking lot attendants were eager to help and converse about hair. Musicians, artists, car dealer service employees, and others would come up to me to introduce themselves and find out why I had dreadlocks.

After six months with dreadlocks, I became more comfortable with myself and no longer was caught off guard by furrowed brows, stares, and comments. In fact, I did not see the difference anymore. The dreadlocks had become part of who I was, and others’ reactions had become a part of who they were. I was putting out positive energy, acting with compassion and clear intentions, and was happy knowing who I was.

**Conclusions**

The lessons I learned through this experience were staggering. People saw my dreadlocks before they saw me. Preconceived notions often arose about who a person with
dreadlocks is. In several incidents, I took it upon myself to change those preconceived notions with a smile, an offer of assistance, or a sincere inquiry about how they were doing and how their day was going. My dreadlocks became a journey with a definite beginning, defining a point of change in my life. They provided me with an opportunity to start fresh, realizing that now is the best time to seek out goals, put dreams into action, and look at life from a different perspective.

Renunciation

This journey was one of renunciation. However, it was not my predetermined notion of renunciation. I was reminded of my experiences in India, 30 years ago when I was in my mid-twenties, learning over the course of time that life there has its own flow and rhythm. Wise American travelers know better than to attempt to replicate their U.S. lifestyle. There would be no point to it, and invaluable experiences would be lost. The same is true with the concept of renunciation.

The practice of living in India as a nun or sādhvī looks incredibly different when relocated to America. Americans do not support faith practitioners by giving alms in rice bowls and offering places of honor to monks or nuns. We do not regularly give up our seats on a bus or plane to a renunciate. We do not often open our homes to feed and shelter renunciates. We do not frequently leave restaurants and give up our meals to faith practitioners. Daily practice is different because our culture is different.

I did not realize at first that the very act of putting my hair in dreadlocks was an act of renunciation. Throughout the year, I had moments of wanting my hair to look “nice,” wanting my dreadlocks to be well formed when they were actually growing together and losing their shape. I knew that renunciates would not have this superficial vanity when their practice included wearing dreadlocks. But this was a very new reality for me. I had always lived with the belief that if my hair could not be washed and easily towel dried, then it was time for a haircut. Now I know that putting my hair in dreadlocks was, indeed, an act of renunciation, no matter how they looked.

Identity and Diversity

Identity became an underlying theme of my experience. People resonated with me positively or negatively based upon my initial appearance. This happened every day. Comparisons were made based upon how similar I was to them – either in appearance or in fundamental attitudes others thought I held because I sported dreadlocks. I understand more clearly now that this continues to happen every day, where our initial experience as an individual based on personal characteristics (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation, appearance, weight) is dominated by preconceived notions. We very quickly draw conclusions about who we are, who “they” are, and who we choose to relate to or shut out.

This was very interesting for me to note. In my classes I emphasize repeatedly that we are all diverse. If we cannot recognize this basic fact, then we will be hard pressed to understand or be open to understand another’s diversity and life experiences. We will teach from behind a closed door, unable to see who we are, who our students are, and who we can become together.
The work continues, with or without dreadlocks. One of my students recently came up to me, armed with a Bible and prepared to have a battle of words about gay marriage. He told me that he feels it is not right. I replied by saying that I understood his perspective and that it can be right for him and not right for someone else.

As educators it is imperative to maintain an open perspective to everyone we come in contact with, particularly students and their families. I believe that if we cannot do that, we should choose another profession. The importance of embracing diversity on so many different levels – from the personal, to the political, to the global – became a powerful lesson I learned.

When I cut my dreadlocks off, I knew I would miss them. But I wanted the freedom to swim, easily wash my hair, have my hats fit, and not spend extra time grooming my hair – yes, ultimately to go back to my “wash and wear” comfort zone. But I longingly look at others’ dreadlocks now with a different appreciation.

**Peace Education**

I entered into this experiment from a personal perspective — to refresh my soul, to enhance my teaching as a peace student, and to strengthen my work as a dedicated peace researcher and scholar. I have cared deeply for years; that was all too clear. What I have often overlooked, however, was the component of social justice and how both caring and social justice are involved in the pedagogy of peace.

There are moments when peaceful pedagogy can be an individual pursuit. However, living my professional life in front of faculty, students, and friends during this experiment taught me that it was not the time for an individual reflective quest. As a teacher and an agent of change, one of my hardest responsibilities was to be open, particularly to the behavior of other people. It was essential to be compassionate and move my thoughts, feelings, and actions toward greater responsibility. Sporting my dreadlocks, I began to see how social justice and caring meant, in part, creating a safe environment for learning in which genuine acceptance and change could occur.

Peace education calls us to be open to move beyond our assumptions. Although it was not my original intention, my dreadlocks opened up possibilities for my students and others to embrace their differences. Inside and outside the classroom, they could choose to open up dialogue around differences and become more comfortable in their own skin. This was not easy. At times, we had to realize that change might not be possible at that moment, regroup, and come at an issue again. But, in the end, all of our experiences fed the development of peaceful pedagogy.

**The Journey Continues**

My “dreaded” identity still follows me. Students from that year have visited me. They tell me they are sad to see the dreadlocks gone because “They suited you so well.” Other students have enrolled in my class and state, “My friend told me you had dreads.” They seem sorry that they missed seeing the infamous dreadlocks. One day, as I was getting on the elevator at work, one of my acquaintances from the public television station in the same building saw me. She whipped off her hat with a broad gesture and a huge smile to reveal her closely-shaven hair.
We are no longer at MTES. When I went there (without dreadlocks) to set up my class, I was told that they no longer belonged to the county’s schools services network that serves homeless youth. I thanked them all for having us in their school.

At GAA we have the privilege to continue to learn and grow together. The other day I was walking down the halls, checking on my students and their mentees. One of the cognitively impaired mentees looked at me, pointed, and said, “That was my teacher last year; she had braids.” My student took it in stride, not reacting, and the young woman repeated, “She had braids.” I walked over to her and said, “Yes, you are right. I did have braids.” She smiled and went about her work.

The lessons I have learned revolve around confidence, peace, and strength — professionally, personally, and in myself as a whole being. It is not easy being different, even though we are all so vastly different from one another. It is not easy having your differences be so public and available for people to see. I discovered that when I let my differences shine through, rather than masking them, I also allow hidden similarities to take center stage. This was shown to me over and over again by the diverse people who reacted positively to my renunciation; I might not have had the pleasure of sharing in our similarities without my dreadlocks.

We must embrace our differences as unique and wonderful expressions of identity, and build upon this concept so we can teach and learn from one another. The complexity of education is growing rapidly. We are responsible to one another as teachers and students, to understand the challenge of learning as it relates to who we are and our individual experiences. It is imperative that we let go of set ways and engage in the hard work it takes to remain open. That is the heart of true teaching, because we have so much to learn from each other.

My dreadlocks are gone. However, the spirit of renunciation is still present. It is a fire within me demanding that I look at my own practices and limitations. It insists that my students understand how important and how vast their future role is as an educator, regardless of whether or not they enter the teaching profession. By locking out my hair, I locked myself out of the comfortable safety of being a university professor. I challenged myself and those around me to see differences, similarities, and caring in a whole new light.

References


The Use of Humor in the Conflict Resolution Classroom

Andria Wisler

Abstract

This paper explores the roles of humor in teaching and learning conflict resolution in an undergraduate, trans-disciplinary program. Anecdotal and documented research specific to humor in higher education is presented. A review of the literature on the functions of humor that have implications for the conflict resolution classroom follows. Uses of humor are presented in light of the course’s objectives to build of culture of learning through intentional peace-building in the classroom community and to “look” and “see” conflict in new ways. Based on the author’s role as the educator, conclusions are considered regarding humor in the conflict resolution classroom.

What is it like for people not to have the same sense of humour? They do not react properly to each other. It’s as though there were a custom amongst certain people for one person to throw another a ball which he is supposed to catch and throw back; but some people, instead of throwing it back, put it in their pocket.
– Ludwig Wittgenstein

Throughout my experience in college, I have found that no force can bring a class together like humor. – Jacob, senior

Introduction

This article explores the potential uses of humor for teaching and learning within higher education conflict resolution courses. I consider humor in syllabi content and as pedagogical interaction or, in other words, humor as the “what” and the “how” of the classroom. Through my current position as a professor in a university program on justice and peace and my previous teaching positions, I have been teaching semester-long undergraduate courses in conflict resolution and transformation for six years. These courses are notably transdisciplinary and tend to have first year to senior students of a wide variety of majors. Humor is considered in light of two of the courses’ objectives: first, to build a culture of learning through intentional peacebuilding in the classroom community; and second, to “look” and “see” conflict in new ways through alternative means, as encouraged by John Paul Lederach (2003). To begin, I present anecdotal and documented research on the use of humor in undergraduate education settings. Following, I review the literature on the functions of humor that have implications for the conflict resolution classroom while simultaneously inviting the reader into my own. I use Graeme Dunphy and Rainer Emig’s (2009) identification of humor as “a complex structure of

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dialogue, conflict, and sometimes resolution” to structure my observations (p. 23). As a methodological note, the data of students’ sentiments are derived from classroom discussions and blog threads on humor at the university, and short reflections on humor in the classroom that twenty of my former students, whose names are pseudonyms, shared with me upon request.

**Humor in College Teaching**

Scholar practitioners recognize humor as a tool that can thwart some of the obstacles of university teaching, such as students finding course material boring or difficult, or student anxiety produced by competition, the fear of making mistakes, or the seriousness of the classroom (Berk, 1996; Çelik, 2004). Ronald Berk (1996) has documented his intentional use of humor in his statistics courses at Johns Hopkins University, from witty phrasings in the syllabus, to teasers on exams, to full-scale comedic dramatizations during class sessions. He evaluated his use of humor in relation to students’ overall learning and found that his ten strategies for humor consistently scored *effective to very effective* for learning across a sample of 316 students. Other educational research presents the effective uses of humor in courses on library instruction (Walker, 2006), economics (Deiter, 2000), linguistics and language learning (Deneire, 1995), as well as in the counseling of certain demographics of undergraduates (Vereen et al, 2006). Mehmet Çelik (2004) reflects on using humor to teach English to college students in Turkey, and suggests that humor helps students to realize that the session topic has relevance for their realities and to sense that they already have a background in it; in turn, this understanding positively affects variables of motivation, self-confidence, and classroom atmosphere and builds upon the relationship between positive attitude and successful learning.

In line with Berk (1996) and Çelik (2004), my student Therese suggests that students “need” humor because it “breaks the monotony and allows them to refocus. Humor...better engrain[s] information into the mind[s] of the students, because students will then associate the information with a memorable classroom experience.” Several students lamented what they felt was the abnormal absence of humor in their classes, in light of humor’s pervasive presence throughout the rest of their lives. Through their observation, they confirm Harvey Mindess’ notion that while people experience many tragic events in their lives, they encounter just as many that are humorous and lighthearted (1976, cited in Vereen et al, 2006). Their observation also gives credence to the generally accepted assumption that humor is a universal phenomenon that manifests itself in all cultures around the world (Martin, 2007; Critchley, 2002). The classroom culture, my students argue, need not be exempt from that.

Berk (as described in Bartlett, 2003) and Ron Dieter (2000), among others (Tamblyn, 2003), appreciate that most professors do use some form of humor in their courses, typically through a random witty one-liner, even though few have what is sometimes called comedic or “humor competence” (Norick and Chiaro, 2009). Yet, while they advocate for a more systematic and intentional use of humor through all aspects of the course design and delivery, these reflective practitioners advise against the planned joke, especially at the beginning of a lecture. They recommend that humor not be forced, but natural. It was on this distinction that several students had opinions and noted their appreciation for humor that proceeds organically, rather than humor that is contrived by the professor to force a connection or relationship with his/her
students. Therese wrote: “if the professor does it [use humor] in order to seem more relatable, the students can tell...[and] feel the teacher lacks professionalism.” Citing what he calls the “stiffness” in most college lecture environments, Tommy suggested that organic humor helps him to realize that “professors are people just like us that happen to know much more in a particular field. They are no different or less human than we are.” Jessy supported Tommy’s perspective and noted that her professor’s blunt, slightly self-deprecating humor disrupted the dichotomy of the teacher and student in the classroom. She wrote: “She wasn’t some all-powerful, faultless teacher who could do no wrong – or thought so. She was just a teacher.” To situate this theoretically, Simon Critchley (2002) recognizes humor as “a form of liberation or elevation” that gets at “the humanity of the human” (p.9). (Jessy was also reminded of an art history professor who told students jokes about artists’ criminal or romantic pasts in order to keep students from revering them as gods and awed geniuses.)

Tommy argued further that a professor’s use of humor is evidence of her energy for teaching and that students would want to “be ... better” in respect of the professor’s obvious investment in the course. Kelli continued that point and offered that my use of humor in our fall 2009 course emphasized to her that I understood students’ interests and views. She was specifically referring to our use of the episode called “Conflict Resolution” of the popular TV sitcom “The Office.” Kelli shared that this use of humor “confirmed [the professor’s] ability to cater the information [on the pitfalls of conflict resolution]...in a pertinent and appealing way.”

My students’ reflections generated two important points about humor in higher education not found in my review of the literature. First, Therese built on her earlier comment about a perceived lack of professionalism of the professor who forces a connection with his students through humor; she disclosed that many of her teaching assistants (TAs) “mock the professor in order to better connect with the students.” She described this as “incredibly disrespectful” and uncomfortable for the learning environment. Second, a few students recognized that the “funny guy” is in fact almost always a “he” – whether that be a male student or professor. Melinda noted, “I know that personally as a female I am afraid to put myself out there with a comment that may be funny but could come off wrong.” Thus, the use of humor, though generally appreciated by students regardless of gender, was quite gendered in itself.

**Humor in the Conflict Resolution Classroom**

Melinda’s comment is congruent with Abi’s over-arching analysis that “humor as a tool of classroom learning has the potential for great things but also the danger of undermining the real issue at hand” and leads me to analyze the implications of humor specifically for the conflict resolution classroom. I find resonance here with the foundation of Dunphy and Emig’s (2009) edited volume, *Hybrid Humour*, that is, in contemporary postcolonial theories “that show humour...as a complex structure of dialogue, conflict, and sometimes resolution” (p. 23). The humor in the classroom is not entirely pre-fabricated; it is a dynamic process that is affected by the comic cultures of the students and professor who have come together to learn. This framework – humor as a structure of dialogue, conflict, and resolution – organizes the remainder of this article.
Humor as a Structure of Dialogue

Humor manifests itself as a structure of dialogue in several ways in the conflict resolution classroom. First, the use of humor – for example, telling jokes or being witty – is simply another form of contextualized communication which students, future peace and conflict workers, must have practice deciphering. Students introduced to the basics of communication in mediation and negotiation learn that conflict parties can use humor to downplay emotion or the seriousness of a conflict and to avoid the issues that the intervention seeks to transform. Serenah noted that she actually learned about this human tendency through analysis of her own conflict with a roommate that she shared with a dialogue partner during a nonviolent communication workshop as part of a conflict transformation course. She states:

I found myself using humor to downplay my feelings about the conflict. In reality, this disagreement had been really very troubling to me. I found myself hiding behind my own humor, and am not sure that I then reaped the full benefits of the exercise as a result.

Further, Maureen pointed out that students use humor as part of their communicative toolbox to downplay what they say and thus preemptively shield themselves from anticipated criticism. This is more likely to occur in a conflict resolution course where subject matter can be sensitive and personal. In a similar vein, I recall a moment during a discussion on the “The danger of a single story” on the first day of class (Adichie, 2009). Casey’s “stereotypical self-depiction” of being a Jewish girl from New York City who had “taken care of her nose,” whose father was a dentist, and whose mother dialed for take-out every night received a great laugh from her classmates. Through this hyper-self-identification, she offered “a way to pre-empt the passive acceptance” of such a stereotype were it to arise in the classroom (Dunphy and Emig, p. 31).

Yet, it is this very use of humor as dialogue in the micro-context of the conflict resolution classroom that has helped several students get through these sessions, or what Kelli called “an overwhelming sense of tragedy,...[as] much of the subject matter of justice and peace studies focuses [on] the harshness [of] reality: war atrocities, human rights violations and overall oppression.” On the first day of the Conflict Transformation course, I show clips from various television shows and films such as “This American Life,” “The Nanny Diaries,” or “The Office,” as previously mentioned. From my observation, it appears easier for an apprehensive student to talk about the conflicts present in these clips on the first day of class than to insinuate to her peers that she might have something inspired to state about a theoretical reading or a globally significant conflict. In this way, humor acts as a dialogical conversation starter. One student noted that this particular exercise was an effective way to break the ice between the teacher and the student, whereas several noted that it set a tone, as modeled by me, for a classroom community that was open, engaged, and comfortable. Thankfully, Simon noted that this incorporated humor was critical for his understanding of the course content too, as it:

exemplified the importance of transforming a conflict instead of “resolving it” for the sake of putting an end to it...The clip showed us a couple of the traps and
mistakes we should avoid as practitioners: acting before understanding the conflict, individualism instead of cooperation, and lack of dialogue.

During that same first class session of the Conflict Transformation course, we look jokingly at this loaded term “transformation,” which has recently pervaded pop-culture. We distinguish it in various forms: from politicians transforming into ballroom dancers, to Oprah’s head to toe make-over transformations, to how whole neighborhoods are magically transformed by newly constructed McMansions in no less than two hours. From this starting point, students more comfortably assess the deeper, more significant theoretical nuances of transition, social change, and transformation.

Humor as a Structure of Conflict

Humor as a structure of conflict in the conflict resolution classroom is almost frighteningly easy to incorporate organically, based on the inherent friction that thrives on densely populated college campuses. Conflict is something that a community of learners opens itself up to once the foundation for an honest dialogue is established. While role-plays are beneficial – and can often be quite humorous – engaging in dialogue about conflict shared among the students can also be a provocative pedagogical choice. In my case, one of my classes explored the consequences of humor through the purported comedic satire in an “April Fool’s Day” edition of the campus newspaper. This educational moment offered a real instance of humor and conflict colliding in the students’ lives and gave them the opportunity to literally become their own case study among our myriad of examples, such as the “cartoons that shook the world” in 2005 (Klausen, 2009). For many students, the newspaper abused both humor and power: by pinpointing victims of sexual assault on campus and naming particular minority groups, it did not meet Critchley’s (2002) directive that “true humor” “not wound a specific victim” (p. 11, 14). Many felt that it was humor that confirmed an unspoken, normalized status quo and denigrated certain individuals and groups on campus; “such humor is not laughter at power, but the powerful laughing at the powerless” (Critchley, 2002, p. 12). For other students, it was an artistic use of satire, privileged by the first amendment. The class discussions and blog explored how the newspaper’s humor explicated the inherent hybridity, diversity, and patterns of change within one culture (in this case, the campus culture) but how quickly the humorous violation of perceived norms can lead to outsider status, as the newspaper was quickly disciplined for its actions. Students debated the newspaper’s straightforward claim that satire is an acceptable form of giving and getting news. Thus, a surprising outcome of these class discussions was my own realization that many students get what they consider “some of their news” from comedy shows such as The Colbert Report with Stephen Colbert and The Daily Show hosted by Jon Stewart. One student shared that, after that semester of the Conflict Transformation course, she can now better discern “the news” through entertainment and understand the time and intellectual artistry needed to create effective satire.
Humor as a Structure of Resolution

This leads to the third tier of this adopted framework: humor as a structure of resolution in the conflict resolution classroom. As mentioned earlier in regards to humor and higher education in general, humor acts to resolve the division between the teacher and student, or what is perceived by Jessy as the polarizing conflict of “the teacher versus the student.... Humor seems to bring us all to the same level in the same classroom on the same side, and that makes the teacher human if not approachable.” The classroom space models how humor can be used to break down dichotomies, one of the first and necessary steps towards social transformation (Freire, 1970). According to Morreall (2008, cited in Capps et al, 2009), “humor can foster analytic, critical, and divergent thinking...and promote risk taking” (p. xiv). These skills and capacities align with the call for creativity in conflict transformation by Johan Galtung (1999). Galtung stresses the importance of eliciting joint creativity from all conflict parties in order to find multiple ways of transcending the incompatibilities fueling the conflict. In Galtung’s prescription, creativity prevents conflict workers from becoming entrenched in the analysis of the conflict. He stresses that the transcending answer is typically external to the conflict, in a new reality waiting to be visualized and actualized, and not from within the details of the conflict itself. That petition for creativity is similarly heeded in humor studies:

humour both reveals the situation, and indicates how that situation might be changed....“true” humour changes the situation, tells us something about who we are and the sort of place we live in, and perhaps indicates to us how that situation might be changed. (Critchley, 2002, p. 16, 11).

If humor indeed fosters creativity, we will be able to “see the familiar defamiliarized, the ordinary made extra-ordinary, and the real rendered surreal” (Critchley, 2002, p. 10), or as my student Kelli simply states, “to see old things in a new way.” Thus, in turn, resolution is nurtured. The most popular case study among my conflict resolution students that exemplifies this formula is that of the Serbian nonviolent resistance movement, Otpor, which used humor and mockery in its efforts to undermine the powerbase of the former Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, in 2000. The students learn about the inventive uses of humor as resolution in this situation – a culturally appropriate and effective political strategy with tangible results. Practically, Otpor created ridiculous antics that caught people’s attention (Sorenson, 2008). Theoretically, Critchley (2002) realizes that “by laughing at power, we expose its contingency, we realize that what appeared to be fixed and oppressive is in fact the emperor’s new clothes, and just the sort of thing that should be mocked and ridiculed” (p. 11). In the future, I plan to make this curricular case study of Serbia comparative by examining how Serbia’s Women in Black group uses humor in a discomforting juxtaposition with grief as part of their transformative course of action (Perkovic, 2005).
Conclusion

These practice notes only skim the surface of humor and conflict resolution in the classroom. More could be written on teaching cartoons about conflict and conflict erupting from cartoons; going with students to the Middle East comedy tour; using *Grey’s Anatomy* to discuss humor and World War II language such as “Nazi” and “on the German warpath.” Similarly, there is more theoretical work to be completed; most notably, the literature on “edutainment,” which is predominantly contextualized by informal settings of learning, could guide and shape this preliminary inquiry.

In conclusion, I want to highlight that humor is attractive as I reflect on my identity as a teacher – I am not known nor have I ever been known as a funny person or someone with a sense of humor. (“Don’t be so serious,” and “Just relax” are two phrases from my four siblings that have censured my more pensive personality.) As cliché as it sounds, however, the new role and identity of teacher that I started developing twelve years ago opened new ways of being, thinking, and doing, through which I have nurtured a more amicable and functional relationship with humor. I do not feel that I adopt a counter humor-savvy persona in the classroom, but that I simply have expanded upon my “real” self. That said, I can hypothesize the same for students – their opportunity to use humor in safe classroom spaces could open up avenues to discover new parts of their own selves. Yet, all of the literature I read was concerned with how the professor used humor or acted humorously in the classroom; no literature was concerned with the students using humor or developing their sense of humor in the classroom. Providing the space for students to not only laugh but also to provide the laugh is necessary for the credibility and sustenance of humor in any classroom.

Acknowledgements

A version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association conference in New Orleans in February 2010. The author thanks Aaron Karako for his editing suggestions and the creation of the chart.
Image 1: The use of humor in the conflict resolution classroom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Use of Humor</th>
<th>Classroom Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Downplay emotion and seriousness of conflict</td>
<td>Students’ use of humor to overcome the overwhelming sense of tragedy or to avoid</td>
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<td>issues that a potential intervention would seek to transform</td>
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<td>Stereotypical self-description</td>
<td>Students’ use of hyper-self-identification as “a way to pre-empt the passive</td>
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<td>acceptance” of a stereotype were it to arise in the classroom</td>
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<td>Humorous external conflict</td>
<td>Video clips of conflict and conflict resolution</td>
<td>Video clips of conflict and conflict resolution scenarios from popular television</td>
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<td>scenarios from popular television shows and films</td>
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<td>Dialogical conversation</td>
<td>Use of humor by professor and students to</td>
<td>Use of humor by professor and students to communicate in open, engaged, and</td>
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<td>starter</td>
<td>communicate in open, engaged, and comfortable</td>
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<td>Relating to content</td>
<td>Humor used to assist in students’ assessment of</td>
<td>Humor used to assist in students’ assessment of more significant theoretical</td>
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<td>more significant theoretical nuances of transition,</td>
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<td>social change, and transformation</td>
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<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Engaging with conflict shared among students</td>
<td>Role-playing conflict scenarios from students’ everyday lives</td>
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<td>“Powerful laughing at the powerless&quot;</td>
<td>Satirical edition of campus newspaper seen as denigrating by some students</td>
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<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Equalizing power relations</td>
<td>Use of humor to break down the professor-student barrier</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Breaking out of conflict paradigms</td>
<td>Humor can assist in fostering creativity, inventiveness, and divergent thinking</td>
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<td>as well as in de-familiarizing the familiar</td>
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Works Cited


Beyond the Fire and Darkness: 
The “Living” Memorialization of the Four American Missionaries Martyred in El Salvador in 1980

Steve Dobransky*

Abstract

This paper analyzes the memorialization of the four American churchwomen killed in El Salvador on December 2, 1980. The paper focuses on the aftermath of the murders and the memorialization process that took place primarily in the United States to the present day. It seeks to establish a more comprehensive and vibrant model for memorialization and social justice transformation. The paper argues that memorialization should be more than just concrete structures and remembrances of the past and, instead, inspire current and future generations to continue the mission of peace and social justice. The paper examines the peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation process and the various actors and instruments used to sustain and expand the original memorialization of the four churchwomen. The paper states that a theoretical model can be developed from this and many more case studies in the future. It, nonetheless, is a normative philosophical analysis of an important case study in social justice circles. The paper stresses that scholars and others can extract many lessons on how to establish a viable and lasting memorialization process that can help assist in furthering the goals of social justice transformation. It concludes with an overall evaluation and recommendations for further research.

Introduction

On the night of December 2, 1980, four American missionaries were abducted, raped, and murdered in El Salvador. The tragic event shocked the world and put El Salvador in the spotlight for its extensive human rights abuses in the midst of a civil war. Sisters Dorothy Kazel, Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, and lay person Jean Donovan were part of an American missionary program to help the poor in El Salvador. As the Salvadoran civil war arose in 1979-1980, the missionary program expanded to help in particular the orphaned children and other victims of the emerging violence. The four missionaries represented a powerful symbol for peace and social justice in the increasingly dismal situation in El Salvador. When the missionaries were killed, millions of people felt the effect. The event was broadcast throughout the world on television, newspapers, and radio. News of the event captivated and traumatized people as the unimaginable happened—four innocent missionaries being brutally kidnapped, assaulted, and shot at point-blank range. Moreover, it was later discovered that the Salvadoran security forces were involved in the incident and that it was premeditated murder. The Salvadoran security forces

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forces viewed the women as communists and subversives for helping the poor. In the end, the killings raised many issues of command responsibility and the effects of U.S. military aid and training on a brutal dictatorship in Latin America (one of many at the time).¹

Immediately upon finding the bodies of the four women in an open field on December 4, 1980, the process of memorialization began in El Salvador and the United States. This paper focuses on the memorialization of the four martyrs and how it has developed over the last three decades. It analyzes the many acts and types of memorialization for the four churchwomen and it organizes the overall process into a model that can be used for other cases of memorialization. It must be stressed that this is just one of the few case studies on memorialization that analyzes a long-term process and that many more case studies will be needed to develop a rigorous and satisfying theoretical model. The four missionaries are to this day a very powerful symbol and inspiration for many people throughout the world and this paper explains why.

The four martyrs are in the hearts and minds of many, Americans and non-Americans, to this day because of the specific and comprehensive types of memorialization that occurred from the moment their deaths were discovered to the present. Unlike many other memorials in which concrete structures (such as statues, plaques, and museums,) have been created to remind people of a tragic event, the memorialization of the four missionaries developed well beyond the typical memorialization process. Few memorializations have been documented in modern times in such a comprehensive, diverse, and long-term manner, with the Holocaust being one of the few. The memorialization of the martyrs has had profound effect for over thirty years. The varied and dynamic acts of remembrances have reached countless people over the years and have inspired them in different ways. This paper describes and explains the broad and distinct process of memorialization that began in the fields of San Pedro Nonualco, El Salvador, in 1980.²

Theoretical Context and Modeling

This paper is a case study in establishing and developing long-term social justice goals through the process of memorialization. It analyzes and evaluates a specific issue that has expanded and remained dynamic for over 30 years. It, moreover, is a very good human rights case that can provide a number of lessons and applications and, thus, may be formulated into a theoretical model for new cases and future causes. This paper highlights the specific memorialization of the four missionaries and observes how the original sacrifice was built upon by many new acts of memorialization directly and indirectly related to the four missionaries. It concludes with the lessons that can be applied to other social justice issues and organizations, and it makes recommendations for further research and analysis.

In terms of a literature review and past academic research on memorialization, relatively little has been done on using a specific and long-term case study such as this and observing its organic development over thirty years. Some issues and conceptual terms have been defined and elaborated upon, but the traditional approach to memorialization has been portrayed often as being frozen in time. This paper emphasizes the new and growing academic movement that argues that memorialization can and should be dynamic and “living.” This new movement has been surprisingly long in coming. With case studies like that of the four
missionaries, there hopefully will be many more efforts to formulate a theoretical model for future testing.

This paper argues that establishing a core social movement atop a memorialized act and, then, incorporating new and related human rights issues to the group are critical to sustaining a dynamic agenda of memorialization. The process of memorialization involves remembering the original act and actors, maintaining some form of archives, and, then, expanding the original cause to ensure that new generations continue to pursue social justice. Memorialization must be comprehensive and should expand to include academia, the media, and other human rights organizations. There must be a core group of leaders to develop a dynamic agenda. All in all, memorialization is both the initial fertile ground and the regular rains that grow the original seeds of sacrifice and martyrdom. If done successfully, new seeds will be planted near the old ones and they will eventually sprout to produce a forest of human rights canopies. Establishing a solid and highly motivated cadre and historical foundations with a dynamic and steady expansion of similar causes will create a systemic memorialization process that can last for decades if not centuries. This is the theoretical underpinnings of memorialization.

