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STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT

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The Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict is the annual journal of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, with its office at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 900 Reserve Street, Stevens Point, WI 54481. Officers are Executive Director Deborah Buffton (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse), Associate Director Sarah Stillwell (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point), and Administrative Director Kathryn Blakeman. The Institute is committed to a balanced review of diverse perspectives. Views of the authors are their own. The Journal is a refereed journal. To purchase a copy, send $15 to the Wisconsin Institute at the above address.

CALL FOR PAPERS: The 2009-2010 issue of the Journal will publish a variety of scholarly articles, essays, poetry, and book reviews on topics such as war, peace, global cooperation, domestic violence, and interpersonal conflict resolution; including questions of military and political security, the global economy, and global environmental issues. We wish to promote discussion of both strategic and ethical questions surrounding these issues. Our audience includes scholars with a wide range of interests within the academy and educated members of the general public. Contributors should avoid discussions accessible only to specialists in their field. Submissions are accepted on a continuing basis. Contributors should first contact the office at wiinst@uwsp.edu for a brief style sheet.
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Editor’s Forward

The 2008-2009 issue of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict continues the interdisciplinary tradition of previous issues by including essays by scholars in a variety of disciplines on a broad range of topics related to peace and conflict. The first article, by librarian and historian Thomas Reich, examines a little known but important aspect of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: the advisory mission led by Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point to reform the South Vietnamese system of higher education. His findings on the pitfalls of undertaking educational reform in a society destabilized by war seem especially relevant today in light of current U.S. “nation-building” efforts in the Middle East.

The essays that follow all deal with issues of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, some focusing on particular areas of the world and some taking a more theoretical tack. Using perspectives from urban planning and international law, Rebecca Sutton carefully dissects the problems of governing the divided city of Jerusalem, offering potential methods to ease tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. Political scientist Spencer Meredith addresses the problems faced by Georgian “Internally Displaced Persons” fleeing the fighting in the Russian-occupied provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; he ably synthesizes research in conflict resolution theory and social network analysis with his own extensive interviewing in the region to call for a greater role for Georgian Orthodox priests in easing the refugees’ adjustment. In the next essay, Fonkem Achankeng, also a political scientist, examines a variety of international mediation efforts to argue for the inclusion of all the relevant parties, weak as well as strong, at the bargaining table, thereby preventing the manipulation of the process for the advantage of powerful outside actors.

Sociologist Lynne Woehrle follows with a cogent overview of the emerging field of “green jobs,” incorporating insights from peace culture theory, ecofeminism, and sustainable development, which highlights the complex issues of economic transformation and includes examples of experiments in green economics. In an especially innovative essay, Colonel Marcia Ledlow of the U.S. Air Force compares the Civil Rights movement in the southern United States to the current insurrection in Iraq, drawing parallels and contrasts between the two events in order to develop guidelines for American military peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. The following two articles explore regional issues. Political scientist Ibaba Samuel Ibaba examines “horizontal inequalities”—regional economic, educational, and political disparities—among provinces in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, stressing the need to develop equality of opportunity and access to power for all in order to build a peaceful society. Finally, Siri Gamage surveys the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, finding its source in the unequal treatment of the Tamil minority, and assesses the prospects of a lasting peace in the wake of the recent military defeat of the Tamil Tigers. A short book review section completes the issue.

I would like to express my gratitude to the authors and contributors to this issue, to the referees who carefully reviewed and evaluated manuscripts, and especially to my co-editor, Kathryn Blakeman, who as always performed the major part of the correspondence, evaluation of submissions, editing, and formatting essential to the production of this issue.

William B. Skelton
Emeritus Professor of History, University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point
Reforming Higher Education in a Society at War:  
Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point’s Advisory Mission  
in South Vietnam, 1967-1974

Thomas C. Reich*

This study explores an important but little known facet of America’s war in Vietnam: the United States effort to reform the South Vietnamese system of higher education as part of the broader “nation-building” process in the fledgling Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Specifically, it examines the interaction between Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point (WSU–SP), now the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Government of South Viet Nam (GVN), to implement educational change.¹ In 1966, USAID recruited President James H. Albertson of WSU–SP to head a group of educators, the original “Wisconsin Team,” to survey and report on colleges and universities in the RVN. Albertson and other members of the Wisconsin Team were killed in a plane crash near Da Nang in March 1967. Other WSU–SP personnel completed the survey, and later that year the university signed a contract umbrella with USAID and the South Vietnamese government to continue the collaboration. This contractual agreement launched a six-year program by which WSU–SP was the principal institutional adviser to the South Vietnamese system of higher education. Over time, some fifty different consultants worked under the banner of the Wisconsin Team, producing thirty-eight major reports and surveys.

Why Vietnam and the Other War?

United States assistance in Indochina began in the later stages of World War II with Office of Strategic Services (OSS) advisory teams supplying and instructing Vietminh resistance groups against the Japanese occupiers. The Soviet Union, with its subjugation of Eastern Europe, emerged from World War II as the most powerful nation in Europe and Asia. American strategists sought to build a balance of world power by supporting its European allies. France assumed a special importance in the new realm of power, and American skepticism about French policy in Indochina was outweighed by European security concerns as the United States

* Tom Reich is an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point University Library, serving as Collection Development Coordinator and Reference and Instruction Librarian. This article is based on his Master’s thesis, “Higher Education in Vietnam: United States Agency for International Development Contract in Education, Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point, and Republic of Vietnam” (UWSP History), which received the 2004 Param Gun Sood Mags Thesis Award from the Midwestern Association of Graduate Schools as one of the three best Master’s theses in all disciplines completed at Midwestern universities and the Winn Rothman Award from the Portage County (WI) Historical Society for outstanding research and manuscript based on local history.

¹ This study is based on extensive research using archival materials relating to the USAID education mission, several interviews with key Wisconsin Team participants, and a broad range of U.S. State Department and USAID documents. Key Archival/Manuscript Series include: “Higher Education in Vietnam: Albertson, Vickerstaff, Eagon, Dreyfus files.” Ca. 1956-1977. Series 17: 48 Boxes, 2 Pkgs, 8 vols., 5 Audiocassettes, Photographs, held at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, Nelis R. Kampenga University Archives, James H. Albertson Learning Resource Center, 900 Reserve St., Stevens Point, WI 54481; and “Albertson Biographical Data and News Clippings,” James H. Albertson Vertical File, Robert Russell La Follette Papers, News Clippings Files, held at: Ball State University Archives and Special Collections, Bracken Library, Muncie, IN.
committed itself to a policy of containment. The State Department’s Asian experts recognized the explosiveness of nationalism in Southeast Asia and urged putting pressure on France to adjust policy and come to terms with Vietnamese nationalism. However, their recommendations were overridden on both Vietnam and China by the department’s European experts who favored France. Charles de Gaulle had refused to accept the Marshall Plan unless the United States helped restore France’s colonial empire. For Vietnam, American paternalism replaced French colonialism, as containment and nation-building became fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. The United States pushed for the economic and strategic reintegration of Japan and Southeast Asia into the Western sphere. With China having fallen to communism, the United States drew a line of defense for this region within the “great crescent” of containment, extending from India to Japan. The Soviet Union’s recognition of the Vietminh seemed to confirm perennial institutional beliefs about Ho Chi Minh’s allegiance. Secretary of State Dean Acheson held that this act “removed any illusions as to the ‘nationalistic’ nature of Ho Chi Minh’s aims and reveals Ho’s true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina.”

Containment was rife with risks of conflict, risks thought to be lessened by nation-building. Foreign policy strategies associated with containment were deployed on two fronts, one military and the other developmental. With Vietnam, the developmental front became known as the “other war.” From a “nation-building” perspective, as former colonies emerged as independent nations, their immediate needs were interpreted as economic in nature, focusing on the expansion of industrial and agricultural output, an improved standard of living, and better health care and education. Education was seen as the primary means of assisting underdeveloped societies beyond economic programs. Education was a prerequisite to political development; it would develop both practical attitudes and the skills needed to build social unity. Education was a social leveler. Development experts felt that schooling could alleviate the social conflicts that characterized the pluralistic societies of underdeveloped nations and move them toward modernization.

As early as 1947 the American consulate in Saigon had forewarned that U.S. intervention was probably the “only possible solution” to problems looming in French Indochina and the best alternative to Vietnamese independence:

This is not to say...that the natives should not have more of an opportunity than they have had in the past. They should! But given the rank and file it is queried as to what would happen in Indochina if they were given independence with no measure of check and control... [T]here would be misgovernment and chaos and...a fine opportunity for a third party, be it Soviet or Chinese, to gain a foothold in this country.

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After the Geneva Accords that ended the French war in Indochina, the United States created the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) to deal specifically with the problems of the newly established Government of South Vietnam. On 8 September 1954, the alliance took on new dimensions as South Vietnam pledged its own resources to the defensive strength of the “free world,” placing itself under the protection of the newly created Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol established a regional alliance promoting economic well-being and development, independence and self-government, and a formal sense of unity by all parties in the collective defense against any aggressor. The Protocol to the Treaty unanimously designated Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory of the State of Vietnam eligible in respect to the Treaty’s economic measures. On 15 September 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained the new U.S. commitment in an address to the nation on radio and television:

Our quest for peace took us last week to Manila... The United States was in a special position...because it was the only one of the signatories which did not have territorial interests in the treaty area. For others, the pact was not only an anti-Communist pact but also a regional pact... Any expansion of the Communist world would, indeed, be a danger to the United States... The protocol extends treaty benefits to Cambodia and Laos and the free territory of Viet-Nam. The Indochina armistice created obstacles to these three countries becoming actual parties... The treaty will, however, throw the mantle of protection over these young nations.

From 1954 through 1958, the cumulative economic aid to Vietnam amounted to one billion dollars. By 1958, the USOM had developed 42 cooperative projects with the GVN: 11 in public works, 11 in agriculture and natural resources, 6 in education, 5 in public administration, 4 in industries and mining, and 2 in information. U. S. advisors directly hired by USOM expanded from 27 in 1955 to 164 in 1958. Most were agriculturalists, educators, and medical personnel. Additional American specialists worked under specific USOM contracts. Over the period of a decade, American foreign aid lost much of its overtly propagandistic nature, as it focused more on the development of emerging nations directly through educational and economic efforts. Vietnam assumed an important position in this broader effort. On 1 June 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy summarized the growing U.S. commitment in a speech before the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which he was a member:

Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike... Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of

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6 John Foster Dulles, “Address by the Secretary of State, September 15, 1954,” ibid., 919-920.
little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assurances to its life, we have helped shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic, and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring, we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs.  

United States military and economic aid to South Vietnam increased after a Communist-led insurrection broke out in 1959 and expanded during Kennedy’s administration. Under Lyndon Baines Johnson, the United States entered the conflict fully, committing army and marine ground forces and launching a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. In May 1965, in an address entitled *Viet-Nam: The Third Face of War*, Johnson explained why engaging in the Vietnam War was different from traditional wars and how education would continue to be central to national development:

The war in Viet-Nam has many faces. There is the face of armed conflict… The second face of war in Viet-Nam is the quest for a political solution… The third face of war in Viet-Nam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need… It is the most important battle of all… For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expectation… that their future will be better than their past… Education is the keystone to future development… We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war… our [US]AID program.

On 6-8 February 1966, the particulars of the “other war” materialized as the United States and South Vietnam strengthened their alliance in Honolulu. President Lyndon Johnson and his top advisers met with the leaders of South Vietnam to stress the critical nature of this second war and pledge to intensify common efforts. With their joint *Declaration of Honolulu*, the leaders pledged to defend “the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam.” The Republic of Vietnam declared that, “in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others: to win the war of independence” and build a nation. In turn, the United States pledged to stop aggression and “to spread the light of education,” while providing advice and support to the people of South Vietnam as they strove to construct a stable society.

That same year, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and David Bell, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. They stressed that nation building required struggling on two interlinked fronts, one of collective security in opposition to Communist aggression, and “the other” of social and political construction. Secretary Rusk, too, answered the question of: Why are we in Viet-Nam?

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Certainly we are not there because we have power and like to use it... But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.\(^\text{11}\)

**Quiet Warriors**

As early as fiscal year 1955, the United States Congress appropriated $322.4 million in economic aid in an effort to assist the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) with its problems as a new state. By 1958, there were 48 technical assistance projects and 16 active institutional contractors in the Republic of Vietnam.\(^\text{12}\) The scope of the projects reflected the recognition that from the outset, the new state encountered an array of problems. The withdrawal of the French meant the immediate loss of the state’s major economic and administrative props. American foreign assistance went from a focus on shaping the country and hopes for peaceful development from 1954 through 1959, to a period in the 1960s increasingly marked by counterinsurgency and revised U.S. objectives. U.S. aid missions called for administrative and political reform, economic programs in rural areas, greater U.S. advisory capacities and supply efforts, and ultimately a more effective and larger Vietnamese Army. Administrative reforms and economic programs fell within the realm of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), and then under the auspices of the USAID.

From 1955 through the early 1960s, U.S. educational assistance initially concentrated on elementary and secondary levels of Vietnamese education, upgrading technical vocational training, and then ultimately reforming the republic’s system of higher education. Fundamentally, the goal was to move basic education in Vietnam away from its traditional theoretical nature and its colonial limitations. Throughout both the traditional and colonial periods, more than three-fourths of all Vietnamese school children terminated their formal education by age thirteen. The USOM and later the USAID undertook a wide range of programs designed to upgrade the total educational experience and steer education more directly in line with the needs of the developing republic, its institutions, and people.\(^\text{13}\)

In 1961, President Kennedy established the USAID as a Department of State agency. The Agency, through contracts with American universities, stressed country-by-country planning and development with long-term objectives of “economic growth and democratic, political stability in the developing world to combat the perceived spread of ideological threats such as Communism.”\(^\text{14}\) By 1966, the U.S. State Department’s Office of Media Services was describing two wars in Vietnam: “the fighting war – the familiar war – [where] men kill and are killed. [And] the ‘other war…the quiet war,’ [where] the men who battle on our side do not kill, but they may be killed.” In 1966, as part of the USAID in Vietnam, there were some 1,200

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\(^{11}\) U.S. Department of State, “The Heart of the Problem... Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearings,” (Department of State Publication 8054, Far Eastern Series 146, March 1966), 1, 3-5.


\(^{13}\) Ibid., vol. II, 502-503.

“quiet warriors” in South Vietnam. In 1968, a peak year, the USAID allocated $2.18 billion globally toward economic assistance; the largest portion, $1.04 billion, was in Development and Alliance for Progress Loans. In supporting assistance, $594 million FY 1968 funds were devoted to sustaining nations under military and economic threat. Of this, Vietnam received $400 million. In 1968, USAID reported “special progress” in supporting regional centers of higher education in Southeast Asia, specifically “resulting from concentration of AID effort and greater Vietnamese responsibility.” By 1968, the USAID had 1,396 contracts totaling $629 million for projects in 67 countries. About four-fifths of USAID-sponsored experts were from U.S. institutions of higher education.

USAID-university relations were complex. From the educational viewpoint, each contract represented a special Agency-university-host nation relationship having its own unique patterns. The setting of projects remained fundamentally important as legislative requirements were designed to make foreign aid an effective instrument of policy and to ensure that the taxpayers’ money was not squandered on unproductive projects. By law, the Agency was to correlate the recipient nation’s capacity for self-help with the availability of economic assistance from other foreign sources. Each situation was unique, politically, socially, culturally, and educationally. If the university was to assist the development of a nation, it needed to do more than offer material, professional, and technical assistance. In nation-building, higher education’s function was to prepare a people for their responsibilities and roles as citizens of a new nation and new social order. For South Vietnam, this would prove a very difficult task as the new nation looked outward, rather than inward, for assistance and validation.

Most of USAID’s university contracts were initiated for one or two years. However, many were renewed for a long-term basis with direct prolonged assistance programs partnering American universities with Vietnamese institutions. For nearly two decades, American universities held contracts in Vietnam. Direct university contractual involvement began in 1955, prior to the USAID, with Michigan State University’s technical assistance program, which had the distinction of being the largest technical assistance program of any American institution of higher education. The activities of the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUG) focused on police administration and occurred in close conjunction with the term of Ngo Dinh Diem. The MSUG contractual direction reflected the cycles of the Diem regime itself, with MSUG operating within a perimeter set by the practices and policies of the government in power. Local perimeters determined the range of success that MSUG and other American university groups who followed would be able to achieve.

Ohio University and Southern Illinois University signed the longest contracts in the history of USOM/USAID assistance to the RVN, both running for some ten years. Ohio

17 Ibid., 18.
18 Ibid., 174-178.
University aided faculties of pedagogy in developing programs for secondary teachers’ training. Southern Illinois University led programs for elementary teachers’ training. The University of Michigan held a contract to advance English language instructional and testing materials. The University of Florida consultants worked on agricultural training and development. A much smaller school, Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point, came to serve as the principal institutional adviser to the South Vietnamese Ministry of Education (MOE), recommending administrative and structural reforms in higher education.

**Why Stevens Point?**

On 1 July 1962, James H. Albertson, at the age of thirty-six, became the eighth and youngest president of Wisconsin State College–Stevens Point. Wisconsin State, along with American higher education as a whole, was experiencing unprecedented growth, both in enrollment and curriculum, as the baby boom generation entered college. New horizons in American higher education were opening at home, and American educators looked to extend their vision to other nations. Albertson shared this vision, and he worked quickly to implement a steady course of growth and change. Stevens Point evolved from a teachers college to a comprehensive state university, becoming WSU in 1964. Enrollment rose from 2,407 in the fall semester of 1962 to 5,907 in the fall of 1967, with annual estimates predicting 10,000 by 1970. Of special interest to Albertson was the campus’s international participation. He had a familiarity with USAID projects from his prior work as an administrative assistant at Ball State University, Indiana. He envisioned WSU–SP becoming a leader in innovative programming and global awareness, and a possible model of institutional development for newly developing nation-states. In 1964, the USAID and the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education presented WSU–SP with a grant providing for an international intern to come to WSU–SP to study administrative procedures. A second, larger USAID grant came to WSU–SP in 1966, calling on Albertson to serve as chief-of-team for a group of American educators to go to South Vietnam to conduct a study of higher education and craft recommendations for reforms.

In December 1966 and January 1967, the Wisconsin Contract PIOT, AID/fe-274 was negotiated and formalized between the USAID and WSU–SP Foundation, Inc. The original contract called for the WSU–SP to administer a survey of South Vietnamese universities, which would include: controls, facilities, finance, personnel, program, purpose, and objectives. Article I of the contract outlined the Operational Plan, calling on the Contractor to provide a team composed of approximately seven specialists (thereafter known as the Wisconsin Team) for a

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26 Ball State University Archives, Albertson Biographical Data and News Clippings, James H. Albertson Vertical File.
period of three to six months. The team was to consult with the USAID Mission to Vietnam, GVN officials, and Vietnamese educators, to attain and organize the necessary information. The makeup of the educational survey team was to be diverse, including specialists in administration, letters and sciences, behavioral sciences, foreign languages, business administration, law, and other areas.\textsuperscript{28} According to USAID contract objectives,\textsuperscript{29} the Wisconsin-led survey team was to:

1) Evaluate the current status of Vietnamese higher education and determine its needs;
2) Design a development program in stages to meet such needs;
3) Delineate an administrative structure and financial plan for higher education;
4) Project intermittent progress reviews.

In January 1967, Albertson, as chief-of-party, departed for Vietnam leading the seven-member Wisconsin Team that included: Harry F. Bangsberg, President of Bemidji State College in Minnesota; A. Donald Beattie, Dean of the School of Business and Economics, Wisconsin State University–Whitewater; Vincent F. Conroy, Director of Field Studies, Harvard University; Howard G. Johnshoy, Dean of Academic Affairs, Gustavus Adolphus College; Arthur D. Pickett, Director of Honors Programs, University of Illinois–Chicago; and Melvin L. Wall, Head of Plant and Earth Sciences, Wisconsin State University–River Falls. They were joined in Vietnam by Robert La Follette, USAID Higher Education Advisor in Saigon, a distant cousin of the Wisconsin La Follette political dynasty and former senior associate of Albertson’s at Ball State.\textsuperscript{30} La Follette had served with the American Embassy in Vietnam since 1964.

Upon arrival, the Wisconsin Team participated in a Saigon briefing where USAID and Vietnamese officials discussed the “two fronts in Vietnam” on which the United States was waging war. Albertson’s initial impressions were revealing of the dangers associated with reforming higher education in a society at war:

This morning [Jan. 11] I had a good example of these two fronts in operation, for as we sat and listened, and as I walked through the corridors and saw and had a chance to learn more about the program, in the distance were flying American planes dropping bombs on the Viet Cong. The ground shook and you could see puffs of smoke go up as the bombs and artillery shells were exploding some eight or nine miles to the east of us. In the daytime an on-going and viable instructional program is in progress. At night the VC move in and the Vietnamese have to move out. There are a few bullet holes in the windows and the Vietnamese have several of their troops billeted in the space that is reserved for the faculty pedagogy. It will be a long time before I forget what I saw and learned this morning.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point Archives, “Higher Education in Vietnam,” Series 17, Box 17, Folder 4, Contract Correspondence; Box 17, Folder 6, Contract and PIOT, AID/fe-274, AID/vn-77 Vietnam, “Contract Between the United States of America and Wisconsin State University-Stevens Point Foundation, Inc.” (1966-1967).
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ball State University Archives, Robert Russell La Follette Papers, Vertical File, News Clippings Files.
In February 1967, Albertson returned briefly to Stevens Point to hold administrative discussions on a USAID request for a second Wisconsin Team, a National Study Team. At his home in Park Ridge, Albertson tape-recorded a meeting of WSU–SP administrators, during which he explained why Stevens Point had received the USAID/RVN proposal to expand the Wisconsin Contract to AID/vn-77 Vietnam. The USAID wanted a blueprint for reforming all levels of education in Vietnam. Albertson felt this was a golden opportunity, but nevertheless an almost impossible task, given the cultural and historic barriers. For any blueprint to be successfully accepted, it had to be a Vietnamese blueprint. That meant getting a team together of experienced American educators “willing to bend with the wind,” willing to work with Vietnamese counterparts one-on-one in developing basic guidelines for the reorganization of the country’s educational system. Albertson explained: “you find yourself with a horse and no whip... They have been at war since 1941, they have been trying to throw out first one group then another, and it may be that they will try to throw out the Americans. [Yet] in education, they like their music, they like their culture, they like their history!”  

Burdette Eagon, WSU–SP Dean of Educational Services and Innovative Programs, volunteered to lead the second Wisconsin Team, stating: “That is wonderful, that is what they have to build on. [However] what they are doing may not actually fit into the total picture of what they need!” Albertson’s and Eagon’s comments proved prophetic.

By March 1967, back in Vietnam, Albertson and the team continued their tour of Vietnamese universities while working to modify their initial report based on responses from Vietnamese counterparts in Dalat, Saigon, Thu Duc, Hue, and Can Tho. On 21 March 1967, Albertson sent an optimistic message of progress to WSU–SP, noting hopes to construct a final draft and return home by early April. Two days later, on Good Friday, 23 March 1967, an early morning phone call from USAID Washington reached Stevens Point. On route to Hue from Saigon, bad weather the day before had forced the Air America twin-engine plane carrying the Wisconsin Team back to Da Nang to refuel. A second attempt to cross over the fog-draped mountains in extreme monsoon conditions ended in a disastrous crash. There were no survivors; the pilot, USAID advisor Robert R. La Follette, and all seven members of the Wisconsin-led survey team were killed. Eugene McPhee, Executive Director of the Wisconsin State University System, summed up the anguish of the moment, extolling the “courage of those who gave their lives for a cause in which they believed deeply…. [They were] front line soldiers in the long range war of ideas.”

The Stevens Point Journal depicted Albertson as an “inventive, bold, resourceful, articulate...model of personal integrity and individual high quality.” Regent Mary Williams cited President Albertson’s capacity for hard work, his idealism,

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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., Series 17, Box 26, Folder 1, Crash-Log of Events, “Schmeller memo to Vickerstaff,” (March 24, 1967).
his persuasive and enthusiastic personality.”\(^{37}\) *Front Lines*, the USAID news digest, reported that the crash was the worst accident in the history of the USAID.\(^{38}\)

On 29 March 1967, USAID Washington forwarded a cable to Stevens Point from USAID Saigon asking Wisconsin State University–Stevens Point to send a representative “as soon as possible to assist in the wrap up” of the higher education survey.\(^{39}\) Acting University President Gordon Haferbecker turned to Burdette Eagon, suggesting that he prepare to leave as soon as possible. Eagon arrived in Vietnam by mid-April, leading a new three-man survey team. Joining Eagon were T. C. Clark, education adviser for the USAID, and Russell Davis, assistant director of the Harvard University Center for Studies in Education and Development. By June, the new Wisconsin-led team had completed the original survey, *Public Universities of the Republic of Viet-Nam*. The report, published in both Vietnamese and English, was designed to serve as a long-term prospectus for reform. The survey was well received. The team then moved to the next contractual task, the National Study of Education. Eagon reported home that: “The South Vietnamese have great potential. They will need a great deal of government assistance – and much patience – in working out their problems in the years ahead.”\(^{40}\)

On 2 July 1967, a ceremony was held at the University of Saigon posthumously awarding the Chuong My Vietnamese Medals of Merit First Class to James H. Albertson and the seven other educators killed in the plane crash. Eagon, representing the team members’ families, accepted the medals from Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien. In attendance were the Vietnamese university rectors, Minister of Education Nguyen Van Tho, USAID Director Donald MacDonald, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and numerous other U.S. and GVN officials.\(^ {41}\)

The first Wisconsin Team report, *Public Universities of the Republic of Viet-Nam*, pointed out that in Vietnam change would depend upon a decentralization of functions, specifically those of the Ministry of Education. The report was historical by its very nature as the team noted that centralization of control in Vietnam, educationally and otherwise, had been the imposed doctrine of the French and had continued after their exit. The ruling class had objectives different from their subordinate administrators and the general population. When the Republic of Vietnam formed its national government, educational responsibility and authority increasingly became concentrated in the Ministry of Education’s top officials. These officials, in self-protection, focused on the processes of government, such as budgets, proposals, memos, and inter-ministerial rivalries, not educational ends. So higher education in Vietnam had an uncertain status, in part due to an absence of strong leadership and lack of effective coordination at the central governmental level. The burdens of responsibility needed


to be more widely shared. The second Wisconsin Team, in their National Study of Education, concurred: “If the Vietnamese government does not devote itself to the role of making sure that the people at all levels believe that their thoughts are considered worthy, it is doubtful that, in the long run, the government can hold the allegiance of those citizens except by force of arms. No unit of government functions effectively when overburdened, and the Ministry certainly appears to be overburdened.” The difficulty of the Vietnamese situation was that “the end of over-centralization is political control—and no nation has developed a quality educational system while that system was under strong political control.”

Burdette Eagon remained as the chief-of-party of the Wisconsin Contract until mid-1974, going to Vietnam seven times, leading and synchronizing efforts of university specialists from throughout the United States working under the umbrella clauses added to the Wisconsin Contract. Albertson’s successor, WSU–SP President Lee Sherman Dreyfus, and other Stevens Point administrators and faculty played key roles in the contract. Educators traveled to Vietnam to complete survey reports, while others coordinated on-campus seminars and led field observation tours in Wisconsin and across the United States. Team consultants contributed their specialized educational expertise in institutional growth to construct a model for the Vietnamese. From 1967 to 1974, Stevens Point hosted a series of workshops designed to offer the Vietnamese added understanding of the formulation and implementation of administrative policy and reform in higher education. Discussions focused on the state of institutional development and specific concerns of each Vietnamese university, as well as how WSU–SP modeled its institutional modernization and development. WSU–SP itself was maturing rapidly with its own expansion and growth in the early 1970s.

Overall the sheer magnitude of Wisconsin Team recommendations amounted to a total assault on the problems of higher education in Vietnam. The Wisconsin Team cited numerous developmental weaknesses in Vietnam:

1) There was an absence of a visibly stated and systematized National Policy for higher education.
2) There was great ambiguity in the term “university autonomy.”
3) There was a distinct lack of institutional unity.

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45 Albertson and Eagon, *Public Universities of the Republic of Viet Nam*.
46 The Republic had not enacted a national universities charter or a national policy. Instead, the universities still operated under modified statutes, inherited from the University of Hanoi. The Wisconsin Team recommended the development of a charter for higher education and the formation of governing board to set the goals of higher education.
47 Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam stated that: “university education is autonomous,” but failed to define the concept.
4) Curricula were narrow in scope and theoretical in nature. Reforms called on institutions to inaugurate semester and credit systems in place of their traditional block and certificate systems, and allow transfer of school credits.  
5) Instructional methods in Vietnamese higher education were highly structured, carrying on a French tradition.  
6) Higher education allowed multiple registrations. Students often registered in two or more faculties and more than one university. Such multiple registrations only added to the problem of excessive enrollment in some faculties.  
7) All institutions had inadequate classrooms, laboratories, and library facilities.  
8) Higher education in the Republic of Vietnam had too few university professors.  

In a continuing abridgment, the Wisconsin Team and their Vietnamese counterparts called for:  
1) Additional regional and national studies and conferences;  
2) Massive training programs and structural and functional reorganization; cooperative inter-ministry efforts;  
3) The establishment of a national training center for leadership; the creation of new educational models offering break-through points at all barriers;  
4) The allocation of twenty-five percent of the national budget for education;  
5) Infusion of a technical emphasis at all levels through method and curriculum; initiation of a three year curriculum revision program;  
6) Widespread participation in a plan for decentralization; and  
7) The establishment of educational standards by professional committees, enforced by the Ministry of Education.  

Lee Sherman Dreyfus  

With the loss of Albertson, the Wisconsin Board of Regents appointed Lee Sherman Dreyfus, formerly professor of communication at UW–Madison, as the ninth president of WSU–SP on 2 October 1967. Brisk development continued at WSU–SP. President Dreyfus became

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48 The Wisconsin Team recommended a reduction in the duplication of some programs and the introduction of new programs in agriculture, engineering, and administration to meet national needs for specialization, and a general centralization of faculty and material resources.  
49 Curricula were not practical. The Wisconsin Team recommended the development of a core program at each institution, which emphasized the interdisciplinary nature of higher education.  
50 In some institutions lectures had become so standardized that students purchased copies from professors or the universities and were not required to attend class. The Wisconsin Team suggested instituting a continuous system of evaluation to alter the traditional year-end examination as the exclusive means of evaluation.  
51 The Wisconsin Team recommended more coordination. There was no provision for central registration, so compiled data relative to enrollment was often erroneous. Duplicate enrollments were not identified, and student records were difficult to locate. The Team found that all faculties except Medicine, Dentistry, and Pedagogy had graduated less than five percent of their total enrollment.  
52 “Suitcase professors” shifted from one institution (most likely Saigon) to another, often teaching an entire course in a brief visit to Hue or Can Tho. Professors’ salaries were inadequate, so they supplemented their income by teaching at other universities and selling their lecture notes.  
Chancellor Dreyfus of the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (UWSP) four years later with the merger of the University of Wisconsin and Wisconsin State University systems. The campus underwent expansion, curricular growth, and system-wide alignment. New challenges included the reorganization of shared governance; faculty layoffs based on projected enrollment declines; regent-imposed guidelines barring excesses of student civil disobedience and unauthorized occupancy of university buildings; innovative programs; and establishment of an Army ROTC unit on campus. The Dreyfus era also marked the zenith of the Wisconsin Contract. In part, Dreyfus’s own quest to place WSU–SP on the road to educational pre-eminence represented an augmentation of the reforms and administrative themes Albertson and others had initiated. Dreyfus set new goals for the University, employing a strong emphasis on new technologies and international programs. WSU–SP was becoming a “twenty-first century campus.”

In terms of Vietnam, Dreyfus benefited from the momentum that the Wisconsin Team had already achieved and Eagon’s talents as the new Team leader.

When interviewed, Dreyfus credited Albertson for the project’s originality and Eagon for the project’s longevity, noting that Eagon possessed the expertise necessary to carry the Wisconsin Team right to its culmination. Dreyfus rationalized: “My job in that contract was essentially political and promotional.” Unlike Albertson, Dreyfus saw things through political lenses, viewing Vietnam as part of an important long-range war. Dreyfus admired Albertson and even credited the Albertson Wisconsin Team as the reason Dreyfus chose to come to Stevens Point. He explained that he did not want the early Team efforts to remain unfinished or their sacrifice to be forgotten. Yet, he saw his most effective role as opening doorways, through which Eagon and other educators could initiate real reform efforts. He felt “obligated” to carry out plans started by Albertson. He sensed that the Vietnamese educators and administrators had begun to see a different approach to higher education. The real issue wasn’t bringing an American system there, but making sure that they understood “our system” and how it could be adapted so as to provide a higher educational base that met a developing nation’s needs for self-government.

In 1968, Dreyfus played such a door opening role when he led the Vietnamese university rectors, who had gathered for a working-seminar in Stevens Point, to a meeting in Washington, D.C., with USAID officials and President Lyndon B. Johnson. Dreyfus recalled that President Johnson asked him the question, “Why Stevens Point?” President Johnson queried if the lack of monetary reward was the reason an Ivy League university or Berkeley did not have the USAID contract. Dreyfus answered that great growth at WSU–SP had occurred in a short time, which now served as an easily understandable model for the Vietnamese. In a short time span, Stevens Point had established a contemporary modernization plan. Almost an entire campus had been constructed and fully staffed in the period since Albertson arrived. The University had developed visible layers of efficient administration, numerous service agencies, academic buildings, dorms, and athletic fields. WSU–SP had built a strong academic core, begun a

54 Paul, The World Is Ours, 111.
55 Ibid., 112.
56 Lee Sherman Dreyfus, interview by author, tape recording (August 2000).
graduate school, and instituted a modern system of registration and records. The Vietnamese
were impressed by the complexity of campus buildings, the fully equipped classrooms, the wide
range of instructional materials and library resources, sports facilities, student centers, and the
growing numbers of professors, a superior salary structure, and favorable professor to student
to operate. In comparison, the UW–Madison, with its huge campus, was much more confusing
for Vietnamese educators who visited Wisconsin on a short-term basis. They made special
reference to American teaching styles centered on current textbooks versus the copied lecture
format and mimeographed texts used in Vietnam. The rectors were encouraged by the great
variety of other instructional possibilities, such as audio-visual equipment, television, and other
forms of telecommunications, with satellite linkage employed as part of distance education.\(^58\)

President Johnson could see that WSU–SP had gained the trust and respect of the
Vietnamese, noting that he himself had graduated from a former normal school, like WSU–SP,
Southwest Texas State Teachers College (now Texas State University–San Marcos). He
remarked, “That is so fucking smart, no one in Washington would have thought of that!”
Dreyfus recalled, “That is the way he talked. But he was sincere!”\(^59\)

Dreyfus shuttled to Washington often during his tenure as chancellor. He led three field
surveys to Vietnam, one under the strict auspices of the Wisconsin Contract; one in conjunction
with his interests in ROTC; and a final trip funded by the U.S. Defense Department as he
traveled with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird looking at the possible conversion for
educational purposes of U.S. military installations.\(^60\) Just as Dreyfus benefited from the
administrative and institutional reforms President Albertson had initiated, he and Stevens Point
benefited internationally and contractually from the momentum that Albertson’s Wisconsin
Team had already achieved and the quick actions of Eagon as new team leader. Dreyfus
gained further dividends from his friendship with Laird and Secretary of the Army Robert
Froehlke, both residents of Central Wisconsin. It was Congressman Laird who set up the White
House meeting for the Wisconsin Team and the Vietnamese rectors. According to Dreyfus,
Laird and Froehlke also played fundamental roles in bypassing Ambassador Bunker’s objection
to Dreyfus meeting with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu at the Presidential
Palace in Saigon. Dreyfus explained:

I came out of there with two arêtes and three decrees—I had everything we
wanted. That they had been—USAID—had been trying to get through State
Department for over two years. That was my function. I was running
interference against the State Department. Having the Froehlke and Laird
backup turned out to be very important to this project, as well as toward the end
delivering things over the educational run. Once it was clear to the U.S. military
commanders that these educational things were growing, in Hue, in Can Tho and

\(^{58}\) Ibid., Series 17, Box 2, Folder 1, Nguyen Van Hai, “A Report on American Higher Education by the Delegation of
\(^{59}\) Dreyfus, interview.
\(^{60}\) Paul, The World Is Ours, 112.
over in Dalat, that these things were important to the Pentagon, not just the State Department.\textsuperscript{61}

Through the use of news conferences and “in country” taped reports, Dreyfus made a public record of his vision of the Wisconsin contract and U.S. relations with South Vietnam. Dreyfus told Bill Meissner of The Stevens Point Journal that the USAID Contract was “possibly the most significant thing this institution can do within this decade. The key factor is the personal relationship; in the simplest terms, it’s human trust.” That and the prestige the University would gain by doing so: “Something of such national import that it puts us in the mainstream of national education.”\textsuperscript{62} In January of 1970, as Dreyfus was preparing to leave for Vietnam, he addressed a large gathering on the Stevens Point campus. In nation-building terminology, he spoke of “another war to fight” and why he felt the educational mission continued to serve long-term relations:

The problems of defense and party are obvious today. Somebody has got to be working in the long-range plan, and one big aspect of that would be the development of higher education and the leadership of that country to keep it stable... I think there is another war to fight. This is a most important long-range war. I feel quite obligated to do it, plus to carry out final plans of that which was started by my predecessor Jim Albertson... [Vietnamese university] presidents had come over here, the vice-presidents, the deans, they now see a different approach to higher education...this broad Jeffersonian tradition we have here in America, they accepted a good deal of this... So now the real issue isn’t bringing our system there, but to make sure that they understand our system and how it can be adapted. What can they take from us to help bring about the changes they need to provide a higher educational base that will meet their needs for a self-governed society?\textsuperscript{63}

By 1972, Dreyfus’s military connections and special interest in Vietnaminization led him to undertake an educational visit to Vietnam to survey the possibilities for the conversion of U.S. military installations and apparatus into Vietnamese educational facilities. Dreyfus suggested that a decommissioned U.S. aircraft carrier be brought up the Saigon River and permanently docked in downtown Saigon to serve as a vocational technical institute. He hypothesized that the old diesel-stove carrier would have its own source of power and enough space for classrooms, dining halls, gymnasiums, housing, and more. He hoped that Wisconsin State University–Stout would join the plan with a program in vocational education. Naval engineers declared that the idea would not work, and Pentagon officials noted that the U.S. military pullout was moving too fast.

In his defense, Dreyfus noted:

\textsuperscript{61} Dreyfus, interview.
You know now some of the Pentagon types and a lot of the Madison [WI] types here, and some of them on this campus, thought this was another, you know [joking] – Dreyfus is hitting the LSD again, but it really wasn’t that wild of an idea. If we were still going full bore, if I had made the proposal a year earlier, and if that carrier had been available I am convinced it would be there today. Think what a marvelous symbol that would be sitting there... as an absolute Buddhist symbol of an instrument of violence that through education becomes an instrument of peace!64

Dreyfus’s final report did prove useful, as he worked with both the Defense Department and USAID, recommending that bases be specifically turned over to the Vietnamese Ministry of Education rather than the GVN or ARVN. Dreyfus succeeded in a large transference of equipment from two mobile surgical units to the Medical College and hospital group at Hue. The Frank Doezema Compound was also turned over to the University of Hue. Numerous other U.S. installations served as sites for vocational-technical schools and junior colleges. The U.S. Army shifted warehouses, heavy equipment, maintenance equipment, radio communications gear, furniture, and laboratory equipment to the new agricultural center at Thu Duc and the National Technical Center in Saigon. Supplies were transferred to the National Center of Administration, University of Saigon, and University of Can Tho. Army Secretary Froehlke credited “Dreyfus’ expertise and forethought... in shaping these important decisions,” and for the transference of $1 million worth of equipment, surplus supplies, and installations to South Vietnam for education and cultural development.65

Growing Uncertainties – the Ebbs and Flows of Reform and the War

Despite showing very little fear of the wartime conditions, Team members were conscious of the security risks, delays in the distribution of supplies, destruction of educational facilities, and limitations imposed on educational funds. During the period after the Communist Tet Offensive of 1968, unstable conditions in the Republic of Vietnam damaged reform efforts in Vietnamese higher education. Uncertainties intensified as Team members cabled home reports of bullet holes in classroom walls and troops billeted at the Thu Duc campus, extensive damage at the University of Hue, and even a misdirected U.S. airstrike causing collateral damage at Can Tho. In 1969, tensions over the war coincided with the assassination of two professors of the University of Saigon, Le Minh Tri, Minister of Education, and Tran Anh, Acting Rector of the University of Saigon. The entire Vietnamese educational ministry was stunned by the assassinations. Minister Tri, who received his doctorate in the United States, had been part of the Medical Faculty at the University of Saigon. Tri had participated in a Wisconsin Team coordinated tour of the United States for twelve days in December 1968, during which time he visited WSU–SP for consultations with team members, Dreyfus, and other administrators and

64 Dreyfus, interview.
Tri’s position as education minister was a difficult one, involving challenges in every direction. Like most South Vietnamese officials, he was in constant danger. On 17 January 1969, Time magazine reported the attack as “The Price of Honesty,” citing the factional political scandals that had characterized the Ministry of Education. On 17 January 1969, Time magazine reported the attack as “The Price of Honesty,” citing the factional political scandals that had characterized the Ministry of Education. A year later, at a 9 March 1970 news conference, Dreyfus noted that Minister Tri had been committed to the reorganization of the University of Saigon. Dreyfus suggested that “certain elements of the faculty who didn’t want change brought about” may have been involved in the incident. “It is a matter of the elite system, the old French elite class… two different worlds between most of the rest of Saigon and a place like that...still 600-700 teachers who still will teach only in French.”

Early on, WSU–SP consultants had reported that the University of Saigon was not a unified campus, geographically or politically. The University was housed in a variety of scattered buildings. Ministry officials and educators at the University of Saigon remained deeply entrenched in Franco-Vietnamese conventions. French education in Vietnam had functioned only to make the Vietnamese useful to France. The original Charter for the University of Hanoi remained the guiding statute for higher education, even in South Vietnam. Francophile faculty were entrenched. The French-imposed curriculum remained. The original report of the Wisconsin Team noted that growth in Vietnamese higher education would not be easy during an age of turmoil:

More than any other single requirement, implementation of this report will require leadership of the universities which will be able to convey to the public a clear statement of aims and purposes. Courage will be required, too, for implementation will necessitate a divorcement from self-interest and a countering of claims of many groups whose theories of higher education do not emphasize service to the people and nation.

For Vietnam, each year brought growing uncertainties about U.S. commitment, the outcome of the protracted war, and the credibility and stability of the GVN. Even with U.S. assistance, the reorganization of traditional curricula proved extremely difficult. Critically, American educational advisors also lacked training in and understanding of the Vietnamese language, history, and culture—a shortcoming the Wisconsin Team continued to note. The Vietnamese dependence on French and then English as languages of instruction, especially at the universities, proved to be a formidable barrier. Faculty members had been trained in such languages and preferred to teach in a like manner. Professors followed a totally lecture approach, with no demonstration and very few assignments. They sold their notes, rarely used books or outside readings, and had very limited library facilities. Eighty percent of college level texts were written in foreign languages, and there was always a shortage in qualified instructors trained in Vietnamese.

69 Albertson and Eagon, Public Universities of the Republic of Vietnam, 41.
The Wisconsin Team’s work took on added importance with the cease-fire of 1973, and the growing disengagement by U.S. military and USAID programs. USAID staff reductions were severe; however, some hoped that the cease-fire would allow the GVN to address more recommendations for reform. In 1973, Eagon returned to Vietnam three times. He consulted with each of the public universities in Saigon, Thu Duc, and Can Tho, and with the new site of the Upper Delta Community College. His reports noted this as a time when societal institutions could benefit from the reallocation of resources, which had been needed for the war.

In March 1973, Charles Green, USAID Saigon, wired USAID Washington, communicating that Eagon had become a historical asset to USAID. With his long-standing team leadership role, Eagon had developed a wide circle of Vietnamese contacts. Most other USAID staff members, both veterans and those newly assigned to USAID higher education, had no such array of connections. Both Green and Eagon had pressing concerns relating to the GVN and MOE. Green reported that Eagon had still observed a lack of overall awareness of higher education as a system and a real hesitation for action on higher education legislation. Eagon was also critical of the Vietnamese Senate for having failed to confirm community college presidents.

Green’s career mirrored developments in American foreign aid programs in the decade from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. Green served with American foreign assistance programs in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Vietnam, and then a second tour in Bogotá. He started in the Foreign Service as Assistant Cultural Attaché in the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Colombia. In 1971, Green received an appeal from the USAID Mission in Vietnam asking him “to come to Vietnam because the program in higher education needed ‘fixing.’” He declined the invitation, but within a month was given the option of going to Vietnam or resigning. Green went to Vietnam. Many years later, Green recollected that during the first year of his service in Vietnam the universities had gone on for the most part as if there was no war. Then in 1972 the North Vietnamese offensive targeted Hue. At the University of Saigon, professors and others refused to move a few miles out of the city to the new location at Thu Duc. Green, himself, taught English classes at Thu Duc. Some educational progress was made in the urban areas, but education continued to be subjected to harsh conditions in the countryside.

In 1973, Eagon still noticed a marked slowness on the part of the other universities to follow the registration and record keeping model of the University of Hue. Green and Eagon agreed that there was still duplication in teacher education programs and only a modest effort to improve instruction, with inferior programs in English at the university level. Eagon criticized the failure to upgrade faculty salary structure, while noting an overall lack of effort

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72 Charles Green, two sets of correspondence and written responses to interview questionnaire, (February 2002). Green described his start in the Foreign Service as a “‘lateral transfer,’ meaning I started a bit up the ladder.”
and huge level of work looming for the understaffed MOE Higher Education Office. Eagon sensed a wait-and-see attitude among the Vietnamese university people, working in a transitional period hoping that peace might come. He also recognized a growing disengagement by the USAID, both in Vietnam and in its relationship with American higher education. USAID was increasingly turning to the private sector with its contracts in lesser-developed nations.

The objectives of the Wisconsin Contract expanded substantially during the more than six years of its existence, as the USAID mission moved from a general survey, to an action plan, to a “brick laying” operation. *Architectural Notes in Vietnam, 1974,* was the final field survey formally published under the Wisconsin Contract. The report offered sustaining designs for new campuses, which linked new and old cultural ideas drawn from Vietnam and its neighbors. New designs for the campuses at Can Tho and Thu Duc incorporated the use of native materials and environmental architecture. American advisory firms had typically constructed cement or steel buildings reliant on air-conditioning, which in turn were dependent on electricity, often in short supply in rural areas. Recognizing a growing world energy crisis, the final Team report sought to reinstate natural principles found in older Southeast Asian architecture in new and imaginative designs. To counter escalating costs of electricity, construction materials, and transportation, the report recommended constructing buildings from locally available materials, including bamboo, wood, and thatch. Construction emphasized the ancient Chinese art of Feng-Shui, where: “Building location and design is based on the belief that at every place there are special topological and topographical features, either natural or artificial, which indicate or modify the cosmic energies there.” Vietnam’s natural riverside settings and forest backdrops were looked upon as assets rather than deterrents. Adjacent buildings on the new campuses were to be connected by tree-shaded pathways, while natural ventilation saved on electricity, and other shading devices were incorporated over large open windows that lined the structures. The maintenance of the campus environment would provide hands-on opportunities for students enrolled in agriculture and engineering. Preliminary sketches for Can Tho even included a large water wheel driven by the current of the Mekong River and an experimental wind tower – designed to stand as campus symbols representing Vietnamese hospitality and symmetry with nature.

Eagon completed his own final in-field report, “Some Current Observations,” suggesting that the work of the Wisconsin Team could continue elsewhere. With a “Preliminary Project Proposal: University Reforms in Developing Countries,” Eagon noted that to date there had not been an evaluation study of the wide-range of USAID projects engaged in upgrading institutions of higher education in developing countries. Eagon suggested amalgamating the “body of knowledge” from the hundreds of university educators in developing nations that had received assistance with those from developed nations who had served as consultants. Eagon recalled

75 Burdette W. Eagon and Sarah Eagon, interview by author, tape recording, four follow-up discussions and correspondence (September-October 2000).
that the United States and other industrial nations often had been disappointed that their higher education contracts had not had the predicted developmental effects on underdeveloped countries. He stressed the long-standing premise of the Wisconsin Team, as he proposed to focus his new study on how best to relate university reform procedures to the “needs of underdeveloped countries.” He stated that UWSP had six years of experience in identifying “change-agents.” The Wisconsin-Team-led projects had recognized the manner in which basic reforms were identified, initiated, and accepted, while elevating the abilities of their university counterparts. Eagon detailed the history of the Wisconsin Contract, recalling the Albertson-led preliminary report and the resulting final report, which stood as the basis for over six years of follow-up programs and the protracted USAID contract. He noted the long line of consultants who had served under WSU–SP/UWSP, the USAID, the Asia Foundation, and other sponsors. He also recounted the philosophy of shared leadership during the reform process, with Vietnamese educators playing the fundamental role when instituting change. The Wisconsin Contract stood ready to employ the experience it had gained from working with one nation as a model for wider higher education projects. Eagon proposed a five-year plan for the wider development of “university-to-university” relations.79

The end of the Wisconsin Contract was clearly on the horizon. In January 1974, Dreyfus corresponded with new USAID/Washington Administrator Daniel Parker. He hoped to secure a continued commitment for Stevens Point from the USAID, if not in Vietnam then elsewhere. Parker, a Wisconsin native, had assisted Dreyfus during his visits to Vietnam, a time when Parker served as a deputy ambassador with the American Embassy. Parker now replied that he had received numerous inquiries from university leaders and other organizations associated with the USAID. Parker noted, however, that it was his intention to support “AID’s increasing reliance upon the private sector.” Parker expressed appreciation for the important role played by Stevens Point in the educational development of higher education in Vietnam: “We regret the need for terminating the funding for educational projects in Vietnam; however, because of the effectiveness, flexibility, and efficiency of your contract services, when the need arises for future work of a similar nature, be assured of our interest in exploring with you the possibility of additional contractual relationships.”80

In March of 1974, University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point hosted its final contractual visitation when Ngo Khac Tinh, Minister of Culture, Education, and Youth, and Khuong Huu Dieu, President of the Industrial Development Bank of Vietnam, visited the campus. Eagon characterized the event as primarily a protocol visit, as the Vietnamese leaders met with the twenty Vietnamese students now studying on campus, briefing them on the current situation in Vietnam and encouraging them to return to Vietnam upon the completion of their master’s programs. Eagon graciously followed up the visit with a personal letter thanking the Vietnamese: “It has been of great benefit and enjoyment for this University to work with your Universities, and we hope that the Wisconsin Contract has been helpful to you. If there is any way that we can continue to be of assistance to you through any type of funding available, we stand ready to help.”81

80 Ibid., Series 17, Box 5, Folder 8a, letter, “Parker to Dreyfus” (February 15, 1974).
81 Ibid., Series 17, Box 5, Folder 8a, contracts and letters, “Eagon to Tinh” (March 22, 1974).
End of a Contract, End of a Conflict – Work Left Undone

The Vietnamese overcame some 1,050 years of Chinese pressure, then survived almost 100 years of modern colonial rule by the French and a civil war that spanned almost three decades. The Vietnamese self-identity was one molded by struggle. The United States had moved into Vietnam with a nation-building vision aligned with halting what was viewed as a Communist monolith. The U.S. military machine learned the hard way that in Vietnam its own efforts were limited, as it controlled only the land on which it stood for the moment. USAID efforts to instill educational reform were important endeavors; however, like American military efforts, the reforms’ effects proved limited.

Graduation rates within higher education paled in comparison to growth in enrollment. In 1954, the University of Saigon was the only public university in South Vietnam; its enrollment was 2,180. By 1970, enrollment at three major public universities had increased to 46,736; however, the total number of graduates from all three public faculties was only 632.\(^82\) By 1973, when Saigon’s enrollment had escalated to some 64,000 students, its facilities varied from dilapidated old structures to newly constructed almost adequate modern buildings. Open-enrollment policies at many of the faculties had yet to produce an abundance of graduates. The majority of students continued to purchase professors’ notes rather than attend classes. Many students remained discouraged and did not take annual final exams, and less than half of those who were tested passed. The University of Hue introduced an automated system for records and registration, and statistical analysis revealed troubling data. Work remained undone in uniform admissions policies and a rigorous system of evaluation.\(^83\)

National capability fell short because of war, financial burdens, and internal corruption. Quantitatively, U.S. officials often proclaimed progress both militarily and in “the other war” in the struggle against ignorance and social problems in the RVN. Educational programs were evaluated on the degree to which they had achieved goals for school enrollment, schools built, teachers employed, students graduated. Just as body counts did not equate with military victory, the quantitative expansion of education in the RVN was impressive, but incomplete. Enrollments increased, but shortages in facilities and trained teachers were never overcome, and changes in curricula were left undone.