The case study of the four missionaries demonstrates the potential application and effectiveness of theory building in terms of memorialization. Many of the acts that will be discussed can be organized and configured into a formal model. Many elements can be extracted and applied to current and future issues. The overall model is presented at the end of the paper. The model is but a general framework and an initial start to the theoretical building process. It is presented as a “chalice of hope and memorialization.” And, it displays the detailed and comprehensive set of foundations, branches, and instruments that are necessary for creating a lasting and shining beacon of memorialization.

The theory of memorialization is essentially one of evolution and adaptation of new and similar cases that allow the torch to be passed to the next generation. Hence, this study’s combination of normative philosophical and theoretical modeling. Another viewpoint would be to see this case study as an example of process tracing and path dependency from a narrow and more specific starting point. This analysis covers several decades and demonstrates how a well developed and sincere cause can be expanded and extended well beyond its original time period. Memorialization and duration go hand in hand. Without constant recognition of the continuing battles and challenges that inspired the original actors, future sacrifices and risk-taking may not take place. Overall, this is the primary lesson of the case study. Let us now proceed to the beginning of this historical analysis and then follow the several decades of developments that have produced a very interesting theoretical model in terms of length, comprehensiveness, clarity, and vibrancy.

**In the Beginning...**

It can be said that the more powerful a seed of peace and social justice is, the more likely that it will grow into a tall, strong, and lasting tree that will multiply. Martyrdom, it can be argued, is the greatest of those seeds. It is a major source of inspiration and commitment to any cause of peace and social justice. Other acts of justice and suffering may inspire and be memorialized, but the deaths of innocents sacrificing themselves for others, especially the poor
and helpless, is one of the preeminent bases of memorialization. Furthermore, when those martyrs are or could have been your neighbors—or even you or your family members—then it touches directly the hearts and souls of many people.

The focus of this research project is primarily on the United States and, especially, Cleveland, Ohio. The four missionaries were Americans and two were from Cleveland. These are important elements to the origins and development of this particular memorialization, as will be seen. In addition, all four martyrs were part of a new liberation movement within the Catholic Church that stressed a greater female role in Church affairs. This contributes another dimension to the topic. Finally, supporting evidence of the memorialization beyond America is included, particularly in El Salvador. Peace and social justice are human ideals and the four missionaries represented many people who supported the cause of helping the poor and orphaned throughout Latin America. Their mission continues to this day.

The Cleveland Latin American Mission (CLAM) Team trained and sent Sr. Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan to El Salvador. CLAM was created in 1964 and has remained strong in its service to the poor in Latin America. One of the key people who was there in 1980 and a good friend of the missionaries, Father Paul Schindler, returned to El Salvador just recently after being away for 26 years—but only physically away. Father Paul continues to be inspired by the four martyrs and has returned to El Salvador to help the poor. He, like numerous others here and abroad, continues the mission that the four missionaries participated in. This paper demonstrates that the multitude of acts and actors like Father Paul transcend the tragic day of December 2, 1980, and contribute to peace and social justice transformation.

Brief History and Context

In 1980 the military junta in El Salvador was waging a war of terror on left-wing insurgents led by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The junta targeted the general population of approximately five million, as well. At the time, most Salvadorans were extremely poor and had little if any land. The right-wing government and their supporters viewed anyone poor or sympathetic to the poor as a communist and subversive, since it was the poor who were most likely to support and benefit from a left-wing insurgent victory. No one was safe from the terror. In March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while celebrating mass. This shocked Salvadorans and the entire world. The Vatican condemned the act. Thousands attended his funeral, including the churchwomen soon to be martyred. Archbishop Romero had been an outspoken proponent of social justice and major reform. He paid the ultimate price for challenging the status quo and right-wing government in El Salvador. He would not be the last. Nineteen priests were murdered during the year leading up to the four missionaries being killed in December 1980. Until that December evening, many people thought that female American missionaries would be exempt from the killings. That December night was a clear message to all that no one was immune from the military government’s reign of terror. Inadvertently or by destiny, the horrors of El Salvador were transmitted to the entire world by the four martyrs. Until that time, El Salvador’s civil war was dirty and getting worse, but much of the world took little notice of it. Many people were focused on domestic issues, the Iranian hostage crisis, the conflict in neighboring Nicaragua, among other issues. El Salvador took a backseat to everything else.
With the election of Ronald Reagan and the subsequent anti-communist program later to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, a clear message was sent to the Salvadoran government and others that the new U.S. government supported all efforts to aggressively engage communism throughout the world. The new anti-communist message from the United States, however, was defined very vaguely and thus could be widely interpreted to include as communists anyone who supported greater equality and an end to poverty, such as the missionaries. The Salvadoran junta took notice and escalated their anti-insurgent campaign of terror throughout the country. As Jean Donovan had foretold before the U.S. election, if Reagan won, there was likely going to be a “bloodbath” in El Salvador as a result of his fervent anti-communist rhetoric. Everyone in El Salvador seemed to understand that Reagan’s election meant a green light for a major escalation of the civil war—which, for all intents and purposes, meant a massive increase in human rights abuses against the poor and innocent. This was the context in which the four missionaries operated in 1980.

The Reagan Administration was filled with ardent anti-communists, like Alexander Haig and Jean Kirkpatrick, who were willing to support and arm dictatorships and insurgents across the planet, all in the name of fighting communism. It soon formulated the Reagan Doctrine to roll back communist gains from the previous decade, from Afghanistan and Nicaragua to Angola and Cambodia, among others. The Reagan Administration wanted to get tough and prevent further communist gains anywhere in the world, including in El Salvador. Advocates of human rights and social justice causes across the globe were now interpreted often by the administration as being communists or sympathetic to communists. The extreme determination in fighting communism clouded the Reagan Administration’s standards of American exceptionalism. And, democracy, freedom, and basic human decency were sacrificed in the name of fighting communism or anything even remotely associated with it.

The Reagan Administration and a large number of Americans seemed to overreact to the Carter Administration’s previous policies of toleration towards many socialist and other left-leaning governments. The 1980s witnessed an opposite response to the previous decade and the Vietnam Syndrome. The Reagan Administration acted vigorously upon its anti-communist rhetoric. Many people, including the four missionaries and others in El Salvador, paid the price for this ideological fervor. The Cold War reached some of its highest levels during the 1980s. The Reagan Administration succeeded in a number of places in stopping or driving back communism, but many innocent people were sacrificed along the way and American values were challenged seriously. To this day, peace advocates and others have very strong and negative emotions regarding the Reagan Doctrine and its effects.

It was not until the end of the Cold War in 1989 that the U.S. government settled down and altered its policies toward El Salvador and other countries. The George H. W. Bush Administration became more tolerant and active in supporting a peaceful resolution to the Salvadoran conflict and many others issues. It drew back its support for many right-wing dictatorships. And, it advocated more freedom, democracy, and an inclusion of all political groups willing to work peacefully within the system. This led to the FMLN’s incorporation into Salvadoran politics. In just a brief moment, and with the end of global ideological conflict, human rights advocates and missionaries like the four martyrs were now transformed into politically acceptable and non-ideological persons. If only this had been established in the 1980s or sooner.
The four missionaries themselves were from diverse backgrounds, but they had a number of similarities. Middle or upper class, they were educated and strongly intent on helping the poor and less fortunate. Sr. Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan went through the Cleveland-based missionary program for El Salvador. Sister Dorothy was an Ursuline nun who, some would say, represented the “new nun.” Since Vatican II in the early 1960s, the Catholic Church sought to encourage nuns to focus more on getting out of the convent and doing social work and helping the poor within and beyond their countries. This was highly controversial and many conservative Catholics and high-level Vatican officials tried to resist these changes.

For decades (and even centuries), churchwomen sought a more active and diverse role in church affairs and in pursuing social justice. Many desired to expand the scope of church affairs and better reconcile the spiritual world with the modern world and all of its troubles. Many sought the Vatican’s support for these activities. Vatican II raised the prominence of Catholic women and challenged the conservative male hierarchy. Thus, Vatican II put a number of groups on a collision course that continued through the 1980s and El Salvador (and even to this day).

Many Catholic priests and lay persons in Latin America interpreted the promotion of liberal ideas to include liberation theology and the pursuit of social justice. Many in the church hierarchy, however, remained fervent anti-communists and were reluctant to support leftists, whether insurgents or peace advocates. They often criticized or condemned other Catholics for supporting socialist groups and causes or any forms of aggressive change. This appeared to compromise the Vatican’s claim of social justice, although it continued the church tradition of supporting conservative governments/dictatorships that were sympathetic to the church. Tensions remained throughout the 1980s as right-wing governments like El Salvador persecuted its people in the name of fighting communists and atheists.

What Vatican II advocated slowly took shape as it worked its way down to other church levels and issues. In the spirit of the times, the Vatican called upon American churches to contribute personnel to do missionary work in Latin America. The Cleveland Catholic Diocese took up the call in 1964 and established the Cleveland Latin American Mission (CLAM) Team in El Salvador. The CLAM developed a training program to send both ordained and lay persons to Latin America to serve the poor in a variety of capacities. The duration of service would be five years for nuns and one year or more for lay persons, excluding the intensive training in the United States before being sent off. While the CLAM carried out its operations, an older and more global missionary program was being carried out by the Maryknoll Sisters of New York. Sisters Ita Ford and Maura Clarke were both Maryknoll Sisters. The Maryknoll Sisters had been sending missionaries throughout the world for nearly a century to help the poor and El Salvador was one of the locations.

The New Movement for Conceptualizing Memorialization

Memorialization is a relatively new research area for scholars. Although the concept of memorializing has been around for thousands of years in simple and more complex forms, there is today a growing understanding among scholars and other interested persons that memorialization means more than the usual granite structures intended to keep an event, person, or group alive in the minds of current and future generations. This contrasts with
remembrance, which tends to be a static approach by focusing solely on the original issue/event and makes no attempt to changes things or build upon the initial act. In their incisive article “The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional Justice,” Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter state that memorialization “is a process that satisfies the desire to honor those who suffered or died during conflict and serves as a means to examine the past and address contemporary issues.”15 They note that memorialization can be carried out during and after the cycle of violence, in many forms, and by different groups of people inside and outside the government.16 And, the authors declare that the

process of determining what shape a memorial project should take and how memorial space should be used is essential—more important, ultimately, than the physical edifice itself. Moreover, the process remains essential even after a memorial is built. Memorial projects that encourage survivors to explore contested memories of the past, promote learning and critical thinking, and facilitate ongoing cultural exchange are more likely to advance social reconstruction. They are also more likely to retain meaning for rising generations than static memorials of long-past conflicts and heroes that fail to interpret their meaning in ways that have contemporary relevance.17

The authors go on to stress that memorialization should be seen by governments, truth commissions, and others as an essential instrument in promoting transitional justice and national healing. However, they state that much of the world still does not fully recognize the usefulness and substantial value of memorialization in the peacemaking and transitional justice process noting that there still remains a lot of learning and coordination that needs to be done among the “specialists from many fields—transitional justice experts, historians, museum designers, public artists, trauma specialists, and human rights activists, among others—who traditionally have not worked together or are not viewed as having concerns in common.18

In “Never Again: Memorials and Prevention,” the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) declares that there has been a “paradigm shift in public memorialization” since World War II.19 The ICTJ explains that the primary purpose of memorials is no longer just remembrance but encouraging prevention, i.e., to help ensure that terrible acts and injustices do not happen again. The ICTJ points out that “as transitional justice measures, memorials can help states officially repudiate past violence and, in the process, create a public discourse which disincentivizes future human rights abuse.”20 The ICTJ furthermore stresses that memorials are meant to educate current and future generations and to create empathy with the victims. The ICTJ notes that “if the victims of human rights abuse can be seen both as human beings and as citizens unlawfully deprived of their rights by state violence, then a potential next generation of bystanders may develop a firm sense of social responsibility with regard to mass atrocity.”21 Sebastian Brett et al., in “Memorialization and Democracy: State Policy and Civic Action,” support the ICTJ’s recommendations but warn that “although the stated purpose of many memorials is “Never Again!” their design may discourage people from becoming involved in and committed to preventing future human rights abuses…. But the deep investment in sites of
memory by every sector of society and the contested nature of those sites can be harnessed for productive dialogue and public engagement.\(^{22}\)

Regarding the timing and sequencing of memorializations, Liz Sevcenko states that support for memorials should occur “throughout the different stages of the conflict—from the time when trauma first occurs as a result of violence and as it reverberates throughout subsequent generations. Each stage or type of memorialization addresses different but powerful needs.”\(^{23}\) Barsalou and Baxter concur by stating that memorialization and other transitional justice issues should be linked over time. They note that

the passage of time enables survivors to achieve perspective on a conflict and what they want to remember about it. If other transitional justice processes—especially tribunals and truth commissions—have finished their work, the public is likely to better understand aspects of the conflict that were previously hidden or repressed. For these reasons, memorialization at the national level ideally follows truth-telling and legal accountability processes and is intimately linked to educational efforts to engage the public and school-children in a dialogue about the past. These education initiatives—ranging from efforts to change how the history of the conflict is taught in schools to public education programs based at memorials and museums—are essential to extending the impact of truth commissions and tribunals.\(^{24}\)

Overall, memorialization is now seen by a growing number of scholars and other interested persons as a critical element to the peace, justice, and social transitioning processes in many countries. People are starting to recognize how important it is to engage the public and present memorialization in different forms that are dynamic and informative over the long term. As this paper proceeds to the specific case study of the memorialization of the four missionaries in El Salvador, it should be recognized that this particular memorialization has incorporated several of the general recommendations mentioned above. Moreover, this case study looks at the various forms of memorialization and the sequencing of events. It shows how these memorials are linked to the original cause and expanded to reach out to other similar movements and issues. The intra- and inter-relationships between the memorialization of the four missionaries and the current and future related causes is a very important factor in developing a comprehensive model for memorialization. The El Salvador case demonstrates that a number of different things can be done to keep the cause alive and encourage others to continue the mission. Let us now examine how the four missionaries have been memorialized over thirty years and how their mission continues strongly to the present day.\(^{25}\)

Transnational Memorialization: El Salvador to the United States

The memorialization of the four missionaries began immediately after their deaths. The site where their bodies were found at San Pedro Nonualco became a gathering place for people to pray and pay their last respects. Salvadorans, Americans, and many others showed their support. Video of the unearthing of the bodies was televised throughout the world and continues to be historical evidence of the extremely graphic nature of the crime. Although the
bodies were removed for burial to various locations (Sr. Dorothy to Cleveland, Jean to Florida, and Sisters Ita and Maura followed Maryknoll tradition and remained in the country of mission, although at a different place than the murders), the killing site itself became a primary pilgrimage location for thousands of people. Salvadorans made sure that the place remained sacred and intact. The four missionaries were hallowed and described as making the ultimate sacrifice for the poor and helpless, not just in El Salvador but for the entire world. Salvadorans of all ages and walks of life praised and remembered the four missionaries from there on after and they supported all efforts to memorialize the event. Many Salvadorans, moreover, started naming their newborns after the four martyrs, and their children are later told why they are named Dorothy, Jean, Ita, and Maura.

A stone monument was placed at the site of the original graves, with the inscription “North American Catholic Missionaries Dorothy Kazel, Maura Clarke, Jean Donovan, and Ita Ford poured out their lives here on December 2, 1980. Receive them, Lord, unto your kingdom.”26 White stones were placed around the original burial site to symbolize the sanctity of the area. A number of people from the United States and El Salvador then worked hard to build a church on the site and design the inside, including the altar, to honor the four martyrs. By 1992, the chapel was built, and Salvadorans and others have maintained it ever since. Some have planted trees next to it in the name of the missionaries. Once an out-of-the-way place for pilgrims and others to demonstrate their respect and remembrance, the execution site is now surrounded by a small community that worships regularly at the church. In all, the site of the killings has developed into a sanctuary and the final destination of people seeking to honor the four martyrs.27

Every year, on December 2, people from around the world travel to the Salvadoran site to sustain the memory of the four missionaries and express their convictions. They exchange their stories of the missionaries and the effects that the missionaries have had on their lives. It is a powerful reminder of what the four missionaries died for. And, no one can travel to the site without first seeing the original cause of the four martyrs, i.e., the many poor and less fortunate people, especially children, that still live throughout El Salvador. Large numbers of Salvadorans participate in this annual event in various ways. Visitors can see painted murals of the four missionaries on outdoor walls, as well as different forms of remembrance, including specially created wooden crosses, icons, shirts, and other items that incorporate the memory of the four martyrs.28 Salvadorans, furthermore, have built a wall similar to the U.S. Vietnam Memorial but with a graphic representation of their own civil war suffering and the lists of over 50,000 names on the wall, including the four missionaries. Salvadorans also named a dental clinic after Sr. Dorothy Kazel. All the visual experiences and remembrances in El Salvador are tied together and are a constant reminder of what the mission was and still is.29

Memorialization Structure and Dynamics

The memorialization of the four missionaries has been more extensive in the United States, primarily because the missionaries had family members and friends who refused to let them be forgotten. Many forms of memorialization and events occurred after their deaths. These efforts at remembrance inspired large numbers of people to contribute in their own ways further acts of memorialization. The strength of memorialization can be gauged to some
extent by what types of organizations and efforts develop from an event. It is even more notable as to how and why people are inspired by those they never knew directly.\textsuperscript{30}

Scholars can categorize the memorialization efforts for the four missionaries into three different time periods: 1980-1992, which covers the Salvadoran civil war; 1992-2002, the post-conflict reconciliation period; and, 2002-present, which includes the trial, conviction, and recent deportation orders of two generals involved in the four martyrs’ deaths as well as the March 2009 election victory of the former left-wing guerrilla organization, the FMLN. But, the continuing mission and memorialization process transcends these time periods and demonstrates that memorialization should live on in a dynamic form that can continue to inspire people throughout and beyond the conflict and reconciliation stages.\textsuperscript{31}

Many acts and types of memorialization occurred during the Salvadoran civil war (1980-1992). As mass violence, death, and terror reigned, large numbers of people sought to challenge the violence with acts of peace, justice, and memorialization. During this period, family members and friends of the martyred testified before the U.S. Congress and made it clear to the public that the missionaries died for a just cause and that the culprits came from the highest levels of the Salvadoran government and military. They also raised serious concerns and opposition to U.S. military aid and training going to the Salvadoran government, as well as U.S. special assistance to Salvadoran security personnel at the School of the Americas (SOA) in Fort Benning, Georgia. The SOA (now called The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) was identified as having trained many Latin American security forces later associated with death squads and other human rights violations.\textsuperscript{32} Many people who heard and saw through the media the brutality of the missionaries’ murders rallied behind the cause of peace and social justice for El Salvador and throughout Latin America. A number of organizations were created or expanded to take up the call of the four missionaries. The groups that developed within the Cleveland, Ohio, area in particular were very fervent in continuing the mission.\textsuperscript{33}

The InterReligious Task Force on Central America (IRTF) was created in Cleveland in 1981 as a response to the murders of the four churchwomen and the ongoing injustices throughout Latin America. The IRTF’s mission is:

Carrying on the legacy of the martyrs, IRTF educates, advocates, and organizes for nonviolent social change: peace and human rights, economic justice, and aid to Central Americans and Colombians. IRTF works to change U.S. policies, corporate actions, and consumer behaviors that undermine this vision of the just society.\textsuperscript{34}

The IRTF held annual commemorations of the four missionaries’ deaths and expanded the annual vigils to include all people in Latin America who have died for the cause of peace and social justice. The IRTF also extended its focus to new and existing issues of peace and social justice in Latin America. The IRTF created a newsletter, a website, and other forms of communication that regularly updated the public to the most recent issues and events and, furthermore, mobilized people to any urgent cases of human rights violations in Latin America. The IRTF became a central building block to the continuing mission of the four missionaries. The IRTF, in addition, rallied and coordinated with similar organizations in and beyond
Cleveland for Latin American peace and social justice. These groups included SHARE, COAR Peace Mission, Witness for Peace, and the Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico, and others. The IRTF continues to play an active role in Salvadoran issues, recently participating as observers in the March 2009 Salvadoran elections. And, among numerous events throughout the year, it continues to hold a “Commemoration of the Martyrs” day every first week of November to promote new and old social justice causes.35

The Written, Visual, and Oral Aspects of Memorialization

Along with the IRTF and other grassroots organizations that united and rallied people to the cause of Latin American peace and social justice, many others contributed to raising global awareness of the four martyrs and their mission. The memorialization in the 1980s consisted of books, newspapers and magazine articles, movies, television documentaries and reports, media investigations, Congressional testimonies, and other forms of mass communication. In March 1981, T. D. Allman wrote in Harper’s a first-hand and provocative account of the Salvadoran civil war and Allman’s experiences with missionaries like Jean and Sr. Dorothy. Inspired by this article, Ana Carrigan made the film Roses in December: The Story of Jean Donovan in 1982. She followed the film with a book in 1984 called Salvador Witness: The Life and Calling of Jean Donovan.36 In 1983, NBC aired the film Choices of the Heart, which portrayed the missionaries in their work and ultimate deaths. The movie included a number of well-known actors, including Melissa Gilbert, Helen Hunt, and Martin Sheen. The movie was shown in primetime and reached millions of Americans. The public and critical responses were positive and forthcoming. They praised the portrayals and were impressed by the real-world acts of sacrifice. Disregarding the culture wars of the time, both liberal and conservative Americans recognized the tragedy and martyrdom of the four missionaries. Oliver Stone continued the memorialization process in 1986 with the highly acclaimed film Salvador, which included the missionaries in the overall context of the Salvadoran civil war (though most of the real names were changed). Salvador received two Academy Award nominations and remains a very powerful movie starring James Woods and James Belushi. Roger Ebert, the well-known movie critic of the Chicago Sun-Times, gave the film three stars out of four. Despite being a low-budget film, it brought in over a million dollars. In addition to these memorializations, Sr. Dorothy’s sister-in-law, Dorothy Chapon Kazel, published Alleluia Woman in 1987, a tribute to Sr. Dorothy’s life and service that includes a number of her writings. And, the Monks of Weston Priory recorded an album called So Full of Deep Joy in honor of the four martyrs.37

Furthermore, artwork, poems, sketches, songs, shrines, plaques, stained glass images and other memorializations appeared across the United States. School scholarships and educational efforts at all levels, from grade school to college, kept the memory alive and promoted the continuing cause of peace and social justice.38 According to Sister Martha Owen, many schools “adopted the women as models for the students and almost every [Catholic] high school religion curriculum contains something related to their lives. Likewise, new elementary religion textbooks also contain references to and pictures of the women.”39 Sister Martha goes on to declare that she herself felt a solemn obligation to convey the cause and message of the four martyrs to all, noting that “Because [Sister] Dorothy had asked me in a letter to explain the
Salvador situation if something happened, I considered the request a holy responsibility and privilege that I was not worthy to perform but chosen to do nevertheless.”

All these various forms of publication reached millions of people throughout the world and from all walks of life. They also established a living memory of the four missionaries in which current and future generations could see real accounts of the women’s lives and deaths. The multidimensional approach to memorializing the four missionaries was very important in reaching directly into the hearts and minds of millions. People could easily empathize with the four missionaries and their cause of peace and social justice in Latin America and even imagine themselves or someone they knew as being in the same situation. This was significant in developing a living memorialization and continuing and expanding the original mission.

Memorialization and the End of the Salvadoran War

The 1990s saw the culmination of American, Salvadoran, and international efforts to bring about peace in El Salvador. The Salvadoran civil war ended officially on January 16, 1992, as the United Nations oversaw a final peace agreement between the right-wing government and left-wing insurgents. Many people believe that the peace settlement could not have been reached without the long-term and intensive pressure of grassroots organizations, including those that were created for or inspired by the four martyrs. As Dr. Ed Brett of La Roche College states, the assassination of Archbishop Romero may have enraged millions of Americans and others, but it was the murders of the four missionaries that rallied Americans to organize politically against the U.S. government in the name of the Salvadoran and other Latin American causes. Peace, social justice, and human rights organizations united over the killings of the four missionaries to pressure the U.S. government to end its military aid to the Salvadoran government. According to former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, the leftist rebels would have surely won the civil war if the U.S. government had permanently ended its military aid to the Salvadoran government in 1980. The pressures from the missionaries’ murders reached critical mass in November 1989 when six Jesuits were abducted and murdered right on the grounds of their university in San Salvador. The Jesuit killings were the final straw for the American public and Congress. What began as a strong and united opposition to a Salvadoran government implicated in the killings of the four American missionaries turned into a mass movement that finally ended all U.S. military support for the Salvadoran government. The complete stoppage of U.S. assistance forced the Salvadoran government to finally seek peace and reconciliation with the leftist rebels in 1990, though it would take another two years to complete the process. Peace finally came to El Salvador after a long and bloody road that was highlighted by the killing of the four missionaries and numerous atrocities. Directly and indirectly, the four missionaries helped to bring about peace to the El Salvador they loved, although it took their lives and many others to eventually fulfill their wish.

As part of the Salvadoran peace settlement, the United Nations established the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador to carry out a formal investigation of the entire civil war. The UN truth commission released its final report on March 15, 1993 entitled From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador. The report presented two thousand witnesses/victims and more than seven thousand incidences of murder, torture, disappearances, rape, and other crimes. It detailed the mass atrocities that occurred during the
Salvadoran civil war, including the deaths of the four missionaries.\textsuperscript{45} Regarding the four churchwomen, the UN report declared that high-level Salvadoran government officials deliberately tried to cover up the murders of the four missionaries, although there was not enough substantial evidence to show that they had actually ordered the killings.\textsuperscript{46} Despite the possibility and likelihood of orders coming from the top, only five low-level Salvadoran National Guardsmen were ever arrested (in 1983) and convicted (1984) for the killings of the four missionaries. The truth commission, at least, publicly recognized the culpability of the Salvadoran high command in trying to cover up the four murders.\textsuperscript{47} Unlike many other truth commissions, the El Salvador truth commission collected the names of all the perpetrators of human rights violations on both sides of the Salvadoran conflict. Within one week of the UN truth commission report being released, the Salvadoran government granted blanket amnesty to everyone in El Salvador, including—and, especially—everyone listed in the UN report. As a result, no one beyond the initial five low-level soldiers was ever held accountable for any of the killings and human rights violations that occurred during the Salvadoran civil war, despite the range of evidence.\textsuperscript{48}

**Peace-Building, Restitution, and Post-Conflict Reconciliation**

As El Salvador held its first democratic elections in 1994 and the country began to heal, the memorialization process continued with Sister Cynthia Glavac’s 1996 biography of Sr. Dorothy Kazel entitled *In the Fullness of Life*. The book was the most extensive piece of research on Sr. Dorothy and, to a large degree, an accounting of all the missionaries in El Salvador at the time. This journey into Sr. Dorothy’s life led Sr. Cynthia to become a major speaker on the four martyrs and other related human rights causes in Latin America.\textsuperscript{49}

As social organizations, publications, and other efforts continued to memorialize the four missionaries, the families of the four women brought two of the highest Salvadoran generals to U.S. court for the murders of their daughters and sisters. In an interesting twist of fate, as the Salvadoran government gave amnesty in 1993 to all human rights violators in El Salvador, the two highest Salvadoran generals implicated in the four murders, Generals Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, had retired to Florida. Garcia had been the Salvadoran Defense Minister and Casanova had been the Director-General of the National Guard. As a result, the missionaries’ families were able to bring a civil suit in 1998 against the two generals under a U.S. law protecting citizens against torture anywhere in the world, called the Torture Victim Protection Act which Congress passed in 1992.\textsuperscript{50} The Florida trial began in 2000 and it received national media coverage. Not only was this a unique event in which foreign leaders were being held accountable for human rights violations and murder that occurred under their command, but it also raised the issue of why these perpetrators were living in the United States. As the trial went on and the key issue of command responsibility was laid out, Americans and the world were reminded of the four missionaries and the mass atrocities that occurred during the Salvadoran civil war, as well as the possible implication of U.S. military aid and training in the human rights violations. In the end, the generals were acquitted on a legal technicality of the definition of effective command responsibility. Nevertheless, the trial was the first of its kind in the United States and it paved the way for the two generals to be tried soon after in the 2002 Romagoza trial.\textsuperscript{51}
In the Romagoza trial, four Salvadorans living in the United States charged Generals Garcia and Casanova with being officially responsible for their torture during the Salvadoran civil war. The plaintiffs used a lot of information from the previous lawsuit by the families of the missionaries. This time the generals were convicted of being responsible for the torture of Salvadorans that occurred under their command and they were ordered to pay $54.6 million in reparations to the victims. Generals Garcia and Casanova appealed their convictions and fines. A U.S. Appeals Court in 2006 ruled to keep the convictions and fines in place. On October 6, 2009, one day after the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Salvadoran generals their last appeal, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings to deport the generals back to El Salvador. Overall, it was a major victory for the families of the missionaries and all human rights advocates. The trial, conviction, and deportation of the two generals demonstrated that human rights violators could now be held accountable, at least to some degree, for their actions by the U.S. court system—but only if they are in U.S. territory. It was a significant move in the right direction, though there still remained the issues of human rights violators living beyond the United States and the reality that similar cases in the future may lead, at best, to possible fines and deportation but not punishment and imprisonment.

Although they were not jailed or punished, the fact that two of the highest level culprits in the murders of the four missionaries were directly convicted of overseeing torture was a major legal victory for the families of all the victims. Sister Ita Ford’s brother, Bill, a lawyer and an outspoken proponent for the missionaries, played an important role in supplying the Romagoza plaintiffs with substantial amounts of material on the two generals that he had collected and used in the 2000 trial. Bill Ford unfortunately died in June 2008 before he could witness the deportation orders for the two generals. Yet, he was there to see at least some degree of justice and acknowledgement established in the 2005 conviction of the generals. Nevertheless, neither of the two generals or anyone else beyond the original five National Guardsmen has ever been implicated directly in or has acknowledged responsibility for the murders of the four missionaries. This continues to be one of the greatest regrets of all the family members and others to this day. Perhaps the world will never know the full truth, but there have been significant efforts over thirty years to bring about some degree of general accountability and justice for the mass slaughter and terror that occurred during the Salvadoran civil war. The Romagoza trial and recent deportations support this, though much more still needs to be done.