In war, there are very few guarantees. This was true in Vietnam, where clearly many things were wrong. The Wisconsin Team recognized that the plight of Vietnamese higher education confirmed a need for redefining the relationships between the government and various institutions and between universities and faculties, and clarifying the responsibilities of officials at all levels. Team leaders stressed that such definitions needed constitutionally guaranteed legal status. An absence of a defined structure and coordinated system of governance discouraged effective administrative leadership and prevented any clear synchronization of educational resources. Vietnamese educators were slow to recognize the interdisciplinary nature of modern higher education, the fundamentality of core programs and pre-established criteria, and the necessity of a transferrable credit system. Often, officials

remained overprotective of their respective institutions and conservative in their views toward faculty, student, and governmental roles in sharing formation and coordinating policy and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{84}

While motivated in part by institutional ambitions, Wisconsin Team members revealed a strong and sincere ideological commitment to exporting American educational values, improving their Vietnamese counterparts, and widening educational opportunities in the RVN. Although limited success occurred in some areas, such as university record-keeping and administration, wartime conditions inhibited broad changes, and the mission was eventually overwhelmed by events. The objectives of the Wisconsin Contract expanded substantially during the more than six years of its existence. The combined efforts of the Wisconsin Team produced some thirty-eight major reports, surveys, observation tours, and seminars. Over fifty consultants worked under the banner of the Wisconsin Team. Ultimately, however, political and military factors played a dominant role in the outcome of USAID and Team projects. The fate of USAID programs and that of South Vietnam were mutually dependent, and the Wisconsin Team had little control over GVN or USAID policy.

Early on in the mission, the Team had recognized the difficulties and dangers of such a mission in a land divided by war. The original Wisconsin Team had given the ultimate sacrifice so others might have the opportunity to learn. They had posthumously received National Awards of Merit from their Vietnamese hosts. As educators in Stevens Point submitted their mandated closure reports and the final Team members departed Vietnam, they too received decorations and formal expressions of gratitude. A real measure of appreciation worked both ways, as educational exchange built lasting bonds. The mutual commitment would not end with the termination of a parchment contract. Upon the ending of the contract and the ultimate collapse of South Vietnam, Team members and their associates worked caringly to assist Vietnamese families in relocating to the United States.

Team interpreter Nguyen Quynh-Hoa was representative. When Albertson recruited her, Quynh-Hoa had already worked for nine years as an elementary school teacher in Nha Trang and three years training Vietnamese science teachers with the International Voluntary Services (IVS). She had barely avoided the Team’s fatal crash.\textsuperscript{85} By 1969, Nguyen Quynh-Hoa had begun her undergraduate studies in Stevens Point. She went on to complete her B.A. at the Catholic University of America, in Washington, D.C., and continued her studies, earning both an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Library Science. Quynh-Hoa served on President Gerald Ford’s Advisory Committee on Refugees. She returned to Vietnam in 1991, at which time she visited the National Library and academic libraries in Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, and Hanoi. While in Vietnam, she drafted a plan for future cooperation between Vietnamese and American libraries. In 1995, Nguyen Quynh-Hoa corresponded with President Clinton as he worked to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam. In spring 1997, she returned to UW–Stevens Point with Eagon and Green, by then both retired, with others and a group of Vietnamese educators that included Mai Quoc (Lien) Linh who had worked with the Wisconsin Team during the war. They discussed the Wisconsin system of Distance Education as a state-of-

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., Series 17, Box 14, Folder 3, “Inter-University Seminar at Nha Trang,” (1973).
\textsuperscript{85} Nguyen Quynh-Hoa, personal papers, correspondence, and tape recorded responses to interview questionnaire, transcribed by author, (February 2002).
the-art model for higher education. At the time, efforts to renew university-Vietnamese relations proved unsuccessful as there was no funding in Wisconsin. Departing from Stevens Point, returning to a unified Vietnam, Dr. Linh issued a hopeful statement:

To modernize our country, we must modernize our education and science. Although the Americans adopt models different from ours, the intellectual assets they have accumulated now belong to the whole of mankind. We should grab these assets without hesitation, and with our intelligence and creativeness...let us find ways, through negotiating and discussing, to take our first steps.  

In 2000, Eagon and Green returned to Vietnam with a small group of retired Team consultants and others, including Vietnamese educators. They found lasting signs of Team recommendations. They visited a fully functioning vocational school and junior college on a former American military base northeast of Saigon [Ho Chi Minh City] that Dreyfus had singled out. Yet, educational autonomy remained a distant dream. Eagon rationalizes that time was too short during the years of war for the university deans and rectors to have an immediate impact. However, “some of those ideas they started with...are still there.” Green recalled that the American consultants made some gains training elementary teachers but never really got going in secondary education. USAID got a decent start in developing libraries. The most positive gains were in higher education. Green credited a first-rate mixture of “sensible consultants” and Vietnamese educators. Green went further, “Actually, we left some good higher education institutions. When I went back to Vietnam [1998, 2000], I was pleased to find that the institutions were doing well with the nucleus we left. The Soviet Union took up training where we left off, but it seemed the language problem limited results. The University of Hue, the University of Can Tho, and the Community Colleges all got off to a good start and are now doing pretty well except for a shortage of well educated personnel. I think that the new regime used our beginning better than the old Thieu Government with the archaic system would have.”

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86 Nguyen Quynh-Hoa personal papers, translation of Mai Quoc (Lien) Linh, “Some Impressions on America.” (Also appeared in Kiến thức ngày nay, Hội nhà văn Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh, Spring 1997.)
87 Burdette Eagon, interview.
88 Charles Green, interview.
Cities may not necessarily be simple reflectors of larger societal tensions and dynamics, but rather, may be capable—due to their physical and political qualities—of exerting independent effects on ethnic tension, conflict, and violence.

Scott Bollens

Jerusalem the eternal city, the united city, the golden city, the open city, the divided city, remains today a contested city. A veritable microcosm of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jerusalem’s physical character and internal dynamics have been influenced immeasurably by the competing national aspirations of the two parties. The influence does not merely flow in one direction, however. There is rather a dialectic relationship between the local and the national, with the situation on the ground in Jerusalem having important repercussions for the broader conflict as well. Indeed, as a result of the fundamental disagreement the city engenders, and concomitant fears it will derail negotiations, the “problem of Jerusalem” has often been separated politically from other permanent or “core” status issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Although this strategy may temporarily enable negotiations on other facets of the conflict to move forward, it denotes a somewhat troubling tendency to perceive the city as being separate from, or in opposition to, formal political agreements. As this paper will argue, we must instead consider how progressive urban strategies can anchor agreements at the national and international level, enhancing prospects for peace. Following an analysis of the current “partisan” approach to planning in the city, I will suggest a transition to an “equity” approach which seeks to ensure a more fair distribution of urban space and resources.

The role of urban planning in Jerusalem cannot be examined in isolation, however: we must remain cognizant that any formal resolution on the city will ultimately take the form of a legal document. The second part of this paper will thus

* Rebecca Sutton holds an MSc in Violence, Conflict and Development from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. This paper was completed as part of a course requirement for a Masters course on law and peacebuilding in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Currently on leave from legal studies at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Rebecca is managing War Child Canada (WCC)'s humanitarian assistance programme in Darfur, Sudan. WCC is a registered Canadian charity dedicated to providing urgently needed humanitarian assistance to war-affected children around the world. WCC helps generate awareness, support, and advocacy for children's rights everywhere, www.warchild.ca.


2 The other permanent status issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are: Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security, international status, and resource distribution.
explore the role of international law in addressing the problem of Jerusalem, focusing on its capacity to restrict unilateral planning; its potential to facilitate progressive change on the ground; and its provision of models of sovereignty for the city. As I will argue, the integration of an equity approach with a shared sovereignty model for Jerusalem—specifically Whitbeck’s Condominium Solution—will not only have important implications for the city but also for prospects for peace in Israel-Palestine more broadly.

What is Jerusalem?

One of the most important questions that must be asked before proceeding any further is also one of the most difficult to answer: What is Jerusalem? With Yerushalayim as its Hebrew name and Al-Quds as the Arab designation, what “Jerusalem” means depends in many ways on whom you ask. Since 1967, Palestinians have sought to establish pre-eminence in East Jerusalem, while a central concern of Israel has been that the city remain undivided under Israeli sovereignty and that continuity between the West and the East is achieved (Klein 3, 56). Although the amorphous nature of Jerusalem’s boundaries has in many ways enabled both sides to maintain broad claims such as these, competing assertions have tended to result in serious friction when maps are brought out and specifics are discussed. The city’s lines have been geographically altered on a de facto or de jure basis at various key historical junctures in the twentieth century such as the British Mandate, the 1947 UN Resolution 181, the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan, the 1967 annexation of East Jerusalem and the Israeli expansion plans for Greater and Metropolitan Jerusalem in recent years (Lapidoth 80). The contest over geographical borders and physical boundaries is complicated immeasurably by the unique place the city occupies in the minds and imaginations not just of its inhabitants but of Muslims, Christians, and Jews internationally as well.

For the sake of simplicity the term “Jerusalem” in this paper will generally refer to the municipality of Jerusalem, but it is essential to remain cognizant of the broader boundaries that many invoke when discussing the city. In Maya Choshen’s words, “Jerusalem is part of the broad, functional, geographic space that includes Jewish and Arab settlements linked by manifold mutual relations” (Choshen 52).

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3 As the British Mandate in Jerusalem drew to a close in 1947, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 181. The ‘Partition Plan’, as it was known, proposed the development of Arab and Israeli states in Israel-Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem, which would become a corpus separatum (G.A. Res. 181 (1947)).

4 On 27 June, 1967, immediately after the Six Day War, the Knesset adopted the Law and Administrative Ordinance Law, Amendment No.11 (LAW 8). This facilitated the annexation of 70 square kilometers into the West Jerusalem municipality, effectively allowing Israel to apply Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to areas formerly under Jordanian control from 1948-1967 (Lapidoth 69).
Urban planning approaches in cities characterized by ethnic and political conflict

The power of urban planning to influence relations between political, ethnic or religious groups should not be underestimated. By shaping the spatial distribution of various groups and the territorial boundaries which they lay claim to at the city level, urban policies impact how groups relate to each other on a daily basis as well as how they navigate notions of ownership and control. According to Scott Bollens, there are four principal urban planning strategies, detailed below, that can be adopted in cities characterized by political and ethnic polarization.

Under the neutral approach, planners distance themselves from issues of ethnic identity and power imbalances. Common in liberal democratic milieus, this approach addresses needs at the day-to-day and technical level, effectively depoliticizing territorial issues that may arise in conflicted societies (Bollens 3, 731). The city of Belfast has historically used this method with mixed results. Although neutral policies that allow separation have proved useful for decreasing violence in the short term and made governing the city more manageable, the segregation and physical partition of groups for security reasons has also served to harden ethnic compartmentalization (Bollens 1, 270).

Planners using the partisan approach no longer see urban problems as merely technical and value-free: by taking sides with the dominant group, their work entrenches existing differences and facilitates territorial expansion at the disenfranchised group’s expense (Bollens 3, 731). This approach most closely describes planning and policy-making in Israel, although rhetorical appeals to the neutral approach are often made (Bollens 3, 731).

More progressive is the equity approach, which takes into account the relative needs of all ethnic groups when developing services. This method is openly politicized and cognizant of power imbalances and economic disparities, as planners work under the assumption that a more equitable distribution of urban space, social services, and political participation may serve to dampen ethnic tensions (Bollens 3, 731).

Finally, the resolver approach strives to go beyond symptoms in the urban environment, focusing on the root causes of urban power imbalances. This method poses the most direct challenge to the status quo, recognizing that the allocation of territory and resources have implications beyond the local and physical milieu (Bollens 3, 732). Johannesburg is an example of a city that has struggled to develop the latter two approaches. During the final years of Apartheid, planners worked with local NGOs and excluded members of society as “resolvers.” After 1995, planning in Johannesburg more closely resembled the equity approach, seeking to balance disparities in

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5 For a comparison of planning in Belfast and Jerusalem, see Belfast-Jerusalem Civil Society Partnership (2005), Conference Report. [http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/policy/lilp/ConferencereportB.pdf].

6 The partisan approach, of course, recognizes that territory and resource allocations in a city can impact power balances at a higher and less tangible level, but elects to entrench the status quo rather than alter it.
opportunities and outcomes in order to foster urban co-existence and unite the historically torn social fabric (Bollens 1, 275).

**Urban Planning in Jerusalem: Israeli and Palestinian Approaches**

*The status quo: the shape of partisan planning in Jerusalem*

Israel’s partisan approach to planning in Jerusalem stems partly from the desire to maintain a favourable demographic balance and also from fears of “creeping sovereignty” on the part of Palestinians who may try to convert municipal solutions in their favor into territorial solutions at the national level (Gold 33). Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem in particular is viewed as a challenge to Israel’s sovereignty in the city, insofar as it connects East Jerusalem to the Palestinian Authority, blurs the 1967 lines of annexation, and isolates certain Jewish neighborhoods (Klein 271).

At the same time, Palestinians perceive Israel to be creating “facts on the ground” in order to make the issue of Jerusalem non-negotiable and Palestinian sovereignty an unlikely event (Whitbeck 782, Klein 2, 21). Many sources, such as Yuval Ginbar, Hussein and McKay, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW), and Menachem Klein argue that these fears are warranted. They perceive a marked inequality in urban planning processes, where unilateral action by Israel combines with a marginal role for planning by the Palestinian leadership (Hussein and McKay 290, Law 8, Klein 271). Hussein and McKay characterize planning by Jews in Israel as positive planning: “a dynamic and proactive if uncoordinated push to create facts, encouraging and initiating development …”. In contrast, planning for Palestinians is negative, spontaneous, regulatory and reactive with no overarching strategy (Hussein and McKay 290). The language “planning for Palestinians” is intentional here, as much of the construction and infrastructure in Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem is dictated by Israeli planning bodies rather than Palestinians. As Ginbar points out, Palestinians rarely have the means, power, or information to battle the Israeli system on equal footing (Ginbar 6).

Echoing Hussein and McKay, LAW argues that Israeli planning for Palestinian neighborhoods tends to stifle development rather than account for the actual needs of the neighborhoods’ inhabitants. To support this claim LAW cites the zoning of Palestinian neighborhoods in lower density areas, severe restrictions on Palestinian expansion and renovation, and a lack of construction loans and subsidies for Palestinian construction (LAW 13, HPCR 7). The zoning of almost 44 percent of land in East Jerusalem as “green,” although ostensibly for the purpose of preserving the natural environment, may also be viewed as an attempt to limit the expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods (Law 14). Israel’s recent construction of the Jewish community of Har

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2 The aforementioned imbalances are replicated in general city funding as well: in 1995 Arabs of East Jerusalem received only 7 percent of city funds although they constituted 30 percent of the city’s population at the time (Klein 74).
Homa on “green” land, which will be described further below, supports this interpretation.

The differential ability of both sides to make use of the Town Planning Scheme (TPS) is also crucial here. Even though these schemes have been used in Jewish neighborhoods since the mid-twentieth century, no TPS was drawn up for Palestinian neighborhoods until 1983 (LAW 11). Also, whereas the development and approval of a TPS for Jewish neighborhoods now takes approximately three years, in Palestinian neighborhoods it is often closer to ten (LAW 11). Accordingly, there are considerable incentives to build without a permit.

As the situation now stands, where Palestinians are seen to have ignored zoning laws or built without a permit, Israel typically responds either by demolition or by turning a blind eye. The former occurs most often in East Jerusalem and Zone C of the West Bank, and the latter occurs when the infraction is not perceived as deleterious to Israeli interests (LAW 14). B’tselem estimates that as many as 13,000 Palestinians were left homeless from 1995 to 2005 as a result of the demolition of 2,200 residences in Jerusalem (B’tselem 2, 1). The numbers are quite different from Klein’s perspective, however. He points out that at the end of 1999 there were a total of 839 demolition orders technically in force in East Jerusalem, but only 141 of them had actually been carried out (Klein 272). In any event, it is perhaps the procedural inequality in permit-issuing that is most relevant here: rather than demolishing Jewish Israeli construction that is built without a permit, Israel typically issues retroactive building permits (B’tselem 2, 1).

**Israeli planning in Jerusalem**

Three cases of unilateral planning by Israel in Jerusalem will now be addressed. Though brief, these case studies demonstrate that Jerusalem’s physical topography is in many ways a manifestation of national aspirations, and may potentially impact the outcomes of the currently stalled permanent status negotiations.

In 1991, Israel expropriated land which had formerly been labeled “green zone” in order to construct the Jewish community of Har Homa. The project effectively severed a key link between Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods and Palestinian Authority territory, and, because Arab residents were not given a stake in the process, Klein identifies the threat this construction posed to Palestinians as both procedural and substantive (Klein 278). In 1997 when the UN Security Council was poised to pass a Resolution declaring Israeli construction of Har Homa illegal, U.S. President Clinton offered Israel the U.S. Security Council veto in exchange for Israel’s compliance with the Oslo accords (UN Security Council 1). The use of Har Homa as a bargaining tool illustrates how changes to the facts on the ground can potentially provide a party with

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8 Builders in Jerusalem require a Town Planning Scheme in order to legally build infrastructure such as roads, sewage networks, and housing.

9 Under the Oslo II agreement, West Bank territory was divided into Zone A (under full Palestinian control), Zone B (Palestinian Authority controls civilian affairs but Israeli maintains security powers) and Zone C (under full Israeli control) (Klein 2, 13).
leverage in international political negotiations (Klein 287). As Jerusalem’s city engineer conceded six years after the project’s conception: “Har Homa is not exceptional. Political rather than professional planning considerations dictate the development of the entire city” (Klein 279).

According to LAW, one of the most deleterious consequences of Israeli settlement construction in the Occupied Territories is the disruption of “the continuity of Palestinian urban space” (LAW 8). Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Ma’aleh Adumim, Israel’s largest settlement.10 Founded in 1975, Ma’aleh Adumim now encompasses a land area of approximately 50 square kilometers and its population of over 25,000 residents is expected to grow to 45,000 in the coming years (Ginbar 2-3). Under Israel’s “E1 plan,” Ma’aleh Adumim is to be linked directly to the city of Jerusalem via a road system. This construction, when combined with Israeli efforts to develop the Eastern Ring Road to connect settlements in Ramallah to those in Bethlehem, effectively blocks Palestinians from developing Al-Quds as the capital of a future Palestinian state (Groag interview). In the interim, the establishment of Ma’aleh Adumim has not been accompanied by any increase in the standard of living for the Palestinian villages11 whose land was expropriated. Rather, these villages have lost important farm land as well as land on which to expand housing, industry and public institutions (Ginbar 2). Further, some have argued that the changes brought about through the E1 plan will have the effect of “pre-empting the outcome of now-stalled permanent status negotiations” (MIFTAH).

In recent years, Palestinian consternation over Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories has been compounded by Israel’s construction of the Security Barrier. Arguably, no manifestation of Israeli national concerns at the local level is as tangible as the construction of the Barrier. Whether or not these concerns are primarily based on security or oriented towards expansion is a contested matter: while Israel maintains the former, B’tselem and Bimkom insist that the Barrier’s route can only be explained by the Israeli desire to annex land (B’tselem and Bimkom 3). They point to certain Israeli claims as problematic, namely the expressed need for a “warning space” between settlements and the Barrier, the contention that the planning route is optimal in terms of topography, and the insistence that the Barrier is temporary (B’tselem and Bimkom 2). The “Jerusalem Envelope”—as the section of the Barrier encircling the city of Jerusalem is called—physically cleaves East Jerusalem from the West Bank. This effectively converts some Palestinian neighborhoods into enclaves, pushes communities such as Kafr’ Aqeb and Wallaja outside the city’s jurisdiction, and marginalizes nearby towns and suburbs which previously maintained important connections to East Jerusalem (B’tselem and Bimkom 34). B’tselem argues that this estrangement is intentional: “The dominant principle in setting the route in the Jerusalem area is to run

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11 The Ma’aleh Adumim settlement was established on land that belonged primarily to the following Palestinian Villages: Abu Dis, ‘Anata, al-‘Izariyyeh, a-Tur, and al-‘Issawiyyeh (Ginbar 3).
the route along the city’s municipal border” and therefore mute Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem (B’tselem 1). Significantly, some of the changes proposed to the Barrier’s route to minimize harm to Palestinians actually left the section around Jerusalem largely the same, except for the addition of 40 kilometers to encapsulate the aforementioned Ma’aleh Adumim settlement on the Israeli side (B’tselem 1).

Palestinian planning in Jerusalem

The emphasis above on Israeli planning should not eclipse Palestinian proclivity to allow the symbolic-national to affect the functional-local. At first glance, there may indeed seem to be a relative dearth of evidence illustrating how Palestinian national aspirations shape the city of Jerusalem. Upon a more in-depth examination, however, we find that Palestinian national aspirations are actually replete throughout the city: they can be readily located wherever sites of struggle and opposition against Israeli planning and construction are found. A brief example regarding East Jerusalem will perhaps suffice to illustrate this. Since 1967, electricity for all residents of East Jerusalem was provided by the Palestinian owned and run Jerusalem District Electric Company (JDEC), while the Israeli Electric Company (IEC) served as the main power source of West Jerusalem (Hutman and Cheshin 417). When Jewish residents of East Jerusalem switched over to the IEC in 1986 for cheaper services of better quality, Arab residents refused: for them, JDEC was in many ways an important symbol of Palestinian independence in East Jerusalem. Here, economic and pragmatic concerns simply counted for less than the value of retaining a symbol of Palestinian independence (Hutman and Cheshin 417). Though perhaps obvious, it merits mention that not every Palestinian challenge to Israeli planning should be interpreted as symbolic. As B’tselem contends, Palestinian housing construction without a permit is often not a political feat or act of protest, but rather a practical effort to circumvent what is a complicated, expensive, and unfair procedure (B’tselem 2, 1).

Implications

The examples above depict a troubling status quo of coordinated unilateral planning by Israelis and a rather passive and reactive involvement by Palestinians. How can this imbalance be remedied? There is a clear need to transition from the current partisan approach to planning in Jerusalem toward the equity approach, and some might even argue toward the partisan approach Bollen describes. I will explore this below following a discussion on the role of international law.

12 In the run-up to the 2006 Israeli elections several parties made it clear that extending Jerusalem’s boundaries to include outlying Jewish settlements is indeed a key goal of Israeli policy. Kadima, the Labour Party, and Meretz-Yachad all referred to a Greater Jerusalem bordered by Gush Etzion in the south, Givat Ze’eve in the north, Beitar in the west and Ma’ale Adumin in the east (Shragai).
13 Other settlements encircled by this extension include Kfar Adumim, Anatot, Nofei Prat, and Qedar (B’tselem 1).
14 JDEC’s status as a symbol of Palestinian independence from Israel is quite intriguing, considering that the company elected years ago to buy from IEC and no longer even produces electricity (Hutten and Cheshin 417).
The role of international law in a solution for Jerusalem

While urban planning and policymaking are clearly capable of creating significant change on the ground, how can one ensure that such change will be fair, just, equitable, and balanced? This section will examine three potential roles for international law: first, in restricting unfair planning practices in Jerusalem; second, in promoting progressive change; and third, in suggesting appropriate models of sovereignty for the city. As will be shown here, while the first role is limited by problems of enforcement, and the second role is promising but perhaps more indirect, the third role is relatively well-established given that permanent status negotiations will inevitably involve the selection of a model of sovereignty for Jerusalem. As will be made evident, all three of these potential roles for international law engage and intersect with planning issues in a crucial manner.

International law: enforcing fairness and restricting unilateral planning

For those who consider East Jerusalem to be under belligerent occupation since Israel annexed the territory in 1967, the inalienable rights of Palestinians as declared by the UNGA Resolution 3236 of 1974 are already being violated simply as a result of the Occupation (LAW 6). From this perspective, human rights conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, as well as various UN resolutions are all being infringed irrespective of Israel’s present actions (LAW 6). LAW and Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay also go beyond such fundamental violations to address Israel’s present actions on the ground in Jerusalem. They argue that all measures by the Jerusalem and Israeli authorities aiming to restrict Arab construction and tip the demographic balance in favor of Jewish residents are in violation of International Humanitarian Law (LAW 6, Hussein and McKay 279).

For some, International Humanitarian Law—specifically the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention—and International Human Rights Law are seen as crucial tools for enforcing rights and halting unfair practices in Jerusalem. For example, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) ruled that parts of the Security Barrier did not exhibit a proportionate balance of security concerns and the needs of inhabitants in accordance with international law (HCJ 2056/04), and subsequently asked Israel to change the route of the barrier. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s ruling that the Security Barrier is illegal (ICJ) is another landmark decision that is seen as playing a role in restricting unilateral action by Israel to some degree. There remain serious problems with respect to implementation and enforcement, however. None of the sections nullified by the HCJ ruling have yet been dismantled (B’tselem 3). In fact,

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15 According to LAW, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is in violation of Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (LAW 49).
16 In the February 26, 2004, case of Beit Surik Village Council v. the Government of Israel, residents from several villages in northwest Jerusalem petitioned the HCJ to contest the route of the Security Barrier. The HCJ ruled that three quarters of the proposed route in the area under discussion were illegal (HCJ 2056/04).
Israel’s revised route of the Barrier following the Beit Surik case actually accommodates the expansion of settlements to some degree (B’tselem and Bimkom 5). Further, the ICJ decision on the Barrier is not binding. Without question, these shortcomings with respect to enforceability have troubling implications for the potential of international law to restrict unilateral planning by Israel.

International law: facilitating progressive change

Moving on, we may perhaps locate an important role for international law in its capacity to provide a coherent language of rights to appeal to and a common theoretical framework for those who wish to challenge unfair planning practices. For example, it might be argued that Israel’s 2005 evacuation of settlers from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank would never have occurred in the absence of pressure from the international community, which maintains that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories are illegal under International Humanitarian Law (HPCR 3). Admittedly, similar problems of enforcement apply here as discussed previously: many have lamented that high profile evacuations of settlers from Gaza are often accompanied by quieter installations of settlers in the West Bank, and it is well-recognized that the construction of illegal settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank continues today. To some extent, this worrisome scenario may be countered by imagining the situation on the ground in the absence of international legal instruments; we might expect that the distribution of resources would be far more inequitable if there were no legal recourse. Of course, it is difficult if not impossible to measure the impact international law has had in this respect.

Regardless, a persuasive argument can be made that a number of international as well as local organizations are making important inroads under this particular role of international law. Bimkom, for example, appeals to rights language and grounds its local planning recommendations in a broader framework that is compatible with international legal norms. While others may view planning as a merely technocratic practice, Bimkom contends that flawed planning and the inequitable allocation of resources in Jerusalem violate basic rights such as human dignity, equal opportunity and access to public resources, the right to housing and an adequate standard of living.

17 Although the HCJ ruled in favor of petitioners in the Beit Surik case, the court also decided that military commanders may account for the expansion of communities that have not yet been officially approved when planning the route of the Security Barrier (B’tselem 11).

18 The ICRC, UN, and EU have all previously declared the settlements illegal under Paragraph 6 Article 49 for the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” (Convention (IV) Art 49.6). A 2001 Conference of High Contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention also reaffirmed “the illegality of the settlements in the said territories and of the extension thereof” (HPCR 6).

19 Israel does not recognize de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories and argues that even if Article 49 did apply, the distinction must be made between forcible transfer of occupants and the voluntary movement of occupants to the territories (HPCR 4).

20 Bimkom is an organization that strives to bring about equality in Israel-Palestine in terms of planning, development, and allocation of land resources.
In response, the organization calls for a transparent planning process and increased participation by all members of the public in that process (Bimkom 1). Viewed in this light, one may detect a potential for international law to facilitate—if indirectly—progressive change that challenges the status quo. I will explore this further below with respect to a transition toward an equity approach to planning in Jerusalem.

**International Law: models of sovereignty for Jerusalem**

Ambiguous boundaries and the use of unclear language have historically enabled both Israelis and Palestinians to assert ownership over overlapping space in the city of Jerusalem. While this may serve to temporarily dampen friction between the parties, in light of the discussion above there is an urgent need to clarify which parts of Jerusalem each party is legally entitled to lay claim to. Geoffrey Watson’s four models of sovereignty provide a helpful starting point for situating a solution for Jerusalem in an international legal framework.

First, there is the option of **full Israeli sovereignty** over West and East Jerusalem. Under this model, Palestinians would have extraterritorial rights and a Jerusalem suburb as their capital. This is the ideal solution for Israelis because Jerusalem would remain a united city under Israeli sovereignty, but the limited autonomy extended to Arab residents provokes Palestinian claims that it would infringe their right to self-determination (Watson 214, Emmet 242). Next, there is the **shared sovereignty** approach, which can take a number of forms; one of these forms, joint sovereignty, will be explored further below. The third model proposes **full Palestinian sovereignty** over East Jerusalem including the Old City, with Israeli extraterritorial rights in the Old City. Although this is the favored approach of Palestinians to a large extent because Israel would be forced to return all land occupied in 1967, Watson anticipates that such extensive change would merely serve to increase tension and decrease stability in the city (Watson 217). Finally, a fourth possibility is the **deferral of resolution** on the issue, with the aim of addressing other permanent status questions first (Watson 217). Here, the issue of Jerusalem is not viewed as an urgent matter so much as an obstruction to progress in the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This latter model has undeniably been the favored approach for political negotiators in the last few decades.

Two other options that Watson does not address are perhaps worth mentioning here. First, there is the possibility that Israel and Palestine may locate or relocate their capitals to more stable locales, such as Tel Aviv and Ramallah respectively (Emmet 247). Second, the international community would likely support a return to the idea of Jerusalem as an international capital or **corpus separatum** in a two-state solution (Emmet 247). Recent variations of UNGA Resolution 181 propose Jerusalem as the capital of multiple states and religions—similar to Brussels—rather than under the jurisdiction of an international body (Emmet 248). As unlikely as the acceptance of international involvement or a multinational presence in the city may seem, it may be a viable option for Jerusalem’s Holy Places.21 This paper will now focus on the relative

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21 Although Israel has refused the idea in the past, in the run-up to the 2006 Israeli elections the Kadima party demonstrated a willingness to consider the implementation of an international regime in the Old...
merits of Watson’s shared sovereignty approach, which Emmet contends may facilitate the development of Jerusalem as a “hinge city” uniting Israeli and Palestinian territories, economies, and futures (Emmet 256).

Shared Sovereignty and Whitbeck’s Condominium Solution

In 1994, Yasser Arafat proposed the possibility of a shared Jerusalem, citing the example of Rome and the Vatican (Emmet 249). While there is no universal interpretation of shared sovereignty, the concept is often equated with offshoot models such as scattered sovereignty (which would create zones of sovereignty throughout the city that are not geographically contiguous) and split sovereignty (which would set up sister cities in an undivided Jerusalem). The variety of configurations increases immeasurably when one integrates variations such as physical partition, permeable borders, vertical division, and horizontal division (Emmet 250). For some, the notion of sharing Jerusalem is tantamount to a territorial partition of sovereignty in the city (Emmet 242). For others, such as Saul Cohen, such a division is not implied: “Sharing should mean giving to the various peoples of Jerusalem an unprecedented degree of formal political autonomy at the municipal, sub-municipal, and metropolitan levels” (Emmet 242). Clearly, the multitude of formulations which may be captured by the term “shared sovereignty” require one to tread carefully.

One subset of shared sovereignty is the concept of joint sovereignty. A commonly cited application of this model is John Whitbeck’s Condominium Solution for Jerusalem, which invites Israel and a future Palestinian state to share the city of Jerusalem as their capital. Although this approach contains elements of the 1947 Partition Plan, as it entails the necessary existence of both an Israeli and a Palestinian state and the demilitarization of Jerusalem, no physical boundary within the city is implied under the Condominium Solution, and sovereignty is to be shared by both parties rather than held by the international community.22 By preventing Israel from having to accept a re-division of Jerusalem and enabling Palestine to make some claim to sovereignty in the city, this arrangement can at least partially satisfy both parties’ symbolic and psychological needs (Whitbeck 786).

As a joint capital, Jerusalem would have a system of districts or arrondissements with Israeli government offices in the West, Palestinian government offices in the East, and municipal offices in both parts of the city (Whitbeck 782). For matters that can be administered at the city-wide level, Whitbeck proposes the formation of an umbrella council (Whitbeck 783). This resonates with numerous schemes of recent decades, such as Israel’s “Strengthening of Jerusalem” plan23 and the Geneva Accord’s proposal that

City (Shragai). Article 6, Section 5 of the Geneva Accord also proposes the establishment of a multinational presence on the compound, subordinate to an “International Group” which would be given the responsibility of monitoring the area (Geneva Accord Art 6.5).

22 It should be noted that some variations on this model, such as Ove Bring’s version of joint sovereignty, emphasize a role for the international community in monitoring the sharing of the city (Emmet 250).

23 The notion of an umbrella municipality was one element of Resolution 3919 adopted by the Israeli government on June 21, 1998, for the “Strengthening of Jerusalem” (Choshen 57).
the two municipalities form a Jerusalem Co-ordination and Development Committee (JCDC) (Geneva Accord Art. 6.11). Sub-committees of JCDC would focus on issues such as planning and zoning, transportation, economic development, and city policing. Representation on these committees would ostensibly be equal for Israelis and Palestinians, but the legal system that is selected for the city will undoubtedly have a role to play in ensuring fairness in the city’s institutions.

Numerous legal systems have been proposed for an undivided Jerusalem under the Condominium Solution, all of which offer a trade-off between clarity and fairness. The most pragmatic approach, for example, would perhaps be the application of Israeli law in Israeli majority districts and Palestinian law in Palestinian districts. The risk associated with this framework is that it will entrench existing segregation by drawing international borders around various discontinuous neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (Whitbeck 788). Although giving the city its own “Jerusalem law” might also prove quite manageable, there remains a risk that existing power imbalances would be replicated in municipal institutions. Under this system, for example, the city’s umbrella council may not be legally required to have an equal number of Palestinian and Israeli representatives. Whitbeck dismisses these options and voices preference for the “flexible” legal system where the applicable law in a particular case depends on the district, the parties involved, and the subject matter (Whitbeck 790). Although this framework is sound in terms of the theoretical equality awarded to both parties under the law, one can imagine the bureaucratic chaos and incessant power struggles that would follow its implementation.

When examining the problem of Jerusalem, Whitbeck argues that various matters such as immigration, the Holy Places, and municipal boundaries must be dealt with individually in order to arrive at manageable solutions (Whitbeck 782). For him, agreeing on various practical criteria is “infinitely easier than rolling aside the symbolic and psychological boulder of the issue of sovereignty” (Whitbeck 790). This tendency to parcel difficult issues into more manageable components resonates with the Beilin/Abu-Mazen understandings of the 1990s, which importantly distinguished the legal-official aspects from the political, symbolic, and functional aspects of sovereignty (Klein 306). Whitbeck’s marked preference for pragmatic and workable solutions at first glance makes his support for the flexible law system surprising. It may be argued, however, that his insistence on dividing up issues into smaller parts actually invites a complexity that is consistent with the idea of a flexible legal framework. Although it is not stated explicitly, Whitbeck also seems to imply that certain things (e.g., city boundaries) may be considered solely in light of how they will function, while others (e.g., a legal framework) must strive for fairness and equally no matter what the cost is in terms of

24 The flexible system is one of the options presented by Watson under a shared sovereignty solution, along with territorial, personal, combination, and concurrent jurisdiction options (Watson 216).
25 UNGA Resolution 181 also parcels various aspects of sovereignty into discrete categories and distinguishes sovereignty from administration, granting powers of legislation, taxation, and judiciary to the inhabitants while retaining administration of Jerusalem under the UN (Cattan 15). A similar division also occurs under the current status quo at the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif: although Israel claims sovereign rights to the site it accepts de facto administration by Muslims (Emmet 2, 25).
complexity. Ultimately, the strength of Whitbeck’s proposal for a Condominium Solution is the underlying cognizance that sovereignty is not the only contested issue in Jerusalem. This is highlighted by Klein, who argues that conflict in Jerusalem is also a battle of “collective identity, narrative, social control, spatial division of labor, economics, and control of resources, culture, and administration” (Klein 2, 8).

Of course, the potential application of the Condominium Solution in Jerusalem is not without controversy. Emmet, for example, points out a crucial flaw in the joint sovereignty model: it fails to address how expansive Palestinian or Israeli areas will be designated without incorporating some neighborhoods from the other party (Emmet 2, 27). The general lack of contiguity between Arab neighborhoods and between Jewish neighborhoods leads Emmet to propose a model of “scattered” sovereignty for most of Jerusalem, with joint sovereignty applied only in the Old City, the airport, and industrial zones (Emmet 2, 27). This territorial discontinuity is indeed a serious issue that any model for Jerusalem must address, but it may be argued that the risk of entrenching segregation in Jerusalem by drawing international borders around various communities is not outweighed by the evenhandedness that scattered sovereignty would confer; this is something that Emmet himself acknowledges (Emmet 249). At the very least, Emmet’s argument reminds us that if a joint sovereignty framework such as Whitbeck’s Condominium Solution is to be implemented in Jerusalem, it will necessitate some creative thinking about notions of residency and citizenship.

*Negotiating the city: merging the equity approach with the shared sovereignty model*

The current partisan approach to planning in Jerusalem demonstrates how a politicized planning process can serve to further reinforce disparities when the more powerful party maintains control of resource allocation. In light of this, it is imperative that the transition to a more progressive approach be referential to, and anchored in, a framework that mandates fairness and justice for both parties in keeping with international law. As Schlomo Hasson remarks, shared sovereignty essentially offers a more nuanced and subtle balance than dichotomous projections of either preserving the status quo or instituting radical change in Jerusalem (Hasson 350). This parallels nicely with Bollen’s equity approach to urban planning, which straddles the main tenance of the status quo (the partisan approach) and proposals for radical change (the resolver approach).

As I have suggested in this paper, Whitbeck’s Condominium Solution for Jerusalem is particularly well-suited to addressing the problem of Jerusalem in conjunction with an equity approach to planning. Whitbeck’s model importantly allows both parties to at least partially satisfy their national aspirations and symbolic needs, and it creates space for more balanced representation in municipal institutions. At the same time, planning through the equity approach has the potential to strengthen and uphold the shared sovereignty model: the equity approach can help to ensure greater participation in local planning processes and can address problems arising in the urban fabric with an eye to restoring balance between the parties.

One important result of this merging would be the increased representation of—and participation by—Palestinians in planning and policy bodies that implement
decisions in Jerusalem. Hussein and McKay pick up this thread, calling for an Arab organization that examines “planning and building across the whole Arab sector and acts as a single voice for the aspirations of the Palestinian communities” (Hussein and McKay 290). This resonates with B’tselem’s recommendation for the establishment of a Palestinian Neighborhood Development Authority in East Jerusalem.26

Conclusion

Jerusalem the shared city has yet to come into being. This remains true in terms of co-existence at the city level as well as in formal political negotiations of sovereignty in the international realm. While national aspirations continue to shape Jerusalem’s urban landscape through the medium of planning and construction, the shared sovereignty model and equity approach may combine to improve relations between the city’s Jewish and Arab residents. Far from being irrelevant broader political agreements, I have attempted to show that the peaceful negotiation of urban space in daily life may actually provide the impetus for compromise at the international level.

Regardless of how one interprets the current state of planning and construction in Jerusalem or what one’s preferred approach is, a framework for discussion and dialogue will be an important outcome of the integration of urban planning and international law perspectives. To the extent that a creative solution for the city may translate into prospects for peace in the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the need for such integration is pressing.

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26 B’tselem also calls for retroactive building permits to be issued for “illegal” Palestinian structures, and proposes the creation of detailed TPS’s for Palestinian neighborhoods (B’tselem 2, 75).


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\(^{27}\) Please note: all page numbers for Watson’s work are inserted according to the SOAS course-pack for 15PLAC094: Law, Human Rights and Peacebuilding: The Israeli-Palestinian Case.
Blessed are the Peacemakers: 
Georgian Orthodox Priests and Reconciliation 
after the Summer 2008 Civil War

Spencer B. Meredith, III*

The Summer War in August 2008 ended Georgia’s bid to reclaim Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian military intervention brought fifteen years of conflict resolution efforts to a brutal, and quite likely final, end. International organizations, transnational aid agencies, and domestic non-governmental organizations had worked across all three diplomatic tracks to resolve the long-standing conflict right up to the point of open hostilities. Unfortunately, their best efforts were only partially successful, relieving short-term suffering but failing to accomplish their stated goal of a lasting peace.

This article does not address the causes of the war, nor the prospects for renewed fighting. Instead, it gives a brief history of the conflict and examines the relevant literature to draw attention to the nearly five hundred thousand internal refugees (Internally Displaced Persons, henceforth IDPs) and how best to meet their needs. Their classification as internal rather than the more traditional external refugee status raises questions about the proper United Nations agency tasked to oversee their assistance. It also raises the more problematic debate between sovereignty and human rights. Are IDPs guaranteed sanctuary within their own country, with all the material and social help external refugees are supposed to receive? Does such assistance require integration or repatriation since the separatist regions are still legally part of Georgia, despite Russia and Nicaragua’s isolated recognition? Much depends on the Georgian government’s capacity to restore its sovereignty in those regions. Since that seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, what alternatives are available to the country’s vast IDP population?

Answers to these questions and viable methods for ensuring the long-term care for this needy group can be found in two sources: the growing conflict resolution literature that brings religion back into the discussion and social network analysis focusing on key local figures within communities. Both fields have begun to merge in the wake of successful peace processes in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. While none of these countries is completely free from the structural problems that cause conflict, they all show the possibilities for conflict transformation and reconciliation between aggrieved parties. The case for Georgia relies heavily on

* Dr. Spencer B. Meredith, III, is a Fulbright Scholar and Guest Lecturer for the U.S. State Department. He has worked on conflict resolution and religious issues in South and East Asia, Eastern Europe, and South Africa. He is a professor in the department of political science at Rowan University in Glassboro, New Jersey.

Dager (2005) discusses the complexity of defining groups, while Martin and Schoenholtz (2006) explore the challenges of compelling incapable and unwilling states to care for their own citizens as IDPs. IDPS and refugees share similar vulnerability to renewed violence and economic disruption, and both authors emphasize the need for clarified UN oversight through existing bureaucracies rather than the creation of distinct IDP-only organizations.
these earlier successes, but departs in one important way. This article proposes that conflict resolution need not include both sides of the recent war, and in fact argues against cross-border reconciliation at this time. Instead, it makes the case for local Orthodox priests to use their role as social network hubs to help IDP communities heal and unilaterally forgive. Evidence supporting the approach comes from extensive interviews with priests and IDPs from four Georgian cities with high IDP populations. While initial efforts to engage Georgian and separatist governments officials through multi-track diplomacy failed to prevent the Summer War, the possibility of helping its most vulnerable victims is more viable today than ever before.

Historical Context for the War

Abkhazia and South Ossetia have sought their independence from Georgia for decades. They have competing historical claims to the region’s founding Christian missionary, St. Nino (c. 300 AD), ethnic connections to groups in southern Russia, and de facto internal sovereignty over their territory. However, every Georgian government from the early Soviet period to today has claimed them as part of Georgia. The separatists’ drive for full sovereignty was given a boost by Russian military forces and diplomatic strong-arming when Moscow formally recognized their independence. The lack of support from the international community has not slowed the Russians from building up the separatists’ internal security forces, or the Abkhaz and Ossetian governments’ appeals for international recognition. Their new status has not encouraged IDP repatriation though, nor have Russian security guarantees to protect them assuaged lingering animosity and fear.

The first wave of IDP migration began after fighting in the early 1990s drove close to three hundred thousand Georgians from their homes. Casualties were high on both sides, with claims of genocide and human rights violations leveled by both governments. Accounts bear a striking resemblance to other regions engulfed by ethnic civil war: mass executions, torture and rape, burning victims alive in their homes, and infanticide. Neither side can claim the moral high ground, but the Georgians suffered the added trauma of being forced en masse from their ancestral homes.

Between fifty and one hundred thousand Georgians eventually returned to South Ossetia and the Gali region of Abkhazia during the decade that followed. The former integrated into Georgian enclaves scattered throughout the region, while the Gali Georgians remained corralled in a buffer zone guarded by Russian peacekeepers. Abkhaz government officials touted this as an effort to restore Georgian property while preserving the Abkhaz nature of their country. Squatters were given carte blanche to claim abandoned homes in Gali, with the stipulation that Georgians with legal claims in the area be given priority over refugees from Abkhazia proper. The ability of these immigrants to restore normal lives remained limited given the pervasive small-scale fighting and persistent fears of escalating violence. However, life in Gali was infinitely

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2 Interviews, June 2007.
better during the “decade of conflict resolution” than during what followed the Summer War.

Accounts differ as to who started the war. Russian media and academic sources claim the Georgian army began shelling Ossetian villages in the early hours of August 8, 2008. Russian troops had been participating in a counter-terrorism exercise above the border and responded in defense of their peacekeepers in the area. What followed was “peace coercion” to ensure the Georgian government would never again try to alter the status quo in its favor through military means. This led to a full-scale invasion of northern Georgia, driving the Georgians out of their American-financed bases near Zugdidi (the closest town to the Abkhaz border), and maintaining buffer zones for several weeks to eliminate guerrilla activity in the area. Abkhazia was also fortified by sea and land forces through newly repaired roads and railways connecting it to Southern Russia.

Some justification for Russian actions can be found in Western academia. Walter (1997) supports the claim that third-party involvement may be necessary in extreme cases of mutual insecurity and irreconcilable national interests, and Kaufmann (1996) argues that ethnic civil wars are most often concluded and produce lasting peace when an outside intervening force picks one side, while ensuring the losing side receives partial interest fulfillment. Russian actions in defense of Abkhazia and South Ossetia seem justified in that regard.

The separatists had maintained defensive positions since the 1992 Sochi Agreement called for a monitored cease-fire under Russian supervision. There had been small-scale skirmishes around the Gali border region and throughout South Ossetia, but nothing more than the occasional flare-up. Even the Georgian capture of the Kodori Valley in 2006 and Russian claims that violence was imminent did not upset the status quo. Domestic cabinet shuffles, inflammatory public statements, even the disruption of diplomatic and trade relations did not induce Russia to set aside its claimed neutrality in favor of the separatists. However, once Georgia began killing Russian peacekeepers and targeting civilian areas with artillery strikes, the Russian government acted reasonably on behalf of the weaker, dependent side.

This argument can be made without recourse to the jingoistic rhetoric commonly heard from the Kremlin and its academic and media lackeys. Western governments may not like the peace imposed by Russia, but the new status quo looks to be more stable, and Georgia’s range of options more certain. Decreasing uncertainty is a hallmark of effective deterrence, and the presence of a credible Russian deterrent could keep the peace for some time.

The Georgian position is diametrically opposed to the Russian view. Russian actions in 2007, specifically shooting down Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter attack on Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, had taken relations in a decidedly negative direction, but the real change began when Russia opened official relations with the separatists in April 2008. This step, with greater diplomatic

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3 See Pladysheva (2008), Dulian (2008) for examples.
significance than the previous issuance of Russian passports to locals, signaled a major shift from tacit approval to outright recognition. This may have been the logical response to President Saakashvilli changing the title of the previous Ministry of Conflict Resolution to the more aggressive Ministry of Territorial Integration. However, the Georgian action can be explained as either playing to the nationalist sentiment in the face of growing domestic opposition, or as fulfillment of a campaign promise to restore Georgia’s long-lost territory. In either case, neither action contradicted the international agreements governing relations between the parties.

Relations became more troubled in late July as South Ossetian militia shelled Georgian villages and military positions. Skirmishes had happened before without much change in the strategic situation, but this new round of local violence took on new significance given the political decisions by Tbilisi and Moscow to heighten the differences in their mutually exclusive views; assertive political rhetoric magnified threat perceptions on both sides of the border. Then on August 1 a Georgian police vehicle was destroyed and Georgian snipers retaliated by killing several off-duty Ossetian police. Heavy fighting erupted on August 6, and late the following night, Saakashvilli publically announced the presence of Russian troops in the Roki tunnel entering South Ossetia. He then called for an immediate cease-fire to prevent further escalation. The South Ossetians allegedly continued their attacks on Georgian villages, to which the Georgian army responded by moving tanks towards the capital, killing several Russian soldiers in the process.

Georgian sources claim that the Russian response was not a response at all, rather a premeditated plan to alter the configuration of power in the region prior to recognizing Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. The evidence for their position has convincing supporters. Cornell (2008) and Allison (2008) give detailed accounts of Russian troop movements in the weeks preceding the war, all pointing towards a massive military escalation. The Russian offensive into Georgia proper further calls into question the view that Moscow’s policy was a) peacekeeping, b) the Right to Protect civilians against aggression, or c) outside intervention in support of oppressed peoples. Why did Moscow act with such ferocity and overwhelming power? What changed the utility calculations of the antagonists after so many years of stalemate?

Russian military commanders believed an attack into Abkhazia would come in the immediate future. Saakashvilli countered that the Russians and Abkhaz were preparing a breakout across the Inguri River. Wherever blames lies, the war is over, the balance of power has shifted, and there is now greater impetus to solve the problems facing Georgian IDPs. Their plight requires more than government action, distributive justice, or repatriation, if those were even possible in the presence of overwhelming

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5 The Nov. 2007 opposition demonstrations revealed a growing weakness in the government’s monolithic control. How far that weakness would have extended in the absence of outright war with Russia seems less certain. George and Stefes (2008) make a convincing case that Saakashvilli could have weathered the storm without fundamentally damaging Georgia’s democratic consolidation.


Russian influence in the separatist regions. It requires a new approach based in the teachings of Orthodox Christianity and social network analysis.

The Case for Religion in Conflict Resolution

Religion has come back into the discussion of peacemaking, but stands on the shoulders of a rich tradition developed over decades in academia and in the field. Conflict resolution (CR) theories and practitioners traditionally rely on human rights as the universal standard for transforming perceptions, restoring peace, and accomplishing justice for the greatest number of people.\(^8\) Kelman (2007) argues that conflict is driven by socio-psychological factors that require both individual healing and redefining group identities through inclusivity and a sense of common humanity. Barriers to developing these conciliatory views need to be removed, which Ellickson (2005) proposes can be done by three types of change agents: self-motivated actors who stand to gain material benefits from the change, norm entrepreneurs with technical knowledge of conflict issues that forms the basis of their legitimacy, and opinion leaders who motivate the masses after the initial catalyst for change has proven successful.\(^9\) These agents are readily identified after the fact, but a priori classification remains problematic. Further complicating the issue, Bessant (2008) addresses the fundamental challenge of separating actors’ intentions from behavioral outcomes. While it is impossible to rule out instrumentality in ex post facto testimonies, inferring intentions can be done through recourse to universal traits and social interactions; human nature and communities provide clues to how people act in general, much the same as the universal assumption of rationality in rational choice theory.

Successful CR efforts use assumptions of common humanity to place individual concerns within larger material, social, and cultural contexts. The goal is to reassure victims that they are not alone in their pain, nor are perpetrators entirely devoid of human goodness, despite evils done in the past. Getting people to see their shared human interests is often complicated by the different foci stressed by human rights advocates pursuing justice, and CR practitioners favoring compromise and peace at the expense of immediate justice. Nesiah (2006) adds that since justice has multiple meanings and nearly limitless avenues for implementation depending on cultural context, the richness of meaning can facilitate dialogue only if the parties are willing to adopt inclusive perspectives. Unfortunately, building common discursive understanding remains one of the greatest challenges if concepts of justice are not agreed upon early in the process, and any number of problems can derail the process of reconciliation: balancing prosecution with incentives for truth-telling; fitting punishments to crimes,

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\(^8\) Conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and peacemaking can be described as distinct processes, and there are certainly times when one approach is more viable than the others. In general though, the basic premises are similar enough to conflate them when discussing the place of religion in conflict termination, that is, ending direct violence and its underlying structural causes. See Lederach (1997) and Crocker et al. (2004) for discussions of core principles and methodological issues in the conflict resolution literature.

especially in the case of genocide and similar gross human rights violations; locating all the guilty parties; and so forth.

Bell (2006) gives a good example of these problems by discussing the tensions between police and civilian activists in Northern Ireland as they tried to create a neutral force capable of ensuring security for victims while punishing violators. Through a series of open discussions facilitated by advocates and practitioners, human rights became the common terminology for negotiations, leaving the more contentious issue of self-determination for later discussions. Empathy developed for former enemies by reframing the issues around the concept of shared humanity. Unfortunately, discourse alone is not enough to bring lasting peace; structural changes need to rectify the underlying causes of discontent, anger, and the easy access to violence. Religion has the potential to bring about those changes.

The past decade has seen a proliferation in religious studies aimed at explaining the causes of conflict between religious communities, ethnic wars that have religious overtones, and textual analysis attempting to teach peace to militants. Gopin (2002) bridges the gap between traditional CR work and religious studies by emphasizing the greater need for action in place of mere words. He argues that while dialogue can help create common terms for sharing, these need to be built in conjunction with concrete faith-in-action. This calls for flexible approaches by deeply embedded cultural specialists rather than a one-size-fits-all approach based on established criteria, reminiscent of Geertz’s (1973) classic discussion of “thick description.”