Finally, as the Romagoza trial was about to begin in 2002, PBS televised a documentary called *Justice and the Generals*. It was a very powerful and provocative investigation into the deaths of the four missionaries and the upcoming Romagoza trial of the two generals. The documentary provided significant details, video, and testimonies that strengthened the four martyrs’ cause and brought greater focus to the issue. The PBS investigation stressed the issue of command responsibility and U.S. military aid to foreign dictatorships accused of human rights violations. The documentary was another important and well-respected memorialization of the four missionaries and the cause that they supported. Its power continues on video and is in many libraries throughout the United States. It can be used in classrooms for instruction on human rights causes and promoting the responsibility that all have for bringing human rights violators to justice.
The Dynamics of a “Living” Memorialization

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the killings of the four missionaries was a major event for many Americans and Salvadorans. In 2005, thousands of people, old and young and from all around the world, remembered the sacrifices of the martyrs and went to the original burial site, including a number of the Ursuline nuns and the Kazel family for the first time. Numerous paintings and other artwork appeared throughout the country to memorialize the four churchwomen, demonstrating that Salvadorans continued to remember and praise the four missionaries for their sacrifice and cause. And the U.S. House of Representatives and the Ohio General Assembly supported the anniversary by passing resolutions recognizing the missionaries and what they did.

In 2008, Father Paul Schindler left his church in Akron, Ohio, to return to El Salvador and continue the mission he began in the 1970s with the missionaries. He has worked strenuously to help thousands of poor Salvadorans and promote social justice. He noted recently that many of the Salvadoran children still do not have any school textbooks to study from and to remember the four missionaries and other victims of the Salvadoran civil war. He strongly supports educational, financial, and judicial reforms to improve the lives of Salvadorans and secure peace and social justice for all. In addition to Father Paul’s efforts, Dorothy Chapon Kazel and Sr. Mary Ann Flannery published The Voice: A Missionary’s Call to Give Her Life, which was another memorialization and compilation of the works of Sr. Dorothy that expanded upon Alleluia Woman. Moreover, Sister Rose Elizabeth continues the Ursuline tradition of serving as a missionary in El Salvador and helping others remember the four martyrs.

Furthermore, there have been many other memorialization acts throughout the United States in the form of shrines and stained glass artwork, as well as other tributes to the four missionaries. Jim and Dorothy Chapon Kazel are always surprised and humbled by the continuing remembrances of the four missionaries. They point out that large numbers of churches throughout the United States and not just in the Cleveland area have formally put stained glass and other material remembrances of the four martyrs within their churches. They note that several other acts have been anonymous. Shrines and other tributes continue to pop up to this day in various places, most recently in Utah and Las Vegas. The Kazels try to visit all of these shrines and remembrances, and they greatly appreciate how people they do not even know could do such kind acts. Many memorialization efforts are carried out not only by Americans but Salvadoran immigrants who remember the four missionaries and want to show their appreciation when they come to America.

Lasting Remembrances of Memorialization

Complementing and recording the many formal and informal acts of memorialization are the Ursuline nuns in Pepper Pike, Ohio, Sr. Dorothy’s home convent. The Ursuline nuns maintain an extensive archive on the four missionaries, particularly their own Sr. Dorothy. The archive includes not only books, videos, cassette tapes, and newspaper articles but also pictures, artwork, songs and poems, relevant speeches, Congressional testimony, personal letters and effects, diaries, and many other remembrances of the four churchwomen from all over the world. In addition, the Ursuline Motherhouse has a specific meeting room named for
Sister Dorothy Kazel and the “Heritage Room,” where a collection of items from the four martyrs is on display. The Ursuline Motherhouse also has a number of personal items of Sr. Dorothy and a stained glass remembrance in the social room. Furthermore, the Ursuline College itself has the Sister Dorothy Kazel Center for Global Awareness, where books on peace and social justice are located, as well as periodicals and a picture of Sr. Dorothy. Moreover, the college awards the Sister Dorothy Kazel Alleluia Award to those involved in human rights and social justice causes. And each year the Ursulines celebrate and remember the lives of the four martyrs through church services and other events and lectures. For the tens of thousands of students who have attended Ursuline College over the years, it is impossible not to know and cherish the four missionaries, especially their own Sr. Dorothy, and to pass on those memories to many others. In this case and more, one could say that the Ursulines’ memorialization of the four martyrs is like “Alleluia with a megaphone”: it has been loud and powerful for over thirty years.

The Cleveland Catholic Diocese has its own archives on the four missionaries, and it continues to expand them. Reverend Stephen Vellenga, the current Director of the Propagation of the Faith Office, oversees the archive as well as all Cleveland missionaries in El Salvador. Rev. Vellenga has been inspired by the four martyrs for decades. He has been to El Salvador and he was an important proponent of building a church on the burial site of the four martyrs and designing its interior, along with Sister Diane Pinchot of the Cleveland Ursuline nuns. The archives are maintained by Chris Krosel and supported by Julie Fekete. Most of the materials come from people across the United States who see or hear something related to the four missionaries and then send the information to the Cleveland Catholic Diocese.

As the twenty-fifth anniversary of the missionaries’ deaths approached, the Cleveland Catholic Diocese recognized that many of the friends of and witnesses to the four martyrs in the United States and El Salvador were growing older and dying. The church, as a result, decided to make an extensive effort to collect the testimonies of the people who knew the four missionaries. The result was a video called ...And She Remained with the People: Life of Dorothy Kazel. It was intended originally to be used for educating both Salvadorans and Americans about the cause and impact of the four martyrs, with the interviews done in both Spanish and English. Sister Rose Elizabeth states that she shows this film every year around the December 2 anniversary to many Salvadorans young and old and to every group that comes to El Salvador to see the original burial place of the four martyrs. The testimonies of the Salvadorans in the video are very powerful and important to the historical record. The following quotes represent the attitudes of a large number of people then and now regarding the sacrifices of the four martyrs:

“Sometimes, I used to say they [the four missionaries] were angels of God...because they didn’t tell anyone apart....” –Candelarie Garcia

“I think that they were special souls. I think that having them among us was a gift of God.”
–Monsignor Ricardo Urioste
“As people say, If the rain doesn’t die, it doesn’t give fruit. The day she [Sr. Dorothy] died, everyone grew stronger.” —Rosa Rivera

“…some plant but others harvest. The harvest of what she [Sr. Dorothy] planted here is being received by the other brothers we are preaching the Gospel to.” —Napoleon Ranos

“This is what made me think...that people from other countries give their lives in this place...it should be us...we should take that cross and serve others.” —Francisca Almenar

Finally, there are many other memorializations to the four missionaries. One occurred during Pope John Paul II’s Jubilee of the Year 2000 in Rome, when the martyrs were recognized officially in the Vatican’s Martyrology and Rev. Vellenga declared publicly their martyrdom at a Vatican service (interestingly and coincidentally, the service was conducted by a Salvadoran priest). A play called A Jean Donovan Journey was performed at Ashland University in Ohio. A musical called Missionaries was performed in New York City and then in the Cleveland area in 2004 (both the Ursuline and Cleveland Catholic Diocese archives maintain information on the musical and the Ursulines have a tape recording of it). Furthermore, Sister Dorothy was enshrined in the Ohio Women’s Hall of Fame in 2000, and she has been nominated to be put into the National Women’s Hall of Fame. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution in 2007 recognizing the four missionaries and their selfless acts. And, a travelling museum exhibit, called “Women and Spirit: Catholic Sisters in America,” included information on the four missionaries and went across the country. Moreover, the women are now connected intricately with Archbishop Oscar Romero and the efforts to canonize him. Some people have strongly supported the idea of declaring Archbishop Romero a saint and the four martyrs and others killed in El Salvador as his Companions.

Conclusion

The killings of the four missionaries in El Salvador led to a very extensively developed memorialization over three decades. The four missionaries have been a tremendous inspiration to many people, as shown above in the wide variety of acts and events as well as interviews. Their cause of peace and social justice has been transmitted throughout the world. Their overall effects can be organized and presented in a conceptual model, which follows at the end. More than thirty years of evidence and experiences suggest that the initial theoretical explanation at the beginning of this paper is confirmed. More precisely, the memorialization process of the four martyrs demonstrates the importance of creating many different types of lasting works and organizations, like the InterReligious Task Force on Central America in Cleveland. The large number of efforts, both planned and random, can be linked with a core organization and cadre of dedicated supporters like the IRTF or they can be surprising, dynamic acts by anonymous or indirectly related individuals and groups. The role of grassroots organizations and lay people has proven to be very important and effective in continuing and expanding the mission. The numerous diverse actions over the years can keep the
memorialization process fresh and alive, while others in the general public may be inspired by the story and followers and then join the movement. In addition, reaching out to the public through visual, print, and audio productions can be critical to making a strong and appealing message for a cause. Remembering the martyrs every year by publicizing their noble purpose and continuing mission is another important part in establishing a cherished tradition that people can rally behind. The grassroots commitment and tenacity are fundamental in the long term. Furthermore, organizing and educating future generations are critical elements to maintaining public support and keeping the mission alive. The many acts and types of memorialization are like, in a number of ways, the spokes of a wheel that enable a cause to turn and move forward: the more coordinated and structured the memorials or spokes are, the more powerful and enduring the cause will be.

This case study of the four martyrs highlights the importance of developing a comprehensive set of memorials over the decades that can reach out to the largest number of people; and this, in turn, can inspire more people to join the cause and create additional memorials that will captivate the imagination of others to the mission. Essentially, memorialization should be a very dynamic, human, and lively interactive process that inspires as many people as possible. Memorializations that are universally appealing in both cause and methods will have the greatest effect on the most people. More specifically, allowing people to empathize with the participants and connect with their cause can be critical to whether others will follow in the footsteps of the original members or, at least, support those that do. Moreover, reaching out to other similar causes and organizations will expand exponentially the original cause and members, and it will ensure a magnified transmission of purpose and direction to current and future generations. Many more case studies must be done to confirm this empirically. The structure and dynamics of this case study can establish a good framework in which to compare and contrast relevant case studies. Other issues beyond the social justice and human rights area can be tested as well. They should be long term or in their initial development. They can take place anywhere in the world. The combination and sequence of variables should be examined carefully and the effects on others should be analyzed. The dynamics and behavior set in motion should lead to a chain reaction that greatly expands the impact and outcome of the memorialization. There is no specific time frame but things should move quickly early on and then keep pressing forward with minimal gaps. It should be an exciting area of future research that can produce very informative lessons on how to promote peace and social justice transformation through the memorialization process.

Overall, the four missionaries and their memorialization process have created a model (see below) in which many more peace and social justice organizations can follow. The model is designed like a chalice and begins at the bottom, i.e., the foundations. After the critical event, the memorialization follows and members join the cause. Everything thereafter is tied together and is an interactive process that drives the growth and strength of the mission. There is no specific sequence of each additional part, just an encapsulation of all. This particular model, to complete the metaphors, can be like the rain that nourishes the tree seeds of peace and social justice. If done properly, the newly grown trees will cover the many various elements above ground. These elements can include the public as a whole, religious and non-religious organizations, journalists, scholars and academics, students at all levels, actors and musicians, poets and artists, as well as political organizations and human rights groups both at home and
abroad. The memorialization model for the four martyrs shows that developing the intra- and inter-relationships of all these various actors and actions through widespread public relations (media, events, archives, et al.) to the original cause of peace and social justice will be the critical formula for lasting success. To this end, the memorialization of the four martyrs is not just a remembrance of the past but an inspiration to the future for peace and social justice. It is a life’s work and calling, a spirit that fires the heart. It guides and inspires people, structures and colors their world. For millions of people, just like the four martyrs and their compatriots, the mission of peace and social justice continues and their faith in a better world endures for generations to come. All in the hope that someday the mission will finally be completed and peace and social justice will truly reign over the world. Let that day soon come. ¡Presente!
### Memorialization Model

#### Annual Events
- Commemorations, Vigils, Remembrances, and Speeches;
- Public and Private Organizations;
- Education Forums; Original and Related Events;
- Churches, Schools; Parades, Rallies; Family and Group Events; Pilgrimages; Et al.

#### Archives
- Writings, Videos, Pictures, Tapes; Lifeworks and Possessions; Diaries and Journals; Commemorative Works; History Of; Government and Non-Government Records and Testimonies; Formal Efforts to Collect Everything Related to Event and Participants; Central Storage and Collection Site; Et al.

#### News Coverage
- TV, Newspaper, and Radio Reports; Continuing Coverage of Event and Aftermath as well as Anniversary and Other Important Related Events;
- Short- and Long-Term Presentations;
- Public Testimonies and Interviews;
- Public Spotlight and Education; Etc.

#### Organization
- Local, State, Regional, National, and International; Public and Private;
- Religious and Non-Religious; Created Based Upon Same Cause and Issue Related to Event; May Expand Focus and Connection with Other Similar Organizations and Causes; Unites and Rallies; Updates; Reaches Out to Community and Beyond; Educates Public, Schools, and Media; Website and Email List; Remembers and Attempts to Prevent in Form of Advocating Trials, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Legal Rulings, New Laws and Institutions

#### Participants
- Local, State, Regional, National, and International; Public and Private;
- Dedicated Cadre of Supporters;
- Family Members and Friends;
- Grassroots Leaders; Political Leaders at All Levels; Academics; Journalists; Lawyers; Students of All Grades;
- Financial Institutions and Support, Including Funding Activities and Scholarships; Et al.

#### Memorialization
- National and International; Local, State, and Regional Specific;
- Government and/or Non-Government

#### Event
- Deaths, Suffering, Persecution, and Imprisonment of Individuals and Groups

#### Random Events
- Plays, Musicals, and Other Theatrical Productions; Shrines, Stained Glass, Murals; Songs and Albums; Sketches, Woodwork; Naming Children After; Missionary and Voluntary Work; Et al.

#### Publications
- Books, Movies, TV Documentaries and Shows; Newspapers and Other Periodicals; Government and Non-Government Records; Truth Commission Reports; Academic Journals and Articles; Biographies; Cassette Tapes and CDs; Videos; Stories and Poems; School Textbooks; Special Library Collections; National and International; Et al.

#### Monuments
- Statues, Plaques, Museums; Chapels, Altars, Grave Sites; Buildings and Walls; Rooms Dedicated To;
- Sculptures, Paintings, and Other Artwork; Trees and Natural DedICATIONs; Water Fountains; Eternal Flames; Etc.
Notes


2. See Glavac’s In the Fullness of Life for the most comprehensive description of memorialization on the four churchwomen, especially Sr. Dorothy Kazel. See also the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) website www.ictj.org for a detailed analysis on memorializations.


9. Ibid., Brett and Brett, Murdered in Central America, and Father Paul Schindler and Sister Cynthia Glavac interviews.


15. Ibid., 2.

16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.
Memorialization needs to have a broader and more dynamic model than previously portrayed. After more than 30 years of the four missionaries’ deaths, this case study demonstrates the duration and intensity of a comprehensive memorialization program.

Sister Colette Livingston, personal interview by author, November 13, 2009, and Ursuline archives. The author greatly appreciates Sr. Colette for providing access to the archives, having the archives exquisitely organized, and for answering the many questions the author had.

Father Paul Schindler interview.

Sister Cynthia Glavac interview. The author greatly appreciates the time Sr. Cynthia gave him to answer all of his questions, providing a personal tour throughout the Ursuline Motherhouse and College to see the many relevant memorializations to the four martyrs, and for giving the author many copies of previous speeches and other materials relevant to the subject.

Sister Rose Elizabeth, email interviews by author, November-December 2009, and Glavac, In the Fullness of Life.

Father Paul Schindler and Sister Cynthia Glavac interviews.

These time periods are good categorizations also for political, diplomatic, economic, and military/security purposes, as well as the domestic and international peace processes.

Sister Cynthia Glavac and Sister Colette Livingston interviews, and Ursuline archives.

Sister Cynthia Glavac interview.

InterReligious Task Force on Central America (IRTF), 29th Annual Commemoration of the Martyrs of Central America and Colombia brochure, November 1, 2009, and website at www.IRTFcleveland.org.

Ibid., and IRTF website links.

T.D. Allman, “Rising to Rebellion: Misery, Mayhem, and American Foreign Policy—A Report from El Salvador,” Harper’s 262, no. 1570 (March 1981): 31-50. This is a very good primary source investigation into the Salvadoran civil war, and it has some very good quotes on the Salvadoran military culture.

Sister Colette Livingston interview, and Ursuline archives.

Sister Cynthia Glavac interview.

Sister Martha Owen, email interviews by author, October-November 2009.

An estimated 75,000 people were killed during the Salvadoran civil war.


Ibid., 62-66.

Some of the five convicted soldiers have suggested that they had received orders from their superiors to kill the four missionaries. See Justice and the Generals for more detailed information, especially from the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in this documentary and other sources.

Ibid., 1-252 and Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002), 39-40. The five convicted soldiers were given 30-year sentences in 1984, but three of them were released in 1998 and two in 2001, all under the pretext of good behavior and overcrowded prisons.

Glavac, In the Fullness of Life, personal interview, multiple email interviews, and materials given on speeches and other works.

Justice and the Generals.

Ibid.

59. Democracy Now!, “Appeals Court Reinstates $54M Verdict Against Ex-Salvadoran Generals,” January 11, 2006, www.democracynow.org/2006/1/11/headlines#8 (accessed November 13, 2009). See also Democracy Now!, “U.S. Court Reverses $54M Verdict Against Salvadoran Generals Convicted of Torture,” March 2, 2005, www.democracynow.org/2005/3/2/u_s_court_reverses_54m_verdict (accessed November 13, 2009). An overview of the entire Romagoza case to the present can be found on The Center for Justice and Accountability website at www.cja.org under the Romagoza case. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta first decided in March 2005 that the plaintiffs did not meet the 10-year statute-of-limitations rule. It, then, upon further research and evidence, ruled again in June 2005 that Generals Garcia and Casanova did not leave power in El Salvador until May 1989 and, thus, since the plaintiffs filed suit in May 1999, meant that the plaintiffs were within the 10-year limit. The court issued a new ruling on January 5, 2006 upholding the old ruling and subsequently reinstating the $54.6 million in fines. In July 2006, General Casanova was forced to give up $300,000 to his victims, which is one of the first cases in history where the victims received money from the person responsible for their abuses. The plaintiffs donated the money to charity.


63. Justice and the Generals.

64. Jim and Dorothy Chapon Kazel interview, Sister Colette Livingston interview, and Ursuline archives.

65. Sister Colette Livingston interview, and Ursuline archives.

66. Father Paul Schindler interview. Interestingly, Fr. Paul notes that millions of Salvadorans live in the United States and that they send back large amounts of money to El Salvador but, because of the financial set up, only Western Union can be used to relay the money. Fr. Paul states that Western Union charges approximately 15% on each money delivery, which means that for every $10 million Salvadorans in the U.S. send back to their families in El Salvador, El Salvador loses around $1.5 million to Western Union for no other reason than a wire transfer.

67. Dorothy Chapon Kazel and Sister Mary Ann Flannery, The Voice: A Missionary’s Call to Give Her Life (U.S.: Xulon Press, 2008), and Sister Rose Elizabeth interviews.

68. Jim and Dorothy Chapon Kazel interview.

69. Sister Colette Livingston and Sister Cynthia Glavac interviews, and Ursuline archives.

70. One of the Ursuline College graduates was the author’s mother, Sheila Toomey, who knew Sr. Dorothy Kazel and used to tell a number of stories about her.

71. Reverend Stephen Vellenga interview, and Cleveland Catholic Diocese archives. Much appreciation goes to Julie Fekete and Chris Krosel for providing the author access to the archival materials and having them well organized.

72. Reverend Stephen Vellenga interview.

73. Sister Rose Elizabeth interviews.

74. ...And She Remained with the People: Life of Dorothy Kazel (Cleveland Catholic Diocese video, 2003).

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Abstract

The infamous uniqueness of the situation in Israel and Palestine has led too many scholars and activist to come to one-sided conclusions that blind them from a just solution. By focusing on land rights issues in isolation from the other issues between Israel and Palestine, it is possible to imagine each segment of the conflict as less than unique and therefore more resolvable. Without attempting to prescribe solutions for Israelis and Palestinians, this article seeks to highlight situations from a sampling of Indigenous Peoples’ land rights struggles that may have at one time seemed comparably intractable.

What we would like to do is to forget the past forever, to bury our misdeeds. But what happened in the past leaves tracks in our life that it is not possible to cancel, and it is thus inevitable that, sooner or later, the ghosts of past wrongs will rise from the graves, forcing us to confront an unwelcome reality. In his immortal work, the sixteenth-century Italian writer and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli reminds us—with cynical pragmatism—that history is made by ‘courses and recourses’, implying that those who are defeated today will be the winners tomorrow.¹

~Federico Lenzerini

The Right of Return: Universal Rather than Exceptional

The longevity and divisiveness surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tend to define the conflict so exclusively that it becomes detrimental to generating solutions. Although the conflict has defied many resolution attempts over many generations, it is still valuable to compare the issues to analogous circumstances. It is neither possible nor necessary for situations to be identical to be worthy of comparison. As the Israelis and Palestinians struggle through their seemingly endless conflict, the issue of Palestinian refugees will not vanish because it is fundamental to the identities of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Right of

Return simultaneously embodies the perpetual suffering of the Palestinians and the perceived threat to the existence of a Jewish state. As the future unfolds and Palestinians strengthen their demand of the Right of Return, comparative examples may provide insight into the opportunities and obstacles in protracted land reclamation. The achievements of Indigenous Peoples offer prospects in transforming traditional judiciary opinions surrounding land reclamation. Despite the progressive holdings of a landmark case in Australia, subsequent cases obstruct the reversal of repressive legal norms. In the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples have made steady progress in land rights, although enforcement and compliance issues dilute the success.

The purpose of this essay is to highlight the historic legal experiences of Indigenous Peoples’ collective land reclamation as support for the Palestinian Right of Return. The historic path of Indigenous Peoples’ use of law is explored to demonstrate how international law has evolved into a supportive tool for reform in the face of hegemonic opposition. This examination contributes to the existing body of literature on the Right of Return, especially that which deals with secondary occupants. Comparative contributions are advantageous, not as direct models, but rather as insights into the process of implementing the legal Right of Return.

The method guiding this work assumes the legality of repatriation for all refugees and displaced people. Whether or not Palestinians have the Right of Return has been debated rigorously by other authors and will not be questioned here. The Right of Return is sanctioned in international law and the obligation to realize this right is universal, not exceptional. Many arguments have been made for and against the legitimacy of the State of Israel and its occupation of the Palestinian Territories. These topics have been thoroughly examined elsewhere and will not be disputed here. Hence, the perspective of this article is limited to Israel’s duty under international law to allow the return of Palestinian refugees to the land and the homes from which they were displaced. The purpose of this research is not to dictate exactly how to implement that return but rather to invigorate the discussion by offering examples of other collective peoples pursuing land reclamation and, where applicable, how other jurisdictions have dealt with the issue of secondary occupancy and conflicts of interest in land reclamation. Examining the issue of secondary occupancy as it has played out in Australia and Paraguay is beneficial to both Israelis and Palestinians as they work towards a resolution. The situation in Australia focuses on a landmark case that ruled in favor of indigenous land claims. Non-native Australians perceived the stark reversal of rights as a threat and the decision was diminished through subsequent cases and legislation. The Paraguayan indigenous land claims deal with the issue of secondary occupancy and are best understood in the context of the larger progressive rulings on Latin American Indigenous Peoples’ conflicts of interest in land reclamation.


The perspective within holds that Right of Return is universally recognized and seeks to strengthen the Palestinian position by contextualizing it within a larger post-colonial, human rights framework that challenges the historical dominance of nation-states. To support the universality of these rights for Palestinians and all other refugees and displaced persons, multiple international instruments support both the Right of Return and compensation when return is either not desired by the displaced peoples or not feasible. Most directly, the United Nations Resolution 194 states, "The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date...compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." In 1949, the United Nations admitted Israel as a member under the explicit condition of its acceptance of Resolution 194. The General Assembly has affirmed Resolution 194 repeatedly and the complimentary rights to return and compensation are upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Hague Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and a number of regional instruments.

Numerous examples of repatriation are at the disposal of both Palestinians and Israelis to draw from in the design of a solution that is both practicable and remedial for both sides of this ostensibly intractable conflict. Many authors have found examples with strong merits for comparison and these contributions are valuable considerations. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 in former Yugoslavia granted the rights of Bosnian refugees to return to their properties,

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5 Israel is obligated to follow international instruments that support the Right of Return. Although not readily enforceable on member states, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 13(2) states, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Ratified by Israel in 1991, the Economic and Social Council Resolution (1988) states that, “Everyone is entitled, without any distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, marriage or other status, to return to his country; No one shall be denied the right to enter his own country; No one shall be denied the right to return to his own country on the ground that he has no passport or other travel document.” Also ratified by Israel in the same year, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 12(4) states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” In 1979, Israel ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), which states in Article 5, “People of all race, national or ethnic origin have the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and return to one’s country.” Israel is also obligated by agreements that guarantee the right to compensation when voluntary rights to return are not chosen or not practicable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” In the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), Article 5 guarantees, “the rights of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law ... [including] the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.” This list is by no means exhaustive of Palestinians’ rights or Israel’s obligations. Rather, the intent is to contextualize the obvious universality of the nature of the rights discussed within the contents of this essay.

or to collect compensation if a return was not possible. The South African Land Claims Court in 1996 arranged compensation or returned land to those dispossessed peoples affected by the apartheid regime. These models of repatriation are significant contributions in the growing body of comparable examples, yet they are neither exhaustive nor necessarily an endorsement of particular solutions. Rather than reiterate those comparisons, the purpose is to look at a fresh set of examples to broaden the options available to Israelis and Palestinians as they work towards a peaceful resolution of the refugee impasse.

Comparing the plight of other Indigenous Peoples with that of the Palestinians does not require their situations to be identical or even substantially related. One does not have to be indigenous to be part of a collective, just as one does not have to be Palestinian to know what it is to be a refugee. The connections lie in their collective, community-related rights of repatriation and land reclamation. The purpose herein is not to define Palestinians or Israelis as indigenous, as that is for each ethnicity to decide and verify independently. The cases of land reclamation in Latin America and Australia mirror the Palestinian issue of the Right of Return with regard to the landless situation and the desire to return to a dispossessed land. There are striking parallels among historical and legal developments that have affected each group and rendered them vulnerable in today’s post-colonial international relations. Simultaneously, the modern situation avails both indigenous populations and refugees of new opportunities for land repossession. Both Indigenous Peoples and the Israelis and Palestinians recognize that resolutions in the United Nations and high court rulings are significant legal achievements but in and of themselves do not resolve conflicts. Decisions that appear biased or too sudden may be rejected and diminished in subsequent cases over time, as has been the case in Australia. Conversely, the gradual progression in Latin America builds towards a consensus in indigenous land rights. Australia provides a relatively long-term look into land reclamation battles years after a landmark case, whereas many of the recent decisions in Latin America await regional enforcement and State compliance. Riddled with dilemmas and setbacks, Indigenous Peoples face an uphill battle on their path to reclaim their homelands. The longevity and sober reality of the Indigenous Peoples’ legal struggles can inform the debate surrounding the Palestinian Right of Return. A sophisticated use of law allows a social movement to avoid dependence on legal systems as their sole strength yet allows access to the forum to raise awareness and mobilize resources.

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10 On December 14, 2008, the government of Nicaragua gave the Awas Tingni Community the property title to 73,000 hectares of its territory.
Circuitous Route of Historical Legal Perspectives

Historical Hegemony

International legal scholars and judges have used Indigenous Peoples to justify colonization and the resulting hegemony of settlers. The perspectives of Indigenous People were at first muffled and eventually silenced though myriad sources justifying colonization in international legal scholarship and in court-rulings, which left Indigenous People largely at the mercy of colonizers and their offspring. One of the earliest legal theorists to promote the rights of the native peoples in the international arena was Pope Innocent IV in the mid-thirteenth century. He declared: “[O]wnership, possession and jurisdiction can belong to infidels illicitly...for these things were made not only for the faithful but for every rational creature.”\(^\text{11}\) In the sixteenth century, John Mair, a Scottish philosopher, taught that people could reject a king that rules unjustly and that as human beings Indigenous People are equally entitled to the rights of ownership and self-governance. Mair’s opinion reached a broad audience and influenced the writings of both Barolome De Las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria.\(^\text{12}\) During the sixteenth century, in History of the Indies, De Las Casas spoke out clearly against Spain’s seizure of land and brutal enslavement in the colonization of the Western Hemisphere. His message was that of a naturalist who refuted the notion that the natives in colonized lands were somehow less than human. Superficially joining him in this regard was de Vitoria who agreed in the “essential humanity” of the Indigenous People.\(^\text{13}\) Although de Vitoria considered Indigenous People rational enough to own land, he deemed ‘Just War’ applicable to those Indigenous People who refused Spanish guidance, trade practices, and Christian influence. Subsequently, Hugo Grotius transformed de Vitoria’s limited acceptance of indigenous land rights into an unqualified principle. Often recognized as the father of international law, Grotius clarified that religious differences were neither a reason to reject the applicability and need for treaties but also that rejection of Christianity alone was not justification for war.\(^\text{14}\) Subsequently, his influence in these matters led to an increase in the number of treaties between Indigenous Peoples and colonizers.\(^\text{15}\) Likewise, Charles V’s “New Laws” required the relinquishment of slaves, and the treatment of Indigenous People as equal to Spanish settlers.\(^\text{16}\)

The post-Westphalian era led to a downward turn for Indigenous Peoples’ sovereignty and respect in international law. The concept of the nation-state limited rights to states and those individuals adherent to the states, essentially disregarding all other groupings of humanity. This was very destructive to non-Europeans who prioritized authority within families and tribal units.


\(^\text{12}\) Teirney, B. (2004), 7.


\(^\text{16}\) Ibid.
Based on the influence of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, theorists such as Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Wolff developed the still widely accepted “law of nations” justifying the exclusive authority of nation-states. Emmerich de Vattel further developed positivist laws of treaties and customs within the nation-state in his *The Law of Nations* or *The Principle of Natural Law* which actually distorted the earlier notions of universality in naturalist theory and limited it to nation-states as opposed to individuals or collectives. Vattel’s writing echoed John Locke who spoke of indigenous land use as wasteful and in a lack of accordance with the biblical instructions found in Genesis, commanding man to work the land. This emphasis on man’s duty to manipulate the earth became influential in U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall’s discerning opinions that shifted between limited respect and outright disdain. For Indigenous People such as the Cherokees in North America whose governance and land use practices resembled European practice, the rulings of John Marshall were generous compared to the condemnation of those Indigenous Peoples “failing” to govern properly and use land efficiently according to “Western” standards.

This post-Westphalian era positivist theory expanded in scholarly research and influenced international law around the world. With it, indigenous sovereignty gradually diminished. Lassa Oppenheim’s *International Law* promoted the constitutive theory of statehood by exclusive recognition within the “Family of Nations,” and Charles Hyde’s embellished version of “Family of Nations” created the acceptance of *terra nullius* and the invalidation of previously recognized treaties. In early nineteenth-century Australia, this concept of *terra nullius*, an uninhabited territory or a vacant land, was translated quite loosely despite violent battles for land between settlers and aboriginals. The term took on a new meaning because local Indigenous Peoples were not seen as even having legal standing to exercise "sovereign authority" over the newly found lands and they were therefore not considered "fully human." John Westlake’s supposed “scrutiny of colonial claims” furthered the growing acceptance of treaty invalidation to add that existing treaties with “uncivilized tribes” obligate morally rather than legally.

This reversal of once-recognized rights grew with the acceptance of the now infamous and invalidated pseudoscientific defense of racism which guided the practice of “civilizing” and converting to Christianity the Indigenous Peoples under the authority of the British, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and throughout Africa. At the first Berlin Conference on Africa, the signing member states agreed to watch over, care for, and bring civilization, morality, and material well-being to the native people under their guardianship.

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18 Ibid., 24-26.
21 Throughout this essay, the terms Indigenous People(s), Native(s) and Aboriginal(s) are used interchangeably to reflect the regional nomenclature.
At the Institute of International Law, international jurists clarified, among other legal questions, the duty to conserve, educate, and improve the moral and material circumstance of indigenous populations. Both of the aforementioned gatherings authorized the assimilationist theory later developed in the post-World War I League of Nations mandate system that remained in place until after the Second World War. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, this mandate system granted Britain rights over and protection for Jews and Arabs in Palestine as spoils of the defeated Ottoman Empire.  

**Contemporary Changes**

In the aftermath of the two World Wars, a new or perhaps renewed concept of human rights challenged the hegemony of nation-states. While avoiding a reiteration of the widely known origins of the United Nations, it is essential to contextualize the international organizational changes to demonstrate the affect on Indigenous Peoples. The establishment of the United Nations eventually led to the dissolution of the mandate system and colonization. The UN upheld the legal principles, norms, and rules concerning state-centred international authority and state sovereignty as fundamental to legal discourse. Membership, which far exceeded the original conception of a “Family of Nations,” still essentially depends on acceptance of recognition, although that concept competes with the UN outline of objectives for statehood.

The UN Charter also embodies a clear concern for individuals and groups that shifts normative assumptions in a move away from positivism. As part of the large organizational shift in international relations agreed to by the member states of the UN, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) works through direct affiliation with non-state organizations as the branch of the UN that governs human rights and social policies. People began asserting their rights through an active use of international law rather than a merely passive subjugation to it, which initiated the path of modern Indigenous Peoples’ claims to their rights concerning land reclamation and self-determination.

“In 1947, when Britain decided to relinquish the mandate over Palestine, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 providing for the partition of the territory and the internationalization of Jerusalem.”  

Israel’s subsequent acceptance into the UN in 1948, conditioned upon its acceptance of UN Resolution 194, did not result in the proposed two-state partition but within two decades spawned a bitter, six-day war in the region between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s dominance in this Six-Day War of 1967 left the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, under Israeli control. The illegality of this acquisition spurred a response from the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 242 stipulating the relinquishment of occupied territories and the withdrawal of armed forces. Israel is not compliant with Resolution 242 and the resulting occupation has been to the detriment of Palestinians both in the West Bank and Gaza and for those who fled and have been refugees and displaced persons ever since.

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The chronologically and philosophically analogous developments concerning indigenous rights in Latin America initially resembled the tone of assimilation and integration prevalent in the aftermath of the mandate system. Developments can be traced to the Pátzcuaro International Convention in 1940, which created the Inter-American Indian Institute and, in 1957, the International Labour Organization Convention 107, as a mandate of the Treaty of Versailles.\(^{30}\) The ILO became concerned with indigenous issues and came to lead in international norms protecting Indigenous Peoples’ rights through the eventual adoption of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention 169), 1989, which corrected the underlying tone urging assimilation.

In 1949, the ‘blue water thesis’ was an attempt within the ECOSOC to address the “social problems of the... under-developed social groups of the American Continent” that was thwarted by an insistence on state-centred requests, which were never applied.\(^{31}\) By 1960, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1514 freeing colonial states from their rulers. Refocusing concern to individuals after the tragedies of World War II created the modern framework of human rights, which offered a fresh opportunity for Indigenous People to take advantage of the conventional and customary international laws applicable to their struggle. Out of a regional cooperation dating back to the nineteenth century, the Organization of the American States (OAS) formed in 1948 as a regional body aligned with the new wave of human rights established in the UN, confirming common goals and respect for the sovereignty of each signatory state.\(^{32}\)

Within the OAS, the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America have made strategic gains through the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights known as the Inter-American Human Rights System. In Australia, such a developed regional organization does not exist, but changes at a national level reflect international legal developments that have commenced since the establishment of the United Nations.

In 2007, the General Assembly at the United Nations adopted the non-binding Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People created by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which began in 1982 as a subsidiary of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which is a subsidiary itself of the Commission on Human Rights.\(^{33}\)

Both the Latin American and the Australian situations reveal long awaited breakthroughs for native people suppressed by the legal ramifications that justified colonization and the dominance of nation-states that prolonged the injustice. As recent litigation and legislation in Australia and Latin America continue to mark an enduring struggle for land reclamation, both regional enforcement and state compliance defy success. Although far from finished, the legal paths of these geographically and ethnically diverse groups of Indigenous Peoples analyzed below provide further evidence from which Palestinians and Israelis can draw to avoid the difficulty experienced by others and benefit from the precedents set before them.

\(^{30}\) Rodriguez-Pinero, L. (2005), 7.
\(^{31}\) Anaya, S. J. (2004), 54. See also Rodriguez-Pinero, L. (2005), 86.
Aboriginals in Australia
*Plagued with problems despite affirmation of native land title rights*

Much like the difficult issue facing Israelis who believe that Israel was a land without a people for a people without a land, the non-native Australians have had to reverse the view they constructed of their society. Since colonization, non-native Australians viewed themselves as a single nation formed by settlers which others have been allowed to join. This view officially structured the government of Australia until Eddie Mabo challenged and eventually invalidated the official understanding of colonial history that held *terra nullius* as a fact. In *Mabo*, the Court held that where native title existed prior to colonization, it remains until extinguished. For aboriginals, including Eddie Mabo, the end of *terra nullius* validated the long-held aboriginal belief in their land rights. On the other hand, native title “challenged the vision of their country held by many Australians.” In a sharp turn away from the previously held prejudice in aboriginal land claims, *Mabo* removed the false concept of *terra nullius* and “[laid] down a new set of principles by which native title may be claimed.” Although the decision clarified the right of the Meriam people of Murray Island in Queensland to possess, occupy, and enjoy the Murray Islands, it did not establish the status of leased land. The *Native Title Act of 1993*, the legislative enactment of the verdict, “was widely perceived as a responsible, equitable, and stabilising move.” For Aboriginals, *Mabo* was a highpoint in a long struggle, but for most Non-native Australians it was an entry point into activism surrounding land ownership that had always been in their favor. The *Native Title Act of 1993* addressed the perceived threat of an immediate and drastic change of lifestyle and livelihood felt after *Mabo*. Israelis hold similar fears of changes to lifestyle and livelihood. *Mabo* and the *Native Title Act of 1993* offer insights to Israelis and Palestinians into how a sudden and drastic change might be managed by a legislative process that offers stability and addresses fears of annihilation.

In Australia, the drastic shift in perception was not smoothly reconciled after the *Native Title Act of 1993* as the following examination of subsequent cases reveals. *Wik People v. State of Queensland* decided that the land rights of Indigenous People who can prove a connection to the land can coexist with the rights of lease-holding pastoralists. In the instance of a clash of rights, the rights of the pastoralists prevail. This rectified a false assumption that the leaseholder had exclusive possession, which necessarily extinguished the indigenous land claim.
as understood by the *Native Title Act of 1993*.\(^{43}\) Whereas *Mabo* required spiritual connection at the time of sovereignty, *Wik* distorts the ancestral connection by subordinating native rights to pastoral rights.\(^{44}\) After a national election led to a change in dominating parties, the Howard Coalition Government found the determination of *Wik* still too biased toward aboriginals and created the “Ten Point Plan” enshrined in the *Native Title Amendment Bill of 1996*.\(^{45}\) Highly criticized for failing to keep the spirit of both the *Mabo* and *Wik* decisions, the new legislation weakened the vulnerable indigenous land rights and created additional obstacles.

The *Native Title Amendment Bill of 1996* and subsequent cases diminished the principles founded in *Mabo* and *Wik*.\(^{46}\) The reversal of repressive legal norms in *Mabo* was ultimately rejected on presumptions that native title does not exist and that non-indigenous claimants are not required to prove extinguishment.\(^{47}\) The policy of partial extinguishment elaborated in *Ward v. Northern Territory of Australia*\(^{48}\) diminished native title rights when they compete with common law objectives that have been determined to protect society. The High Court concluded that all native title conflicts involving non-indigenous leases face an *Inconsistency of Incidents Test*, which ultimately defeats but does not extinguish native title rights.\(^{49}\) Although a non-indigenous lease does not necessarily grant exclusive possession, its existence extinguishes indigenous usage. While refraining from an outright revocation of native title, the High Court decision essentially reversed the progress made for native land rights in a way that strikingly resembles pre-*Mabo* times.\(^{50}\)

As if the whittling away of aboriginal gains were not thorough enough, *Yorta Yorta* added insult to anguish. Despite the undisputed atrocities of colonization and the disruption of traditional ways placed on aboriginals in order to survive modernization, *Yorta Yorta*\(^{51}\) required a successful native title claim to prove that adherence to aboriginal law and custom had “continued substantially uninterruptsed since sovereignty.” Considering the devastating effects of colonization on indigenous lifestyle and livelihood, coupled with the practice of forced assimilation, an “uninterrupted” lifestyle was impossible over the centuries. The revivalist traditions of the Yorta Yorta Community did not satisfy the newly found requirements of continuation predating the British Crown.\(^{52}\) The extensive anthropological studies required as burden of proof surpass the resources of claimants\(^{53}\) and create a normative system.\(^{54}\)

Extinguishment, which necessitates a partial or complete discontinuity, contradicts the traditional customs used to determine legitimacy in native title claim. The United Nations

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\(^{45}\) Amankwah, H. A. (2003), 4-5.


\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 113. See also Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002) 194 ALR 538.

\(^{52}\) Timms, C. (2006), 113.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Amankwah, H. A. (2003), 4-5.
Committee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination describes the weakened native title claims as “legal certainty for governments and third parties at the expense of Indigenous title.”

In subsequent cases, the Ten Point Plan managed to deplete most of what was left of native title claims. *Wilson v. Anderson* extinguished native title in nearly half of New South Wales by reversing the understanding that leases grant exclusive usage but not exclusive possession as held in *Wik*. Likewise, government control of water, “living aquatic sources,” airspace, or future authoritative grants of said sources extinguishes native title claim despite the sole dissenting judicial opinion. Reserved land, many exploration tenements, and acts or grants over land or waters within towns or cities all fall under this protective extinguishment of native title claim.

Judge Lindgren of the Australian Federal Court gave a summary report concerning his judgment in respect to eight overlapping claimant applications under the Native Title Act. The decision in *Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia* is the first involving substantial claims in the Goldfields region of Western Australia. Expressing his dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in native title claims, Lindgren says, “Perhaps the heart of the problem is that the legal issue that the Court is called upon to resolve is really only part of a more fundamental political question.” In three categories, Lindgren explains the gist of the remaining problems of native title claims in Australia. The first highlights that the present-day Australian legal system, established by the British sovereignty in 1892, determines land claim applicability rather than indigenous ancestral heritage. Secondly, inherent inequalities and normative values play out irrespective of the merits of the case. Finally, historic migration altered the legal landscape for today’s native title purposes.

As a euphemism, people say that possession is nine tenths of the law. What remains for aboriginals to claim are lands that interest neither government, nor non-native Australians, nor businesses in the past, present, or the future. As an example for Palestinians, this certainly looks disheartening for the Right of Return that they have yet to bring to fruition, and one that aboriginal Australians struggle to keep in sight. P. H. Russell offers some assurance: “We can only be sure that it will not be back to a condition of terra nullius, in which the very existence of Indigenous Peoples as ongoing human societies and a defining part of Australia is denied by the majority.”

55 Timms, C. (2006), 114. See also UN CERD/C54/Misc.40/Rev.2, 3 [March and August 1999].
56 *Wilson v. Anderson* [2002] HCA 29; 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313; 76 ALJR 1306 (8 August 2002).
60 *Harrington-Smith on behalf of The Wongatha People v. Western Australia* (No 4) [2003] FCA 17 (20 January 2003).
Indigenous Peoples of Latin America

*De jure does not ensure de facto*

The Organization of American States plays an important role in Latin American regional indigenous land rights issues, differentiating them from their contemporaries in Australia. Although compliance issues obscure the results of some recent judicial decisions, at the very least there has been progressive recognition of the origins of indigenous sovereignty. Latin American policies are moving towards indigenous land reclamation. After a series of judicial decisions in the Inter-American System of Human Rights that vindicated indigenous land claims, the High Court in Belize\(^64\) issued a similar ruling, which moves Latin America toward new international norms recognizing indigenous land rights. The situation in Paraguay closely reflects the issue of secondary occupancy in the Palestinian Right of Return, and the pattern of regional legal precedents can invigorate the discussion of repatriation in the Israeli-Palestinian debate. Throughout Latin America, the land claims reflect the needs of the ethnically and geographically diverse indigenous communities, and the pattern of legal precedents is integral to understanding how the recent norms have developed.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is working towards developing international norms for Indigenous Peoples’ rights in the region. In *Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua*, the landmark indigenous land rights case of 2001, a refreshing pattern of judicial decisions indicates an evolutionary reversal of the philosophy that dominated in and after colonial times. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community of Nicaragua (Awas Tingni Community) are an Indigenous People that, as part of a larger language-related indigenous ethnic group, have lived in the North Atlantic Region of Nicaragua since at least the fourteenth century. The Awas Tingni Community has no land title despite the Nicaraguan domestic laws granting the Awas Tingni Community’s rights to entitlement and repeated efforts to gain such documents.\(^65\) The state of Nicaragua granted concessions to a Korean logging company (SOLCARSA) to exploit the traditional indigenous lands without the consent of the Awas Tingni Community. Under obligations of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court ruled for the state to realize specific measures to protect Indigenous Peoples’ rights to land and natural resources according to Indigenous Peoples’ customary use and occupancy patterns. The subsequent cases in indigenous rights build upon the Court’s progressive, inclusive decision. On December 14, 2008, the government of Nicaragua granted the Awas Tingni Community the property title to 73,000 hectares of its territory. Unobstructed decisions in *Awas Tingni* and subsequent decisions are effectively working towards the development of international norms. In *Awas Tingni*, the “Court’s interpretation avoids the discrimination of the past and, rather than excluding indigenous modalities of property, it embraces them, marking a new path for understanding the rights and status of the world’s Indigenous Peoples.”\(^66\)

\(^{64}\) *Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize* Case No 12.053, Inter-Am CHR Report No 44/04 (12 October 2004).

\(^{65}\) On December 14, 2008, the government of Nicaragua gave the Awas Tingni Community the property title to 73,000 hectares of its territory.

The Community of N’djuka Maroon Peoples (the N’djuka Maroon Community) is descendent from escaped slaves brought to the Americas from Africa who lived in Moiwana Village in Suriname since escaping the slave trade. During a brutal massacre on November 29, 1986, the N’djuka Maroon Community was forcibly exiled from the village and 39 people were killed. The survivors were unable to practice their traditional rituals to honor the deceased while the perpetrators enjoyed impunity, the remains of their deceased were missing and they feared a repetition of the attacks. When the government of Suriname granted the N’djuka Maroon Community permission to return, the internally displaced people in Suriname and refugees in French Guyana were unable to do so because of the aforementioned disruptions of their traditional rituals. Although the massacre took place prior to Suriname’s signing of the American Convention, the State’s failure to address residual and continuous violations related to and resulting from the massacre led the Court to rely on a controversial doctrine of “continuing violation.” The Court identified the State’s continued failure to guarantee a safe return among multiple violations of the American Convention. In terms of reparations, the Court decided that the State of Suriname was ultimately responsible for punishing perpetrators of the massacre, recovering and returning the remains to surviving members, ensuring collective property rights in the traditional lands from which the N’djuka Maroon Community was expelled, guaranteeing the safety upon return, and developing a fund to pay various compensations. The Court also instructed the State to hold a public ceremony to recognize responsibility and issue an apology, and to build a memorial for the deceased. To Suriname’s credit, the families of the victims received compensation, and Suriname complied with their obligation to hold the ceremony and create the memorial. Unfortunately, the State has thus far failed to comply with the remaining obligations. Judge Cançado-Trindade’s concurring opinion offers insight into the Court’s progressive rulings in terms of prolonged displacement. “The tragedy of uprootedness (desarraigo), manifested in the present case, cannot pass unnoticed here, as uprootedness affects ultimately the right to cultural identity, which conforms the material or substantive content of the right to life lato sensu itself.” Although Cançado-Trindade’s concerns about “uprootedness,” reiterated regularly since his appointment as judge, were not upheld by the majority of judges in Moiwana, his philosophy affects and is affirmed in subsequent rulings.

In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Inter-American Commission submitted the case to the Court with their findings that Paraguay prohibited the Yakye Axa Community from effective possession of their ancestral lands. The Court affirmed that the victims’ “relationship with the land is such that severing that tie entails the certain risk of an

67 I/A Court H.R., *Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname* Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 233. Court found Suriname in violation of Articles 1(1), 5(1) [para 103], 22 [121], 21 [135], 8(1) and 25 [163 and 164].


irreparable ethnic and cultural loss, with the ensuing loss of diversity.”

The Yakye Axa Community, barred from their traditional lands and living on the side of a road, was deprived of the “possibility of enjoying its traditional activities (i.e. hunting fishing and harvesting) therein, which are essential for ensuring the effective preservation of its members’ right to life.” Paraguay argued against the return of the traditional land because the territory was occupied and used effectively according to Paraguayan laws. The Court affirmed, “Disregarding the ancestral right of the members of the indigenous communities to their territories could affect other basic rights, such as the right to cultural identity and to the very survival of the indigenous communities and their members.”

Although enforcement is still a grave concern, Yakye Axa builds upon the decision in Awas Tingni, and works toward forming an international norm. This legal development is applicable to the Palestinian Right of Return because the Palestinians share the common bonds of the Right of Return as a collective right even when the territory has since been occupied. The dissenting opinions of Judges A. A. Cançado-Trindade and Manuel E. Ventura Robles in Yakye Axa, concerning proof of cultural and territorial integrity as equal to the right to life, led to juridical developments in the following case.

In Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the state argued that the conflicting land claims have both been duly registered for a significant period of time; that the land was used sufficiently; and finally that the current owner’s right to possess and use the land was part of a valid bilateral agreement between Paraguay and Germany. Over the passage of time during this conflict of land rights, many members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community suffered illness and death related to their landlessness and restrictions from cultural practices tied to that land.

Although the traditional lands taken from the Sawhoyamaxa Community were held privately and reasonably exploited as legitimized in the Paraguayan Constitution, this was not considered sufficient grounds to disallow the return of the indigenous community to that

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72 Ibid., Para. 5-9.
73 Ibid., Para. 54 (a-m).
74 Ibid., Para. 242 and 147.
75 Ibid., Para. 144-154 and 217.
77 Ibid., Para. 24 “We the undersigning Judges decided to state our position and issue the instant Joint Dissenting Opinion on the objective international responsibility of the State for violation of the right to life of ten members of the Yakye Axa Community, including eight helpless children (see paragraph 8, supra), because in cases such as this one, in which lack of due diligence by the State has a direct impact in terms of loss of human lives, it is our understanding that the Judges of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights must enhance the awareness of all inhabitants of our region so that facts such as those of the instant case do not happen again, to the detriment of those who most need protection, who have no one else to resort to in our societies, and of all those who are socially marginalized and excluded, who suffer in silence, but who in no way can be forgotten by the Law.”
79 Ibid., Para. 29-34.
land.\textsuperscript{80} The court instructed the State of Paraguay to return and grant title for the land to the Sawhoyamaxa Community within three years from the close of the decision.\textsuperscript{81} Rather than dictate how the state was expected to proceed, the Court clarified only that the rights of the indigenous community are to be realized under whatever internal changes take place at the national level.\textsuperscript{82} Stepping beyond the decision of Yakye Axa, the Court declared Paraguay in violation of the right to life as protected by Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as it concerns the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community.

Finding Paraguay in violation of the right to life, based on the cultural and territorial needs of the Sahoyamaxa Community as a means of survival, demonstrates a dramatic juridical progression in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Less than a decade ago, the Awas Tingni Community in Nicaragua fought a very difficult battle to have their land recognized, not as the state saw fit but in a way that is true to the needs of the Indigenous People. Sawhoyamaxa upholds that not only is this communal land not to be defined by the state, but that removing the community from their land is a detriment to their very right to life.

Conclusion

As the Israelis and Palestinians navigate the path towards a peaceful resolution to the seemingly endless conflict, the issue of Palestinian Right of Return will not disappear. In fact, it is at the heart of both the suffering of Palestinians and the existential fears of the Israeli Jewish state. As the future unfolds and Palestinians continue to demand the Right of Return, each comparative example provides lessons in achieving that goal through positive and negative experiences. The examples of Indigenous Peoples’ use of international law detailed above provide insight into the opportunities and obstacles in protracted land reclamation battles.

In Australia, the landmark case of \textit{Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland (No. 2)}\textsuperscript{83} dramatically reversed the historical understanding of land rights and land restitution. Responsive legislation opened subsequent cases, which proved that making said restitution into a reality through jurisprudential development is an arduous struggle on both sides of that change. Although the subsequent decisions alter the principles laid out in \textit{Mabo}, over time Australia has managed to resolve a limited number of individual land claim cases and has set up an extraordinarily complex system of resolving each claim throughout the country. In the long view, any return of Palestinians to Israel is likely to come with equally high contentions. The evolving legislative response to \textit{Mabo} highlighted above should forewarn Palestinians how the effect of politics can lead even such a strong landmark decision astray.

In the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the jurisprudential developments, from the \textit{Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua}\textsuperscript{84} to the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous

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\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., Para. 214.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., Para. 215.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., Para. 225.
\end{flushright}
Community v. Paraguay\textsuperscript{85} case, struggle to achieve regional compliance at present but underscore a pattern of consistent rulings. As discussed in this essay, the indigenous struggle for land reclamation through the Inter-American System exhibits valuable insight in terms of recognizing collective rights and a dedication to resolve issues of “uprootedness”\textsuperscript{86} related to the on-going struggles of refugees and displaced persons.

Although there is optimism in the transforming of traditional judiciary opinions surrounding land reclamation, the reversals of such formative and long-held beliefs have resulted in a dismal reality that exposes a defiance of the liberal judicial decisions. Precautions abound after a landmark case, as subsequent legislation institutionalizes the decision, as in Australia’s Native Title Act. In the decisions exemplified in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the results are progressive, yet some remain subject to elusive regional enforcement and reluctant state compliance.

The Australian Aboriginals disproved the long-held policy of terra nullius, the Awas Tingni Community in Nicaragua defined and established collective rights, and the Sahoyamaxa Indigenous Community established their communal lands as essential to their right to life. Hopefully, both Israelis and Palestinians will be able to synthesize the best comparative practices and find practical solutions towards lasting peace.


Host-Settler Relations, Conflict Dynamics, and Threatened Identity in Kano

Jacinta Chiamaka Nwaka*

Abstract

Kano, one of the oldest cities in Nigeria, has known volatility since 1953. Although host-settler conflicts have always had ethno-religious and political colorations, they were largely in response to threats to the religious, economic, and political foundations of Kano and northern Nigeria. Strategies to address the conflicts have included separation, mobility, inertia, and violence. However, in recent years, economic opportunity, greater tolerance, and changes implemented by the stakeholders (hosts, settlers and governments) to tackle the issues of threat and the concomitant crisis, have addressed the conflict in Kano. These strategies have altered both the settlers’ attitudes and the hosts’ status, minimizing their differences and promoting their similarities. In the search for peace between and among groups, therefore, the role of the third party is only secondary; the task of transforming a given conflict lies primarily with the parties involved.

Introduction

Until relatively recently, Kano city in Nigeria has been the hub of host-settler conflicts of a largely ethno-religious character. However, for almost a decade, 2001-2010, there has been relative peace in the city compared to other northern states like Plateau, Zanfara, and Kaduna which have experienced crises involving high levels of destruction of lives and property since 2000. The thrust of this paper is to trace the historical development of host-settler conflicts in Kano up to 2001. The paper, through a historical analytical approach, will attempt an explanation of host-settler conflicts and the relative peace that seems to be the case in Kano.

Theoretical Framework

The research is anchored on the similarity-attraction and categorization theories. These theories assert that potential threats to identity can be outweighed by positive effects of shared values and comparable status (Brown 1978, Tajfel 1971, Turner et al 1987, Brewer & Campell 1976, Rokeach 1960). According to their study of an East African community, Brewer and Campell concluded that similarities, whether of status or attitude, promote attractions between groups. The outgroup thought to hold similar attitudes is liked and better treated than the one that is believed to be different. In his identification and clarification of the

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categorization process as one of the ways of inter-group conflict reduction, Tajfel (1971) noted that an outgroup psychology needs to be transformed for it to be categorized as having something in common with the ingroup. Hostility towards an outgroup, he believes, is closely related to perceiving it as dissimilar from the ingroup. In their study of Israeli community, Struch and Schwartz (1989) found out that religious groups in Israel with similar values to the respondents’ own groups were viewed with less hostility than those seen as dissimilar. Using two important categorizations, Vanbesclaere (1991), like Deschamps and Doise (1978), noted that bias against those who share at least one cultural category is virtually eliminated. In accord with Brown and Turner (1979), Diehl (1990) holds that for those who share no cultural category, bias seems to increase, and, if not controlled, will lead to conflict which may be violent, as the ingroup which feels threatened reacts to protect its identity.

Threat, therefore, can be conceived as any feeling, thought, action, or experience which challenges the power and identity of a group in social relations. Every group occupies a social niche within a network of inter-group relations. These identities, though related to one another, are not equal because the social niche or identity of a group in any relationship is determined through negotiation (Breakwell 1963a, Smith 1991, Brubaker 2008). The power of a group to negotiate strongly and favorably depends on many variables, among which are: material resources available to the group, persuasiveness of its ideology, historical position, numerical and psychological strength of its members, ability to enter into a coalition, and so on. Any objective challenge to the power of a group to negotiate favorably is conceived as a threat. It may take either or both of these forms: material (economic) or symbolic (ideological or cultural) threats. While the former tampers with resources available to a group to promote its power in social relations, the latter involves changing the conceptualization of a group or its ideology through rhetoric, propaganda, or any other form of regulating group ideology (Breakwell, 1963b:189). The consequence of such a threat is likely a dramatic change in the physical structure of a group. First, the group loses members through hunger or death as a result of violent struggle for scarce resources. Second, members may be lost through defection to another group with a more acceptable and appealing ideology at the moment. This change in physical structure affects the group’s negotiating power as it dwindles. An outgroup/settler group with a different ideology and stronger economic power is likely to constitute a threat to an ingroup/host, which will in turn employ various strategies to protect its identity. Such strategies may include: mobility, violence, inertia, and change. Mobility has to do with moving away to evade the threat. In this case, the threatened group moves away from the threat. Violence is sometimes adopted as response to a threat. A threatened group may decide to use force through violence to repel the threat. Here the threat rather than the threatened makes a shift. Change as a response to threat influences both the threat and the threatened to adopt more peaceful means of co-existence. For instance, norms and rules may be changed to suit the new situation rather than relinquishing membership or relocation. An outgroup that constitutes a threat may readjust or recategorize some of its norms and values in order to share something in common with the threatened ingroup (Turner 1981, Gaertner et al 1993). In this way, members of an outgroup can be subsumed into a new and larger category and thereby be seen as part of an ingroup. Thus, change in general aims at eradicating sources of threat positively. While the first three strategies are largely the responses of the threatened group, change can
come from either or both the threat and the threatened. It is within this framework that host-settler relations in Kano will be examined.

Kano’s Cosmopolitan Outlook and the Origin of Host-Settler Tension

Kano, one of the largest advanced cities in Nigeria, started around seventh century as a settlement of immigrant Abagayawa blacksmiths who came to mine iron from the ironstone outcrop of Dalla hill (Willet 1971:368). Maguzawa immigrants, led by Bagauda, conquered the settlement around the eleventh century and established a formidable political entity. The construction of city walls, which started in the twelfth century, was extended by 54 percent in the fifteenth century to accommodate immigrants from Borno and North Africa (Frishman 1986).

Kano’s exposure to various cultures explains its early liberal policies towards strangers and the formation of Kanawa identity (Shea 1983: 107). The emergence of a distinct Kanawa identity was a consequence of massive migratory trends and the mixture of diverse social groups (Adamu 1999:200-204). The Kanawa (Kano indigenes) engaged in long-distance trade, pilgrimages, and warfare. Islam was introduced in Kano in the fourteenth century by the Wangarawa traders from Mali (Albert 1994:48). It became the official religion of the state in the fifteenth century. Kano played host to a number of Islamic scholars whose activities facilitated the overthrow of the Maguzawa (Padem 1973:42). The city was also a major trading port in the trans-Saharan trade. Kano skirmishes with the Kwararafa led to the assimilation of Kwararafa slaves into the Kanawa society (Abubakar 1981). Kano also imported war captives after the Fulani Jihad. Thus, unlike most cities in Nigeria that assumed their cosmopolitanism after the colonial migrations, Kano’s cosmopolitan outlook dates back to its formative stage. By the sixteenth century, its population, according to Maumy (1961), was 74,000. The Wangarawa, the Kanuri, the Arab, the Nupe, and the Yoruba settlers’ colonies were established from the fifteenth century (Olaniyi 2006:389-390). The city also assumed the status of an Islamic center in West Africa, as well as the primary repository of northern Nigerian religious, political, economic, and cultural values and identities (Albert 1994:7).