Such an approach seems more likely to succeed in specific contexts, but has limited generalizability for three reasons: 1) the amount of time required to learn the intricacies of each side’s cultural and religious meanings may make participants impatient and lead to a collapse of peace negotiations; 2) facilitators are few and far between compared to combatants, and they are needed in many places around the world; and 3) resources to train new CR practitioners are equally limited. Sampson (2007) rescues the religious approach from obscurity by placing it in the context of existing CR models. Accordingly, religion frames how actors, groups, and society understand norms of appropriateness. It can also motivate for particular actions. While the latter may be used to instigate violence, Sampson focuses on religion’s positive role in societies that ascribe value and meaning to religious identities. Obviously this limits

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10 This article does not address the incentives and punishments used to coerce aggressors into conflict resolution processes. The case of Georgian peacemaking relies on grassroots efforts in the absence of direct, meaningful government involvement. The 2008 Summer War invalidated all the previous CR efforts, creating a clean slate for new approaches more aptly tied to Georgian cultural contexts.
11 Helmick and Peterson (2001) present a rich body of essays written by practitioners and theorists of the emerging field. They engage the initial debate about religion as a potential force for peace, as well as offer advice from well-known conflict resolution settings. See Abu-Nimer (2001), Redekop (2007), and Jafari (2007) for additional examples.
12 Little (2007) gives examples of outstanding peacemakers in different conflicts, but their inclusion in a special volume shows how rare they are. A common refrain from each person is their isolation and solitary efforts compared to the forces of violence arrayed against them.
13 Silberman (2005) describes religious beliefs as a meaning system capable of adapting to new circumstances while maintaining core principles. The use of sacred/secular divides, emotional
the approach to self-selecting communities, but Sampson’s point that a great number of people hold religious beliefs gives credence to its application alongside traditional human rights CR models.

Sampson also offers examples of religious peacemakers fulfilling five roles in conflicts based on their proximity to victims and victimizers, and their legitimacy as respected voices for peace in their communities. Advocates work for peace as a universal good regardless of specific group interests, activists promote the interests of underprivileged groups, intermediaries stand in the gap between warring factions, and observers call the international community to witness atrocities. Finally, educators work to heal wounds and train in non-violent ways of resolving deep seeded conflicts. The key for each of these roles is distance from acts of violence balanced with closeness to victims; they have to live with victims to be of greatest value. Gopin (1997) proposes ways to balance proximity and influence by showing that the greatest impact comes from religious leaders who share the suffering of their flock while maintaining religious authority to direct their actions towards reconciliation. That authority is most effective when used to change the way people see the Other, specifically ascribing positive meaning to their reconciliation efforts (Nielsen 1998). The inclusivity of religious claims can also affect the chances of reaching a negotiated settlement (Svensson 2007), as can religious identity’s peripheral or central meaning in the conflict. Individuals and groups that define themselves primarily as religious adherents, as opposed to mixing religious and political identities, are more likely to enter into compromise and reconciliation. Svensson adds the degree of indivisibility of the issues at stake – political, economic, and social – to set the range of negotiations; fungible interests and goals are more easily accommodated than zero-sum positions. The presence of inclusive religious teachings, both textual and didactic from the pulpit, add weight to fungible goals, and are therefore the best case for religious accommodation and compromise in peacemaking.

Harpviken and Roislien (2008) bridge the gap between analyses of religion’s substantive/normative side and its functional application to peacemaking. They give excellent definitions of the internal processes by which believers come to identify with specific teachings, and how they model their lives on core beliefs. They also emphasize the structural assets religious organizations and leaders bring to their communities. Organizations that can mobilize the faithful stand a better chance of impacting policymakers than obscure sects with little following. While it seems obvious to say that contentment, and internal reflection, coupled with group reinforcement, make religion a viable partner for CR practitioners.

Marks (2000) is full of examples of brave peacemakers who risked their lives and families to help communities stop the growing violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Appleby (1998) examines the ways religious teachings adapt to conflict situations. Sometimes they harden animosity towards the enemy, but they may also give raison d’être for peacemaking among exhausted, traumatized victims. Transformation can come from “faith-based experiences, life-altering circumstances, or changes of perspectives and goals that might occur following trauma, do-or-die situations and ‘acts of fate’… Many such alterations are subtle, incremental, pervasive, and not readily noticeable,” requiring expertise to maximize their positive impact (Etezady, p. 561).
popular leaders can influence government officials, Harpviken and Roislien go beyond rudimentary analysis to show how religious norms of appropriateness and coercive threats of eternal punishment resonate with the population, allowing for the aggregation of popular inputs. This creates more than just a mob mentality and transforms inputs into concrete policy goals. Such an approach remains limited to conflicts where religious identities are directly tied to the conflict, or are central enough to group identities to be recalled by religious advocates for peace. In such cases, religious leaders can function as liaisons between victims and those combatants that desire peace; coordinators working within a shared religious tradition, although the problem of differing interpretations of similar “truths” remains a serious obstacle; or as representatives of one side to the Other and the international community.\textsuperscript{16}

Specifically, the Christian Scriptures state that peacemakers are blessed, or more accurately, fully satisfied with God and others,\textsuperscript{17} and there are several examples of Christian churches playing pivotal and positive roles in peacemaking. Shore (2008) convincingly defends the active involvement of indigenous and international Peace Churches in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). She argues that Christianity was an integral part of South African culture at the time, and secular human rights were rejected by TRC participants as being quasi-imperialist and out of step with traditional \textit{ubuntu} justice. Christianity resonated with a vast majority of the population, and coupled with the growing democratic culture in the country, gave TRC definitions of justice greater legitimacy than Western liberal ideals. As a result, the Commission opted for justice as social shaming for the majority of the guilty, reserving punishment for the most severe perpetrators of violence and cruelty. Problems remain in the implementation of distributive justice as reparations have not been fully paid and the poor condition of many black South Africans due to unfair employment, housing, and education policies persists. However, the non-TRC alternatives for South Africa would have been much worse, and the Christian churches continue to work on reconciliation and social justice decades after their earlier peacemaking.

Penfold (2005) and Serapiao (2004) review similar evidence from Sierra Leone and Mozambique. Christian and Islamic clergy had a less prominent role in resolving Sierra Leone’s long-standing conflict, but afterwards played a major role in reconciliation efforts. A Truth Commission and independent criminal court were established simultaneously in order to balance restorative justice and punishment, but both required cooperation from Revolutionary United Front (RUF) officers. Church and mosque leaders appealed to them, and eventually this became possible after a change in its leadership, a brave step considering the lack of amnesty for senior members of the rebel group. Religion in this case set the terms for living in the wake of catastrophic

\textsuperscript{16} Harpviken and Roislien conclude that this convergence is absolutely necessary for religious peacemaking to be successful.
\textsuperscript{17} Mohagheghi (2004) tracts similar beliefs in Quranic teachings in favor of active peacemaking against violence and structural injustice. The examples listed are not to privilege one religion over others in the effort, rather to correlate earlier Christian success with the ongoing crisis in Georgia as a predominantly Orthodox Christian nation.
violence, prompting Christians and Muslims to focus on forgiveness and healing rather than costly, unrealistic monetary reparations.

The case for Mozambique was more complicated. Even though Sierra Leone suffered more horrendous violence at the hands of civilian combatants, the contradictory role of the official mainline churches in Mozambique made reconciliation more difficult as its participants had competing claims to legitimacy within sacred texts and different communities. In the end though, the indigenous Catholic Church organized against both rebels and the government by drawing grassroots support from native Catholic and Protestant groups. Their ability to set aside sectarian differences stands as a model of peacemaking by the powerless. Only after years of negotiations centered on Christian virtues and practice were the combatants willing to accommodate each other’s demands. Religion played a positive role by reminding them of their Christian duties, while retaining the threat of public shaming for failures to live up to those standards.

None of these three examples are free from problems, nor can religious groups claim sufficient explanatory power to rule out other influences. However, neither condition is the main point of including religion in conflict resolution efforts. The negotiating table is long and wide with many diverse participants. Religion has its place, as do economic development, good governance, and sustainable environmental programs. The questions are how best to use it and who should be entrusted with its power over the faithful. In the case of Georgia’s civil war, the answer lies with local Orthodox priests.

Priests as Network Hubs

Social network analysis (SNA) looks at the relationships between individuals within a community, and individual nodes have different types and intensities of connections. These can include single connections in dyadic relationships, multiple connections to the same person through other nodes, or overlapping connections with every member of the group. Some nodes also serve as connectors between subgroups within the network, while others connect different networks as bridges. Most people have few connections, a few have many, but the key is how important those connections are to the maintenance of the network. Nan (2008), Quatman and Chelladurai (2008), and Maoz (2009) present the multiplicity of possible connections, and are excellent references for the basic premises of SNA. What is necessary here is to apply the methodology of identifying key players and how they influence other members of the network.

Prime movers are often labeled as network hubs because they 1) have the most connections, 2) act as gatekeepers for information flows, or 3) have asymmetrical influence over members even if their connections are relatively few. Christopolous (2008) raises the issue of “meaningful connections” by analyzing the strategies for building trust and using personal influence by different types of hubs. One method for determining influence on a network is the degree of legitimacy the actor had before the network formed. While previously important people may retain their social positions, declining reputations are also possible, especially if their previous roles were as conflict
resolvers who failed to stop the violence.\textsuperscript{18} Determining who still has influence and who are the new hubs requires extensive interviews and field work, and Christopolous correctly identifies two challenges of empirical research in SNA. Methodological rigor can overcome the common mistake of identifying the most vociferous members of the community as hubs, but the more serious challenge of delineating network boundaries may only be possible with easily distinguished groups. Refugees and IDPs can be so identified if they have not been integrated into their host communities, but time may work against that assessment as even the most staunchly resistant foreigners will eventually pick up local customs and adapt to their new surroundings.

Applying SNA will be most fruitful in situations where 1) networks have distinguishable characteristics compared to their neighbors, 2) network hubs have meaningful connections with most of the network either directly or through respected intermediaries, and 3) levels of trust are flexible enough to grow but are not vulnerable to short-term setbacks and disappointments. Nyiri (2008) adds another dimension to the ideal case study – size. Examining the human cognitive capacity to form meaningful attachments, Nyiri argues that “scale-free” networks, those with the standard many-with-few/few-with-many connections, reach a maximum of one hundred and fifty members. However, the upper limit does not mean each connection has the same importance to the network or meaning for the individual. Drawing on group testing, Nyiri shows how intensity and quantity are inversely proportional so that a person’s dearest connections will likely not exceed the smallest number of persons, usually five. Meaningful connections need not be determined exclusively by the total number of people in the network though; subgroups are also possible within larger networks, which allow for less proximate network hubs to rely on subgroup actors with influence.

Finally, the network’s goals factor into its cohesion and the ability of hubs to influence peacemaking decisions. Garb and Nan (2006) compiled nearly a decade of research on Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs working to resolve the long-standing conflict. They argue that coordination networks among individual NGOs allowed for greater influence and resource collection than unilateral action. However, these groups had to share the same norms of inclusivity and confidentiality regarding new members and their past wrongdoings. They found that when groups had these in common they were more likely to sacrifice their interests and approach interactions with the Other through non-zero sum perspectives. Groups succeeded in meeting short-term social and economic needs as long as they kept these perspectives and did not allow issues of self-determination to poison their cooperation. Unfortunately, Garb and Nan’s hope that continued cross-border network coordination would eventually lead to peace came undone in August 2008. The destruction of bilateral trust created new avenues for peace, though, ones that must start unilaterally with a previously underutilized social resource.

\textsuperscript{18} Glanville and Paxton (2007) explore psychological and social aspects of trust formation, and the role conflict has on rebuilding trust after disappointments.
Christianity in Georgia is complicated by the conflation of national and religious identities; to be Georgian is to be Orthodox Christian. Unfortunately, the nationalism that developed in Georgia over the past two decades minimized the peacemaking aspects of Orthodox Christianity. Many evangelists for the Church emphasize the return to Orthodoxy as a modernizing step after the dark days of Soviet control, but the potential for religious discourse shaping policy remains limited. Patriarch Ilia II is a frequent public figure when President Saakashvilli dedicates public service facilities, but he is not a member of the President’s inner policy making circle. Local priests are better positioned to do the grassroots work of peacemaking, even if their financial resources are small compared to the Patriarchate. Evidence shows that they are able to connect IDP groups with their neighbors to create more avenues for material assistance and psychological healing.

Interviews were conducted with priests, lay ministers, and church members in four cities with large IDP populations: Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and Gori. The last two border Abkhazia and South Ossetia and have seen massive influxes of refugees over the years. Kutaisi has the second largest IDP population after Tbilisi, but the capital far outnumbers the other areas. Church members included students, professors, government officials, merchants, day laborers, and the unemployed; men, women and children; and ages ranged from late teens to the elderly.

IDPs were initially reluctant to share their experiences, partly due to the lingering shame many felt at being homeless, and partly from their distrust of conflict resolution measures after years of broken promises. Fathers in particular expressed an abiding sense of personal failure that they could not meet their families’ needs, mixed with anger at any and all parties in the conflict; years of NGO and government activities promising to improve their lives had produced few lasting benefits. While a few communities and subgroups (women, disabled persons, young children) have enjoyed international attention, many Georgian IDPs see themselves as part of a faceless mass, long-forgotten at best, purposefully ignored at worst. Social stigmas are also prevalent, coming in the form of housing discrimination, frequent reminders at school that IDP children are not native to their current regions (identity conflicts have pervasive effects throughout social interactions), and rampant unemployment.

In addition, the insular nature of IDP communities fosters the spread of these horror stories, reinforcing a sense of isolation and feelings of hopelessness, anxiety, and anger.

I initially tried to build connections in IDP communities through academic and governmental sources. However, IDP hostility towards official conflict resolution efforts

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19 Muslims make up a small percentage of the population, primarily in border regions near Turkey and Azerbaijan. Pelkmans (2006) traces the impact of religious-political conflation on Muslim communities after Georgian independence from the Soviet Union. This article recognizes the place of other religious communities in Georgia, as does the current political administration in Tbilisi. However, for the sake of brevity and in line with the overwhelming majority of Orthodox Christians in Georgia, I accept the belief that religion and national identity are one for most Georgian citizens. That assumption is born out in Nadia’s research, as well as my own in the cities of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Gori, and Zugdidi, where most IDPs live.


21 Unemployment remains high in Georgia in general, but IDP levels are considerably higher.
often framed those early interactions, with the result that few interviewees were willing to share much beyond their anger; almost none would consider forgiveness and reconciliation as viable solutions to their problems. After discussing the problem with several priests I knew in Tbilisi, I asked a few Orthodox lay ministers (deacons) to accompany me. The change brought immediate results, and the IDPs began to share more openly, both in the quantity of information they shared and its content. In particular, many shared personal feelings rather than just political opinions, and their stories more often generated tears than anger.

One reason was that church members felt pressure to appear more “Christian” in front of their religious leaders. Deacons play an active role in Orthodox communities, and at the very least have connections to priests that could be used to condemn recalcitrant parishioners. However, this seemed unlikely given my interactions in the Orthodox community, and I controlled for this externality by bringing deacons from different cities who were personally unknown to the IDPs, but whose reputations and bona fides came through their local priests. While there might have been some fear of reprisals for “unchristian” behavior, the vast majority expressed relief rather than anxiety when the deacons and I arrived. Even more poignant were the times when priests accompanied me. This was the first indication that they have significant trust among IDPs, fitting the priests into Sampson’s (2007) categories of activists promoting peace for all parties and advocates for IDP needs.

The main reason for priests’ success in these roles is that many stayed with their flocks as they fled the conflict zones; some tried to interpose themselves between the combatants and gave the their lives in the process. Priests embraced similar hardships during and after the fighting, and their final destinations did not matter to them, whether they stopped across the border or continued to Tbilisi. This closeness to the people’s suffering enabled them to become peace educators in addition to religious instructors (Sampson’s fifth category, 2007). Once they arrived, the relatively small housing communities and their isolation from neighboring areas reinforced the role of priests as prime movers in their social networks (Nyri, 2008).

As a result, IDP interviewees stated high confidence in their priests’ trustworthiness and religious legitimacy. Most rely on their local churches for more than spiritual comfort, receiving food and clothing to supplement government and international assistance. Monetary gifts are rare, but monasteries around Kutaisi and Zugdidi often take in homeless refugees before they move in with relatives or IDP

22 Several professors in the Department of Conflict Resolution at the state university held joint appointments in the Parliament, making it easy for already disgruntled IDPs to lump them all together in the same unsavory group.
23 Many were still angry, but their willingness to go beyond anger was clearly evident to me and the others accompanying me.
24 Intermediaries according to Sampson (2007).
25 The only category not mentioned is observer to draw international attention. This has been done by the Patriarch more than local priests.
26 These activities meet Svensson’s (2007) criteria for closeness and indivisibility of religious issues in peacemaking.
Priests also work with deacons in their communities to carry out assistance programs. These range from spiritual counseling for crises of faith, listening to war stories as a psychological healing process, community outreach to connect IDPs and their neighbors, and coordination with aid agencies.

Orthodox churches also incorporate congregants in the Eucharistic portions of the service. Lay ministers distribute the elements as the priest explains their significance and issue warnings to those who partake without the proper attitudes of humility and forgiveness. Services are didactic, emphasizing church doctrine concerning biblical passages, as well as reinforcing community connections through historical stories and details of the lives of saints.

One particular service stands out as an example of the church as a network and the priest as its hub. In June 2007 at a small neighborhood church in Tbilisi, Father Giorgi delivered a challenging message after the celebration of the Eucharist. He had earlier taught on the need to be more than Georgian in their identities, emphasizing the Christian aspects of Orthodoxy over its common nationalist sentiment. He illustrated the point by referencing two medieval saints who defied their Muslim rulers and endured martyrdom for their faith. He then described the need to forgive the Abkhaz, South Ossetians, and Russians for their attacks on Georgia, and any individuals that had caused them pain. The priest placed this instruction in the context of biblical texts, church traditions, Georgian history, and as an essential element of Christian identity. There were many audible groans and visible headshakes in response, but Father Giorgi continued unabated, retelling his own suffering during the war. Holding a cross in one hand and pointing to an icon of the suffering Christ with the other, he called on the church to follow his example as he followed their Savior and Lord in forgiveness and reconciliation.

I spoke with some of the church members and the priest after the service. The congregants expressed mixed emotions about the priest’s message, but the majority said they agreed with the need to forgive and would try to do so, despite their personal pain. Their obvious trauma gave credence to their commitment to forgive; these were not polite comments to appease a foreigner. Father Giorgi confirmed that many of them had come to him over the years seeking guidance and comfort, and he expressed confidence they would continue to do so after his message that day.

An example from Kutaisi also reveals the sacrifices local priests make for their communities, and their network status as a result. Father Nugzar ministers to a community of IDPs from Abkhazia. Most live in an eight-story hotel that was reclaimed in the early 1990’s. The original landlords initially allowed the squatters to stay, but shut off water and electricity services after months of non-payment. Their priest became directly involved, using his religious authority and Christian teaching on charity and mercy to convince local businesses to build power lines to the hotel and a communal water faucet in the neighboring courtyard. Bypassing the landowners alienated the

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27 Names have been changed to preserve the anonymity of interviewees. While I would like to give credit to all the brave men and women working to make peace in their country, the political climate and personal dangers to them compel me to offer what little protection I can.
priest from powerful business elites, but he remained unmoved in his commitment to the needy people in his community. Interviews with the IDPs in the hotel showed a deep loyalty to the church and their priest, but they all expressed an equally abiding distrust of the government and the Abkhaz. Discussing this with Father Nugzar afterwards, he sighed and a look of sadness crossed his face. Despite his hope that forgiveness and peace would become a reality for his flock, Father Nugzar admitted that it was a constant struggle in view of their daily suffering.

Another religious leader at St. Bodbe convent in Kakheti uses the appeal of the tomb of St. Nino (the first female Christian missionary to the Caucasus c. 300 AD) to raise support for IDP women. Sister Hatuna holds weekly prayer meetings open to the public, and IDP needs frequently come up for discussion. Beyond the spiritual connection Hatuna has with others, she also brings IDPs and homeless people to the convent for extended retreats. These religious services include practical teaching on forgiveness and Christian ethics, as well as gardening and maintenance on the church’s buildings. Produce regularly goes home with poor visitors, and many visit the sacred spring nearby to receive special prayers.

Two final examples show how priests have used their status as network hubs to bridge IDP and native communities. Fathers David and Gocha minister in the border regions of Zugdidi and Gori. Both have faced the horrors of intermittent war and the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to peace for people living on the edge of their homelands. David’s people live in a reclaimed hotel but have no electricity; a makeshift well taps into underground pipes supplying neighboring communities. The well was a major source of contention because the natives around the hotel were being charged for the extra water usage and threatened violence if the IDPs did not allow workers to close the well. Father David offered church funds to pay the difference and promised to prevent any new wells from being dug. This concession forced additional hardship on the IDPs as their numbers grew, but the priest was able to convince them of their need to comply. Teaching individuals to sacrifice is a key attribute found in network hubs, and Father David uses his position well.

Father Gocha lives in Gori, the birthplace of Josef Stalin, and faces the added challenge of overcoming the cult of personality in its last stronghold outside of Russia. Christian doctrine emphasizing the Lordship of Jesus Christ and pursuit of His Kingdom without worry for material needs form the basis of his Sunday messages. These are hard to hear given the exceedingly high levels of unemployment in Gori and its proximity to fighting in South Ossetia. Yet Father Gocha continues to preach forgiveness despite the external hardships he and his community face.

Neither of these brave men may be active peacemakers any longer – Zugdidi and Gori were overrun by Russian and separatist troops in August 2008. They may have moved on with their people or died protecting them, but Fathers David and Gocha lived lives of forgiveness and peace and taught their communities to do the same.
Conclusion: Practicing Peace

Local priests in Georgia practice many of the techniques advocated by Western conflict resolution theorists, but do so without formal training. They listen, pray, encourage, feed, and clothe the needy because these things are commanded in their sacred texts. Much of the literature on religious conflict resolution deals with interreligious fighting and the pursuit of synergy between religious doctrines on peace. This article argues for a different approach based on the unilateral adoption of peace teachings found in one’s own religion. Part of its applicability to the Georgian civil war context is the shared Orthodoxy between the antagonists. However, this need not limit a broader generalization to other cases. The basic premise is to “find what is true, what is honorable, what is just and pure, what is lovely, what is commendable, if anything is excellent, if there is anything worthy of praise, [and] think about these things.” (Philippians 4: 8) However, personal meditation is not enough in the practical application of religious conflict resolution. The Apostle Paul’s concluding admonition remains the standard for leaders in peacemaking: “What you have learned and received and heard and seen in me – practice these things, and the God of peace will be with you.” (ibid, v 9)

Social network analysis correctly identifies local priests as hubs and prime movers in their communities. They advocate for peace, actively promote the church’s role in helping the needy, mediate conflicts between natives and IDPs, and teach forgiveness in their services. Their social networks are close-knit, often to their detriment, but priests use this to build positive self-esteem without contradictory influences; Father Nugza likes to remind his church members, “It’s easier to appreciate daylight from the bottom of a well.” Since they have been able to do so much with so little, additional resources could make a major impact on IDPs.

First, formal training would help utilize existing Christian teachings to create greater efficacy among target groups. Baruah and Paulus (2008) argue that training improves idea generation for peacemaking strategies. Giving individuals instructions that free them to think without worries about time or money, or any other commonly self-imposed mental limitation, followed by free-for-all group discussions significantly increases the quantity and quality of original ideas. It also builds greater group cohesion and personal confidence among participants. This simple task could benefit priests through their regular contact with IDP communities, and the facilities already exist within churches to have brainstorming meetings with very little additional costs.  

Second, the Patriarchate should increase communication and contact between IDP-centered priests and neighboring communities. This can easily be done through the church’s hierarchical mechanisms – edicts and letters are a frequent means of communicating to the faithful. The same result can be accomplished by the local leaders themselves, as some have been able to do, but official sanction would give greater legitimacy to the efforts already underway and create new connections in the process.

28 Many services are conducted in natural light so energy costs are minimal.
Third, monetary assistance to increase food allocations would help move thousands from subsistence living. This is a short-term fix, and longer-term job creation is also vitally important. However, both remain political issues, something local priests have avoided for their perceived corruption and untrustworthiness among IDPs. That is not to say popular pressure is irrelevant, just that the current government apparatus has survived several opposition uprisings and shows no sign of bending to the will of a few priests.

Fourth, the end result of peacemaking efforts should be to move beyond personal healing to engagement with former enemies directly. Established conflict resolution mechanisms would come into play, and hopefully the initiative shown by Georgian victims would sway their separatist counterparts. The goals should be personal reconciliation, not repatriation. This is unlikely even under the most favorable Russian-Georgian relations, and that status quo shows all the signs of remaining fixed for the foreseeable future.

It must be made clear that the first steps should not wait until the final condition becomes viable. Even if the Georgians and separatists never reconcile their broken relationships and come to a mutual understanding and acceptance, unilateral forgiveness can still heal many wounds and relieve much suffering among the IDP communities. It is my hope that aid agencies will seize the moment, support their fellow peace workers, and help bring lasting relief to a desperate group of people in tremendous need. Local priests stand ready to partner with them, but are equally willing to continue their work alone. Such is the power and hope of religious peacemaking.

Bibliography


Actors with Obvious Stakes in Conflict must have a Place at the Table: A New Approach to International Mediation?
Fonkem Achankeng*

...resolving conflict through mediation requires the conscious efforts of human beings working in a very fraught and complex arena. How well their efforts are understood by people in the mediating profession and scholars determines how successful mediation is going to be.

(Jacob Bercovitch, 1996, p. 9)

Jimmy Carter, United States president and Nobel Peace Laureate, may not just be a major actor struggling to achieve comprehensive peace in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. His insistence on meeting with the leaders of Hamas and Syria in April 2008 within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, against outright objection from many powerful governments and actors in the international mediation arena, may also have introduced a new approach to international mediation, one that the “global community” has yet to fully understand and adopt. Critics, including the George W. Bush White House, not only faulted Jimmy Carter for invoking the concept of apartheid in his book, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid* (2006), but also criticized the former president for “dignifying” or “legitimizing Hamas,” “a terrorist organization,” by insisting on meeting with its leaders within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Some of these critics described Carter’s meeting with the leadership of Hamas as a “bad mistake.” Listening to Carter himself on National Public Radio, April 21, 2008, this author began to think that Carter’s willingness to embark on this private initiative may have changed the game for the future of international mediation in many intractable conflicts. If the world community truly seeks lasting peace, not only in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also in many other deep-rooted conflicts across the world, Carter seems to have laid the foundation of a new methodology in international mediation and peace negotiations.