In 1903, Kano was occupied by the British. The army of occupation comprised southern Nigerians and a few other Africans and non-Africans. With the establishment of the British administrative presence and location of some European companies in the city, there was an influx of southerners. Kano, therefore, expanded as the commercial nerve center of northern Nigeria. Northern commercial and political orientation, as Coleman (1958:39) argues, shifted from the trans-Saharan trade to a linkage with southern Nigeria. The southern migratory trend accelerated with the completion of the Lagos–Kano railroad in 1912 and the groundnut boom of the 1920s (Tamuno 1965:39). Colonial migrations into Kano were initially dominated by the Yoruba. Of the 2,000 migrants in Sabon Gari (the migrant community), Kano, in 1921, 1,478 (73.9 percent) were Yoruba (Albert 1995:6). The Port Harcourt–Enugu railroad, which linked the Lagos–Kano rail line in 1927, and the completion of the Makurdi Bridge in 1932 opened up northern Nigeria for the Igbo. Following the burden of taxation and industrial expansion in Kano
during the Second World War, they flooded Kano. R. I. Maiden, a colonial officer, in 1938, captured this development thus: To the “ubiquitous Igbo and other tribes from the distant South,” the city of Kano was “an El Dorado” (Maiden, in Albert 1995:6). By 1948, the population of the Igbo (6,680) had surpassed that of the Yoruba (4,415) (Albert 1994:218). Although Kano indigenes (natives) had no choice but to play reluctant host to the southerners, the Yoruba gained more acceptance than the Igbo. The former, being predominantly Muslim, became easily integrated into the Kanawa society. The latter, on the other hand, were at variance with their host for various reasons. First, eastern Nigeria, the home of the Igbo, had not gained a significant number of Islamic converts; thus, their belief systems differed. Second, the Igbo political system was democratic as opposed to the autocratic and feudalistic Hausa-Fulani. Third, while the Igbo appreciate socio-economic status achieved by hard work and attach little importance to obedience to superiors, the rank and file of their host depends on the wealth and social status of their patron for survival. Finally, the economic aggressiveness of the Igbo has no parallel in either the Hausa-Fulani or the Yoruba, or in any other group in Kano. Apparently, their increased population was a source of threat to their host. Consequently, inter-group relations began to evince features of resentment of southern domination, especially that of the Igbo, and containment of the spread of Christianity.

The 1980s witnessed the resurgence of a symbolic threat of religion. Nigeria opened up to fundamentalist Christian groups in the 1980s. With the freedom of religion entrenched in the nation’s constitution, many of these fundamentalist groups were found in Sabon Gari Kano in larger numbers than in some southern cities. Their activities, especially their mode of preaching, were often considered provocative to the Muslims. For instance, posters depicting blind and lame Muslims dropping their walking sticks and walking straight to Jesus as they beheld his healing-power were perceived as an indirect way of winning Muslims over to Christianity and the denigration of Islam in Kano. Similarly, the fundamentalist Islamic groups, with Chadian and Cameroonian links, began to operate in ways that threatened the traditional Muslims of Kano. There was the fear that Kano would lose its population and identity to these Christian and Islamic fundamentalists. Since Islam makes no distinction between religion and politics (Mohammed 2002:260), the loss of population to conversion would bring about a decline in the religious and political power, not only of Kano but the entire north. It could, therefore, be argued that Kano (and by extension the whole of northern Nigeria) was under economic, religious, and political threats right from the colonial period. What, then, was their response to these threats?

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1 The period of the Second World War witnessed the establishment of import substitution industries in the British colonies. Kano was one of those places in Nigeria where such industries were sited in line with the British war effort.

2 Most southern cities are Christianized. The north, being a Muslim enclave, is seen by Christians, especially the Pentecostal churches, as the home of unbelievers which needs to be won for Christ. There is, therefore, the presence of many more Pentecostal churches in Kano than in some southern cities which engage in the work of evangelization.
Settlement Patterns and Policies: Panacea or Threat?

Although its Islamic status was lessened with the emergence of Sokoto as the headquarters of Islam in Nigeria, Kano remained a center of Islamic civilization. Islamic centers are characterized by specialized quarters. By 1859, Kano was organized into seventy-four quarters (Mabogunje 1968) headed by Mai Ungawa—the emir’s representatives. The quarters were divided into two: Birni (the walled or holy city for Kano indigenes and other Muslims of Hausa-Fulani origin in the north), and the Waje (the outside city for non-indigenes). The desire to preserve Islam from pollution led to the separate settlement. Migrants who were Muslim could be quartered inside the walled city. The Wagara, the Arabs, and the Yoruba (in the nineteenth century) were quartered within the walled city at Sharifai, Durimin Turawa, and Tudun Ayagi, respectively (Albert 1994:50, Olaniyi 2006:389-390). The Kanuri were also quartered within the walled city. However, there was no formal law prohibiting the settlement of non-Muslims inside the “holy city.” The reason may not be far-fetched; Christianity had not penetrated Kano, and the number of the traditional religious group was insignificant to constitute a threat to the Islamic Kano.

Tension became imminent with the en masse movement of the southerners into Kano. Lord Lugard, the governor of the protectorate, had earlier promised the Sultan of Sokoto the protection of Islam in the entire northern part of Nigeria (Kirk-Green 1968). Consequently, Christian missionaries were banned from penetrating the north, including Kano. Restriction of the southern influx into Kano was also pursued as a colonial policy, though without much success since colonial administrative and commercial structures in Kano needed educated southerners to man them. Moreover, the high cost of living caused by the economic depression of 1930s made such restriction unrealistic. To keep the southerners away from the natives, a separate settlement for them known as Sabon Gari was established in 1911 by C. I. Temple: “The Sabon Gari Kano should be occupied by non-native Africans and by such natives as might cause trouble if they live in Kano city” (Temple, cited in Albert 1994:56). As Crampton (1975), Ayandele (1966:31), and Olusanya (1967:94) noted, the reason was simply to prevent, as much as possible, missionary influence in the “holy city.” This separation was followed by a law in 1912 which formally prohibited non-Muslims from staying in the walled city (Osaghae 1994:31). Sabon Gari was placed under the Colonial Administration while the Native Authority took charge of Kano city. At the end of the Second World War, Sabon Gari came under the Native Authority and was denied necessary developments (Crowther 1978:340). Non-adherence to settlement policies elicited stricter measures, including a five-pound fine in 1914 (Albert 1999:279). In addition to allaying the fears of the Hausa-Fulani Kanawa, separate settlement was pursued to actualize the British aim of colonization. It was a measure to restrict the influence of the already nationalist southerners (Osaghae 1994:35). To forestall such influence in the north, other northerners were moved from Sabon Gari in 1914 to Tudun Wada under Native Authority.

While colonial separation policies seemed to have temporarily checkmated the spread of Christianity in Kano, the problem of restricting southern influx proved insurmountable. Colonial industries and administrative arrangements in Kano needed skilled and educated personnel that the Hausa-Fulani could not provide because of their isolation from westernization. The migrant population, particularly the Igbo, continued swelling in Kano unabated. Of the 124,989 migrants from the south to the north between 1952 and 1963,
110,742 (88.6 percent) of them came from the east and were overwhelmingly composed of the Igbo; 50 percent of these went to the central core area of Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, and Jos (Nnoli 1978:56). Fifty-nine percent of the inhabitants of Sabon Gari in the mid-1950s were Igbo. These migrants were initially employed at both federal and regional civil services. An opportunity to curtail the southern influx came with the 1954 regionalization, which was followed by a northernerization policy. The southerners in the regional economic and political sectors were replaced with northerners irrespective of the low qualifications of the latter. However, rather than curbing the population flow, this measure caused the migrants to move into the private sector. The Igbo particularly excelled in entrepreneurship as traders supplying the city and its surroundings with motor spare parts, building materials, plastic kettles and other wares, provisions, pharmaceuticals, grains, chewing sticks, and so on. Hence, while still playing a significant role in the official sector through their presence in the federal establishment, the Igbo dominated the private sector of the economy, making Sabon Gari the beehive of economic activities in Kano. The Sabon Gari market established in 1918 had by 1940 reduced the Kano main market to insignificance and squeezed the indigenes out of business (Paden 1970:250). As William Shack (1979:6) observes, the economic aggressiveness of the strangers, more than any other factor, explains the hostility of the host communities to settlers. The Igbo, more than any other group in Kano, were likely to face the wrath of their Kano host. The economic domination, if unchecked, was not only detrimental to the prosperity and survival of the indigenes, it would reduce the Kanawa economic power and, by extension, northern negotiating power at the national level. As Paden (1970) noted, the Kanawa perceived the southern waves of migration as an attempt to facilitate the colonization of the north by the Igbo and the Yoruba.

Using Violent Means to Repel Settlers’ Threats in Kano

The first response to the influx of settlers, as shown above, was separate settlement aimed primarily at preventing missionary influence in the “holy city” and preserving the Islamic identity of Kano. While this strategy swept the problem under the carpet for some time, the fear of economic domination generated by population influx lingered on. The northernerization policy of the Northern Region Government geared towards restricting population inflow instead got the migrants indirectly entrenched as it provided opportunity for the development of the private sector more than ever. The next strategy adopted by the host community was violence.

The first host/settler violent eruption in Kano occurred in 1953. As a result of northern backwardness, or conservatism, the southern motion in 1953 for Nigeria’s political independence in 1956 was opposed by the northerners as premature.3 The southerners decried this refusal in disparaging language and booed northern representatives on the streets of Lagos. The decision by a Yoruba-dominated party (Action Group) to carry its campaign for independence to Kano sparked off a riot in the city. The Kano rioters attacked Sabon Gari, killing and maiming mainly the Igbo. Thirty-five people were declared dead while 251 were

wounded. In the January 1966 coup d’état led by an Igbo major, eminent politicians and high-ranked military men mostly from the north lost their lives. The north perceived this development as an attempt by the south (particularly the Igbo) to dominate the entire nation politically. The promulgation of Decree 34 for a unification of Nigeria by an Igbo military leader seemed to confirm northern fear of domination. On March 29, 1966, the rioters again attacked Sabon Gari, targeting the Igbo. The counter coup d’état of July 1966 produced similar attacks, first in Kano and later in other northern cities, killing thousands of the Igbo. These attacks, as Albert (1995:13-15) rightly observed, were geared towards checkmating the ascendancy of the Igbo in Kano.

After 1966, conflict in Kano became more religiously defined. The 1980 Maitatsine riot and the 1996-1997 Shiite attacks on orthodox Muslims were intra-religious conflicts with some political undertones between the fundamentalist religious groups (with Chadian and Cameroonian links) and orthodox/traditional Muslims in Kano. Kano traditional Muslims detested the tone of the fundamentalists’ preaching, especially their denouncement of Kanawa Muslims who belonged to the kadiriyya and the kabalu traditional Islamic sects as pagans. Several clashes between them produced hundreds of casualties.

The 1980s and 1990s were periods of inter-religious violence, as well. Inter-religious clashes were moves to check the excesses and ascendancy of Christianity represented largely by the easterners in Kano. The fagge crisis of 1982 was sparked by the determination of some Muslims in Kano to prevent the reconstruction of a dilapidated church located close to a mosque. Also, the Muslims, in 1991, detested the tone of advertisement for Reinhard Boonke’s Christian crusade. More so, the permission given to Boonke to preach in Kano could not be reconciled with the government’s refusal to allow Sheikh Deedat from South Africa into Kano for Islamic revival. A riot broke out on October 13 as soon as Boonke arrived in Kano. The 1991 riot marked a watershed in the history of conflicts in Kano. For the first time, the southerners launched a counter-offensive against their host. Again, both Christians and Muslims from the South were attacked unlike earlier when such attacks were restricted to the former. This suggests a mixture of some other issues, perhaps politics, with religious threat.

Beginning in 1999, conflicts in Kano assumed a new dimension. With the new democratic dispensation, Kano became a fertile ground for disgruntled and disfavored politicians who exploited its volatile nature to promote violence against settlers, thereby destabilizing the governments of political opponents. It is within this context that one will understand the October 2001 crisis in Kano, where the perceived “sons and daughters of President Bush” (settlements) in Kano were maimed and killed for the sins of America against Osama bin Laden. Put differently, violent eruptions in Kano since 1999, though in religious

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5 The eastern and western regions together made up the southern Nigeria. The dominant ethnic group in eastern Nigeria is the Igbo. Unlike the western region, with about 45 percent Muslims as of 1966, the eastern region had few Muslim converts, about one percent. For the northerners, therefore, every Igbo man or woman represents Christianity

garbs, have added another dimension to the issue of identity threat which characterized the colonial period and the 1980s and 1990s (Odey 2004:22).

The next response to the problem in Kano was avoidance. This was used by the governments of post-colonial Nigeria. Neither have governments at various levels been committed to finding solutions to the problems in Kano, nor have they devised appropriate conflict management strategies for a volatile zone like Kano. In all these eruptions, the response of the settlers, especially the often-targeted Igbo, was largely temporary flight away from the city. It suffices to argue that none of these measures have addressed considerably the problem. In fact, violent response, separate settlement, northernization, restriction of population inflow, and avoidance could be described as negative-oriented strategies which, more often than not, provide but temporary solutions.

Ethnic Migrant Unions/Empires: The Settlers’ Response

Unlike responses discussed above, ethnic unions and migrant empires were the responses of the settlers to the problem in Kano. As a way of adapting to the Kano environment of centralized political organization and sectional heads without losing their cultural identity, meeting their material and security needs; articulating group interests through petitions and delegates, or protesting publicly, associational ethnicity was adopted by migrant groups in Kano (Osaghae 1994:39-53). Although it had long existed as village, clan, and town unions, by the 1940s, it assumed an ethnic character following the developments in Kano. The Igbo Community Association (ICA), for instance, made provision for a monthly allowance of seven shillings and six pence for their unemployed in Kano (Albert 1995:9). Similarly, the Union built primary and secondary schools in Sabon Gari for their neglected children in the 1960s.

Inter-ethnic collaborative mechanisms were also developed by migrants. In 1944, for instance, the leaders of ten ethnic groups and the Landlords’ Association jointly petitioned the resident officer over the demolition of their houses in Sabon Gari. The Non-Indigenes Consultative Committee, formed in the 1980s to protect the lives and properties of migrants in the wake of religious violence of the period, liaised with the Kano government on matters of security, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. In 1993, for example, when non-indigenes in most parts of the country, fearing a possible outbreak of a civil war following the annulment of a presidential election in 1993, fled most cities in Nigeria, the Kano state government, through this committee and other central ethnic unions, appealed to migrants in the city to remain. These unions also serve as rallying points for concerted actions against attacks and demands for compensations. The potency of the ICA, for example, in security provision and mediation gave it wide acceptance by non-Igbo groups from Bayelsa, Cross River, and Delta States.

However, the most effective of the associational ethnicity mechanisms in Kano was the formation of ethnic migrant empire. In spite of their religious and cultural affinity with the

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7 At the end of the Second World War, the Sabon Gari, which was hitherto under the Colonial Authority, came under the Native Authority. Consequently, it was relegated to the background such that the inhabitants had to take its development by themselves. Moreover, the constitutional development in Nigerian politics during this period accentuated regional and ethnic chauvinism more than it had ever been in the country. Also see, National Archives Kaduna, Kano Prof/6115. Sabon Gari Kano Administration.
Islamic north, which had already endeared them to their host, the Yoruba had by 1974 established their ethnic migrant empire with the installation of the Sarkin (king) Yoruba by the Emir of Kano. The changing character of the Igbo migrants in Kano from temporary sojourners to semi-permanent settlers after the Nigerian civil war,\(^8\) led to the emergence of an Igbo migrant/ethnic empire in the 1980s. The need for better security for themselves and their huge investment in Kano and the desire to participate in the governance and development of Kano propelled them towards Kano’s centralized system of political organization. This point is validated by the fact that no such development was found at this period in other cities like Lagos and Ibadan with large numbers of Igbo. Moreover, as an acephalous, or leaderless, group with a segmentary form of political organization, the Igbo were not inclined to centralized political organization. It can therefore be argued that the associational ethnicity/ethnic migrant empire in Kano was meant to be an instrument of representation, protection, and welfarism that strengthened the status of migrants in Kano. By conformity to the socio-political organization of Kano, migrants expected to enjoy greater respect and acceptance from their host.

On the part of the host community, the society is speedily opening up to new global trends which are gradually bridging the gaps between the north and the south. Unlike earlier, when the northerners were averse to western education, the door has been opened for most northerners to avail themselves of the golden opportunities and empowerment provided by such. A number of institutions of higher learning including the famous Bayero University, Kano, are found in the northern Nigeria today. New and educated elites from these centers of learning, whose ideas and experiences modify and redefine the Hausa-Fulani/Kanawa economic and religious identity, are slowly emerging. For instance, the new elites view settlers’ investments, which hitherto constituted threats, as advantageous to Kano in the new global economy. All these factors are generating new understandings. Some Igbo migrants, especially second-generation migrants and those born and bred in Kano who are not so averse to their host culture as the early groups, live today with the hosts in Gyedi Gyedi, Naibawa, Bompai, Nasarawa, and Fagge—a practice that was earlier a near abomination. A good number of the Kanawa are also found in Sabon Gari today.

Analysis

Following the accident of colonialism, Nigeria was immersed in north-south dichotomy. The north was generally taken to be Islamic while the south was mainly Christian. Lagos and Kano became the commercial emporiums of southern and northern Nigeria respectively. As the center of Islamic civilization in West Africa and the primary repository of northern Nigerian religious, political, economic, and cultural values, Kano became so important to the socio-political and economic development of northern Nigeria, that any threat to the city, what it

\(^8\) Prior to the Nigerian civil war, the Igbo saw themselves as temporary sojourners repatriating their profits from the north and other urban centers home and spending almost equal time in both urban and rural dwellings. At the end of the civil war, owing to the increased level of organization of the migrant associational groups as well as increased investments in Kano, the Igbo migrants began to view themselves no longer as sojourners but as semi-settlers who could live in Kano to protect their investments.
stood for, and its people, was deemed a threat not only to Kano indigenes, but to the entire north, particularly in their negotiating power at the national level. With the British occupation and southerners’ influx, the fear of losing Islamic Kano to Christianity and westernization became rife. Increased population inflow, particularly of the Igbo with their economic assertiveness, added another dimension to this threat, i.e., the fear of their dominating the economy and politics of Kano and, by extension, the entire nation. Separation, the colonial solution to this threat, did not solve the problem; rather, it accentuated the host-settler differences and made the settlers in Sabon Gari the target of their threatened host. Unlike the southern Yoruba group whose politicians conducted an unwanted campaign in Kano, the Igbo were attached because their commercial activities were seen as robbing the indigenes of their economic power and because they did not share similar religious beliefs and values with the Kanawa as the Yoruba did. The pogrom of the Igbo in 1966, which started in Kano and spread from there to other parts of northern Nigeria, showed that the Igbo more than any other group were perceived as a threat to their hosts.

At the end of the Nigerian Civil War, the Igbo who returned to Kano had to start from scratch. This lessened temporarily the economic threat they posed to their hosts through their commercial activities. However, the religious threat persisted. Religious fundamentalism in the 1980s fanned the ember of this threat. There was the fear that the traditional Muslims of Kano would convert to either Christian or Islamic fundamentalism. Since eastern Nigeria is dominated by the Igbo and has no appreciable converts to Islam, the region was generally regarded as the hub of Christianity. Inter-religious crisis during this period usually led to ethnic killings directed in most cases against the Igbo. Having seen the potency of religious crisis in destabilizing the nation, northern politicians of the new democratic government began to exploit religion for their political advantage. Thus, a number of states which hitherto were peaceful have become volatile centers of religious crisis.

If the identity of a group in a social context is determined through negotiation, as Brubaker (2008) noted, and the power of the group to negotiate strongly depends on such variables as: material resources, persuasiveness of its ideology, numerical and psychological strength, and historical position (Weinreich 1963, Smith 1991), then there is no denying the fact that the religious, economic, and socio-political identities of Kano (and the entire north) were threatened with the above historical development. The threat was in two forms, material and symbolic. The first threatened the resources available to the host, while the second, through religious rhetoric and propaganda, challenged the group’s conceptualization of its religious ideology. The two trends threatened the physical structure of the group. The Kanawa were bound to lose members either through defection to Christian or fanatical Muslim groups, or through violent conflict in the struggle for scarce material resources amidst large population inflow. If the physical structure was allowed to be altered negatively, the negotiating power of the north at the national level (given what Kano stands for) would dwindle. It was to forestall such a development that violent attacks were directed particularly against the Igbo who epitomized these threats.

9 The Igbo in Kano and some other parts of northern Nigeria who fled to the eastern region following their attack in 1966 lost their property left behind in Kano. On their return at the end of the war, only a few people were able to recover such property. The rest had to begin all over again.
Like separation, northernization was an indirect way of restricting migrants’ inflow and probably pushing them away from Kano. Unfortunately, mobility as a positive response to threat is largely a strategy of the threatened and so could not solve the problem. Instead, it heightened the already existing threat as migrants turned to dominate, more than ever, the informal sector of the economy in Kano. Violence used by the host as a response elicited mobility again, not from the threatened but the threat. Moreover, it was an involuntary movement and so temporary. The threat reappeared as soon as violence was quelled. Avoidance employed by the federal government falls under inertia as a strategy of response to threat. Various committees set up to investigate each eruption came up with findings, suggestions, and recommendations which the government at all levels neither made public nor implemented.

Ethnic migrant unions and inter-ethnic collaborations were means adopted by migrants in the early days of their settlement to promote their welfare and secure and protect their interest in Kano. It therefore did not invalidate or lessen the threat; rather it provided coping mechanisms to the negative reactions of the host community. However, with the emergence of the eze Igbo (king of the Igbo) in Kano, who is a member of the emir’s cabinet, and the building of the Igbo ethnic empire, the Igbo, like the Yoruba migrants, are not only conforming to the political culture of Kano but have indirectly become the emir’s subjects. Politically therefore, they share common values with their host community.

The westernization of Kano has also helped to gradually bridge the gaps between the conservative ingroup and the westernized outgroup. Their attitudes towards development and other global trends are becoming similar. Western education has increased the status and economic power of Kano indigenes such that their perception of the outgroup and fear of being squeezed out of business by them is lessened. Finally, the new generation of settlers in Kano today have within them a considerable number of people born and bred in the city who could speak the language fluently and who are not so averse to the culture of their hosts as to generate tension and resentment. All these are generating new and better attitudes towards the outgroup. However, religious differences still persist. Although it is expected that new understanding and shared values will lessen religious tensions, religion as a free floating phenomenon is a potent force which can be subtly exploited and manipulated easily by individuals and groups in the name of collective struggle. The religious composition of Nigeria and the new political climate in the country offer politicians and ethnic chauvinists, particularly in the north, the opportunity to use religion to promote their selfish interests. It behooves religious groups (Christians and Muslims) in Kano to educate their people on the real tenets of their religions, especially emphasizing common values among religious groups. These, among other things, will reduce tension and threats and chances of exploiting religious differences by disgruntled political and ethnic elements in Kano.

Conclusions

Although host-settler violent eruptions in Kano, beginning in 1953, had ethnic, religious, and political colorations, they were largely manifestations of threatened identities. The economic power and religious identity of Kano city and, by extension, the political position of all of northern Nigeria, were threatened by the influx of southerners. To maintain the identity of
the city and the negotiating power of the north at the national level, the southern influence, especially that of the Igbo with their socio-cultural uniqueness and economic aggressiveness, had to be curtailed and checkmated. Ethnic, political, and religious strategies were used by the host to repel them. Of all the measures adopted to deal with the issues threatening the city, only those positive strategies adopted by both settlers and hosts on their own to readjust their political differences, promote their socio-cultural similarities, and diminish the unhealthy perception of their economic status, seem to be addressing, albeit gradually, the Kano conflicts. In the search for peace among groups therefore, the role of the third party is only secondary, i.e., to provide fertile ground for peaceful transformation of conflict. The duty of resolving and transforming any given conflict lies largely with the parties involved. Although economic gaps between the host and the settler may seem to be the underlying factor threatening identity, religious and socio-political factors as seen in Kano are also potent forces to reckon with in the search for peaceful host-settler relations. In spite of the reduction of the economic and other socio-political threats, religious difference is still a potent source of violence in the city, making Kano’s relative peace a precarious one.

References


Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta: Exploring the Reconstruction of Nigerian Democracy in Post-Amnesty Peace-Building

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Abstract

This article examines oil, conflict, and peace-building in the Niger Delta, and observes the neglect of democracy as a policy option for sustainable peace. The author argues that the lack of democracy and good governance in Nigeria underpins the slow pace of development, the use of violence in the electoral process, the inequitable allocation of resources, the system of centralized federalism, and the absence of institutional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts which have triggered violence in the region. The inability of the Nigerian people to hold their government accountable due to election rigging is a major constraint to development and peace-building. The reconstruction of Nigerian democracy, by ensuring that votes count in free and fair elections in order to make elections opportunities for political choice and good governance and the recognition of collective rights through political representation in the legislature, appears to be the best option for sustainable peace in post-amnesty Niger Delta.

Introduction

Nigeria’s Niger Delta has been a theater of conflicts linked to oil. Although oil, which accounts for 85 percent of federal revenues and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings (Obi, 2010:473), is mainly produced in the Niger Delta, the region lacks development (UNDP, 2006). This paradox triggered conflicts which began in the 1970s as community agitations against transnational oil companies (TOCs). The issues in contention were environmental pollution, payment of compensation for properties destroyed by oil production activities, and provision of basic social amenities such as potable water, school buildings, health facilities, and the security of livelihoods. From community agitations in the 1970s, the conflict was transformed to full blown insurgency in 2005 (Watts, 2007), as militia groups, which emerged to make political demands such as resource control and self-determination, engaged the Nigerian security forces in armed confrontations.

The militia groups, the most prominent being Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), attacked oil infrastructure and seized oil workers, whom they held as hostages. This interrupted oil production and reduced the country’s production output. This got to its climax in 2009 as disruptions in oil production cut the country’s oil production by about 25 percent (Obi, 2010, p.477). As part of conflict resolution and peace-building, the Nigerian government offered amnesty to militia combatants. The 60-day amnesty, declared in June

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2009, but which commenced on 3 August 2009, ended on 4 October 2010, and recorded the surrender of 287,445 rounds of ammunition, 3,155 magazines, 1,090 dynamite caps, 763 explosives, and 18 gun boats, and the renunciation of militancy by over 26,000 persons (The Nation, October 2009, p.1; Kinsley Kuku, 2011). Since then, the violent attacks on oil facilities, kidnapping, and hostage taking have ceased. Oil production has risen to its peak, while the post-amnesty rehabilitation and reintegration process is ongoing.

Thus far, the role of democracy has been ignored in the sustenance of the cessation of violence in the region. Significantly, the literature has noted democracy as the best option for peace-building because of the opportunities it provides for the peaceful resolution of disputes, promotion of accountability, and the provision of an enabling environment for the open and fair competition for political power (Samuels, 2005) and the enhancement of development (Ake, 1996a).

Peace-building pertains to the establishment of sustainable peace. It involves three phases which deal with conflict prevention, conflict resolution or management, and post-conflict settlement (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). The end of organized armed conflicts, such as the type in the Niger Delta, requires adequate intervention measures to prevent the recurrence of violence. Santiso (2002) has noted in this regard that the United Nations has in recent times linked peace to development, and for this reason emphasis has been placed on the promotion of democracy and the strengthening of good governance as core issues in post-conflict peace-building. This is predicated on the peace, development, and democracy nexus, which sees societal reconciliation, democratization, and economic reconstruction as mutually reinforcing factors in peace-building. However, the conditions have not been adequately established as a strategy for sustainable peace in post-amnesty Niger Delta.

This article thus notes that the neglect of democracy in the post-amnesty peace process in the Niger Delta is a major challenge to peace-building in the region. It argues that the best option to prevent the recurrence of violence in the region is to secure democracy in Nigeria. The link between democracy and the Niger Delta crisis is not new, as the Willink Commission highlighted in its 1958 report. Recently, some studies have also drawn attention to this (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, 2007), but have failed to address how Nigerian democracy can be reconstructed to ensure peace in the region.

The paper explores the argument that the reconstruction of Nigerian democracy by ensuring that votes count, in order to make elections opportunities for political choice and good governance and the recognition of collective rights through political representation in the legislature, is the best option for sustainable peace in post-amnesty Niger Delta. Specifically, the following issues are analyzed:

(1) How has the failure of democracy in Nigeria impacted the Niger Delta Crisis?

(2) How can Nigerian democracy be reconstructed to promote peace-building in the Niger Delta?

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1 Kinsley Kuku is Special Adviser on the Amnesty Program to Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.
Bringing Democracy into Niger Delta Discourse

Inarguably, the lack of development is the most fundamental cause of the Niger Delta conflict, as the quest for development stands out as the primary objective for agitations and demands for resource control and self-determination. This makes a clear understanding of the paradox of development in the region a crucial requirement for peace-building. Thus far, the analysis sees ethnicity-based political domination as the most fundamental cause of the lack of development and the persistence of conflict in the region (Naanen, 1995; Okoko, Nna & Ibaba, 2006). This standpoint blames the neglect of development in the Niger Delta on the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria that have used their control of the Nigerian state to deny the Niger Delta people an equitable share of national revenues. State legislation, such as the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Petroleum Act of 1969, and the gradual reduction of the derivation principle from 50 percent in 1960 to 1.5 percent in 1984, have been noted as the effects of ethnicity politics, which instigated the crisis in the region.