By primarily focusing on the human rights and humanitarian needs of all stakeholders in the conflict, rather than linking international mediation to the interests of international mediators and other third-party interveners, President Carter has stepped away radically from the current philosophy and practice of international mediation which has, to date, not always achieved the desired broader resolution in many intractable conflicts. Subscribing to this viewpoint, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2005, p. 21) have, for example, observed that “the track record of third parties is not

* Fonkem Achankeng teaches Social Issues and Solutions in the College of Education & Human Services at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh. His research interests include social issues, conflicts and solutions; the post-colonial state with emphasis on conflict causes and peace processes; indigenous systems of peace making; international mediation and intractable conflicts; terrorism and governance; and human rights and nationalist politics. Currently, he is involved with studying liberation movements and political refugees.
good” when considered in terms of third-party motives, strategic priorities, tradecraft, and geopolitics.

This paper focuses on Carter’s meeting with the leadership of Hamas as a new approach in international mediation. My goal is to make the claim that President Jimmy Carter’s inclusive approach is a departure from the current practice of international mediation as an extension of international politics to one of empowering parties to the conflict, notably low-power parties, who nevertheless have a stake in the search for a comprehensive settlement. From the standpoint of a larger view of the concept of power in social systems and human behavior, I argue that this shift should be encouraged if powerful third-party interveners, as the dominant actors in international conflict resolution, seriously desire to achieve comprehensive resolution of conflicts. This is especially applicable in many post-colonial settings where we find the greatest number of intractable conflicts.

**Mediation theory and the practice of international mediation**

The traditional practices in international mediation reveal a remarkable distance from traditional mediation theory, which provides that peace cannot be dictated nor imposed on a party or parties to a conflict. In his book, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, Christopher Moore (2003, p. 23) considers the roots of the practice of mediation as being present in the “wider acknowledgement of individual human rights and dignity, the expansion of aspirations for democratic participation at all social and political levels, and the belief that an individual [or group] has the right to participate in, and take control of, decisions affecting his or her life.” We may ask whether the traditional practices in international mediation recognize this right of individuals and/or groups to participate in, and take control of, decisions affecting their lives.

Unfortunately, the literature on international mediation provides hints that powerful states and organizations, acting through their elite leadership have remained the main actors in international mediation throughout history, and have attempted to dictate or impose peace on less-powerful people, groups, and countries. The United States and many other major powers, as well as the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, for example, have taken this path in many international mediation attempts. In this paper, let us examine two cases, the role of the George W. Bush Administration in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict beginning in 2000 and the United Nations international mediation of the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, as examples of the approach used by powerful states and international organizations in international conflicts. Let us begin with the example of the Bush Administration in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The policy of the Bush Administration toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be considered to have evolved in three phases. In the first phase, when it came into office in 2000, the administration remained uninterested in embarking on any mediation in the conflict, in keeping with the administration’s policy to avoid intervening abroad in what it considered to be “nation building” adventures. In the second phase, the Bush
Administration floated the idea of a “Road Map to Peace” under the auspices of the Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Community, and Russia), and sporadically became involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Some observers viewed this involvement mainly as a distraction from the problems of the administration in the Iraq war as well as a way to hide from the unpopularity of the Bush Administration at home. The third phase was marked by the administration’s stated desire for a “two-state solution by the end of 2008,” when President George W. Bush’s term of office would be ending. This phase began in Annapolis, Maryland, with the November 2007 international mediation effort. The conduct of the Annapolis Mediation Talks may be useful for this analysis.

In preparing for Annapolis 2007, the Bush administration did not only pick and choose from among the representatives of the Palestinian people for the international mediation, but also ignored and sidelined Hamas, the group which by then had won the majority in the Palestinian parliamentary election in 2006. The practice of powerful third-party actors in international mediation efforts—hand-picking the representatives of the less-powerful parties in a conflict for negotiations—has been a recurrent practice in international mediation. This was the case in the recent international mediations over Darfur held in Abuja, Nigeria, and in Sirte, Libya, where the organizers selectively hand-picked the parties permitted to take part in the mediation process. In the United Nations-sponsored mediation in Sirte, McDoom (2007) reported that the “mediators had not invited the genuine parties that should be part of the peace process to the talks,” and that the mediators instead sided “with the Sudanese government by inviting people specified by Khartoum.” The same report by Reuters indicated that “Signed by only one rebel faction, that agreement had little support among the 2 million Darfuris trapped in displacement camps” and that “rather than bring peace, the deal triggered fresh violence.” The two main groups, namely the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) were absent from the mediation. Darfur expert Alex de Waal (2007), noting the absence of these parties, has hinted that “A peace process can be started, but in the aftermath of Abuja, it is essential that any agreement that is reached includes everybody.”

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under study, the planning for and implementation of the Annapolis 2007 International Mediation Talks was not substantially different from the practice in international mediation, which has, most often, been determined mainly by the geopolitical and strategic priorities and other interests of the powerful third-parties that intervene in many of these conflict situations. It is with this experience in mind, that Moore (2003, p. 23) considers the contemporary practice of mediation as “motivated by growing dissatisfaction with authoritative, top-down decision makers and decision-making procedures; imposed settlements that do not adequately address parties’ strongly felt or genuine interests.” The failure of the Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Community, and Russia) in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was noted in September 2008 by a coalition of twenty-one human rights and aid organizations working in the area, including CARE International, Oxfam, Christian Aid, and Save the Children. In a document titled, “The Middle East Quartet: A Progress Report,” these agencies pointed
out that the international group had failed to fulfill any of the goals it set for itself regarding the Middle East peace process (IRIN, 2008).

As in the 1988 negotiations over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, the chances of success of the 2007 Annapolis Talks, namely, “the vision of a democratic Palestinian State, existing in peace with Israel” before the Bush Administration left office in January 2009, are not yet in sight. While extolling the virtues of freedom, human and people’s rights, and participatory democracy for a peaceful world, the Bush Administration left the elected representatives of the Palestinian people out of the talks, and, at the same time, tried to give the impression that the international community was interested in mediating a genuine and peaceful settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

After discussing the Bush administration’s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the light of international mediation, let us now focus our attention on a case involving an international mediation conducted in 2006 by the United Nations. The 2006 Greentree international mediation over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute by the United Nations is striking for this discussion. When the Republic of Cameroon took the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Bakassi, a location disputed by the two states, the people of ex-British Southern Cameroons addressed an Interpleader to the ICJ in which they lay a claim over Bakassi and considered both the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria as “two thieves fighting over a booty which belonged to neither of them” (Nfor, 2008).

Whereas the Palestinian problem and the case of Darfur are well known and documented, Ex-British Southern Cameroons and its 48-year-long national liberation struggle are not really known because the liberation conflict has not made headlines in the world press. The territory is the southern half of the League of Nations Mandated and later United Nations Trust Territory known as the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. The territory lies between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and La Republique du Cameroun at the point where the West African coastline turns sharply and runs southward to the Congo and Angola. It has an area of 16,581 square miles and a population of some five million people.

The Southern Cameroons national liberation struggle is a territorial dispute between ex-British Southern Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun. The fundamental issue, according to the people of the territory, is that La Republique du Cameroun crossed its internationally recognized boundaries to illegally annex and occupy as a colony the Southern Cameroons. To restore its independence and sovereignty, the Southern Cameroons has been involved in a nonviolent liberation conflict with La Republique du Cameroun for nearly five decades. It was from this standpoint that the territory sent an Interpleader to the International Court of Justice claiming jurisdiction over the Bakassi Peninsula because the Peninsula is part of its territory rather than part of La Republique du Cameroun. The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) is the main group that claims to represent the territory, but there are other groups, including the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) and the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM).
The ICJ ignored the Interpleader from ex-British Southern Cameroons, and issued a judgment in the case in October 2002 in favor of the Republic of Cameroon. In their article, “Cameroonian Deputy Governor Abducted in Bakassi,” Ohia & Chinwo (2008), quoting sources in the territory, affirmed that “…the handover of their homeland to the Republic of Cameroon was not in the interest of the people of ex-British Southern Cameroons.” For a long time, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was reluctant to implement the judgment of the ICJ until the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan embarked on a series of private meetings in Paris, Geneva, Yaounde, and Abuja, which culminated in the Greentree international mediation. Led by Kofi Annan himself, with the participation of the United States, France, Britain, and Germany, the mediation concluded with the signing, on June 12, 2006, of the Greentree Accord between President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and President Paul Biya of the Republic of Cameroon, with neither mention nor involvement of ex-British Southern Cameroons as a stakeholder. Although the Greentree Accord was lauded as a “remarkable experiment in conflict resolution” and as “a great example to the world from sub-Saharan Africa of a negotiated agreement to end an intractable conflict,” the Bakassi Peninsula continued to experience a great deal of conflict and violence two years after Nigerian troops were reported to have withdrawn from the territory (Ohia & Chinwo, 2008).

In most of these international mediations, whether concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Darfur, or the Bakassi Peninsula, a comprehensive peace was not achieved, and conflict and violence have persisted. For example, Darfur is still in conflict and the Bakassi Peninsula has continued to experience a great deal of violence, while a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be elusive. Participatory democracy, as a process, achieves results from building consensus from the bottom up rather than dictating it from top down. Leaving out a people and their designated representatives constitutes a barrier to any expectation of achieving real peace. Any mediation process which ignores and sidelines the people with an interest in the conflict and their representatives cannot achieve a just resolution of conflict because it is imposed, rather than crafted by all stakeholders. Attempts in international mediation which have imposed solutions have been unsuccessful in most cases because they have been premised on treating the less powerful people as those whose human rights need not be taken into consideration. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend how a peace conference on Darfur, Sudan, could be held in October 2008 without the rebels, who are parties in the conflict. Expressing doubts about the credibility of such a process, Bashir Adam Rahma of the opposition Popular Congress Party viewed the three-day peace conference held in October 2008 mainly as intended “not to solve the problem of Darfur, but to give sanctuary to President Omar al-Bashir from the International Criminal Court (ICC)” (IRIN, 2008).

It may be useful here to understand what mediation theory teaches us. The practice of international mediation, such as the Greentree Accord brokered by Kofi Annan, the Sirte Mediation in Libya over Darfur, or the effort by the Bush Administration in Annapolis, Maryland, in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, does not seem to acknowledge individual human rights and dignity. Nor does it show any interest in the
human rights of all individuals and groups and their need and desire for “democratic participation at all social and political levels,” especially where such individuals and groups desire to “participate in and take control of decisions affecting their lives” (Moore, 2003, p. 23). In each of the cases cited here, the participants were pre-selected by the powerful third-parties intervening in the respective conflicts. Moreover, the November 2007 Annapolis Talks, the Sirte mediation in Libya, and the 2006 Greentree international mediation, for example, failed to reflect the theoretical position in mediation. One may also argue that the rationale underlying the respective international mediation talks was anchored on the practice of international mediation as an extension of international politics of the powerful third-party interveners. It is also worthy to note that some of the less-powerful parties involved in the conflicts never had a voice in selecting the third-party interveners. In the case of the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, the leadership of ex-British Southern Cameroons expressed surprise at how the United States, France, Britain, and Germany became involved as participants in the mediation process.

**International mediation as an extension of international politics**

International mediation scholar Jacob Bercovitch (2005, p. 99) has observed that international mediation is not altogether “a benevolent act exclusively performed in the interest of the parties to the respective conflicts.” He also holds that the vested interests of international mediators pollute international relations, and this may be a key to understanding the intractability of many conflicts. Bercovitch (1996, p. 4) also presents the strong argument that “whether individuals, organizations, or states, these (international) mediators enter a conflict system to … passively or assertively, promote or protect any interests they may have.” This position is relevant to the 2007 Annapolis Talks when we consider the conveners of the Annapolis Talks as parties preoccupied with furthering national interests, whether apparent or obfuscated, especially when we consider whom the conveners chose to invite to, isolate from, or participate in the international mediation. In examining the role, relevance, and contribution of individuals, nation-states, and international organizations to address resistant conflicts, Jacob Bercovitch (2005, p. 99) has attributed to the mediation of conflicts the “characteristics of international relations,” where states have become aware from the experience of the World Wars that the “interests of the state are constantly involved in important ways with events far afield” (Kennan 1951).

In considering international mediation and international negotiation as acts of international politics, the views of former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1998) are relevant for this discussion. This scholar and practitioner has emphasized that “the goals of American foreign policy, namely to ensure the continued security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans, have not changed in more than 200 years.” George Kennan (1951) earlier iterated the same interests of a sovereign state when he pointed out how the United States was, by 1900, generally aware of the world-wide significance of its power, how the United States could be affected by events in far-off lands, and how “from that time on, our interests were constantly involved in important
ways with such events.” Indeed, President Jimmy Carter (1996, p. xi), a well-respected figure in international mediation efforts, has also subscribed to the same viewpoint in his reflections on his own initial actions in international mediation. As he stated, “In negotiations that I conducted as President and in my post-White House years, I tried to put myself in the place of foreign leaders and to imagine how they viewed their nation’s interest.” These considerations were probably the underlying thinking when nations negotiated during the nineteenth century to map out boundaries of nations, or to alter such boundaries at the end of World War I. The same considerations were in play when the demise of the Soviet Union was negotiated in 1989 and during the 2008 international negotiations to grant independence to Kosovo.

In the majority of international mediations/negotiations, whether the Dayton Agreements on the Balkans, the Oslo Accords on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Abuja Agreements on Darfur, or the 2006 Greentree Accord over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, the powerful third-party interveners in the respective international mediations were first and foremost concerned with their own nation’s interests. Rubin (1981) has linked Henry Kissinger’s mediation efforts between Israel and Syria after the 1973 Yom Kippur War to mediator interests. Similarly, the work of Webb, Koutrakou and Walters (1996) on the European Community in the Balkans amply provides other examples where international mediation was dictated by the domestic political considerations of the mediating powers. National political considerations were equally in play when the Big Three (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin) negotiated the Yalta agreement at the end of World War II. As Kasperek & McDonough (2008, p. 220) put it, “Backroom deals had already been constructed. Poland and other border countries and islands were used as trade goods to seal arrangements. The Yalta and Potsdam agreements were how this played out officially on paper.” Considering the history of U.S. intervention in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1988 mainly as “a cycle of meaningless negotiations and harsh repression,” some observers, including Marco Rosaire Rossi (2008), think the “purpose of the Annapolis summit was to give the appearance of progress toward peace, while depicting Hamas as a spoiler to the process—even though they were excluded from the summit by Israel and the United States—and thus provide a pretext for Israel to repress the people of Gaza further.”

Studies conducted by many other scholars also indicate two major trends in international mediations. First, Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala, and Nuamah (2006, p. 175), studying international intervention in Africa, have pointed out that “prospective mediators are motivated by their own self-interests in either initiating entry, or accepting an invitation, to mediate” and “parties to a conflict are equally motivated by self-interests in accepting mediation and entry of a particular mediator.” In his visit to the Middle East in April 2008, President Carter (2008) reported that the Israeli government “publicly rejected his request to meet with Israeli government officials” because the government presumed that he would not be supportive of its continuing expansion of the 9,000 settlements being built, the imprisonment of 41 of the 43 Hamas candidates elected to the Palestinian Parliament from the West Bank, and other such repressive policies of the Israeli government.
Second, other studies argue that the vested interests of international mediating powers are always in play, “even in the mediations undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations, the actor in international relations supposedly with claims to impartiality and neutrality” (Skjelsbaek & Fermann, 1996; Carnevale & Arad, 1996; Wehr & Lederach, 1996). In many cases, the international mediating powers paint undesired parties in a negative light to exclude them. Some cases in point include Hamas in Palestine, and Hezbola in Lebanon, where both groups are considered by the governments of the West as “terrorist organizations,” whereas Hamas and Hezbola view themselves in the respective countries as the ones seeking liberation for their peoples. In the Palestinian-Israeli setting, Hamas is labeled by the West as a “terrorist organization” even after the 2006 election in which Hamas became the democratically-elected government of the Palestinian people.

Similar examples can be found in other parts of the world. Many liberation organizations in post-colonial settings are viewed negatively by major powers in international politics, labeled negatively, and excluded from international mediation efforts in conflicts to which they are a party. Just as the African National Congress was for several years labeled negatively and isolated in the context of apartheid government in South Africa, the November 2007 Sirte Talks in Libya did not include every group in Darfur under the pretext of not legitimizing them. The same was the case for many years with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in Ethiopian politics, the South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) in South Africa, and the East Timorese liberation movement in Indonesia. The case is not different when we consider other cases including Cassamance in Senegal, Anjouan in the Comoros, and the Basque region in Spain. Similarly, as discussed earlier, the Greentree mediation process over the Bakassi dispute did not include ex-British Southern Cameroons groups in spite of the efforts the leadership of the territory made to inform the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations of the territory’s historical and legal claims to Bakassi.

The colonial factor in international mediation

In the light of many intractable conflicts, the idea and practice of colonialism cannot be dismissed. Colonialism is often an unspoken factor, especially when the elite nation-states known under various references (the Quartet, the UN Security Council, the Paris Club, the Group of 8) continue to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to think and to decide for all other peoples of the world. The members of the club of powerful former colonial states continue to be influenced by old thinking. Kennan, in his respectable book on American foreign policy (1951, p. 83), articulated this kind of thinking when he wrote, “The things for which other peoples in this world are apt to contend are for the most part neither credible nor important and might justly be expected to take second place behind the desirability of an orderly world.” For members of these colonial elite nation-states, other people, or those belonging to the “disorderly world” do not seem to qualify as persons with dignity, feelings, or rights of their own. The pervasive top-down vision of these elite international actors and the realpolitik
considerations of such powerful states, which have a major influence on conflicts and particularly on the direction or persistence of many conflicts in postcolonial states, remain factors in the old approach to international mediation. C. Wright Mills (1956, p. 19), for example, describes the situation best when he indicates the structural coincidences of interest that develop “a permanent war establishment by a privately incorporated economy inside a political vacuum.” Within such a framework, international mediation conceived and implemented as an extension of the realpolitik of powerful intervening states cannot be enough to resolve the conflicts (even when experts have the personal skills and the best knowledge for resolving such conflicts) because such international third-party interveners with colonial interests cannot mediate from a position of trust, neutrality, impartiality, and good faith.

**President Carter departs from the tradition**

President Jimmy Carter is not a new name in international mediation. In addition to the Carter presidency years (1976-1980), the former president and the Carter Center have since been involved in a variety of ways in many international mediation cases across the world. Carter has actively taken part in monitoring elections in Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Mexico, Paraguay, Haiti, Zambia, Ghana, and Palestine, as well as the state of Florida. He was a participant in the third-party interventions between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO (1989), between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement. Carter has most often worked through the International Negotiation Network (INN) of the Carter Center, which convened two major consultations in 1992 and 1993 to examine conflicts in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. In his April 2008 involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Carter (2008) remarked: “For peace in the Middle East to be sustainable, it needs to be comprehensive ... it also means that actors with an obvious stake in the conflict need to have a stake in finding a solution.”

Carter’s new approach in his meeting in April 2008 with Hamas and Syrian leadership seems remarkable. It marks a major departure from the traditional approach to international mediation, which, as discussed earlier, has mainly been an extension of international politics. In Carter’s new view of international mediation, he considers the traditional approach as “counter productive.” Arguing his point within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Carter (2008) posits that “to isolate Hamas” in any meaningful framework for a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace is not likely to be effective. This new view is important because Hamas members, for the time being, are the elected representatives of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people firmly reserve the right to choose their representatives. It is difficult to understand the motivation of the world community when it claims to broker peace between the Palestinians and the Israeli people but ignore the Palestinians’ choice of leadership. In his new approach, President Carter believes it is important to involve Syria and Hamas in discussions necessary for Palestinian-Israeli peace “since Syria and Hamas will have to be involved in a final peace agreement in any case.”
Advantages of the new approach

President Carter’s initiative in meeting with Hamas has a number of advantages that can enhance the probability of successful international mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. First, the new approach empowers the party with less power, as required in mediation theory (Moore, 2003). Second, it recognizes the right of a people to be part of their own peace process. Third, it gives them ownership of the process, a concept which is essential for mediation success and lasting resolution. In considering the second advantage of the initiative, Carter not only recognized and legitimized Hamas as the elected representative of the Palestinian people, but he also served as an advocate for them. He helped to empower Hamas by bringing the movement to the limelight within the context of a conflict in which they are bona fide stakeholders. Recognition and empowerment of the parties, and particularly of the party with less power, are important elements in mediation success. The fourth advantage comes with the stature of Jimmy Carter as a former United States president, a Nobel Peace Laureate, a well-known name in international mediation, and a genuinely sincere individual. With these credentials, Carter has considerable leverage to bring to the table, not to mention resources. Rather than considering Carter’s initiative as controversial, the academic and practitioner community should be willing to view the initiative as the most practical way and the only one aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace by involving all stakeholders. This approach is also advantageous because it diminishes the ability of major third-party powers to manipulate indirectly the outcome for the vested interests of their own countries.

These advantages were brought about for a number of reasons. Although a former United States president, Jimmy Carter is now a private individual and unofficial intervener or mediator (Rouhana, 1995; Chigas, 1997, 2005). He is therefore free to act without the direct constraints of nation-state interests. As an unofficial mediator, the former president is simply moved by his personal humanitarian concerns of justice, genuine desire for peace, and willingness to make a personal contribution toward finding a lasting resolution of the conflict. Not mandated by any national or state authority, President Carter is free of interests to protect or promote. The former president mainly continues his lifelong dedication to humanitarian missions, his willingness to advance the cause of peace and promote democracy, and a desire to enhance understanding between diverse people and groups.

In this regard, Carter has a free hand to seek genuine dialogue between enemies without the traditional motivations and interests of international politics. Such a mediator is not motivated by the concerns of nation-states and intergovernmental organizations. As shown by other studies, like many major powers, the United Nations and the African Union are not always impartial third-party interveners. From this standpoint, President Carter presents a unique example. In his recent contacts with Hamas, Jimmy Carter did not carry any official portfolio, and whatever he succeeded in doing was apart from the preoccupations of official diplomacy otherwise known as Track-One mediation, which is steeped in international relations policy and practice and carries a baggage of interest considerations.
While the leadership of powerful nations and organizations embark on international mediation efforts with the consideration of promoting or protecting their interests, former President Jimmy Carter stands tall among a core group of individuals who champion the cause of achieving a comprehensive settlement of conflict, which includes genuine peace for less-powerful peoples and groups. As an independent actor on the global stage, President Carter is not involved in the dualism common among the leadership of powerful nations and organizations in regard to views about peace, human rights, and human dignity. He is unfettered by their striking disregard for and neglect of peoples involved in their legitimate freedom struggles. The same power elites, including the Bush Administration, pay lip service to the virtues of human liberty, human rights, and participatory democracy, but have most often overlooked the fight by others to participate in the decisions affecting their lives. Too often, many groups and individuals seeking human rights and human dignity are labeled in the global system as “terrorists,” “radicals,” or “rebels.” When they are thus labeled, they are ignored and isolated from any role in nation-state politics.

In the opinion of this author, the negative criticisms of the work of former President Carter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are mainly a smokescreen of hollow slogans to maintain grotesquely unfair levels of inequality among peoples in conflict. These critics hold the opinion that the peace process in any given conflict must go a certain way, their way only, and should involve only those pre-selected actors who will agree with the directives and positions of the ones doing the selection.

In a world in which structural violence sustained by political history continues to be used against many peoples in postcolonial settings, this new approach becomes a serious business. That is why some of Carter’s critics continue to charge the former President for “undermining the moderate Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas” by engaging Hamas. The fact is that Jimmy Carter understands there will be no true peace and security for both Israeli and Palestinian peoples when key players and key groups are ignored, neglected, isolated, and even barred from participation. Carter’s approach does not seek to undermine any one individual or any group. Although resentments run deep and long, his viewpoint is to include all the stakeholders.

By ignoring his critics and meeting with the leadership of Hamas in Syria, in Gaza, and in the West Bank, Jimmy Carter embarked on a new dynamic in international mediation by lending an ear to a neglected and isolated group that the “official world community” prefers to ignore and isolate in the tradition of elite-power politics. Carter’s response to his critics, namely, that “we stop isolating Hamas” from the Middle East peace process, may well be the starting point for the future of international mediation if the international community genuinely seeks meaningful peace in this and other deeply-rooted conflicts. As Carter (2008) affirms in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “the problem is not that we met them, but that the U.S. and Israeli governments refused to meet with them, making peace harder, if not impossible, to achieve.”

As many other examples across the world (including the Niger Delta conflict, Sudan, Congo, ex-British Southern Cameroons, Chechnya, Korean Peninsula, Kashmir, the Balkans, the Basque conflict, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cassamance, Northern Ireland, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Oromo, Iraqi Kurds) illustrate, many questions still
need to be addressed. These include recognizing and empowering every stakeholder if the conflict-resolution community seeks to settle any of these intractable situations. If we can better understand the aspirations of some of the low-power groups and small or low-power nations by working with them inclusively to address their own interests, we may be able to make international mediation more effective. This approach will involve many of the principles of group psychology as well as those which guide Jimmy Carter’s efforts as “the conscience of the international community” (Kolb and Associates, 1997, p. 388). These principles include Carter’s willingness to put self and reputation at risk, his desire “to do what is right and just for human society,” and the feeling of a personal obligation to work in deep-rooted intra-national civil disputes that have heretofore resulted in prolonged suffering. Third-party interveners in international conflicts will have to adopt Carter’s new vision if they seek to achieve a lasting resolution to the many conflicts begging to be addressed.

Conclusion

This paper set out to examine former President Jimmy Carter’s meeting with the leaders of Hamas in Gaza, the West Bank, and Syria in April 2008 from the standpoint of the theory and practice of international mediation. The paper related international mediation to the totality of the interests of the states taking part in the mediations. It argued that Carter’s insistence on meeting with the leaders of Hamas and Syria, even against the wishes of powerful governments (including his own, which neglected and isolated these stakeholders), is a major departure from the typical practice in international mediation. In the past, mediation has been used as an extension of the international politics of powerful nation-states. These powerful states generally intervene in conflicts primarily to protect, promote, and preserve their gains and/or interests in a global context.

Citing other examples, such as the Darfur conflict and the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, the paper argued that Jimmy Carter’s insistence on meeting with the leadership of Hamas in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts may usher in a new approach in international mediation and, therefore, stimulate increased participatory democracy and renewed emphasis on human rights. The paper claimed, in this regard, that any international mediation process which sidelines some stakeholders and their democratically-elected representatives is not likely to achieve a lasting resolution of conflict. Without these legitimate stakeholders and representatives, the mediation process is imposed by big-power interests rather than crafted from the bottom up and inclusive of all the people and groups involved in the conflict. President Carter’s willingness to involve all the stakeholders becomes imperative in international mediation from the perspectives of the empowerment role in mediation theory.

In sum, I return to Carter’s (1996) affirmation that “We must support the study of conflict situations and look for creative opportunities for their peaceful resolution.” Any such creative opportunities cannot isolate, neglect, or negatively label the people affected by, or involved in conflict. It also must not isolate, neglect, or label their bona fide, elected representatives. Powerful nation-states have usually done the opposite in
the past within the context of intervener-interest-based mediation, and most of the
time the results have been temporary, at best. Carter’s bold meeting with the
leadership of Hamas and Syria in April 2008 is the beginning of a respectful new
approach and a more effective way to achieve comprehensive peace through
international mediation.