This explains the dominant view which sees the restructuring of Nigerian federalism, resource ownership, and control as the best option to end ethnicity-based domination and ensure development in the Niger Delta. But Wheare (1964, p.47) has observed that non-democracies are incompatible with federalism and insists “that federalism demands forms of government which have characteristics usually associated with democracy or free government.” The main essentials that Wheare pointed out are, “free election and party system, with its guarantee of a responsible opposition.” Although Jinadu (1979) has questioned this view because of lack of empirical investigation, Suberu and Agbaje (1998) agree with it on the basis of the Nigerian experience, where autocratic military rule abused the country’s federal system. One element of this abuse is the centralization of powers and national resources, and the resultant subordination of the states to the federal government. The several years of military rule created structural deficiencies in the federal system, as the military imposed its superstructure on the country’s federal structure, leading to the centralization and concentration of powers in the federal government (Naanen, 1995).

The interdependence between democracy, development, and conflict resolution in the Niger Delta was also highlighted by the Willink Commission Report (1958:30, 95) which noted “voting power, development of democratic institutions, and detribalized party system as the best protection against governmental neglect or discrimination.” Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz (2007) also share this view when they argued that “democratic governance and conflict resolution are the only routes to secure the Niger Delta.” This suggests that the failure of democracy in Nigeria cannot be disconnected from the crisis in the Niger Delta, as it has led to

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2 Nigeria is a federation of thirty-six states, and powers are shared on the basis of the exclusive and concurrent lists. The exclusive list is made up of sixty-eight items and is reserved for the federal government. The concurrent list, made up of thirty items, is for both the federal and state government, but the federal government overrides the states whenever there is conflict. Further, national revenues are centralized and paid into a common account known as the Federation Account. Revenues are shared monthly among the federal, state, and local governments based on criteria such as derivation, population, need, etc.

3 The Willink Commission was established by the British colonial government in 1957 to ascertain the facts about fears of domination expressed by minorities in Nigeria and propose means of allaying such fears. The Commission’s Report was submitted 30 July 1958.
the loss of the development and peace benefits of democracy, such as the enhancement of development and reduction of structural violence, the establishment of governance and political rules that minimize the potentials for conflict, checks and balances of governmental powers, political representation that addresses deep-seated divisions and unequal access to resources, provision of avenues for rational political discourse and settlement of conflicting social interests, good governance, accountability, and transparency (Ake, 1996a; Ake 1996b; McGuire & Olson, 1996; Brown & Hunter, 1994; Diamond, 2004; Samuels, 2005; Ross, 2006).

The poor state of development and economic progress in the country cannot be dissociated from the lack of democracy and good governance. Similarly, the failure of development and the crisis plaguing the national economy cannot be disconnected from the Niger Delta crisis. The oil industry is associated with negative impacts on the environment, due mainly to oil spillages and gas flaring. Adeyemo (2008, p.62) has noted that between 1991 and 2000, a total of 5,781 incidences of oil spills, involving the spilling of 640,987,209 barrels of crude oil were recorded in the region. Similarly, the United Nations Development Program reported in 2006 that between 1976 and 2001 about 3 million barrels of crude oil were spilled in a total of 6,817 incidences. Less than 30 percent of this was recovered (UNDP, 2006, p.76). Also, it is estimated that the country flares about 17.2 billion cubic meter of gas every year (Onyekonwu, 2008, p.17). Oil spills and gas flares destroy crops and economically useful trees, diminish agricultural production, destroy mangrove swamps, reduce nutrient value of the soil, and kill marine life (UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 1995; Adeyemo, 2002). Because oil production mainly takes place in the rural areas, which make up over 90 percent of the settlements in the region (UNDP, 2006, P. 23), oil spills and gas flares have destroyed the local economies, which are mainly based on fishing and farming.

One consequence of the oil-induced collapse of the local economies, made worse by poor governance and rural neglect, is population displacement as people search for alternative means of survival. Although figures are not available, it is widely known that this has contributed to rural-urban migration. But the poor state of development and economic decline in the country has compounded the situation. The lack of employment opportunities and social infrastructure in the urban areas has created frustration, which is one source of aggression in the region. The point here is that if the country had witnessed development and economic prosperity, it could have moderated frustration and anger. If those who migrated to the urban areas had gainful employment or other opportunities for survival, the structural violence which has contributed to the crisis could have been minimal.

Presently, Nigeria generates 3000 megawatts of electricity for a population of over 140 million persons. It also has only four refineries with production capacity for just over 50 percent of consumption needs. This is so despite the huge sums of money derived from the sales of oil only. The country has received 509.6 billion USD between 1960 and 2006 as oil revenue (Ibaba, 2009). Claims that the major ethnic groups have used the oil wealth to develop their ethnic homelands at the expense of the Niger Delta appear not to capture the reality, as development indices show, for example, that the Northern part of the country is less developed than the South (NPC, 2008). Similarly, the development of the Niger Delta does not reflect the huge oil revenues that have flowed into the region since 2000. The Olusegun Obasanjo regime, which came into power in May 1999, began the implementation of the 13 percent derivation fund in March 2000, and this increased revenue transfer from the Federation Account to the
This captures the views of Diamond (2004) who posits that “poverty is not just a lack of resources, but also a lack of political power and voice at all levels of authority.” Unlike non-democratic rule, democratic governance empowers the poor and common citizens in a number of ways as identified by Diamond (2004). First is that free and fair elections motivate political leaders to be responsive because they can be voted out of power for corruption, inefficiency, and other reasons. Second, it provides citizens the means to articulate and defend their interests, in addition to participation in the public policy process. Third, it ensures transparency and accountability in governance. If this is true, then it is certain to enhance development. But scholars have drawn attention to compatibilities and contradictions in relation to the democracy-development thesis, citing cases where authoritarian regimes have enhanced development better than democracies, or where no difference exists in their development performance. Probably alluding to this, Waziri (2009, p. 9), has provided data to show that most of the critical infrastructure in Nigeria, such as roads, railways, and airports, were provided by military regimes.

But Ake (1996a) has argued that authoritarian regimes only promote economic growth, and not development, because democracy itself is part of development. This article agrees with Ake, and predicates this on the views of the South Commission Report (1990) which considers “individual freedoms of speech, organization, publication, and a system of justice which protects people from actions inconsistent with just laws” as part of the components of development. Importantly, the protection of rights and the rule of law are better realized in a democracy. However, Oludoye (2006) has amassed empirical evidence to argue that democratic governance in Nigeria appears not to impact positively on the funding of development. Using federal government expenditure for thirty-three years (1970 – 2002) as the basis of analysis, Oludoye highlighted the recurrent and capital components of federal government budget and notes that:

The highest proportion of recurrent expenditure occurred in 1970 and 1971. Apart from 1987 and 1988 with actual recurrent expenditure accounting for 71 percent and 70 percent respectively, there were no other years when the recurrent expenditure attained this lofty height. Conversely, capital expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure played the second fiddle. The highest level of capital investment was recorded in 1980 with nearly 68 percent, while the lowest occurred in 1987 with nearly 29 percent. The growth rate was negative in only 8 of the 33 years...1978, 1979, 1981, 1982,1983,1984,1994 and 2000. Three out of these years fell within military dictatorships, while five of them were during civilian administrations (pp. 27-28).

This appears to negate the views of Brown and Hunter (2004) who contend that democracy funds social infrastructure and services at higher levels than non-democracies. But the huge sums involved in budgeting, which hardly affects the quality of life of the poor, draws attention to the issue of bad governance. Corruption, the illegal or unethical use of governmental authority for personal or political gain (Agara, 2006), underlies governance
failure in Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria has created a culture of politics which inhibits the attainment of peace and development. Since independence in 1960, governance in Nigeria has been dominated by non-democratic governments, as the military has ruled the country for about twenty-seven of the fifty years Nigeria has existed as an independent country.

Whereas the many years of military rule are significant, the years of democratic governance are perhaps more significant, due to the near total lack of democratic values and principles in governance. Elections are central to democratic practice, as they provide the avenue for citizens to freely choose their leaders, a process that results in the establishment of social contract, accountability, transparency, and the responsiveness of government to the needs and aspirations of the people (Okoko, 1998; Gauba, 2003). But in Nigeria, votes hardly count in elections due to election rigging (Agbaje & Adejumobi, 2006), and this has led to what Ake (1996b) calls “elections without choice.” Because those who govern are not elected by the people, the leadership is unresponsive to national development goals.

Two key elements of democracy in Nigeria are ethnicity politics and election rigging. One consequence of British colonial rule was the emergence of ethnic consciousness and the subsequent ethnicization of politics. Nnoli (1978) blames this on socio-economic scarcity and the resultant competition for the resources. Deprivation in the colonial urban setting, Nnoli explains, enhanced ethnic identities, which made people compete on the basis of ethnic affiliations. The politicization of ethnicity affected the nationalist movement, and this led to the emergence of ethnically-oriented political parties (Coleman, 1986; Ademoyega, 1981). Examples include the Action Group (AG), the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) for the first republic, and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigeria People’s Party (NPP), the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) for the second republic. The third and fourth republics had political parties that were more national in outlook, but ethnicity, as a rallying point for political mobilization, is a fundamental characteristic of these parties. A logical outcome of this has been ethnic voting behavior and the ethnicization of state policies.

The centrality of ethnicity in the voting pattern of Nigerians has been adequately captured by Alapiki (1995) using the 1979, 1983, and 1993 presidential elections. The election results clearly show party preferences based on ethnic considerations. The UPN, led by the Yoruba, got the highest number of votes in the Yoruba states, just as the NPP, led by the Ibo, and the NPN, PRP, and GNPP, led by the Hausa-Fulani, received the highest number of votes in the ethnic enclaves of their leaders. Although the 1993 presidential elections, contested by two state-created political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention, is widely seen to have departed from ethnicity-based support, Alapiki (1995:95) has provided data to the contrary. The results indicate that the SDP received 61.6 percent of the votes from the southern part of Nigeria and 38.4 percent from the North. In like manner, the NRC got 56 percent of votes from the North and 43 percent from the South. The Yoruba candidate of the SDP scored the highest number of votes in the Yoruba-dominated states of Ogun (87.8%), Lagos (85.5%), Ondo (84.4%), Osun (83.5%), and Oyo (83.5%). The SDP presented a Yoruba as its flag bearer for the election, while the NRC presented a Hausa-Fulani. This article

4 The elections were inconclusive, and this represents the results that were released.
agrees with Alapiki that although other factors contributed to the outcome of the election results, the ethnic factor seems to have played the dominant role.

The results of the 1999 presidential elections are perhaps more demonstrative of ethnic preference for political parties. The elections were contested by three political parties: People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Alliance for Democracy (AD), and the All People’s Party (APP), later renamed All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP). The APP adopted the candidate of the AD, and for this reason, the elections were contested by two candidates. Because the presidency was zoned to the southern part of Nigeria, the two candidates were of Yoruba origin. The AD was led by the Yoruba, and the PDP by the Hausa-Fulani. The Ibo had no candidate, while the Niger Delta retained its traditional alliance with the Hausa-Fulani. The election results demonstrated ethnic bias in the voting pattern. Although both candidates, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP and Chief Olu Falae of the AD, are of the Yoruba ethnic group, the Yorubas voted massively for Chief Olu Falae because Chief Obasanjo was widely believed to be a stooge of the Hausa-Fulani-dominated North (Mohammed, 2008).

The PDP got massive votes in the Hausa-Fulani-dominated North, and the impressive votes received by the AD in the North are attributable to the influence of tribal leaders, who led the APP in their states. Examples of such states include Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Borno, Gombe, and Kogi. Because the Ibo had no candidate, the party affiliation of the political elites underpinned by ethnic interests swayed votes in favor of the political parties and their candidates. For example, the AD got the highest percentage of votes (42.70%) in the Ibo area from Imo State, where prominent indigenes were leaders of the APP. In the case of the Niger Delta, the massive votes received by the PDP are attributable to the traditional alliance between the Niger Delta and the North. Political elites of the Niger Delta prefer to align with the North, based on the perception that they are less vicious with ethnicity politics. It is imperative to note that in 2003, the Yoruba-led AD did not nominate a candidate for the presidential election, but rather asked its members to vote for the PDP candidate, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. This time, the PDP got massive votes in the Yoruba-dominated states. One consequence of this ethnically-defined voting is the preference for political patronage, as against commitment to national development. Thus the use of elections as avenues for political choice and good governance is abused. Ethnicity-based political behavior, which also pervades the states, is reinforced by the structure of governance which places minority groups at a disadvantage. For example, representation in the upper branch of the legislature, the Senate, is based on equality. Thus, each state is represented by three senators. This implies that the Yoruba-dominated south-west zone has eighteen senators, the Ibo-dominated south-east has fifteen senators, while the Niger Delta also has eighteen senators. The north-west has twenty-one senators, north-east, eighteen, and north-central, nineteen.

Representation in the lower branch of the legislature, the House of Representatives, is based on population, and given the large population of the major ethnic groups, they have higher numbers of representatives. For example, the 2006 census figures indicate percentages of 19.7 for the south-west; 11.7 for the south-east; 15.0 for

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5 The south-west zone is made of six states, the south-east, five states, south-south, six states, north-east, six states, north-west, seven states, and north central, six states. In addition, there is one senatorial district from Abuja, the federal capital territory.
the south-south; 25.6 for the north-west; 13.5 for the north-east; and 13.5 for the north-central. This numerical strength and the two-thirds majority requirement for decisions to be taken in the legislature have subjected the destiny of minority groups to the majority groups. A major consequence of this situation is that state policies reflect ethnic interests, and for this reason public policies lack economic rationality and thus have limited developmental impact (Ake, 2001). Further, it has deepened ethnic cleavages and antagonisms and undermined the peaceful resolution of disputes.

This condition is made worse by the desperate struggle for political power at all levels of the state, triggered by the privatization, personalization, and use of the state for the pursuit of private interests (Aaron, 2006; Ekekwe, 1986). According to Ake (2001, p. 46-47), a logical outcome of this is election rigging, the use of violence in the electoral process, the alienation of citizens from political participation, corruption and the lack of accountability, and the unresponsiveness of government to the needs and aspirations of the people. Rigging is synonymous to Nigerian elections (Alapiki, 1995; Ibrahim, 2006), and has made the majority of Nigerians lose faith in elections as effective means for the selection of leaders (Afrobarometer, 2006). This is done through vote buying, violence, and unlawful activities such as the falsification of election results, illegal printing of voter cards and result sheets, illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers, announcing results for places where elections did not occur, and stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers (Bratton, 2008 Ibrahim, 2006).

Election rigging is one key reason for the inefficiency of government in Nigeria, as citizens cannot hold the government accountable. Because elections are rigged, votes do not count, and therefore the people cannot vote out a bad, inefficient, or corrupt government. An electoral system is an alternative to violence in the contest for power, but rigging undermines this and makes violence a tactic for political competition (Ibrahim, 2006), as evidenced by the commoditization of violence in the Nigerian electoral system (Joab-Peterside, 2005). This is a major challenge to peace-building in the post-amnesty Niger Delta. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented the interdependence between elections and violence in the Niger Delta. Using Rivers State in the Niger Delta as a case study, the February 2005 briefing paper of HRW highlighted how politicians encouraged armed groups to disrupt elections. It noted in particular the use of the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Asari Dokubo and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to counter the influence of opposition parties and the mobilization of support.

Joab-Peterside (2005) made the same point and explained that, due to insecurity, residents in Port Harcourt, the Rivers State capital, had constituted themselves into armed vigilantes to provide security. But these vigilantes were hijacked by politicians to compete for political power, leading to the recruitment of armed youths as political thugs. The NDPVF and the NDV were recruited for this purpose for the 2003 elections in Rivers State. Although the PDP was the party in power, the ANPP controlled the Okrika local government, one of the twenty-three local government areas in the state. It did so by winning the dominant votes in the area during the 1999 elections. But in the 2003 elections, the PDP sought to counter the

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6 Nigeria runs a three-tiered federal system, made of the federal, state, and local governments. Each state of the federation is divided into local governments, determined by population and viability. The country has a total of 774 local government areas.
influence of the ANPP in the area, and chose violence as the tactic. Joab-Peterside noted that the PDP provided logistics and political protection to the leadership of NDV to violently dislodge the ANPP. This resulted in violence, loss of lives and property, and the displacement of several persons. Similarly, the PDP recruited the NDPVF and its leader Asari Dokubo to take over the leadership of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) as a means to mobilize youths to ensure the victory of PDP in the 2003 elections.

A number of issues are discernible from the discussion above. First, the proliferation of arms, instigated by insecurity, laid the foundation for armed gangs and groups in the Niger Delta. Second, the availability of arms and the desperate struggle for power make violence an essential commodity in the electoral process. Third, the Niger Delta will be prone to violence as long as there is the proliferation of arms, and politics in Nigeria resembles warfare. But the arms and the armed youths will only undermine peace if the objective conditions of poverty and election rigging remain. This makes the reconstruction of Nigerian democracy an important ingredient of peace-building in the region.

Making Votes Count and Reforms in Political Representation: Exploring the Reconstructing of Nigerian Democracy

One of the most fundamental challenges to democracy in Nigeria is to make elections opportunities for political choice and good governance. As noted earlier, rigging has undermined choice in the electoral process, making Nigeria operate a disabled democracy where people either vote without choosing (Ake 1996b) or don’t vote at all. Significantly, elections underpin democracy, and thus making votes count is central to the reconstruction of Nigerian democracy. As mentioned earlier, free and fair elections ensure that the government is accountable, transparent, participatory, and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. This enhances development and also creates an enabling environment for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Because election rigging denies the political system these advantages, democracy in Nigeria alienates the people. For example, one effect of rigging is corruption and the deprivation of the people of the oil wealth. Because the institutions of governance at the federal, state, and local levels are corrupt, only a small fraction of budgeted funds trickle down to the population. Consequently, development, hindered by the activities of the oil industry, is not achieved, thus creating a fertile ground for conflicts to thrive. This makes the containment of election rigging a useful tactic for peace-building. An understanding of how rigging takes place is essential for the determination of policy options to deal with the issue. Table 1 provides information on election rigging methods in Nigeria.
**Table 1: Modes of Election Rigging in Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Election Day Rigging</th>
<th>Polling-Day Rigging</th>
<th>Post-Election Rigging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Illegal acquisition of voter cards by political parties and their candidates to over-register voters in their strongholds and under-register in their opponent’s enclave</td>
<td>1) Collaboration between polling officials and political parties to subvert electoral rules. For example, distribution of fake result sheets.</td>
<td>1) Destruction of or refusal to count ballots from opposition strongholds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Recruitment of loyal party supporters as electoral officers</td>
<td>2) Late or non-supply of election materials to opposition strongholds</td>
<td>2) Changing results between voting centers and collation centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Buying over electoral officials</td>
<td>3) Delay in opening polling centers located in opposition strongholds</td>
<td>3) Declaration of false results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Prevention of candidates from contesting party primaries</td>
<td>4) Stuffing of ballot boxes</td>
<td>4) Annulment of elections in situations where the results are unacceptable to incumbents or other parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Falsification of electoral constituencies and polling units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Falsification of voters register by adding names of party members, or deleting the names of opposition party members</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibrahim, 2006, p.13

Election rigging has become a central feature of elections in Nigeria since independence, despite the damage it has caused the political system. Alapiki (1995), Ibrahim (2006), and Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006) have all given vivid accounts of how elections have been consistently rigged in the country. But why has this continued unabated? The culture of impunity in the country where people who breach or violate rules are not punished or are sanctioned appears to be one answer. Thus far, there is no known case of conviction or punishment arising from electoral fraud, despite the widespread nature of rigging. Because persons who engage in rigging are not punished or made to suffer any inconvenience, people have continued to engage in it. Rather than being punished, people who engage in rigging are rewarded with political appointments and contracts. Presently, some state governors whose elections were annulled by the courts on account of rigging have gotten extended tenures, having won the re-run elections. For example, in Bayelsa, Kogi, Cross River, and Ekiti States, the elections of the incumbent governors were annulled after they served for about one year. However, these governors won the re-run elections, and based on a Supreme Court judgment that the four-year tenure of a governor begins to count from the date of swearing in, these governors are expected to be in office for another four years. If the laws provided for the disqualification of any beneficiary of rigging from future elections and, in addition, subjected him to a prison term, they probably would discourage rigging.

Another issue to consider is the ethics crisis facing the country and its impact on political parties and the electoral body in the country. Political parties represent one of the essential institutions for democracy to thrive efficiently. But this depends on their adherence to the rules. Unfortunately, the country is presently experiencing an ethics crisis, and this has rubbed off on the political parties. In common usage, ethics is associated with morality, which deals with matters of right and wrong (Babbie, 1979, p.59). Ethics manifests as behavioral patterns defined by environmental, political, ideological, religious, economic, cultural, and social factors.
It is predicated on rational behavior which is always in tandem with rules of conduct, and therefore promotes individual aspirations and collective interests. What is ethical or unethical is measured with behavioral patterns that are either in or out of sync with agreed practices of society or organization. It is discernible that ethics is the standards of conduct of a people, society, government, profession, or organization. Obedience to ethics promotes organizational goals. For example, the standards of conduct in the civil service include anonymity, impartiality, political neutrality, obedience to rules and regulations, respect for senior officers by subordinates, and the exhibition of rational behavior by members (Lynn and Wildavsky, 1992; Adebayo, 2000; Henry, 2004). Strict adherence to these ethical standards promotes efficient service delivery by the civil service.

In politics and governance, ethical norms include obedience to the rule of law, probity and national interest, fair play, justice, hard work, respect for other people’s rights and responsibilities, and impartiality (King, 2006). Ethical behaviors promote individual aspirations and the collective interest of society, while unethical behaviors are destructive. Even though the latter behaviors may enhance individual interests, they destroy those of society. In governance, unethical behaviors, which include corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, and nepotism, undermine development and peaceful existence. But the ethics crisis sustains such behaviors in Nigeria. Ethics crisis refers to a situation where unethical behaviors have become acceptable in society. In order words, irrational behavior, or behaviors which infringe on the accepted standards of conduct, have become a way of life (Robbins and Coulter 1996). This is pervasive in Nigeria. For example, although election rigging negates the fundamental principles of democracy, Nigerian political parties see rigging as a requirement for electoral victory.

Political parties in Nigeria are ethnicized and lack ideology, discipline, and internal democracy (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). Consequences of these include internal strife, imposition of flag bearers, and abuse of party rules and the constitution. This accounts for their use of rigging and violence as tactics for election victory. For example, when a party imposes an unpopular candidate on its members, it tends to engage in rigging to ensure victory. Making votes count in Nigerian elections will therefore require the strengthening of political parties. Similarly, officials of the Independent National Electoral Commission see the conduct of elections as avenues to amass wealth, thus encouraging compromise and fraud (AIT, 2010). Ethical orientation and an enforceable code of ethics are therefore essential to ensure that votes count in Nigerian elections.

The voting process also requires changes to ensure free and fair elections. Presently, the country votes by the open-secret method where a voter is accredited in the open, makes his/her choice in secrecy, and votes in the open. Whereas this method checks some problems such as ballot box stuffing, the requirement that voters should leave the polling center after voting compromises election results. Although votes are counted at the polling centers, it is only party agents, election officials, and security personnel that are involved, leaving room for compromises and manipulations. The 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria are widely acclaimed to be the most free and fair elections in the country. A fundamental reason which accounted for this was the open ballot system which ensured that votes were counted and declared in the presence of everybody. While the open ballot system would not work because of problems of intimidation and assault on persons who did not vote for a particular candidate,
the declaration of results in the full view of all voters in all polling centers would contribute to free and fair elections and significantly reduce post-election rigging as election results will be in the public domain.

The electorate also has a crucial role to play to curtail election day and post-election rigging. One crucial issue is the compilation of an inclusive voter register that is known to the public. A major means of election rigging is the manipulation of the voter register through the inflation of names or the deletion of names. Names are usually deleted in the strongholds of opposing political parties by the party manipulating the voter register. The display of voter register for claims and objections prior to elections can reasonably correct such fraud and enhance transparency and fairness in the conduct of elections.

Making votes count will contribute to peace-building in the Niger Delta in a number of ways. The first is making government accountable and responsive to the people. The knowledge that the people can vote a government out of office will ensure judicious and equitable use of the oil wealth. Budgeted funds will get to their targets and thus enhance development. This may also lead to the end of political thuggery and election violence, as efficient service delivery and policy positions become the basis for winning elections. Ending corruption in the Niger Delta, a fundamental requirement for peace-building and development, lies with the power of the people to vote out corrupt governments. The achievement of government accountability, however, depends on a vigilant civil society. Voter education and the insistence on adherence to election rules through the judicial system are tactics that can be adopted by civil society organizations (CSOs) to strengthen the electoral process. The activation of the civil society enhances democratization through the protection of the rights of freedom, property, and life from attacks by the state, monitoring and controlling state activities and citizen’s rights, articulating interests and bringing relevant issues to the public agenda, forming democratic attitudes and habits, tolerance and trust, building social capital and bridging societal cleavages, and balancing interests with the state (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, p. 32).

The re-invention of these civil organizational functions, which is a condition for the strengthening of CSOs in Nigeria, is crucial. The required changes in the political process can most likely be spearheaded by CSOs, as the political leadership can only do so by committing symbolic suicide (Wilmot, 1980), an act which appears improbable at the moment. Diamond (2001) has explained that, on their own, political leaders lack the motive or at least the opportunity for reform due to reluctance for change, arising from the privileges and opportunities they derive from the existing order (Diamond, 2001).

In addition to this is the need to address horizontal inequalities through political representation. Ake (1996a) has identified the recognition of collective rights and incorporation as essential elements of democracy that can ensure development in Africa. To achieve these, Ake suggested the establishment of a “chamber of nationalities,” made up of equal representation by various nationality groups, at national and sub-national levels. This can apply to the Niger Delta condition as such a legislature can generate participatory and nationalistic feelings, and thus help to moderate the ethnic tensions which arise as a result of ethnicity-

7 Non-governmental, not-for-profit, and non-state actor organizations, (World Bank, 2006; Ikelegbe, 2001).
8 Subordinating their personal interests to the public good.
based political domination. The inclusion of marginalized groups as representatives in the legislature, whose exclusion undermines democracy and development (Ake, 1996a), is also critical. The provision of special representation for CSOs in the legislature is likely to provide avenues for all groups to canvass their interests and thus make people see dialogue as an alternative to violence.

As noted earlier, the structure of political representation in the country has contributed to the marginalization of minority ethnic groups, and is a causal factor of the conflict in the Niger Delta. It is imperative to note that ethnicity-based political domination is not restricted to the majority groups alone. In the states of Nigeria, there is evidence of ethnic domination, and this has triggered conflict. A classic example in the Niger Delta is the case in Delta State, where the Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic groups have been pitched against each other due to Ijaw grievances over Itsekiri domination (Ukiwo, 2007). With the exception of Bayelsa State, all the other states in the Niger Delta are made up of heterogeneous ethnic groups who are not equal. The realities of ethnic politics in Nigeria make the protection of the collective rights of minority groups imperative for the peace process.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to demonstrate that democracy is central to resolving conflict in the Niger Delta. It has argued that the lack of democracy and good governance in Nigeria underpins the lack of development, use of violence in the electoral process, inequitable resource allocation, centralized federalism, and absence of institutional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, which have triggered conflict in the Niger Delta. However, the paper has observed that these problems have been neglected in the post-amnesty peace-building program and noted this as a major challenge. In the view of the author, the inability of the people to hold government accountable due to election rigging is a major constraint on development and peace-building, and he makes a case for the reconstruction of Nigerian democracy by ensuring that votes count, in order to make elections opportunities for political choice and good governance. Free and fair elections ensure that the government is accountable, transparent, participatory, and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, and thus they enhance development and also create an enabling environment for the peaceful resolution of disputes. To achieve this condition, however, requires a strong civil society that has the capacity to demand transparency and accountability in governance. This, and the recognition of collective rights through the creation of a legislative “chamber of ethnic nationalities,” are crucial options for preventing the recurrence of violence in the post-amnesty Niger Delta. The author acknowledges the fact that ensuring free and fair elections will not address all the contending issues in the conflict, but he notes that it is an important step to take in the march towards peace-building in the region.
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The Nation, 9 October 2009.


Militarization and Gender: Pathways to a Violence-Based Patriarchy

Muhammed Asadi*

Abstract

My purpose in this paper was to empirically test the relationship between the level of militarization of a society and its level of gender-based stratification. Militarization is a gendering process which works only when certain assumptions regarding masculinity and femininity are culturally dominant within an institution. These gendered relationships are projected in the wider society depending on the importance of the military within a social structure. Using global data comprising of sixty-one countries, my findings suggest that militarization has a significant and highly diminishing effect on women’s empowerment and an enhancing effect on violence against women.

To become militarized is to accept militaristic values (belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force) and priorities as one’s own. To see military solutions as particularly effective, to see the world as a dangerous place best approached with militaristic attitudes...most of the people of the world who are militarized are not themselves in uniform. Most militarized people are civilians.

Cynthia Enloe (2007:4)

Introduction

Classical Marxism recognizes only two primary divisions in capitalist society, the division between the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and the workers (the proletariat). Marx theorized that as capitalism advanced from its free market “thesis” towards the monopoly form, all other divisions that existed, as carryovers from previous modes of production, would gradually either wither away,¹ diminish in importance, or be transformed in order to serve the underlying relationships of production within capitalism (Marx 1846). These divisions, such as racial- and gender-based divisions, as relationships linked to earlier modes of production, have not vanished. Together with the newly constructed and sustained (through political affirmative action) white middle class in the United States, post-World War II (Mills 1951, Katzenelson 2006) racial and gendered divisions still structurally stratify groups of people within the United States and by extension in the U.S.-dominated, post-World War II world, given the United States’ hegemonic status within a capitalist world order.

Remaining within Marx’s elaboration, we can understand why multitier stratification still persists within advanced capitalism.² The mode of production defined by laissez faire capitalism

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¹ “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.” (Marx and Engels, 1848)

² “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production and with them the whole relations of society…” (Marx and Engels 1848)
of the Victorian era produced specific relationships which, if allowed to progress without structural grafts and adjustments, would eventually lead to a withering away of all non-class-based divisions, similar to the elimination of slave labor in the process that defined the proletarianization of the work force for the purpose of accumulation. The end result of such a concentrated class-based conflict, were it to proceed without adjustment, would be a socialist revolution and an end to a capitalist accumulations regime. In order to preserve the accumulation process, divisions from the past that exist as “ruins” of earlier forms of social organization are incorporated within capitalism and transformed in the process, to be of service in the preservation of the system. In *The German Ideology* (1846), Marx and Engels state,

Bourgeoisie society is the most advanced and complex historical organization of production....(which) therefore provides an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all formerly existing social formations, the ruins and component elements of which were used in the creation of bourgeoisie society. Some of these unassimilated remains are still carried on within bourgeoisie society, others however which previously existed in rudimentary form, have been further developed.... (Part 1, Feuerbach.)

The surplus human societies were able to muster by mixing domesticated animals with land tilling technology allowed large cities with settled populations to become possible for the first time in human history (Lenski 1984). A rapidly growing population (high fertility rates) meant that women were preoccupied with reproductive labor more than at any time in human history, which put them at an exclusive disadvantage in the economic realm of production. This disadvantage in the productive arena was what led to the emergence of classical patriarchy, where men are considered “naturally” in charge of women because they are dependent on men for resources and protection. The values that define patriarchy emerged due to relationships of reproduction which allowed men to monopolize production and restrict women to domestic roles, giving rise to an “honor code” among the feudal elite, part of which entails considering as dishonorable all work outside of the home done by women. Women under such “high fertility” interaction became users of resources and not producers; dependency leads to a cheapening of reproductive labor and a preference for male children compared to females.

When a change occurred in these “relationships of reproduction” with the discovery and institutional incorporation of machine power in production (in place of animal power), the specialization of tasks that necessitated formalized education (adding to the cost of child rearing, caused fertility rates to drop and the values that previously described patriarchy could not be structurally sustained or verified. This led to altered consciousness and the emergence of women’s rights movements in greater volume and intensity in order to challenge the traditional patriarchy. However, the continued existence of patriarchy within advanced capitalist societies means that this “culture lag” from agricultural societies is still very much salient, which leads us to the conclusion that it is purposefully maintained in the workings of social institutions. The traditional relationships, as Marx and Engels implied, mix with capitalist commodification (that is, they are assimilated within the workings of an accumulations regime) to produce an objectification based patriarchy. As capitalism evolved into a new militarized form (given a global permanent war economy as in the Cold War or now a Global War on
Terrorism a variant form of objectification-based patriarchy was produced, which I describe as a violence-based patriarchy.³

A violence-based patriarchy would be characteristic of societies dominated by the military institution within a capitalist accumulations regime. My empirical analysis aims to demonstrate the effects of militarization on gender within a capitalist world system. I take the United States as the model of such world systemic effects since it emerged as the hegemon after World War II and had a unique role in the militarization of the newly structured post war world.

The Military and Gender

The military creates a “common symbolic world” (Sasson-Levy 2002:367) that defines in ideology as well as in practice the “differences” between men and women. In other words the “biology is destiny” overgeneralization that suggests that women’s entire being should be defined in terms of their reproductive function finds its ideal fulfillment within a military institution. My purpose in this paper is to test empirically the relationship between the level of militarization of a society as reflected by the dominance of the military in the state’s expenditure priorities and the size of a country’s military establishment and the level of gender-based stratification that exists in that particular society. Gender as a stratification variable determines the social position of groups of people within a society. As a category, women are considered inferior in status to men in almost all societies, but the degree to which they are disadvantaged varies from society to society, as well as across time (Chafetz 1984:1).

My purpose therefore is not to question whether gender-based stratification exists, but to establish that societies disadvantage women in direct proportion to their level of militarism within a capitalist world system, in that the more militaristic a society is, the more disadvantages faced by the women that live within that society. I seek to answer the following two questions. The first one is the primary question that I test empirically based on a sample of sixty-one countries. The second is answered through logical deduction based on the primary empirical analysis.⁴

- Is the level of gender-based stratification in a society (reflected by the level of empowerment of women vis-à-vis men) explained by the level of militarization of that society?
- Is the level of violence against women in a society explained by the level of militarization of that society?

³ In such conditions, past definitions of inequality are often presented in contrast to the present to show “progress” in values even though the same underlying institutional divisions are deliberately retained with the least change necessary to preserve them. It is this socio-surgical effort unsupported by a sub-structure that makes racial, ethnic, and gender divisions much worse and more manipulative in their effects in capitalist societies than similar divisions in agricultural societies of old: they oppress and they alienate.
⁴ Empirical analysis of the second question is beyond the scope of this paper and should be explored as separate research in the future.
Theoretical Elaboration of the Model

The U.S. power elite\(^6\) never settled after World War II to the idea of converting their booming wartime economy into a peacetime economy. War had been the ultimate rescuer of the capitalist system from collapse and the necessary context to U.S. economic hegemony over the globe, given its productive and market dominance at the end of the war. The Great Depression had forced the political economy to incorporate socialist props (through the New Deal)\(^7\) into a capitalist system in managing its contradictions. The 1930s therefore, according to


\(^6\) From C. Wright Mills’s *Power Elite* (1956) where those at the pinnacles of the economic, military, and political institutions rule America through an “uneasy alliance” post-World War II, involving interchangeability of position and the resulting social cohesion and “class consciousness,” in an economic structure defined by “permanent war” and a militaristic ideology, the “Military Metaphysic.”

\(^7\) For a summary of New Deal programs, see http://home.earthlink.net/~gfeldmeth/chart.newdeal.html, retrieved 9/30/09.
C. Wright Mills was a “political decade” (Mills 1956:273), in that the power of industry was supplemented through need, by the state that forced itself into the hitherto economic power structure. Despite such “socialistic” state intervention, the economy remained sluggish and unemployment in the prewar period was around 19 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1938).\(^8\) Wartime production reduced unemployment drastically, to slightly over 1 percent according to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1942,\(^9\) which was a record low. Not only were the unemployed given jobs, but previously largely unemployable groups (women and racial minorities) were for the first time incorporated into non-traditional segments of the labor force.

The birth of the U.S. permanent war economy is intimately linked to World War II (Mills 1956, Melman 1974, Hooks 1991). In order to maintain a permanent war economy as the new structural reality after World War II, the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), or the military definition of reality had to be mainstreamed using the “cultural repertoire” of the old order already available (Williams 1995). The Global War on Terrorism and its eventual institutionalization after the events of September 11, 2001,\(^10\) in the United States was similarly achieved using master symbols (Gerth and Mills 1953) 1964:277,\(^11\) religious, moral, and patriotic, within the same “vocabularies of motive” (Mills 1940) that legitimized the entry of the United States into World War II. With the ascendency of the masculinized warfare state, the welfare state of the post-Depression era that defined the U.S. New Deal was feminized. In other words, it was devalued in the classical military sense, and this led to its rapid decline (Hooks 1991:161) within the context of what can be described as a “war-toxicated” society. Competition for resources between welfare and warfare (the guns versus butter argument) within a warfare state, where spending on military procurement directly flowed to corporations against the indirect flow of welfare funds to them (Baran and Sweezy 1966) led to a new relationship between capitalistic accumulation and militarization. As a result, to be on welfare or to demand help from the government came to be considered through actual use of female metaphors\(^12\) “incompatible with self-reliant masculinity and indeed as emasculating” (Sawer 1996:132).\(^13\) Ironically, what rescued welfare Keynesianism in Europe in the same period was its military dependency on the United States during the Cold War years, because the “burden” of militarization of regions associated with capitalist accumulation was assumed by the United States. The rugged individualism as cultural ideal, framed in masculine terms, was resurrected

\(^10\) Denoted as 9/11 henceforward.
\(^11\) Mills and Gerth wrote, “Those in authority within institutions and social structures attempt to justify their rule by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence, with moral symbols, sacred emblems, or legal formulae which are widely believed and deeply internalized (by the masses).” (Gerth and Mills (1953)1964:277).
\(^12\) “The nanny state” (Sawer 1996:124), and the welfare state being associated with “maternalistic politics” (Sawer 1996:125).
\(^13\) “The minimal state with its self-reliant citizens is a wholly male construct. In fact, as Robert Goodin has pointed out, the boundary of the 'self' contained within the concept of 'self-reliance' is drawn outside the family. The conflation of the individual and the family serves as a vanishing trick whereby women and their non-market work disappear behind supposedly self-reliant market men” (Sawer 1996:122). Also within such a minimalistic state the discourse on strengthening the family serves to enhance the “dependency of women” (Sawer 1996:123).
as against state interventionism even though the state was massively subsidizing warfare-based industry in the United States.\textsuperscript{14} The result was a form of false consciousness within a system where human agency is minimized due to concentration of wealth and information (Mills 1956, Herman and Chomsky 2002), but nonetheless promoted as ideal.

\textbf{The Military as a “Male” Institution}

The military’s gendered structure is maintained through the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), a militaristic version of reality that sees problems in terms of devaluing enemies and frames all solutions in terms of aggressive combat. Since women are kept out of combat roles, they are devalued through a gendered division of labor. The combat role, since it is materially constituted by men, has a cultural element of the hegemonic male in whose image women have to mold themselves in order to prove themselves and to differentiate themselves from the “other,” which is the civilian female. Women in traditionally male roles (like infantry) therefore distance themselves from other women in order to build status and affirm a positive identity (Sasson Levy 2002, Fanon 1963). This is a form of “doing gender” in that such acts implicitly affirm inferiority of everything considered feminine within a society.

A militarized economic structure implies that the state has an enlarged and centralized role in the economy. Max Weber’s definition of the state as the only institution that monopolizes the legitimate use of force (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958) implies an intimate role of the military in state affairs. Nationalism based on “masculinized memory” (Enloe 1992) and the resulting definition of citizenship is contextually situated within the military that becomes not only the standard-setter of citizenship but also a driver of gender-based stratification within the wider society (McClintock 1993). Through incorporation of military men within the state, a warfare-based state with a civilian façade is set up (Mills 1956), a state whose ruling elite includes warlords. In processes similar to how “affiliation” links colonized territories to imperial culture, displacing indigenous culture, to use Edward Said’s conceptualization (Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 1999:26), nationalism framed in masculine terms reproduces through affiliation a structure of gendered relationships within the wider society and the world given the dense networks of economic, political, and military ties that exist at the World Systemic level among the dominant nation states. As a result, we see similar policies on women serving in the military in geographically distant but structurally linked countries like the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Germany, and France that largely exclude women from the main combat functions, functions that disproportionately lead to promotions and officer assignments.\textsuperscript{15}

Military service by women in World War II in Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom are illustrative examples of how gender is “done” in the military. Women served in

\textsuperscript{14}In other words, socialistic state underwriting of R&D led to most of the technological inventions in the U.S. that then are erroneously credited to “capitalism.” There is therefore no basis to the claim that socialistic medicine would discourage innovation, for example.

Germany during World War II, but their military jobs were labeled “civilian jobs.” In the United States, WASPs (Women’s Air Service Pilots) were treated as civilians, while in the United Kingdom, women in service were explicitly classified as “non-combatant” even when they wore the uniform (Segal 1995:760). Similarly, women have been involved in combat and support operations in revolutionary wars due to labor needs during operations in “Algeria, China, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Russia, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the U.S. Revolutionary War.” Yet when the need was no longer there, gender divisions became dominant once again in the new roles that were allocated after these wars were over (Segal 1995:761), and women were actively removed from military service.

**Citizenship, Gender, and War**

Citizenship has historically been linked to the military and its combat role. In ancient Greece, those that “made the city possible by taking arms on its behalf” (Kerber 1990:92) were model citizens. Since men monopolized combat roles, they became model citizens by default. As citizenship got monopolized by men because of their link with the combat functions of the military, women were systematically underrepresented in all facets of public life, just as they were underrepresented in the military in combat positions. The image of the citizen soldier, who is always a man, translates into other facets of public administration as well. Citizenship is structured in a hierarchical fashion based on sacrifice to the nation with sacrifice being measured in terms of actual combat roles that then get linked to men because they monopolize such roles in the military (Elshtain and Tobias 1990). This loss of citizenship by women in the modern nation-state has serious consequences for them since only citizens are given the status of full human being through an individuated identity; everyone else is judged more or less categorically. Through militarization, the system robs women of their human status within the political entity that defines the capitalist world system, the nation state, and therefore dehumanizes and objectifies them within the wider social and global structure (Arnold 2004).

Women in the military are not considered “real” women by their male counterparts who are fighting the war to defend “real” women and children from the enemy. Facing this discrepancy in ascribed gender roles, women in the military are “otherized” as government supplied “whores and prostitutes” (Campbell 1990:115). Also preventing the full acceptance of women within the military is their cultural image within the wider society as peacemakers. This image of women as peacemaker is from the post-World-War-I era, and it reflects women’s purposeful exclusion from what was developing as an independently powerful institution, the military, due to the centrality of warfare among the preoccupations of the state. As Joyce Berkman (1990) writes, there are two dominant images of women in history: that of a warrior and that of a mother (1990:143). The mother image was retained in relation to the modern nation state, but the warrior image was dropped. Images of the woman warrior are found in almost all cultures as they are in early European history. The role of pseudo-warrior that women are forced to adopt in modern militaries, as in revolutionary wars based on labor needs, therefore predictably remains subservient to their mother role. Their pseudo-warrior role in

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16 Some examples include the female militia during the French Revolution, Joan of Arc, and the participation of women in urban riots, etc.
crisis situations is seen as a “natural extension” of their role as mothers “protecting their children” (Segal 1995:761) and not as warriors performing an actual function in the military. They are therefore “civilianized” even when they wear a uniform.

**Doing Gender, Military Style**

The dominant image of women within the wider culture, that of peacemaker and mother, directly relates to how the military “does” gender (West and Zimmerman 1987). Among the justifications that are drawn up for war by the military is the rhetoric that war is needed in order to establish peace; in explicit Orwellian terms, “War is peace” (Orwell 1961:16). Peace is linked to defending women and children.\(^{17}\) Defending them cannot be accomplished effectively in terms of that logic if women were directly in the line of fire at the front lines. As a result, those very few women who are given combat roles are either stigmatized as deviants or masculinized; they wear the uniform but “not as women” (Campbell 1990:107). The representation of female members of the military often as “daughters” is a projection of the ideology of the family within which women are supposed to be located within gendered societies. These generalizations are applicable with a difference in degree only to Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), just as they to the United States and Western Europe (Segal 1995). Women’s symbolic inclusion within the military, even when they form 33 percent of the military’s ranks (as in the case of Israel), does little to undo gender (Sasson-Levy 2002). The fact that women in combat positions, where they have adopted the dominant image of the hegemonic male, are content or “happy” does not mean that they are not oppressed (Chafetz 1984:7). Such contentment merely amounts to identity verification based on predetermined subordinated roles to which the individual has adapted and through which they now find meaning, a form of false consciousness that results in women looking down upon other women that don’t adopt a masculinized role and therefore an implicit acknowledgement of inferiority within the system.

Militarization is therefore a gendering process which works only when certain assumptions regarding masculinity and femininity are culturally dominant in the institution, which is then projected to the wider society because those images are required in order to perpetuate war (Enloe 1990:202). When recruits enter the military, they are indoctrinated into a militarized culture where military vocabulary is laden with denigration of feminine traits.\(^{18}\) Despite the association of women with images of peace, their mobilization efforts are required during times of war; that is, supporting war-time rationing, price and wage controls and literally maintaining the peace in the civil arena. Therefore, the military seeks their support, just as it seeks their enlistment when it faces labor shortages in crisis times. As a result, most women in the United States support a strong military and their nation’s many wars, which leads to further entrenchment of gender-based stratification and translates into violence against women as well.\(^{19}\)

\(^{17}\) Such conflation of women and children leads to infantilizing women and over-sexualizing children within advanced capitalist societies, linguistically reflected in the interchangeable use of the word “baby.”


\(^{19}\) On average, 23.2 per 1000 spouses of military personnel experienced a violent victimization. FY90-96, (Spouse & Child Maltreatment, Department of Defense, reported by the Miles Foundation). Also, “thirty percent of female
The Militarization of Society

A permanent war economy implies that production is not only concentrated in the military arena but that non-military economic activity is always conducted within a permanent war situation, as against a peace-time economy that sees war as an aberration and not “business as usual.” The military as such becomes a driver of economic activity, and state expenditure on the military assumes, in military Keynesian terms, a growth stimulus reputation rather than that of a parasitic necessity or a necessary sacrifice. The economic basis of ideological hegemony, to use Gramsci’s conceptualization, is thereby linked though an alternative route to reproduction of gendered relationships within a militarized economic structure (Boothman, ed 1995). As Joane Nagel suggested (2003:193), the massive Military Sexual Complex proceeded concomitantly with the development of the massive Military Industrial Complex in post-World-War-II United States.

The evolutionary perspective of gender stratification suggests that, “the more often a society engages in warfare, the more likely is social control to be vested in politico-military elites that exclude women” (Huber 1999:71); also, in militaristic societies, a “male culture of violence and coercive domination contrasts with female culture” (Collins, Chafetz, Blumberg, Coltrane and Turner 1993:191). There is also a greater tendency for “sexual alliance politics” (Collins et al 1993:197) in militaristic societies, in that women become commodities that are exchanged to build alliances, which together with the capitalistic objectification of women, reproduces the use of women as commodities, making them susceptible to even greater violence. Severe aggression against women, including rape, is significantly higher within the military compared to its prevalence within the civilian society, even controlling for crucial demographic variables (Heyman and Neidig 1999:242). The gender “factory,” so to speak, within militarized capitalism and its link (through citizenship) to the state feeds directly from relationships that exist within the military. The relationships that exist within the military which become part of the productive apparatus of militarized capitalism are then projected into the wider society that gauges its link to its country through a militarized definition of reality, what C. Wright Mills conceptualized as the Military Metaphysic (Mills 1956).

The Direction of Determination

The modern state system is largely a male state. It emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The states in Europe got their structure after religious wars (Veblen (1923) 1997:22-24), and the state-form was globalized through colonized territories, later...
decolonized as countries. European settler states like Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Pettman 1996:6). The entire process of state-building was a war-and-conquest-based enterprise backed by economic considerations (Veblen 1997, Tilly 1985). The historical context of a state’s structural formation is key to understanding people’s lives within such a structure in sociological analysis and the emerging culture within that society (Mills 1959, Veblen 2008). Militarization preceded the modern nation-state-building enterprise. As a result, the state emerged as largely male-dominated, where conflict was set up between women and the public arena through violence and the threat or fear of violence, the main preoccupation of the state being the “selling” of protection (Tilly 1985). This gives us clues as to the direction of determination where militarization precedes the formation of a gendered state. The fact that all of these states emerged as masculinized states is no surprise, given the handful of players involved in the creation of the modern nation-state system, their militarized history and outlook and the incorporation of the military firmly within the economic substructure after World War II. Therefore, the level of militarization is the cause rather than the consequence of gender-based oppression within a society.

Terminology, Previous Research and Measurement Choices

In answering the first question outlined above within the theoretical framework of a militarized violence-based patriarchy (VBP), I use the definition of empowerment outlined by Naila Kabeer (2005). She defines empowerment as the “ability to make choices” (2005:13) in order to cause change. In her rendition, empowerment has three closely related dimensions, those of agency (entailing choice), resources (facilitating choice), and achievement (the end result of empowered choice). When we talk of choice, however, it entails not only the choice between given official alternatives (Mills 1959), but also the imagination to invent alternatives based on ideals of social justice that might or might not be predefined within a social structure. Empowerment of women, therefore, in the ideal sense, would entail the level to which women, as informed members of the public, can cause structural change in order to fix public issues related to gender-based inequalities and other issues in their society, inequalities that are structurally perpetuated (Risman 2004). However, this broad, idealized definition of empowerment as conceptualized cannot be operationalized realistically because of the types of social structures that exist, working within which we need to measure the level of comparative empowerment of women. I will therefore restrict myself to Kabeer’s definition22 and measure women’s ability to make decisions that affect outcomes of importance in relation to themselves and to their families.

The three dimensions of empowerment listed by Kabeer (2005) are captured by the United Nations’ Gender Empowerment index. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), measures women’s agency in a particular country (index scores range from 0 to 1). Agency is conceptualized as political agency (operationalized as number of parliamentary seats held by women), employment (number of senior officers and management, professional, and technical positions held by women), and earned income (in US $ PPP). Each of these three areas is

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22 Kabeer does recognize the fact that “institutional bias can constrain choices” (2005:14).
converted into an “equally distributed equivalent percentage” and then nominally averaged without any further weighting. Some studies have used the United Nations’ Gender-related Development Index (GDI) as a measure of women’s empowerment. However, the GDI is a GDP-based basic capabilities index that does not measure women’s comparative empowerment but rather favors the high-GDP countries as more gender developed (Schuler 2006: 162). Some high-GDP countries that score high on the GDI (like Japan and France) score poorly on the GEM (Blackburn, Jarman and Brooks 2000: 122).

Pillarisetti and McGillivray (1998) look at the UN Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and conclude that the measure is inadequate because it is not culturally sensitive, as its empowerment aversion parameter is associated with “historical and cultural factors” (1998: 4) and its income component is included in unadjusted form with weights adjusted using active men and women in non-agricultural labor even though the non-agricultural part of employment in most developing countries is very small and therefore the GEM says “little about the power over resources” (1998: 200). The GEM doesn’t include a woman’s right to vote as an empowerment measure. Also, by aggregating differences into one measure and ignoring variation within nations, the GEM has an “aggregation bias” (1998: 200). For example, when the authors regressed GEM on female labor percent, they got a significant and positive slope coefficient (4.73 p<0.01), which means that this enhances women’s empowerment as measured by the GEM. The dimensions used to construct the GEM are explicitly capitalistic where the old capitalist countries enjoy “economies of scale” based on those dimensions and therefore comparability with the more agricultural states is questionable, leading to inaccurate or inflated results of women’s empowerment in the “developed” countries.

Riffat Akhter examines the relationship between “global economy, gender equality, and domestic violence” (Akhter 2006: 124). Her findings suggest that global economic and cultural variables (measured through religion) have direct effects on gender inequality in education, labor force participation, and women’s empowerment (measured through the UN’s GEM). Her findings also suggest that countries with higher levels of GDP have lower shares of female agricultural and industrial employment but higher levels of service sector employment, suggesting a form of job segmentation that might or might not be disempowering. Her choice of including women’s share of the labor force as predictor of empowerment was due to the fact that women who work outside of the home can make choices regarding their marriage and children, freeing themselves from dependency (as empirically documented by Pillarisetti and McGillivray (1998)). I therefore include this variable in my composition of (the index of) women’s empowerment. Her analysis suggests that a higher female share of education increases participation of women in the informal economy and industry which is empowering for them. I used the literacy rate of a country as a crude predictor of such empowerment together with the percent of GDP accounted for by industry in a country. With GEM as the dependent variable, Akhter (2006) examined the effects of female to male education, GDP, economic growth, peripheral location of the country, religion, and foreign direct investment on it. The findings from her basic model suggest that GDP is positively related to gender empowerment (β=0.191 p<0.001) as is peripheral status of countries (β=0.71 p<0.05) while the two significant negatively related effects are religion (−.162 p<0.01) and foreign direct investment (FDI -0.024 p<0.01).
Stephanie Seguino (2000), in her economic model predicting gender inequality leading to economic growth, hypothesizes that gender inequality will lead to export expansion since women who are paid unequal wages are segregated into low-paying manufacturing jobs. Export expansion leads to technological change and eventually through such change to economic growth. In her basic regression model (2000:1219), she regressed GDP growth (dependent variable) on growth of capital stock and measure of skill levels of the labor force. Both of her independent variables were positive and significant (4.12 p<0.05 and 16.60 p<0.05). She then added various wage gap measures between men and women that measure gender-based inequality and got positive and significant unstandardized coefficients (general wage gap + 1.99 p<0.001 and education-adjusted wage gap +1.95 p<0.001, export/education-adjusted wage gap +1.78 p<0.001). All of these supported her hypothesis of gender-based inequality leading to economic growth through export enhancement. The shortcomings of her study, as the author herself acknowledges, are that “institutional differences within countries cannot be easily captured within this modeling framework” (Seguino 2000:1219). My study attempts to correct for these shortcomings by suggesting theoretically that in militarized societies (in which the military is dominant, operationalized through the military’s population in that country and the percent of state expenditure allocated to it), women’s empowerment would be low regardless of the level of economic development, measured through GDP per capita or the percent of GDP accounted for by industry or the literacy of the population, in other words, crudely controlling for the economic structure of a society.

**Regression Analysis**

As stated above, I seek to answer the following primary question using multivariate regression analysis: Is the level of empowerment of women within a nation-state explained by the level of militarization of that society? My primary hypothesis therefore is:

*The more militarized a nation-state (independent variable), the less empowered its women (dependent variable).*

I operationalized “militarization” as the percentage of total expenditure allocated to defense in a country as well as the size of a country’s military population (per 1000 population). I conceptualized women’s empowerment based on the definition of empowerment outlined by Naila Kabeer (2005), as detailed above. She defines empowerment as the “ability to make choices” (2005:13) in order to cause change. Since I was interested in the state and its militarization, this “ability to make choices” would be located in positions of power within the state. Part of such choice making would also be linked to formal education (which would broaden women’s choice horizon) as well as the ability to access resources through labor force participation (leading to “choices achieved”). Using this logic, I operationalized empowerment based on a composite weighted scale constructed through factor analysis using four variables:

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23 The four variables were: percentage of parliamentary seats held by women, percentage of women at government ministerial level, percent of adult labor force who are women, and average female years of schooling
from a global data set of 174 countries, collected through various international organizations, primarily the United Nations and the World Bank.

My reason for constructing a new dependent variable based on a composite index of the above mentioned four variables was based on the inadequacy of the GEM to capture women’s empowerment. I did not want a variable which proposes to measures women’s empowerment, both political and economic based on agency and choice available in a society, to be linked to income differentials between rich and poor countries. I also wanted to control for the level of capitalization as well as possible given the variable history of state development within capitalism among various nation-states in the world, because such difference obfuscates gender relationship differences between old and new states. Gender development and empowerment measures already available, such as the UN’s Gender-based Development Index and (the income) part of the UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) are GDP-based, in that a major component of those indices are either the HDI (Human Development Index), in the case of the GDI, and income differentials between rich and poor countries, in the case of the GEM. These lead to an inaccurate comparative assessment of women’s empowerment between rich and poor nations. I reasoned that if I could construct a new index using variables that represented both economic and political dimensions while ignoring direct GDP differentials within countries (as the four variables mentioned above do), I might be able to measure women’s empowerment more accurately given the historical constraints that can unfortunately not be controlled for in such cross-sectional analysis given the very long duration of structure formation.

The proportion of variance in each item of the empowerment scale I developed was high on percentage of parliamentary seats held by women and percentage of women at governmental ministerial level but moderate on percentage of adult labor force who are women and average female years of schooling as a percentage of male years. Factor loadings are listed in Table 1 below. The total variance explained by the extracted factor was 55 percent. The Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient for the scale was calculated at 0.719.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardized Components</th>
<th>Women’s Empowerment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of parliamentary seats held by women</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women at government ministerial level</td>
<td>0.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of adult labor force who are women</td>
<td>0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average female years of schooling as a percentage of</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average male years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Presented are Principal Component Factor Analysis (N=96) of the four components listed above as they are loaded on the factor that measures women’s empowerment.

Based on theoretical necessity and previous studies related to women’s empowerment, I chose the following predictor variables: GDP per capita, a country's population (measured in the 1000s), percentage of GDP accounted for by industry, the literacy rate, the population of

as a percentage of female years. All four variables were standardized (converted into Z scores) before factor and reliability analysis.

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the military (per 1000 population), and the percentage of a state's total expenditure allocated to defense. Regarding the expected direction of relationship of these variables with the main Women’s Empowerment scale, I expected that the higher the GDP per capita of a country, the more absolute resources available to women, which would enhance the achievement dimension of the empowerment measure. Regarding population size, I expected that a larger population of a country would result in a lower score for women’s empowerment because of a relative scarcity of resources available to women in all societies, other things being equal. It was also expected, based on the “industry as percentage of GDP” measure, that the greater the percent of GDP accounted for by industry (which would indicate a comparatively industrialized versus agricultural, and more patriarchal, society), the greater the empowerment of women through the ‘choice’ dimension of empowerment. In other words, this variable would control in a crude manner the degree of capitalization of a society. My expectations regarding the literacy rate were that the higher the literacy rate of a country, the greater the access of women to information, and hence a greater empowerment potential of women, similarly through the choice dimension of empowerment.

The above-mentioned variables, GDP per capita, population size, percentage of GDP accounted for by industry, and the literacy rate, were classified as “economic variables,” since empowerment of women through their route is linked to the economic institution. The last two variables that I used as predictors, size of the military’s population and the percentage of the state’s total expenditure allocated to defense, were classified as “militarization variables,” as they represent militarization’s role in (diminishing) women’s empowerment (through restricting the choice dimension, through exclusion). As mentioned earlier, culturally diffused militarization restricts women’s participation in the state and thereby narrows their access to resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's empowerment</td>
<td>-0.34354</td>
<td>0.7011</td>
<td>-1.8637</td>
<td>1.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of GDP per capita</td>
<td>8.2274</td>
<td>1.1522</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>10.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population</td>
<td>9.1173</td>
<td>1.6456</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>14.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>763.05</td>
<td>222.417</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP based on industry</td>
<td>29.954</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% expenditure allocated to defense</td>
<td>10.103</td>
<td>6.809</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>29.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of military population</td>
<td>1.3773</td>
<td>0.97281</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Exploratory Statistics

I transformed GDP per capita, population, and population of the military variables by taking the log of these measures respectively, since they were all highly positively skewed, in order to ensure robustness of the regression results.
Table 3: Significant Bivariate Correlations *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Bivariate correlations revealed that among the militarization variables, the percent total expenditure allocated to defense was negatively associated (-.382 p<0.01) with the dependent variable (women’s empowerment) as expected. literacy was positively associated with women’s empowerment (0.347, p<0.01), also in tune with expectations. Other significant associations were: (Log of) population of the military was associated positively with percent of GDP accounted for by industry (+.248 p<0.01), (Log of) GDP per capita was associated positively with percent of GDP accounted for by industry (+.360 p<0.01), (Log of) GDP per capita associated positively with the literacy rate (+.737 p<0.001), and percent of GDP accounted for by industry associated positively with the literacy rate (+.311 p<0.05). All of these associations were in tune with logically-deduced theoretical relationships outlined above. As listed in Table 3, I noted significant relationships among the dependent and some independent variables, which were mostly in line with what was expected. However, bivariate relationships are no guarantee of magnitude, direction, or significance of multivariate relationships which necessitated multivariate regression analysis.
Model 1: Multivariate Regression of Women’s Empowerment on Defense Expenditure, Industrialization, Log of GDP Per Capita, Log of Population, Literacy Rate, and Log of Military’s Population (N=61).