My recommendation in this paper is that elite nation-states that have played a
lead role in international mediation should step back to make way for trusted eminent
personalities with a mindset similar to that of Jimmy Carter to take the lead in
international mediation. Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, and other such
eminent personalities are sensitive to the humanitarian and human rights
considerations of the parties to a conflict, the validity of the respective causes, the
power imbalances between parties, and a fair and just mediation process. This is a
departure from the national-interest considerations of intervener nation-states and
organizations taking the lead, as has most often been the case. Such eminent, trusted
personalities would not only have the total freedom and flexibility to make contact with
various persons and groups in and outside of governments, but would also not be bound
by the interests of the internal and international politics of big powers and multinational
organizations.

Some questions may arise regarding the realism of expecting outside actors like
President Carter to have any real impact on major conflicts. Any such questions have a
basis in the influence of power in politics, which somehow continues to be the dominant
view of the concept of power. One possible reason for the dominance of the political
scientist’s view of power is because human decisions both at the individual and
organizational levels have been based on the threat of power. This is rather unfortunate
because this thinking has not produced comprehensive settlements in many conflicts,
some of which continue to be intractable in spite of the interventions of major powers.
In a postmodern world where these major powers are in search of collective means to
influence events, outside actors with legitimacy, love, friendship, and respect for human
needs and values can provide a significant alternative to the United Nations Security
Council in terms of securing legitimacy for the international mediation of deep-rooted
conflict.

This thinking is inspired by the work of Kenneth Boulding (1989) on the influence
of power in social systems and human behavior. In studying the different faces of
power, Boulding (1989, p. 10), for example, distinguishes three major categories. These
include the power to destroy (threat power), the power to produce and exchange
(economic power), and the power to integrate (the power to create such relationships
as love, respect, friendship, legitimacy and so on). These three categories extend the
concept of power beyond the realm of political science. Because many mediation
attempts in post-colonial settings fail, not due to the absence of threat power or
economic power, but because of the absence of legitimacy (an aspect of integrative
power), outside actors like President Carter can have a real impact on many serious
conflicts. As Boulding puts it, “without legitimacy, both threat and riches are naked”
(Boulding, 1989, p. 10).
Animated principally by a personal and moral responsibility to mediation, Carter’s new approach seeks to legitimize and empower all the stakeholders in a conflict by being inclusive and particularly by recognizing the great role, in mediation success, of “listening closely also to excluded actors.” Although Carter stated that he was not acting as a negotiator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, his new approach to the conflict may, in fact, introduce a new paradigm in international conflict mediation, and one that may provide the opportunity for achieving comprehensive peace in this conflict, and in many other deep-rooted conflict situations in post-colonial settings. In intractable conflicts, the international community needs to recognize and involve all the people in conflict and their representatives in mediation talks if the conflict resolution community genuinely seeks lasting resolutions.

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Green Jobs, Peacebuilding and Paths to Community Empowerment

Lynne M. Woehrle*

The purpose of this paper is to explore the integration of peace culture theory with ideas about environmentally sustainable development and their promise in guiding the development of green economies within a framework of social justice. Emerging in parallel planes, the concepts of peace culture and sustainable development have many compatible and at times overlapping ideas, and yet they bring important differences to the table. Theoretical analyses developed by scholars and practitioners of ecofeminism provide an important context in which to explore the overlap of “peace” and “green” visions for social change.

For a couple of years, the terms “green jobs” and “green-collar” economy have been emerging as a promising answer to the loss of well-paying but disappearing blue-collar and white-collar jobs related to the industrial economy. Since not everyone can or wants to go to college, there has been an avid search for some alternative to low-wage service-sector jobs. Something is needed to fill the gap between the upper-level management jobs in global companies and the low-paying service economy. This is of particular interest to urban, rust-belt communities such as the one in which I live. Overcoming poverty and related social problems requires offering living wage jobs to those who can work.

While moderate in its popularity (though this is changing rapidly), the concept of green jobs has sparked interest from a diverse set of actors. As such, the vision and implementation of a green economy has come from many sectors, including grassroots initiatives and government-funded programs. Being “green” is perhaps the newest “hot” image so it is important to ask critical questions about the socio-political context in which these economic innovations are taking place. Should we be satisfied if we are told a development strategy is “green?” How can we tell if it is ecologically green or of more interest because it is financially green? Can a job be truly green if human ecology is ignored? Are green jobs just another phase of everyday economics as we know them, or do they hold possibilities for deep social change?

The place to start is an exploration of how principles of peace culture could provide a context of justice in which to locate the concept of greening the economy. Practical applications as well as challenges of policy and implementation can be considered from there.

* Lynne M. Woehrle is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Mount Mary College, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where she coordinates the Peacebuilding Certificate. She holds an M.A. from the Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (1988). She completed her Ph.D. in Social Science at Syracuse University where she also earned an M.A. in Sociology and a certificate in Women’s Studies. She is co-editor of Social Conflicts and Collective Identities, (2000) and co-author of Contesting Patriotism: U.S. Peace Movement Discourses 1990-2005 (2008). She has also written and published on the topics of women and war/peace, consensus and conflict in groups, and peace education. She has held leadership positions in many scholarly organizations in both Sociology and Peace Studies. Over the years she has also served on the boards of and volunteered for many community organizations. Locally she is actively involved with the Candlelight Coalition, Peace Action, the Hartung Park Community Association, Growing Power, and the Greater Milwaukee Human Rights Coalition. She has a long history of working for justice and studying the processes of social change.
What is green? What are the green jobs? What is sustainable development?

The importance of an ecological sensibility applied to all aspects of human society, including economics, is not a particularly new idea. In the early 1970s, E. F. Schumacher (1973) pointed out the risks of our approach to industrialization, particularly the assumption that bigger is better. To him, addiction to growth is problematic. Growth in production, he argued, does not necessarily improve quality of life and it can lead to overuse of resources in a way that is harmful to the ecosystem. This sentiment has been echoed many times over the years.

The Brundtland Report put a global face on the discussion in 1987 by linking global environmental problems with economic inequalities whereby nations of the global south had become mired in poverty and nations of the global north were practicing unsustainable patterns of consumption and production. The report from the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development made popular the concept of “sustainable development,” which it defined as meeting current needs without compromising what is required to meet the needs of future generations (Center for a World in Balance).¹

This criterion does not match well with traditional growth-centered economics. Yet when one tries to imagine a world where the current patterns of production and consumption are applied to all human beings, it becomes evident that such a plan will not achieve environmental sustainability (Daly, 1996). While the exact limits we face are a source of great debate, there is a strong sentiment among many that our earth has a capacity and a breaking point. As Daly (1996) observes, “Once you draw the boundary of the environment around the economy, you have said the economy cannot expand forever” (p.7). He goes on to argue that once the limit to growth is reached, qualitative development must replace quantitative development. When that point is reached (and he believes we are there), the answer to alleviating poverty becomes an approach to development that is sustainable and produces qualitative improvements (Daly, 1996, p. 7).

For many, the concept of sustainable development has evolved to represent an acknowledgment of the need for development to maintain a local emphasis while not losing sight of the global implications of decision-making. The local orientation reflects the “small is beautiful” sentiment, that development is best when its direction and benefits are rooted in the communities likely to be most impacted. Interestingly, most attention to this approach to development has been focused on the global south with little articulation of the need for the global north to change production and consumption patterns (Daly, 1996). Somewhere in the shadows we long for a solution that promises that both continued quantitative growth and an environmental sensibility can exist together.

And what about the idea of green jobs? Are they a force for change? The simplest definition is that green jobs “...reduce the negative impact made on the environment” (Annandale, Morrison-Saunders & Duxbury, 2004, p. 82). This would include both jobs in new green industry and energy generation as well as in traditional industry with an aim for environmental compliance. While the literature barely nods in this direction, it would also include non-industrial jobs such as organic farming, seed-saving, or other forms of species or resource maintenance/management with an eye to the ecological implications.

It is important to assess green jobs within the boundaries that sustainable development provides. To be really green, green jobs should be an example of the qualitative development that Daly recommends, not a panacea that sustains our addiction to growth. Green jobs can be a strategy to shift our understanding of the economy. We would stop seeing the economy as an autonomous sphere governed by its own rules and culture and instead begin to see it as a subsystem of the larger ecological system. Because it offers new opportunities, it should also be approached as a mechanism for restructuring work away from social inequality. But it is not so green after all if all it does is aim to substitute one type of job for another without an economic and ideological shift. That shift to green economics changes the focus to an evaluation of “use value,” where human and environmental needs take precedence over monetary value, quality replaces quantity, and regeneration of individuals, communities, and ecosystems replace accumulation (Milani, 2005, para 1).

**Principles of Peace Culture**

Peace cultures are characterized by an embrace of diversity, actions that show mutual caring and concern for well-being, a commitment to and practice of equality, systems dedicated to stewardship and equitable sharing of the earth’s resources, a sense of security based on mutuality, and a lack of need for violence (Boulding, 2000, p.1). The idea of peace in recent years has been turned active by characterizing it as a process: peacebuilding (Boulding, 2000, p.1; Lederach 1997). The creation of a peace-filled society is never done. Peace is work. It requires constant flexibility to remain open to positively embracing the diversity of cultures that are woven together in the social fabric, and maintaining a structure of justice and equality among all.

Boulding (2000) argues that how peaceable a society becomes can be measured by whether a balance between human need for bonding and human need for autonomy has been achieved (p. 2). In other words, a society does not have to be violent, nor does it naturally turn to peace. Historically and presently, however, our resources have primarily been invested in systems of war, not peace. Lederach (1997) argues for a reallocation of resources structuring our investments for peace around two broad categories: socioeconomic and sociocultural (p. 87). Changing our relationship (or perhaps addiction) to conflict means investing our resources differently. Heavily militarized economies will not sustain a culture of peace. And a military industrial complex that depends on a growth model depends on the expansion of demand.

I would argue that much like our green reconfiguration of principles of economics, peace culture requires attention be shifted to use value, regeneration, and quality of development. We can learn to set and live our priorities in new ways. Peaceable economics holds central the values of justice, ecological awareness, and interdependence.

**Ecofeminist Worldviews**

The perspective of ecofeminism offers an important analysis of power and domination missing in much of the sustainable development literature. While the destruction of the global south through the practices of growth economics in the global north is acknowledged, what is often neglected is a recounting of the culture of colonialism that justifies economic
stratification. According to ecofeminists, the domination and devaluation of women and the domination and devaluation of nature are attributed to the same patterns of hierarchy, namely patriarchy (Diamond and Orenstein, 1990; Plant, 1989; Woehrle and Engelmann, 2008). Knowledge, too, is viewed as a commodity to be exploited, and technology is used to benefit the wealthy and powerful (Woehrle and Engelmann, 2008).

These patterns of domination and devaluation around gender can also be linked to other systems of privilege and oppression such as racism or classism. Thus, ecofeminism provides a way to analyze how the power and privilege to rule can sideline a justice framework for greening the economy. It also brings in the ecological standpoint which is necessary to developing an understanding that goes beyond convenient and timely economics to one which investigates the demands of earth-centered analysis. In that way, it crosses paths with concerns for sustainable development. However, not all conversations of sustainability deeply investigate the risks of domination-thinking as a social context in which policy-making is mired. Ecofeminism raises the critical questions of “who benefits?” and “why does this matter?”

Applying the Principles and Lenses

Moving from theory into practice it is helpful to consider brief examples of projects designed to green the world of work. Each example provides us with material out of which an agenda for concerns and issues for going forward can be developed.

Sweden: Local Investment Programme

The Local Investment Programme (LIP) initiated in Sweden in 1997 brought large-scale investment to support ecological sustainability at the local level. The funds were made available for the modernization of buildings, infrastructure, and energy systems at the local level (Baker and Eckerberg, 2007). The goal was to promote sustainable development and to expand job opportunities through the creation of new green jobs. Assessment data collected and analyzed by Baker and Eckerberg (2007) suggests that the program did succeed in reducing problematic emissions, encouraging conversion to renewable energy, reducing waste, and creating new green jobs. However, the vast majority of these jobs were in management and some were simply a recasting of existing jobs. Moreover, the study suggests that not enough was done to integrate the program with other job creation initiatives and regional development strategies (p. 332). The LIP program did not adequately meet its broader goals of education and establishing private/public partnerships around green economies. Thus, the authors argue, while the programme did reach some goals, sustainable development was not truly promoted, nor was citizen participation adequately sought or achieved.

Australia: Green Jobs Initiative

An assessment of green jobs in Australia found that “environmental employment trends are much more positive than are other employment trends” and that further growth in Australia is expected in the next several years (Annandale, Morrison-Saunders, and Duxbury, 2004, p. 84). The study also found a gap between the skills needed by the green economy and those held by the current workforce. Training was needed both in general workforce skills and in those specific to the industry. The survey also studied motivation for the job creation and the
drivers were (1) supporting sustainable development; and (2) adhering to environmental practices. The authors conclude that the policy implications are a need for specific government support in providing training and to encourage the further development of green jobs through incentives (p. 86).

**United States: Green Jobs Act and Green WPA**

Calling for the emerging green economy to serve as a “pathway out of poverty,” the Green Jobs Act passed as part of the 2007 Energy Bill set aside $25 million for job training, specifically for low-income people in fields like solar power installation and green roofing. The overall bill allocated additional funds for other types of green job training and re-training in certain jobs, along with funds for expanding research on renewable energy and energy efficiency. One outcome has been projects such as those in Oakland, California, where the establishment of a Green Jobs corps has recently been given seed money by the Oakland City Council (Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, 2008).

Establishing a large-scale job-creation effort in the United States, a “Green WPA,” so to speak, has been recommended as one answer to the post-industrial woes of the rust belt (DiPerna, 2004). Job creation, argues DiPerna (2004), can be reconciled with environmental protection. She gives the examples of jobs created by projects for pollution abatement, the need for more efficient heating, ventilation, and cooling, water conservation, and cleaner processing systems. Northern Indiana, for example, has rebuilt much of its industry with green-collar jobs. A green WPA, she argues, could fund much-needed jobs while also providing advancements in developing and creating a myriad of ways that communities can improve their energy efficiency. It would make sense, DiPerna says, to put infrastructure investment programs into environmental jobs. Moreover, she calls for it now, not in ten years. Importantly, changes in the environment demand new skills, and training workers with those skills prepares them to live in a 21st-century world. The Chicago bus drivers that have had to learn to handle vehicles using hydrogen fuel, DiPerna (2004) argues, are learning vital skills for the future economy.

**Wisconsin: Milwaukee Community Service Corps, Project Lead the Way, and Growing Power**

A job training program in the greater Milwaukee area, Milwaukee Community Service Corps (MCSC), provides job training to young adults age 18-23. As a “grandchild” of the Civilian Conservation Corps in Wisconsin, the organization is committed to hands-on training that earns a wage and serves the community. Youth in the program have rehabbed homes to LEED standards, are being trained on solar installation, installed community gardens and rain gardens, and engaged in recycling and rain barrel projects (MCSC). A recent grant from the WIRED Innovation Fund will support the development of a training project in water technology designed to mesh with business and university projects locally. Other green industry areas with potential to expand are using plants to clean contaminated soil and groundwater and expanding solar electric and solar hot water training (McClain, para. 8-12; Litzau). In another case, Project Lead the Way is a program in the Milwaukee Public Schools. Recently the program received a grant to look for ways to link the current program, which is strong in areas of applied science and math, to water industries and technologies (McClain, para 5).
Another Milwaukee-based nonprofit, Growing Power, stresses the importance of local control over the production and marketing of food. A unique angle on green industries can be found in their youth and adult training programs on greenhouse aquaculture, community gardens and raised beds, composting, and worm-farming. A current project is training high school students in the principles of installing a sustainable roof-top garden over a garage in a residential neighborhood. Development of urban fish farms and the facilities for a low budget anaerobic digester are also in testing phases. Growing Power also coordinates a newly emerging national movement on the intersection of racial justice and food security for all (Growing Power).

**Issues and Concerns**

Principles of peace culture, sustainable development, and ecofeminism provide essential context to our assessment of the growing wave of “greening” the workforce. There are a number of important questions to be raised. First and foremost, What are our major goals for establishing green jobs? There are several goals that could be important, but they do not all point to the same trajectory for policy and implementation of green jobs. If our goal is quick job growth, there needs to be minimal intervention because we can expect that with little effort at least some small changes to our practices are imminent thanks to environmental problems. But if the goal is really “true green jobs,” then the values that shape much of the capitalist business system will need to be revamped. One might say we need “capitalist retraining” not just “job training.”

**(1) Who is served?**

This question points us to the critique offered very persuasively by grassroots initiatives that, much like other technological and business innovations historically, green jobs could easily become a boon for the middle and upper classes (Belli, 2007; Ella Baker Center, 2008). The question becomes how to make sure that the justice goals of true sustainable development and peacebuilding are part of the vision and implementation of projects. In other words, greening the economy needs to pass the test of achieving eco-equity vs. eco-apartheid (Ella Baker Center). Projects like those at MCSC provide great examples of what is possible in the realm of combining improved livelihoods for the poor with a society-wide response to environmental pressures. At the same time constant monitoring and asking of the questions of “who benefits” and “who is served” is essential. Eco-equity rails against the current structures of inequality, and monitoring is necessary to make sure equity is truly achieved and maintained. Another important dimension this article adds to the justice discussion is that eco-equity should also test positively for the elimination of gender bias. Applied math and science and hands-on skilled labor training often are aimed (intentionally or not) primarily at males. Gender impact studies should be included in the design of education and training programs because truly sustainable development provides opportunities and equity for all.

Significant training and education are required for many green jobs. There are some good examples of connecting job training programs to environmental concerns but there is also a risk that minimal innovation will really happen. The examples in Sweden and Australia show us that learning/education is not always central to the implementation of government investment in greening the economy. Often the bottom line of employment numbers could
outweigh the goal of making the skill training accessible. So criteria for success need to include that initiatives have impacts across all socio-economic classes and that training/education be integral to funding for local green initiatives. We also know that much of the research and conversation on green jobs has focused on post-industrial, urban communities. Rural applications of these concepts should not be excluded; food security depends on it.

**2** Level of implementation

There is not full agreement on which level of initiation of green economies/jobs creates the best and most just outcomes. Clearly funding is most likely to come from the top down or from private sources. But initiative and incentive could come from either national governments, local governments, or community organizations. The Swedish example teaches us the risks of top down and the value of local initiative for implementation (Baker and Eckerberg). One advocate in the field argues that each state should create a task force on jobs and environment (DiPerna, 2004). Examples in California suggest that local governments could be helpful in funding green jobs initiatives (Ella Baker Center, 2008). But who makes the decisions about what will best fit a community remains under debate. Theoretically, peace culture, ecofeminism, and sustainable development tend to favor local control and democratic decision-making as the most effective and sustainable approach. But many resources are often controlled at higher levels. Community-government partnerships are challenging to maintain but can offer a bridge across the gap between resources and initiative.

**3** Relationship of public and private sectors

The key word is partnership. Actors from nation-state, business, and community need to be involved in sharing knowledge and developing understanding of what it means to green the economy in a practical and equitable way. In other words, the questions of equity and the need for a broad scope suggest there would be great payoff in working together. Core to achieving this is Boulding’s (2000) observations about how peaceable societies strike a balance of autonomy and bonding. This demands a new way of seeing economic relationships that is about community and interdependence as much or more than it is about individual success. An ecological model calls on us to approach problems and solutions with a system-level analysis.

**4** Quality vs. Quantity

If we are searching for a technological fix to our unemployment woes, green jobs might be a decent solution for filling a short term problem. The surge of support for “green” opens space for doing business and industry with a concern for environmental awareness. However this “light green” approach does not fully engage what society has already learned about the complexities of job development, especially within a justice frame. Living wage employment, whether that is in an urban or rural context, requires investment of resources. And the outcomes must be measured primarily by quality, not just by quantity. To meet the goal of sustainable development, it matters who controls the power and who benefits. Care must also be taken to provide practical yet firm guidelines on what defines a job as “solid green” instead of light green.
Conclusions

Despite the claims of the new popular statement – “it’s so easy being green” – riding the wave of greening the economy is more complicated than it might first appear. Evaluative research is relatively sparse on the topic, but what we can consult shows us that not all green paths lead to sustainable development. This article argues that a culture of peace perspective, combined with ecofeminist thinking and sustainable development goals, may chart our path toward eco-equity, while protecting the eco-system. Peace culture provides guidance on the importance of community interdependence for thriving societies. Ecofeminism provides a basis for asking critical questions about power and who is served by programs and policies. Sustainable development shifts our focus from answers that endlessly expand the pie to those that realistically assess our future. Calling a job green might serve as an effective fundraising strategy, but being a green business or organization requires a qualitative change in values, norms, and systematic practices. Environmental demands on the production sectors provide an excellent opportunity to develop a workforce that can care for our ever increasing green technology. If left only to market forces, green jobs will likely evolve to exclusively serve the needs of business, even if those needs deviate from the needs of society. Greening the job market should be done in a way that enhances community control, provides equitable access to the opportunities in employment, and contextualizes change within the dynamics of our ecosystem.

References


Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement

Marcia M. Ledlow *

“We’re willing to be beaten for democracy.”

C. T. Vivian, after having his face bloodied on the steps of the Dallas County Courthouse

Those who do not study history are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past. History, however, is too often ignored when trying to craft solutions for current-day problems. Such is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States and its allies have struggled to build peace in nations where diverse ethnic and religious groups are challenged simply to peacefully co-exist. But the question of how to bring together different groups and integrate them as one nation is not foreign to America’s history, which can provide proven solutions for today’s problems. The military, which bears the initial burden of building peace after a conflict, has not used these lessons. Members of the military primarily study past military conflicts and the use of force to bring about peace. As the old saying goes, when all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. The lessons of successful non-violent movements should be added to the military’s toolbox. When the United States invaded Iraq, the intelligence analysts predicted the troops would be welcomed as liberators. That hasn’t quite been the case,

Events in Iraq can now be classified according to the triumvirate of dissonance which has haunted the state since its inception: the traditional role of leadership for the Sunni has resulted in a Sunni-associated insurgency through fear of disempowerment; Kurdish nationalism is fueling a drive for autonomy with hints of possible secessionist tendencies; and Shi’i marginalization under the Sunni is now forcing their leaders to attempt to impose their will over the institutions of the new Iraq. ¹

As bad as Hussein was, he compelled Iraq to remain unified. Without his oppressive unification efforts, sectarian violence has radically increased. The result is a violent power struggle with America squarely in the middle. The problem now is how to meld these groups into a democracy that ensures no group is left disenfranchised.

¹ Alex Danchev and John MacMillan, The Iraq War and Democratic Politics (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 36.

* Air Force Reserve Colonel Marcia Ledlow, Ph.D., is an Air War College Distance Learning Professor who resides in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, where she is a lecturer for the Business Department at University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point. She wrote this paper while attending the Naval War College. It received the Vice Admiral James H. Doyle Military Operations and International Law Award. The opinions here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.
This struggle spans the spectrum of strategic to tactical challenges. For example, Army Lt. Col. Chris Hickey was sent to Iraq to command a cavalry squadron and found he was also playing peacemaker between Shiites and Sunnis. Hickey formed a Reconciliation Committee to bring the two groups together to resolve their differences peacefully. Lt. Col. Hickey and many others like him have been taking such steps on their own, without guidance, and often without the support that comes from understanding the success of similar efforts that were undertaken in the past. For example, the Reconciliation Committee Hickey helped form bears a striking resemblance to the Biracial Committees formed in Alabama and other Southern states at the height of the Civil Rights struggle. While many are not proud of the Civil Rights Era, it was successful in many ways, particularly when compared to other nations that turned to genocide to solve ethnic problems.

There are numerous ideas that should be harvested from the Civil Rights Movement and used today for peacebuilding abroad. History can teach how to understand ethnic tensions and find workable solutions. Selma, Alabama, is just one of many examples. Selma’s story specifically shows how to establish an effective, representative government and the rule of law that empowers people by giving them a voice in their government.

The American Civil Rights Movement

The Civil Rights Movement in America is often ignored when history is studied to find solutions for today’s problems. This neglect is unfortunate because of the powerful, albeit painful, lessons from the successes of the movement. The movement’s most unique characteristic was that it consisted of “ordinary people using nonviolent resistance to change a nation.” But these ordinary people did not simply rise up on their own and in a vacuum; they were guided by local leaders, the leadership and resources of several different national groups, and eventually by a federal leadership.

While slaves were freed in the Confederate states in 1863 by Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, African Americans were still a long way away from having an equal voice in government. Immediately after the Civil War, there was a brief period where things looked hopeful, and blacks were even elected to public office in numerous Southern states. This progress was short-lived once the federal government ended the occupation of the South. Southern whites, using what can only fairly be characterized as terrorist tactics, re-exerted control at the ballot box and forced black officeholders from their positions. Southern legislatures then passed what are known as Jim Crow laws. Without actually reinstituting slavery, such laws essentially established total segregation

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3 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 5.
in every aspect of life.

In 1954, the United States Supreme Court ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* outlawed the doctrine of “separate but equal.” This ruling gave strength to a fledgling Civil Rights movement, and the first significant nonviolent campaign took place a year later when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a Montgomery city bus, thereby sparking a boycott. The challenge to bring about change was immense; Virginia’s Prince Edward County public schools closed for years, public swimming pools were filled in with concrete, and library seats and tables were removed, all rather than have them integrated. 6 Another area where equality was lacking was the right to vote. After Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., returned from receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, he discussed the need for a voting rights act with President Lyndon Johnson. The President responded that passage of such legislation would be impossible at that time. 7 Johnson’s statement notwithstanding, the movement continued to spread.

The Civil Rights Movement was often interpreted as a national movement orchestrated by one charismatic leader, Dr. King. This was not entirely so. While King was an essential and charismatic leader, the movement was actually a series of local movements, several of which King crafted into what appeared to be a unified effort that tied together both local and national-level goals. To highlight the local nature of the movement, and how it supported the attainment of a significant piece of federal legislation, the focus here will be on a single “campaign” that took place in Selma, Alabama.

**Selma, Alabama**

“At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape a turning point in man’s unending search for freedom. So it was at Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it was last week in Selma, Alabama.”

President Lyndon B. Johnson, March 15, 1965

In the early 1960s, Selma, Alabama, was typical of many cities in the Deep South. However, it was the stage for one of the most interesting campaigns of the Civil Rights Movement. The struggle in Selma marked the end of the larger nonviolent efforts, and it succeeded in the adoption of significant federal legislation. Most importantly, it involved one of the most basic tenets of democracy America is often striving to establish abroad: the right to vote.