(b)  (Se)
Percent total expenditure allocated to defense -0.012  0.014
Percent of GDP accounted for by industry 0.023*  0.009
Log of GDP per capita 0.289*  0.115
Log of country population -0.319*  0.125
Literacy rate 0.001*  0.001
Log of military’s population -0.395**  0.114
Constant -1.988  1.131
R-squared 0.454

Table 4: Presented are unstandardized regression coefficients (b)/ *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

My multivariate regression model proposed that women’s empowerment (Y) is a function of: percentage of expenditure allocated to defense (X1), percent of GDP accounted for by industry (X2), the log of GDP per capita (X3), the log of a country’s population (X4), the literacy rate (X5), and the log of the population of a country’s military (X6). Influence analysis revealed that three cases (Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Mauritius) stood out as extreme outliers that appeared to be skewing the results. Successive removal and redoing of the regression revealed that only Mauritius was distorting the results. As a result, it was removed from the analysis. The actual regression equation obtained from multivariate regression analysis (Model 1) was:

\[ \hat{Y} = (-)1.99 (-)0.012X1 (-)0.023**X2 (+)0.289*X3(-)0.319*X4(+)0.001*X5(-)0.395**X6 \]

Forty-five percent of the variation in women’s empowerment was explained by the model’s independent variables (R-squared= 0.45, F=7.616, p<0.001). Contrary to expectations, the variable ‘percent of expenditure allocated to defense’ was not significantly related to the dependent variable controlling for other factors. A possible explanation for this is that most of the expenditure on the military is used for the maintenance of a large military population.

Model 2 incorporated the interaction between military expenditure and military population and the results are presented in Table 5 below.

Size of (significant) standardized effects

The greatest positive effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable in model 1 (i.e., without interaction effects) given standardized coefficients (or betas) was that of the economic variable, the log of GDP of 0.803 (P<0.05). The second greatest positive effect of an independent variable on women’s empowerment was that of the literacy rate with a standardized slope of +.367 (P<0.05). The most significant negative effect on women’s empowerment was that of the log of a country’s population with a standardized slope -0.756 (P<0.01), followed by the militarization variable log of the military’s population, standardized

\[ \text{This is interpreted to mean that for every one standard deviation rise in the log of the military population of a country, women’s empowerment as measured goes down by 0.442 standard deviations, controlling for other effects.} \]
slope -0.537 (P<0.001). All of the previous stated results were in tune with my theoretical expectations. The economic variable percent of GDP accounted for by industry had a standardized slope of -0.319 (P<0.01). The direction of this effect was contrary to what was expected but in line with some of the previous research that suggests that as countries industrialize based on serving an export market, women get segregated into low-paying assembly-type jobs that negatively affect their empowerment (Akhter 2006, Blackman et al 2000). Collinearity did not seem to be a major problem in the model given its absence based on tolerance and variance proportions methods and only conservative detection through VIF (>2.5 but < 4.0).

**Interpreting (significant) unstandardized coefficients:**

The significant unstandardized coefficients revealed that for every one unit increase in percent of GDP accounted for by industry, women’s empowerment (as measured) goes down by 0.023 units (b = -0.023, p< 0.01), net of other effects. For every one unit increase in the literacy rate, i.e., one person increase per 1000 population (as measured), women’s empowerment goes up by 0.001 units (b = 0.001, p< 0.05), net of other effects. For every one unit increase in the log of GDP, women’s empowerment (as measured) goes up by 0.289 units, net of other effects (b=0.289, p<0.05). And for every one unit increase in the log of a country’s population, women’s empowerment (as measured) goes down by 0.319 units, net of other effects (b= -0.319, p<0.01). Regarding the one militarization variable that was significant, the log of military population, for every one unit increase in the log of military population, women’s empowerment as measured goes down by 0.395 units (b = -0.395, p< 0.001), net of other effects. Militarization, therefore, as the standardized coefficient interpreted above suggested, has a significant negative effect on women’s empowerment. This finding, based on the regression model I designed, strongly supports my hypothesis: The more militarized a nation-state, the less empowered its women, net of other effects. The (standardized) magnitude of the negative effect of militarization on women’s empowerment was greater than the (standardized) magnitude of any single economic predictor in my model other than the log of a country’s population.

**Model 2: Multivariate Regression of Women’s Empowerment on Defense Expenditure (centered), Industrialization, Log of GDP Per Capita, Log of Population, Literacy Rate, Log of Military Population, and Interaction Between Defense Expenditure (centered) and Log of Military Population (centered) (N=61).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(Se)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent total expenditure allocated to defense (centered)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of GDP accounted for by industry</td>
<td>-0.022**</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.330**</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of country population</td>
<td>-0.379*</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of military’s population (centered)</td>
<td>-0.358**</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction variable</td>
<td>-0.024*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>1.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5:** Presented are unstandardized regression coefficients (b)/ *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Interaction effects (incorporated in Model 2, Table 5) between expenditure allocated to defense and the log of military population revealed a significant increase in the explanatory power of the model after this adjustment was made (Adjusted R-squared increased from 0.45 to 0.60). The interaction between (centered) percent of expenditure allocated to defense and (centered) log of military population revealed that for every one unit increase in the log of military population, the negative effects of a per unit increase of military expenditure on women’s empowerment went up by 0.024 units (p<0.05), net of other effects, thus making military expenditure allocated to defense a significant predictor of women’s empowerment, unlike in Model 1, Table 4.

**Pathways to a Violence Based Patriarchy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Military expenditure [mean of % GDP and % government expenditure]</th>
<th>UN Gender Empowerment Measure scores [higher score indicates greater empowerment]</th>
<th>UN Gender Inequality Index [higher score indicates greater inequality]</th>
<th>UN Rape Statistics [per 100,000 population]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 5 Military Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>13.15</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>28.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Top 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.89</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.638</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.3932</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.48</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom 5 Military Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>12.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>30.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>26.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Bottom 5 Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.721</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.3628</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.68</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent difference and direction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5 (compared to Bottom 5), base of comparison 100.</td>
<td>463%</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[lower empowerment]</td>
<td>[higher inequality]</td>
<td>[higher incidence of rape]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Average outcomes of the top five and bottom five military-spending countries that are NATO and/or OECD members on the UN Gender Empowerment Measure 2008 (GEM), UN Gender Inequality Index (2010,) and UN Rape statistics, per 100,000 population.

The only international measure of violence against women that is comparatively more reliable than other such available global measures is reported rape. This is because its definition does not vary as much (as other measures of violence against women) from nation to nation and because it is the only measure on which data is collected by the United Nations since it is considered a crime in almost all countries around the world. Reporting differences might make
this statistic of limited value in research, except among structurally similar countries\textsuperscript{25}. To gauge how rape statistics between OECD and/or NATO member countries (that is, those nations that have special economic, military, and political links creating greater homogeneity compared to other countries of the world) vary based on militarization, Table 6 compares United Nations’ GEM scores, Gender Inequality Index scores, and rape statistics between the top five and bottom five military-expenditure countries\textsuperscript{26} that are NATO and/or OECD members.

Since the variation in GEM scores (11.5 percent lower in the top five military-expenditure countries compared to the bottom five) between these so-called advanced economies or those in special relationship with them is not as great as the variation in reported rape statistics among them (52.8 percent higher in the top five military expenditure countries compared to the bottom five), and, since being a member of NATO and OECD automatically controls for several structural factors, these differences do not represent a mere difference in reporting of rape based on gender empowerment but rather provides prima facie evidence for my VBP (violence-based patriarchy) thesis that was advanced in this paper.

Conclusion

In an international system where continuous wars have become a normal part of people’s “taken for granted” world (Berger and Luckman 1967) after World War II, militarization and military men have ascended to positions of prominence within the global structure (Mills 1956). Militarization due to the nature of the institution involved is a gendered undertaking which works only when certain assumptions of masculinity and femininity become culturally dominant within societal structures. These cultural images of men and women are required in order to perpetuate “wars without end” (Enloe 1990) and to reproduce a militarized social structure post formation. As I demonstrated in this paper, the more militaristic a society is, the less empowered its women are in terms of choices they can make through political and economic participation, even controlling for economic factors. My research demonstrated that militarization variables have a significant and highly diminishing effect on women’s empowerment, especially the size of a country’s military (results for the effects of expenditure allocated to defense were more ambiguous and became significant only through an interaction effect with the military’s population). Logically extended, this suggests that through delegitimizing women’s access to participation in the state and citizenship, a militarized society dehumanizes women and therefore results in a violence-based patriarchal society, where prevention of participation is coercively and violently imposed.

\textsuperscript{25}NATO and OECD-member countries are structurally quite similar to each other compared to the rest of the world, so such comparison automatically controls for structure. The top five militarized countries (on average) are 22 percent lower in GEM scores, 41 percent higher in gender inequality scores, and 13 percent higher in reported rape compared to the bottom five militarized countries.

The implications of this study are political in that these findings contain practical suggestions for anti-war social movements. For militarization to be challenged and the military’s hegemony over the global structure undone, “undoing gender” (Deutsch 2007) is of paramount importance. Without undoing gender, militarization cannot be challenged. No previous studies that I am aware of have linked militarization directly with gender oppression without going through its economic intermediation (Chafetz 1984). The “doing” of gender (West and Zimmerman 1987) with enhanced militarization loops back into a cyclical relationship that further entrenches the militarized state and its violence-based patriarchy (VBP), leading to grave consequences for women and for nations that are made theatres of war by the major powers. My research, as a preliminary, exploratory step was aimed at empirically explaining gendered oppression within a militarized international system. Further research should look into an empirical analysis of the effects of militarization on the type of patriarchy that evolves within a militarized state, the type I specifically refer to as “violence-based patriarchy” which will involve better measures of violence against women and its relationship to women’s incorporation within a global system defined by militarized capitalism.

References


Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Yerlan Iskakov

Abstract

Stereotyping and prejudice, as the essential aspects of intergroup relations, are among the basic psychological determinants of conflicts. In this article, the knowledge of the categories of stereotypes and prejudice in societies experiencing intractable conflicts was applied to the study of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995. The author attempts to answer the following questions: What was the role stereotypes and prejudice played in enabling the conflict? How did the groups involved in the conflict form the images about and attitudes toward each other? Results show that ethnically biased history has often been used in Bosnia as a tool for ethnic division and conflict. Rather than the mere fact of existence of negative stereotypes, it was the use of stereotypes and prejudice which was institutionalized through national narratives and manipulation of animosities by political elites that greatly contributed to the evolvement, maintenance, and management of the civil war.

I thought often of the refugees I had visited in 1992: how they knew many of the men who had killed and raped their families; how some of the killers had been their co-workers for twenty years; and how they had hardly been aware of ethnic hatred until 1990.

Richard C. Holbrooke
(recalling the events in Bosnia in To End A War, 1998)

Introduction

Ethnic and political conflicts have been part of human experience throughout history. Their persistence in contemporary times is evident in examples such as the Middle East, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In these places, groups clash and resort to violent means, including terrorism, atrocities, wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. In these conflicts, group members act on the basis of the knowledge, images, attitudes, feelings, and emotions that they hold about the conflict; about their own past, present, and future as a group; and about the rival group (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005, p.1). One might think that conflicts are about disagreements and contradictions with regard to real issues such as territories, self-determination, resources, or trade. However, as Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman note in their study, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society (2005), the psychological foundations of conflicts contribute greatly to their evolution, maintenance, and management.

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Stereotyping and prejudice, as the essential aspects of intergroup relations, are among the basic psychological determinants of conflicts. This paper is an attempt to apply the knowledge of the categories of stereotypes and prejudice in societies experiencing intractable conflicts to the study of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1992-1995. Bar-Tal and Teichman’s integrative conceptual framework to the study of the acquisition and development of psychological intergroup repertoire (stereotypes and prejudice) will be applied to the conflict.

In the course of the study I will be attempting to answer the following questions: What roles did stereotypes and prejudice play in enabling the conflict? How did the groups involved in the conflict form the images about and attitudes toward each other?

Definitions
Here are the definitions of some of the terms often mentioned, or shown as the examples of intergroup stereotypes, in the work.

*Intergroup conflict* – a situation in which a group considers its goals and interests to be obstructed by the goals or interests of an opposing group.

*Psychological intergroup repertoire* refers to stereotypes and prejudice; these terms are used interchangeably in the text.

*Stereotypes* – stored beliefs (mental representations) about the characteristics (physical appearance, traits, abilities, behaviors, etc.) of a group of people.

*Prejudice* – stored attitudes toward another group. Refers to both favorable and unfavorable evaluation (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005, p.23-27, 57).

*Ethnic cleansing* – the term is broad, and covers murder, arson, rape, expulsion, eviction, extortion, burglary, and arbitrary arrest of soldiers and civilians based on their ethnicity (O’Meara, 2001, p.30).

*Chetniks* – Serbian nationalist and royalist paramilitary organization operating in the Balkans before and during the World Wars. In 1941, Yugoslavia was defeated by Germany and occupied by the Axis powers from 1941 to 1945. While initially formed as a resistance movement, they collaborated with the Axis occupation to an ever-increasing degree, eventually functioning by the end of the war as an Axis-supported militia (Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Chetniks).

*Ustasha* – Croatian fascist movement that nominally ruled the Independent State of Croatia during World War II (Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Ustaša).

Background
A number of complex factors—an intense economic crisis in Yugoslavia in the late-1980s, the disintegration of the Federation (The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the rise of nationalism, the revival of old-time religious sentiment instigated by traditional elites—contributed to the evolution of the conflict. The war involved the three main ethnic groups of Bosnia—Muslims (Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats—each of whom made a claim for self-determination and control of the territory.

The labels “Muslim,” “Serb,” or “Croat” were deceptive. All three peoples belonged to the same ethnic group, South Slav, and all three spoke Serbo-Croatian (although Serbs used the
Cyrillic alphabet, while Muslims and Croats used the Latin alphabet). The major difference between them was religious. Centuries ago, the northern South Slavs (Croats) had been converted to Roman Catholicism. Those in the south (Serbs) had accepted Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The arrival of the Turks in the fourteenth century had convinced some Slavs to convert to Islam, and the Bosnian Muslims were born.

The Muslims (then, 44 percent of the population) and Croats (17 percent) favored independence; the Serbs (31 percent), wanting to stay connected to Serbia, opposed it. In January 1992, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, declared themselves an independent Serb republic within Yugoslavia (the Republika Srpska, RS); two months later, Bosnian citizens voted overwhelmingly for independence, and the following month, Bosnia was recognized as a nation by governments around the world. The first skirmishes occurred in March 1992, and open fighting began in April. Serbian militias, backed by elements of the Yugoslavian army, began to attack selected Muslim villages in eastern Bosnia. The attacks were designed to remove Muslims and Croats from the parts of Bosnia that were claimed by the RS. The whole process was the beginning of what would become known as “ethnic cleansing.”

The international community did little to intervene. Neither the European Community nor the United Nations was designed to (or desired to) threaten military force (Ciment, 2007, p.764-770). From 1991 to 1995, the United States took the lead, intervening in Bosnia. However, politically and ideologically the United States was confused as it attempted to define its interests in the Balkan region (O’Meara, 2001, p.30-32).

In July 1995, the Serbs attacked the UN-declared safe area of Srebrenica. In all, 30,000 people were forcibly deported from the town, and between 7,000 and 8,000 men were murdered and buried in mass graves. This was the worst massacre to occur in Europe since World War II. The slaughter of Srebrenica was the deciding moment for the West concerning the Bosnian civil war. In August 1995, NATO warplanes began attacking Serb positions all across Bosnia. In October, the parties finally agreed to a cease-fire.

The Bosnian civil war had ended. At least 200,000 Bosnians were dead, and more than two million had been forced to leave their homes (Ciment, 2007, p.772).

**Framework**

This section introduces an integrative model (presented by Bar-Tal and Teichman) which explains the formation of stereotypes and prejudice. It is the analytical framework; during the review of the sources, the interrelation of its various components was examined in the context of the conflict in BiH. Social scientists assume that stereotypes and prejudice about other groups (the groups in our case are Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) are learned. The following is the modified/simplified (for the purposes of the paper) version of the model.
Formation of stereotypes and prejudice: the three-level model

First level:
- History of intergroup relations (wars, violence, cooperation, friendship);
- Socio-political factors (group status, norms of tolerance, ethnocentric ideology, etc.);
- Economic conditions (e.g., deprivation of basic needs);
- Behavior of other groups (e.g., third-party intervention, mediation, facilitation of a change of negative stereotyping).

Second level:
- Channels of information (the mass media, cultural products, leaders’ speeches, schoolbooks, etc.);
- Direct contact with outgroup members;
- Micro social environment (family, friends).

Third level:
- Personal variables (the knowledge about outgroup absorbed, evaluated, organized, and stored).

Consequences:
- Information that is consistent with the repertoire tends to be more attended and remembered;
- Psychological repertoire is used as a framework when organizing new information;
- Individuals tend to use their psychological repertoire in making attributions, evaluations, judgments, or decisions about other groups.

Findings

Bosnia-Herzegovina came to represent our worst nightmare of ethnic conflict, offering a choice between ethnically-pure territories and mutually-assured destruction. Its tragedy is symbolic as well as real. The symbolism of the tragedy is in the death of an idea of multinational coexistence, ethnic tolerance, and multicultural civilization in the Balkans (Woodward, 1996, p.15). Reading and analyzing different sources on the conflict reveals a paradox. On the one hand, we cannot ignore the fact that Bosnia’s many communities—Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Jews—had lived together for generations. The intermingling of peoples and cultures had continued apace in the twentieth century with more than one-fourth of the marriages in modern Bosnia cutting across ethnic divides. Ethnicity had ceased to be the defining criteria of identity for Bosnia’s new generation of “Yugoslavs” (Ali & Lifschultz, 1994, p.367). On the other hand, there is a phenomenon of ethnic cleansing and violence between neighbors. For instance, Amir Berberkić, a Bosnian Muslim doctor from Foča, testified about the April 1992 attack on the village outside Foča where he took refuge with his family: “All the soldiers that entered the weekend cottage were my neighbors… I knew them. Only one of them was not from Bosnia. I knew all the rest from before, and I had even treated some of them, as a doctor, while they were in hospital” (Lieberman, 2006, p.296).
It should be noted that the history of intergroup relations in Bosnia is not only about the cooperation and peaceful coexistence. It has its dark sides too; it is also a history of wars and violence. But the problem is how this history is interpreted and reexamined in a given social and political context.

While ethnic grievances may create tensions and hostility, ethnic wars are typically the result of political leaders using myths, symbols, and memories of the past to create fears that fuel these tensions and hostile relations (Bakke et al., 2009, p.230). To understand this paradox of ethnic cleansing, it is useful to look closely at national narratives. Cumulatively, eyewitness reports suggest that the same neighbor of everyday life can mutate into an enemy when seen as a figure in a long-term historical narrative of nationalist struggle. Memoirs and myths of past violence and victimization form the crisis frame which is important for understanding the differing attitudes. Nationalist narratives present their hero, the nation, as unique in suffering; they depict the national narratives of rival nations as illegitimate. For Serbs, the key events in a narrative of national struggle and victimization include the Battle of Kosovo (the site of a much-mythologized Serb defeat by the Ottoman Turks) of 1389, World War I, and Ustasha murders of World War II in Bosnia and elsewhere. Though submerged and often hidden from view, nationalist narratives survived through the years of “Brotherhood and Unity.”

The revival of Croatian nationalist narratives stressed similar themes, only with Croats as the victimized and betrayed protagonist nation. Thus the Croatian media similarly publicized crimes of World War II, though the disinterred graves were of Croat victims of partisans rather than Serbs killed by the Ustasha. The tales of betrayal and massacres called for revenge. Cvijeto Job, a former Yugoslav diplomat, recounts hearing songs of nationalist hatred and revenge on the streets of Yugoslavia’s cities: “Comrade Slobo, send salad,” a street song heard in Belgrade began. “There will be meat galore; we’ll be slaughtering Croats.” A song heard in Zagreb espoused much the same sentiments (Lieberman, 2006, p.299-303).

The “centuries-old ethnic hatreds” much cited by international commentators and policy makers as the ultimate explanation for the war in the former Yugoslavia were in essence derived from the interpretive model of the conflict between Muslims and Christians. The very word Muslim invoked a set of associations consisting of “fundamentalism,” “violence,” “backwardness,” and hostility towards Christians. The Serbian propaganda machinery epitomized by Radovan Karadzic referred to Bosnian Muslims as Turks (an old Christian-Slav slur) and thus categorized them as foreign invaders with no right to the land (Bringa, 2002, p.26-28).

Hate-crime perpetrators and participants in ethnic violence, not surprisingly, endorse attitudes (prejudices and stereotypes) that fit extreme forms of discrimination (Friske, 2002, p.127). Within the emotional atmosphere resulting from a time collapse, the Serbs, especially those living in BiH, began to feel entitled to do to Bosnian Muslims what they believed the Ottoman Turks had done to them. One piece of propaganda against Bosnian Muslims read: “By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries (Ottoman troops)...” (Volkan, 2002, p.95).

According to Robert Kunovich and Randy Hodson, widespread ethnic prejudice is an incomplete explanation for the development of war in the former Yugoslavia (Kunovich & Hodson, 2002, p.185-212). However, high levels of prejudice in ethnic enclaves played an
important role in increasing ethnic tensions and facilitating the outbreak of war. With the decentralization of political power following Tito’s death (1980) and trends towards democratization within republics, political leaders on all sides mobilized ethnic enclaves for political gain. Thus, regional differences in ethnic prejudice provided a foundation for the emergence and spread of ethnic conflict. Based on combined survey data and county-level census data, Kunovich and Hodson’s research examined structural sources of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia. Results suggests that ethnic diversity and ethnic occupational segregation decrease ethnic prejudice (diversity decreases ethnic tensions because ethnic plurality should create a more dispersed power system; in Bosnia, occupational segregation appears to shield different ethnic groups from direct competition in the labor market and, thus, reduces levels of prejudice) while ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudice (high levels of economic hardship and unemployment in the county of residence increase ethnic prejudice for the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities because competition is greater when economic conditions are worse) (Kunovich & Hodson, 2002, p.192-201).

Media reporting of the Bosnian conflict was significant in shaping Western policy responses to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Representations of Bosnia were complicated by the use of historical and geographical analogies. On the one hand, media and the national governments such as the British government created a sense of involvement and empathy with the victims of the war by emphasizing Bosnia’s position within Europe, but at the same time, consumers of news in Britain were frequently told by the same media that “Bosnia” was the result of “ancient ethnic hatreds” that Britain and the rest of Europe were powerless to prevent or even understand. In addition, Western media will often reinforce, rather than challenge, stereotypical images of geopolitical and cultural identity and consequently whole regions of the Balkans have been stigmatized and imprisoned within national stereotypes. Descriptions in British newspapers of the primitive, barbarian nature of the Balkans and the people were not uncommon between 1992 and 1995. A leader in the Sunday Mirror warned its readers: “Balkans, bloody Balkans. …Once again Europe’s stability could be stewed by this crazy cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds and tribal vendettas” (Robinson, 2004, p.378-387).

In Bosnia, the examples of stereotyping, along with nationalists’ use of propaganda and the representations of the war in the mass media, can be seen in the other social communication channels. For instance, education: not only was the Marxist principle replaced by the nationalist one in history textbooks, but also the group that used to be “ours” became partly “our” enemy. Of all the former Yugoslav republics, BiH has become the most complicated case from the point of view of history teaching and curriculum. Since the war, the three major national groups of the country have used different textbooks and followed different curricula. The areas under the control of the Serb army borrowed books and curricula from Serbia, and the areas under the control of the Croatian forces took them from Croatia. In Bosnian-controlled areas, the production of new textbooks and curricula was initiated, reflecting the ideology of the integral and civil state of BiH. In his study of the strength and influence of hetero-stereotypes of history textbooks used by Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, Pilvi Torsti (Torsti, 2007, p.77-96) examines the eighth-grade history textbooks used in the schools of BiH in the 1999-2000 school year; those textbooks represent the type of history textbooks and history curricula in use in Bosnia for about ten critical war and post-war years from 1992-1993 to 2003.
Although I will not discuss the study in detail, I would like to summarize its results and provide some examples of outgroup stereotypes. Representations of other national groups are central in eighth-grade history textbooks used by the three national communities. In the Croat book *Povijest*, the basic “others” are the Serbs. The most common words used to construct their characterization include “Great Serbia,” “Great Serbs” (in its “expansionism/expansionists” meaning), “Chetnik,” and “terrorists.” The presentation of other South Slav nations in the Serb-used textbook *Istorija* focuses on the negative description of Croats. Such expressions are used with regard to Croats: “Ustasha,” “traitors,” “racist,” “chauvinist.” The “others” throughout the Bosnian textbook *Historija* are the Serbs (and Montenegrins, often referred to along with Serbs). Negative descriptions include: “enemies,” “destroyers,” “aggressors,” “terrorists,” “extremists” (Torsti, 2007, p.81-89).

Torsti claims that in addition to creating mental barriers and hatred, the division created by the politics of history has also had immense practical consequences. The divided schooling and history teaching are among the factors that greatly inhibit the return of refugees to their pre-war homes in post-war BiH. Parents have not wanted to return to areas where the children would be subject to history teaching suggesting that their own national group is evil or inferior.

**Conclusion**

The reports of war depict suspicion, intense animosity, and even hatred among the different peoples of Bosnia, but they also provide strong evidence of cordial relations across ethnic and religious boundaries (Lieberman, 2006, p.296). Ethnically-biased history has often been used in Bosnia as a tool for ethnic division and conflict. Stereotypes and prejudice were one of the many factors which greatly contributed to the evolution, continuation, and management of the civil war. The most dramatic instance was their use to justify violence (“ethnic cleansing”).

The mere fact of existence of negative stereotypes is not an explanation for the conflict. Stereotypes and prejudice themselves did not instigate the conflict. It was rather their use which was institutionalized through national narratives, manipulation of animosities by political elites, propaganda, and the division of schooling into three curricula.

**References**


Is World Peace Possible? An Essay Review

The dream of peace is as ancient as the harsh reality of war. Even in the midst of Homer’s Iliad there is a vivid description of a scene on Achilles’ shield of the “city of peace” contrasted with the “city of war.” But it wasn’t until the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment that concrete proposals for international peace were put forward by thinkers such as Rousseau, Kant, and William Penn. Despite these lofty philosophical plans, no grassroots peace organizations emerged until the next century to lobby against war—albeit unsuccessfully. Ironically, it was the most violent century in recorded history—the twentieth—that gave birth to the most powerful and far-reaching progress in peace advocacy. And this progress, according to historian and peace studies veteran Kent Shifferd, gives us solid evidence for believing in the abolition of war in the next hundred years. Here at last is a book (by a founder and former executive director of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies) that gives empirical hope for world peace without resorting to New Age fantasies.

Shifferd begins with a seemingly simple yet profound question: Why do good people so often support the bad work of war? In search of a comprehensive multi-faceted understanding, he examines the psychology of military killing, the long history of warfare, and ultimately the global “war system.” Here, in this mutually reinforcing set of bellicose concepts, hyper-patriotic feelings, national security institutions, standing armies, and lucrative weapons manufacturers, he finds the self-perpetuating source of war: “the cause of war is war itself.”

This conclusion can be a source of deep pessimism because the international war system is so deeply woven into world cultures and social structures, usually disguised as patriotism, religion, and national security. But his analysis of the war system can also be a source of cautious optimism, since a system created by human beings logically can be changed by human beings. This can only happen, however, if we continue to build a comprehensive alternative, viz., a global peace system. (In this logical inference, Shifferd apparently follows the reasoning of sociologist Robert K. Merton, who famously argued that key social institutions are not simply abolished, but rather replaced by functional alternatives.)

In order to advance this hopeful argument, Kent Shifferd must refute popular but fatalistic beliefs like “human nature is essentially violent and greedy.” If this were true, there would be no peaceful periods of history nor stable regions of peace. Yet both do exist. Indeed most people most of the time are acting peacefully. And areas of stable peace such as Scandinavia, the European Union, and the U.S.–Canadian border are undeniable. Gandhi carried this argument one step further by arguing that if human nature were fundamentally violent, homo sapiens would have gone extinct long ago. (A similar argument can be found in Darwin’s Descent of Man, where the great evolutionist recognizes not only an instinct of competition for resources, but also a powerful “instinct of sympathy” leading to cooperation and co-adaptation.)

As an historian taking the long view, Shifferd views the movement toward the abolition of war as similar in key ways to the progressive movements against slavery, colonialism, and institutionalized racism. All seemed impossible at first. All began with small grassroots groups
motivated by moral outrage. But as they grew, they evolved into larger ethical visions, ultimately pulling national governments into their moral orbit.

The author, in fact, sees twenty-three trends of the last one hundred years converging toward the evolution of a stable peace system. Chief among these are:

- The growth of international and regional courts;
- Supra-national parliamentary institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, and the Organization of American States;
- The emergence of peace research and peace studies as academic fields;
- The explosion of INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) focused on disarmament, human rights, social justice, humanitarian aid, and environmental protection;
- The development of nonviolent struggle as a substitute for war;
- The rapid spread of democratic regimes in the last half century;
- The creation of the internet;
- The growth of international law.

Kent Shifferd is in a unique position to write a “big picture” book on war and peace. He has not only taught and researched these trends for thirty years as the founder of Northland College’s Peace Studies Program, but he has actively participated in many of the peace and justice organizations described in the book. He is that rare combination of analyst and activist. And it shows.

But is his a utopian vision? Yes, in the sense that the complete peace system exists at present only in visionary thought. But in a more important sense, Shifferd’s book could be described as “practical idealism” because all of the elements of this peace system exist singly already. The great task of the next one hundred years is to strengthen and consolidate those elements around the ancient yet growing philosophical vision of one human family cooperating together on one imperiled planet.

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