In 1960, Selma was a small city with a population of about 14,400 white residents and 14,000 blacks. 8 Out of the total population, only 5,744 adults were registered voters. 9 While sharecropping had largely ended by that time, the economic

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6 Ibid, 14.
9 Ibid, 383.
opportunities available for African Americans were few. “In any ranking of Alabama’s cities in the 1950s and 1960s, Selma would very likely have emerged as its single most inflexibly and fervently segregationist.”

Much of the resistance to change in Selma came from its White Citizens’ Council, which, in June 1955, counted one-fourth of all white males in the county as members. “We intend to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who advocates de-segregation to find and hold a job, get credit, or renew a mortgage.”

A Ku Klux Klan klavern was established in Selma in November 1957, and its members burned five crosses at each entrance to the city to celebrate. A prominent member of both organizations was Jim Clark, sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama. Clark issued a call for all white males over the age of twenty-one to be deputized, and he formed a posse of 66 mounted and 350 unmounted deputies. Sheriff Clark gave this posse “one purpose – to keep the black people of Dallas County from voting.”

All members of Clark’s posse came from the White Citizens’ Council and the Klan. Sheriff Clark was somewhat balanced by Selma’s public safety director, Wilson Baker, who, albeit a segregationist, was a more “careful” one.

In the face of such resistance, the right to vote was not easily obtained by Selma’s black residents. To register to vote, applicants needed to wait in long lines at the registrar’s office which was only open two days a month. Employees of the Board of Registrars often showed up late for work, took long lunches, and left work early. Registrars also unfairly administered literacy tests by asking questions such as, “How many bubbles are in a bar of soap?” In 1959, the FBI began an inquiry into Dallas County voter registration practices, and it is worthy of note that the Bureau’s 1959 request for records wasn’t fulfilled until November 1963. The U.S. Justice Department filed suit in May 1962, charging the Dallas County Board of Voting Registrars with racial discrimination. As a result, thirty-six black teachers who testified in the case or who cooperated with the Justice Department were fired. The African Americans of Selma decided they needed to do something to end the oppression.

A voter campaign began in 1963, and marches to the courthouse to register to vote became common. In April 1963, 350 blacks, mostly teenagers, had the courage to attend the first mass meeting in Selma for a voter registration drive. The church where they met was surrounded by city police, sheriff’s deputies, and fifty members of Jim Clark’s posse.

Dr. Martin Luther King and the SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) were asked on several occasions to come to Selma to help with this drive.

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10 Ibid, 380.
11 Ibid, 393.
12 Ibid, 406.
14 Lewis, 306.
15 Ibid, 305.
17 Sam Walton (Selma’s National Voting Rights Museum) interview by the author, 24 January 2006.
18 Thornton, 441-442.
19 Ibid, 446.
20 Ibid, 450.
but they were busy in Birmingham.\textsuperscript{21} Shortly afterwards, in 1964, John Lewis, the national chairman of SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) moved to Selma to help organize a bus boycott after a black pregnant woman was dragged to death after failing to get off a bus quickly enough.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, in 1965, Dr. King and the SCLC also came to Selma to assist with the voter registration campaign.\textsuperscript{23}

A coalition of SCLC, SNCC, and the Dallas County Voters League worked together to organize the people of Selma for action. On 2 January 1965, Dr. King announced that demonstrations would begin on 18 January. These demonstrations, which continued for more than two months, became a contest not only between the city’s whites and blacks, but also between the Selma police (led by the more moderate Public Safety Director, Wilson Baker) and the county sheriff’s office under Jim Clark.\textsuperscript{24} Clark’s jurisdiction began at the steps of the county courthouse where the voting registrar was located, and his jurisdiction continued outside the city limits of Selma. Baker’s police escorted the marchers safely to the courthouse, where Clark and his deputies were waiting for confrontation.\textsuperscript{25} The marchers’ attempts to register to vote resulted in regular and sometimes violent confrontations with Sheriff Jim Clark and his deputies. Clark’s temper worked against him when he handled the highly-respected Amelia Boynton roughly as a television camera captured his actions in time to show them on the nation’s evening newscasts.\textsuperscript{26} Clark’s mishandling of Boynton inspired 125 black public school teachers to march to the courthouse three days later, an action that was “electrifying” since “no group of blacks in the region was more easily intimidated,” and few groups of blacks were more revered in the community.\textsuperscript{27} The teachers’ march was also significant because teachers and ministers were the informal leaders of the black community.\textsuperscript{28} Once these two groups were willing to risk their jobs to march, everyone, including children, would follow them, thus causing the movement to grow and gain momentum.

One of the unique aspects of the Selma movement was how it was more of a bottom-up campaign than many of the others, with the people pointing the way and the outside agencies assisting with guidance.\textsuperscript{29} John Lewis, the chairman of SNCC, described those who began and participated in the movement as “salt-of-the-earth people—school teachers, beauticians, undertakers, housewives, men, women, and children from every walk of black life in Selma....nameless individuals to outsiders, faceless people to all but those who were there. Yet they were the face of the civil rights movement, these unidentified men and women with no titles in front of their names, no Ph.D.s after them.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 475.
\textsuperscript{22} Phillips, 198.
\textsuperscript{23} Thornton, 474.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 479.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 480.
\textsuperscript{26} Phillips, 201.
\textsuperscript{27} Thornton, 482.
\textsuperscript{28} Phillips, 201.
\textsuperscript{29} Lewis, 307.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 307.
These nonviolent protests grew as children joined them. On 10 February, Sheriff Clark arrested 160 teenagers staging a silent protest and took them on a two-mile forced run into the countryside. He and his deputies encouraged them to keep moving by shocking them with electric cattle prods. By the time they returned, several had lumps, cuts, and burns from the cattle prods. “[O]ne nine-year-old boy stood with tears streaming down his face—he had made the march barefoot.” When Sheriff Clark was later checked into the local hospital for exhaustion, many of these same children went to the hospital and prayed outside for his recovery—they were determined to uphold the principles of nonviolence.

Student involvement in the movement spread, and on 18 February 500 students in nearby Marion, Alabama, marched from a church to jail to protest the arrest of SCLC secretary James Orange. This march was particularly dangerous since it took place at night. Suddenly, as if on cue, the streetlights went out, and Alabama State Troopers and local police charged the marchers, beating and arresting them. Onlookers also ambushed the press, physically assaulting them, smashing cameras, and spraying TV lenses with paint. One of the marchers, 26-year-old Army veteran named Jimmie Lee Jackson, was shot by a state trooper while protecting his mother and grandfather from a vicious beating. Jackson lay in the street for a half hour before local police took him to the county infirmary. Eight days later, Jimmie Lee Jackson died in a Selma hospital. Jackson’s death gave birth to the idea of a march to the state capitol building in Montgomery to dramatize the plight of those fighting for the right to vote.

The 50-mile march was planned for Sunday, 7 March 1965. Before it began, SCLC staffers conducted an impromptu training session to teach the marchers how to protect their bodies if attacked. However, much of Selma’s black populace had already been trained in the principles and tactics of nonviolence. The group of nearly 600 marchers proceeded in an orderly line of 2-by-2s to Selma’s Edmund Pettus Bridge. Downtown Selma was eerily quiet; however, once the marchers crested the bridge, they could see line after line of Alabama state troopers, some on horses, others with billy clubs, and many in riot gear, stretched from one side of the highway to the other. When the marchers approached the foot of the bridge, the troopers fired tear gas on them and brutally beat them back across the bridge, continuing to chase and beat them the full mile back to the church where they started. Forty canisters of tear gas, 12 canisters of smoke, and 8 canisters of nausea gas were used on the marchers.

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31 Thornton, 484.
32 Lewis, 314.
33 Ibid, 315.
34 Ibid, 316.
35 Thornton, 486, and Bullard, 29.
36 Bullard, 29.
37 Lewis, 318.
38 Ibid, 323-324.
39 Phillips, 203.
As a result, 56 blacks were hospitalized. The brutality of “Bloody Sunday,” as this day would come to be known, was broadcast on television all over America that evening. ABC interrupted its prime time movie, “Judgment at Nuremberg”—a movie about Nazi war crimes—to show fifteen minutes of film footage of the Selma melee.

The images were stunning—scene after scene of policemen on foot and on horseback beating defenseless American citizens. Many viewers thought this was somehow part of the movie. It seemed too strange, too ugly to be real. It couldn’t be real.

The next morning, the Justice Department announced it would send the FBI to Selma to investigate. It did not take long at all before “people from all over the nation, led by hundreds of white clergymen and nuns, began converging on Selma.” One of the visiting clergy, Reverend Reeb, was clubbed in the head by white segregationists and died two days later.

Reeb’s death helped draw even more national attention to the events transpiring in Selma. Four days after Reeb’s death, President Johnson sent a voting rights bill to Congress, saying in a nationally televised speech that Selma “is part of a larger movement...Their cause must be our cause, too. Because it’s not just Negroes, but really it’s all of us who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome.” Johnson’s use of the movement’s catch phrase brought tears to Dr King’s eyes and shocked the white resistance.

President Johnson federalized more than 18,000 Alabama National Guardsmen to provide the needed security, along with 2,000 U.S. Army troops, a hundred FBI agents, and a hundred U.S. Marshals. In the words of John Lewis:

Ministers, nuns, labor leaders, factory workers, schoolteachers, firemen—people from all walks of life, from all parts of the country, black and white and Asian and Native American, walked with us as we approached the same bridge where we’d been beaten two weeks before. The same troopers were there again, but this time National Guardsmen were there as well, and we passed over the river without incident, trailed by two truckloads of soldiers and a convoy of Army jeeps.

Despite threats of violence, 25,000 people marched to the capitol in Montgomery and arrived on 25 March. That evening, Viola Liuzzo, a white mother of

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40 Thornton, 488.
42 Lewis, 331.
44 Bullard, 73.
45 Lewis, 342.
46 Ibid, 343.
five from Detroit, was shot and killed by Klansmen while transporting marchers.\textsuperscript{47}

The Selma campaign was a complete success. Four and a half months after the conclusion of the march to Montgomery, the Voting Rights Act was passed to ensure fair access to the democratic voting process for all. Among the provisions of the legislation were:

- The suspension of literacy tests in 26 states, including Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi
- The appointment of federal examiners to replace local officials as voter registrars
- Authorization for the attorney general to take action against state and local authorities who used the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting\textsuperscript{48}

In addition, Sheriff Clark’s posse was found to be illegally constituted and was ordered to be disbanded.\textsuperscript{49} From 1964 to 1968, Selma’s total number of registered voters grew from 6,000 to 13,500, and the number of black voters from 250 to 5,000.\textsuperscript{50} The day the act was passed, President Johnson declared: “The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different from other men.”\textsuperscript{51}

**Lessons from Selma for Peacebuilding Today**

While Selma, Alabama, may seem far in both space and time from the problems of Iraq, there are many lessons Selma can teach to those seeking to quell sectarian violence in Iraq. Two prominent authors who see history as a way to understand the present, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, propose using what they call “mini-methods” to dissect a problem and correctly use history to help solve it.\textsuperscript{52} Neustadt and May suggest turning to history carefully: “Quickly jotting down the Likenesses and Differences can block use of potentially misleading analogies... [and] can also help define concerns.”\textsuperscript{53} Surprisingly, this method reveals many similarities between these two vastly separated situations which are described in the Appendix, and it points to specific areas that should be considered in future peacebuilding operations.

The overwhelmingly complex task of rebuilding a nation predictably leaves many leaders wondering where to start. As a result, the military, for example, may choose to go with what they know and tackle security problems first. This, however, could be dangerous.

\textsuperscript{47} Bullard, 29.
\textsuperscript{48} Lewis, 346.
\textsuperscript{49} Thornton, 489.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 498.
\textsuperscript{51} Lewis, 346.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 235.
We found that if we concentrated solely on establishing a large security force and targeted counterinsurgent combat operations—and only after that was accomplished, worked toward establishing a sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-market system—we would have waited too long.\(^{54}\)

The military guidance for these operations pointed out the need to work on six tasks *concurrently*:\(^{55}\)

- Establish and Maintain a Safe, Secure Environment
- Deliver Humanitarian Assistance
- Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure/Essential Services
- Support Economic Development
- Establish Representative, Effective Governance

The American military is comfortable with the security mission and somewhat comfortable with most of the others on the chart; however it is least experienced at promoting governance. Not only is governance the foundation upon which peace rests, it is the one area where Selma provides the most lessons, both on what to do and what to avoid.

The task of “establishing representative, effective governance” is described in this military guidance as: “The ability to engage in the early restoration of local governance activities, e.g., restoring city/regional councils, developing transparent reconciliation processes, restoring or possibly reforming the internal security and judicial systems, and resolving property claims and disputes.”\(^{56}\) While the military may only perform this function temporarily, the goal is to build host nation governmental structures that are “representative and inclusive, responsive to constituents, and accountable for their actions”\(^{57}\) — which means the military must take *immediate* actions to support long-term goals, even if the shooting has just ended. If done correctly, there are six desired effects which result from the successful completion of this task:

1. Establishment of political institutions and processes both interim and long term that are accepted as legitimate by the host nation population
2. Establishment of basic tenets of the rule of law and governance
3. Establishment of a credible judiciary
4. Establishment of host nation police forces capable of enforcing law
5. Establishment of a system of rights
6. Participation of the host nation population in the political process\(^{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) Ibid, viii.

\(^{57}\) Ibid, 46.

\(^{58}\) Ibid, C-9.
All of these are key elements of a functioning democracy, and Selma shows how these must go more than skin-deep if they are to endure beyond a military occupation.

**Establishment of political institutions and processes**

Political institutions and processes need to be established at the national and local levels. At each level:

Political reform efforts must take into account deep-seated rivalries and distrust among ethnic and religious communities, should they exist. The new political agreements must provide all groups/communities with the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the governance process, including mechanisms to protect minority groups from discriminatory actions by the majority.  

Both Selma and Iraq highlight the challenge of bringing about this type of political reform. In Iraq, this is a much greater challenge than it was in Selma since the United States already had established political institutions and processes. In Iraq, the goal is to bring about a stable, consolidated democracy, with a constitution enshrining the rights of individuals and recognizing the multi-ethnic nature of the state. Such requirements are easily stated, but they have rarely, if ever, appeared in Iraq’s tortured eighty-year political history. Assuming democracy will emerge as the natural state of being for Iraqis, the building blocks of democratic order must be created from scratch rather than rediscovered in the wreckage of Iraqi political culture.

Another challenge in Iraq has been the removal of the Ba’ath Party, which left a power vacuum.  

Unfortunately, Iraqi voters are likely to align themselves with demography rather than political agendas, which means “the electoral victor will rule in the name of the largest fragment, rather than that of the country as a whole.” Much like Selma, the majority in Iraq (Shiite) likes the idea of voting since it believes the vote will significantly shift power in its favor and keep it there. Yet the experience of Selma also shows how national-level voting and effective national-level lawmakers can help a minority group have a say in government and not just be at the mercy of the majority. The experience of Selma also demonstrates that both the majority and minority groups need to stay involved in the effort to ensure political processes remain fair. Without the

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59 Ibid, 46.
60 Danchev and MacMillan, 135.
61 Ibid, 141.
efforts of many whites in the federal government such as President Johnson and the efforts of many other whites who came to Selma and who participated in other protest marches all over the United States, attention would not have been brought to Selma, and national and local-level change would not have occurred.

In addition to national-level political institutions and processes, it is also important to establish similar local structures and systems. One of the lessons learned from the Civil Rights Movement was that it was actually a compilation of local uprisings brought to the forefront by the strong, charismatic leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King. Local campaigns such as those that took place in Selma, Montgomery, and Birmingham, were not necessarily linked to each other, nor were they similar. They were inspired and carried out by local leadership to resolve local problems. This necessary focus on local leadership and local political institutions is also important when conducting peace operations abroad. Understanding local politics is even more important when helping groups establish new power relationships with one another, yet all too often resources are stretched beyond capacity and efforts are focused solely at the national level. Just as the Civil Rights Movement did not rely on one charismatic leader who planned every campaign, peacebuilding work should equip local leadership to bring about grass-roots changes.

**Establishment of basic tenets of the rule of law and governance**

Nowhere is the challenge of establishing a rule of law and governance more apparent than in Iraq. Major General Chiarelli described this challenge:

[A]ll levels of command were intimately involved in educating and mentoring the emerging Iraqi federalist-based, democratic system. In many instances there was a degree of unlearning that needed to occur. Although the population despised the rule of law under Saddam Hussein, it was the only model they knew, and they were prone to fall into patterns of governance reminiscent of that regime. 63

This is clear, for example, in the Iraqi laws that criminalize “speech that ridicules the government or its officials,” some of which were resurrected verbatim from Saddam Hussein’s penal code. 64 This frightening sign highlights the importance of building local and national political processes and institutions to provide appropriate checks and balances.

Selma showed that simply having established government institutions is not enough to have a true democracy for all citizens. Even in America—with our well-established Constitution and laws—we needed refinements so all Americans could be included in the political process. While the Constitution theoretically gave everyone the

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63 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 13.
same rights, local enactments such as Jim Crow laws and restrictions on voter registration actually took these rights away. For change to occur in Selma, it took local nonviolent movements to raise awareness and draw federal attention to explicitly define rights. Selma and current events in Iraq also show the challenge associated with returning to a previous set of laws as the military occupiers leave. Just as the states of the former Confederacy adopted unfair Jim Crow laws shortly after Reconstruction ended, there is the potential that Iraqis will fall back into some of their old ways as they struggle to combat violence within their nation. Leaders who are aware of this issue can educate and mentor Iraqis to help them find a nonviolent way to move ahead.

**Establishment of a credible judiciary**

One of the important checks and balances to ensure a fair and equitable rule of law is a justice system that effectively applies the rule of law. This serves as a deterrent to potential wrongdoers and helps healing and reconciliation to begin. For example, those charged with the murders of two of the Selma supporters killed during the campaign were found not guilty by local, all-white juries. For decades, this had been a regular occurrence throughout the South. In the Liuzzo case, the U.S. Justice Department, becoming frustrated with Southern juries, eventually charged three people with conspiring to violate Mrs. Liuzzo’s civil rights. The defendants were found guilty and were given the maximum sentence allowed—10 years.\(^{65}\) This was a landmark case as it was the first time Klansmen were convicted in a civil rights murder. The verdict in the Liuzzo case sent an important message to those who opposed civil rights with violence.\(^{66}\) Gradually, the justice system in the South began to change.

The Iraqi justice system must establish similar checks and balances. This includes selecting judges who will fairly hear cases, and, as the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees, a trial by a jury of one’s peers. In Selma, there were only a handful of blacks in the jury pool, and they were rarely called to serve. There was no way for a black citizen to get a fair trial, and whites who committed crimes against blacks were never found guilty. America needs to ensure the same does not happen in Iraq. Jury pools must reflect the demographics of the population so defendants can be confident they will get a fair trial.

Selma also shows the importance of establishing checks and balances with an appellate process. Many decisions made by trial courts in Selma were overturned on appeal, and this helped minorities gain a sense they could be fairly treated. Saddam’s trial, for example, gave the public an example of the changes that had taken place in the Iraqi judiciary. The effect this trial and its broadcast had on the Iraqi people cannot be understated. Peacebuilders must understand the importance of establishing a credible judiciary at all levels, and they need to ensure word about the judiciary is spread throughout the population since it can be a powerful deterrent to lawlessness.

\(^{65}\) Bullard, 75.

\(^{66}\) Ibid, 75.
Establishment of host nation police forces capable of enforcing law

While justice and the rule of law provide the foundation for a nation’s security, there must be a police force to ensure the law is enforced. These forces must be robust to provide security, and they also must be seen as legitimate for them to be trusted. This can be a challenge when local militias spring up to fill security vacuums.

Building a police force is a priority, particularly if the existing police force has collapsed. In the case of Iraq, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army left a gaping hole where missing security forces were replaced by coalition forces. It is important to turn this function over to the host nation as quickly as feasible. A survey in Baghdad found that “72 percent of the local populace stated there was a direct correlation between their sense of security and the presence of the IPS [Iraqi Police Service].”67 One problem encountered while rebuilding the Iraqi police was a difference of opinion about how to use security forces. The Ministry of the Interior preferred “strike forces that conduct blitz operations rather than operate as the ‘cop on the beat.”68 Like Sheriff Clark’s posse, these forces are likely to do what they are trained to do—raising the level of violence instead of reducing it.

The insurgents recognize the importance of a capable police force and, therefore, have repeatedly targeted police recruits. But there is hope even in the face of this adversity, as this example shows:

In May 2004, on the death of approximately 100 potential IPS recruits at a police station targeted by terrorists using a car laden with explosives, an amazing thing happened: On the following day there were over 300 potential recruits standing tall, ready to join the Iraqi Police Service—not out of nationalistic feelings, but to “honor those who have fallen.” Tribal, religious, and familial honor drove a new batch of recruits to defend the honor of those killed—and this was not an isolated occurrence.69

The challenge is working to ensure recruits who join the police to seek revenge for fallen family members do not act in ways that cause the police force to lose its legitimacy.

Establishing legitimate security forces has been a challenge in Iraq, but steps are being taken to turn things around. For example, Iraqi authorities “suspended an entire brigade of as many as 1,200 police officers for suspected connections to kidnappings and executions.”70 This was followed by removing Iraq’s two senior police commanders “in the first broad move against the top leadership of Iraq’s unruly special police forces.”71 The situation in Iraq is strikingly similar to groups such as the KKK who did not

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67 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 8.
68 Ibid, 8.
69 Ibid, 9.
want the federal laws to be enforced. Often local police were part of these groups and actively helped prevent the enforcement of federal laws in Selma, including targeting those they were sworn to protect. Just like the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, the federal government had to intervene and ensure that police corruption was rooted out. It also took another kind of militia—the National Guard—to provide needed security for the Selma campaign.

The U.S. National Guard provides a good example of how to have a militia with a local focus that can still fall under federal control. At the same time, Selma demonstrates the dangers of a militia (like Sheriff Clark’s posse) that is not under the control of a competent authority and is not averse to using violence to get its way. This issue of militias has repeatedly stood in the way of Iraq’s security. As if the collapse of the police force was not bad enough, disestablishing the Iraqi Army on 23 May 2003 added approximately 400,000 more unemployed Iraqi men to the recruiting pool for the growing insurgency. Many joined local militias, and their growth coincided with an upsurge in ethnic violence. Not taking steps to disarm and disband these militias sent a signal that they were necessary to augment official forces to maintain law and order. The Sunni Sons of Iraq, for example, were transformed from insurgents to local security forces and put on the U.S. payroll during what was known as “the Awakening.”

However, once the United States stopped paying, these 95,000 individuals have only slowly integrated into the Iraqi security forces, and many are returning to their old ways. Many unauthorized militias operate under the guise of civilian organizations with the goal of preserving local order: “For example, the Badr Brigades renamed itself as the Badr Organization, and gave itself an explicitly humanitarian mandate although it retained some 10,000 armed personnel.” Events in Iraq have shown the importance of getting the militias under control, just as Selma needed to get extremist groups under control.

Leaders involved in peacebuilding are going to be involved in helping to provide security and raise up the host nation’s capability to provide its own security, so these considerations are important to keep in mind. Initially, whether they want to or not, military occupying forces will help design the host nation security forces merely by picking which forces to acknowledge as legitimate. We must ensure that the mistakes of Selma aren’t repeated in Iraq or anywhere else.

Establishment of a system of rights

Denying anyone their rights—especially the right to vote—denies democracy to all. Selma shows the importance not only of establishing a system of rights (which in itself is a challenge in a multi-ethnic mixing pot like Iraq), but also the importance of ensuring those rights are actually afforded individuals at the local level. Equal rights

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72 Danchev and MacMillan, 165.
74 Danchev and MacMillan, 173.
may not seem like an important issue during a military occupation when other pressing issues are at hand, but it may easily creep up after departure, much like it did in the South after Reconstruction. Equal rights also play an important role in establishing security. It has been found in Iraq that “a direct correlation existed between the level of local infrastructure status, unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers.”

As the Shi’a continue to press for control of the state, the Kurds seek to redress the injustices of nearly a century ago, and the Sunnis struggle to come to terms with their disempowerment, a political solution needs to be found which is based upon consensus, an understanding not to resort to violent means, and compromise—hardly defining features of Iraq’s political history.

One solution is the example of the nonviolent movement in the Selma campaign. The nonviolent nature of the voting rights movement in Selma, combined with significant information support, is what made the movement unique—and successful. The principles of nonviolence did not just emerge in a vacuum, though. Nonviolent workshops were conducted before each campaign, and organizations such as SNCC and SCLC trained thousands of people of all ages. Not everyone passed their strict requirements. Without TV cameras catching and sharing footage of the violence against passive resistance, the American people would never have known what was going on in Selma, nor would they have been persuaded to get involved to encourage change. By responding with nonviolence in the face of violence, the “moral high ground” shifted to the group seeking a change. When the nonviolent movement eroded and violence erupted in many American cities, the pace of social change slowed significantly.

In August of 2009, Shiite clerics and politicians throughout Iraq began to urge their followers not to retaliate against a fierce campaign of sectarian bombings—an extraordinary contrast to Iraq’s recent past:

Bombing Shiite mosques has become so common that Sunni extremists have been forced to look elsewhere to provoke outrage. They have attacked groups of Shiite refugees waiting for food rations, children gathering for handouts of candy, lines of unemployed men hoping for a day’s work, school buses, religious pilgrimages, weddings, marketplaces, and hospitals in Shiite areas and even the funerals of their victims from the day before.

Iraq’s Shites, counseled by their political and religious leaders, …have refused to rise to the bait—for now. Instead, they have made a virtue of forbearance and have convinced their followers that they win by not

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75 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 10.
76 Danchev and MacMillan, 155.
77 Phillips, 206.
responding with violence. ... the Shiites’ spiritual leader, Grand Ayatolla Ali al-Sistani, has forbidden any sort of violent reprisals.\textsuperscript{78}

Even some extremist groups in Iraq have renounced violence, such as the Asa’ib al-Haq, or the League of the Righteous, who decided instead that they wanted to get involved in the political process.\textsuperscript{79} While teaching nonviolent methods to the most extreme insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere might be out of the question, there are moderates in each group in Iraq who would do well to understand the importance of combining nonviolence and information sharing to obtain and ensure their rights under the new government. An important task for anyone building peace abroad should include educating the local populace about nonviolent methods to bring about change and the development of local leaders who subscribe to nonviolence.

**Participation of the host nation population in the political process**

One of the major lessons from Selma is the importance of the vote. In addition to having a legitimate political process and abolishing laws preventing participation in the political process, it is also important to address the issue of intimidation. “It is useful to remember that Saddam also held elections, enjoying an immense turnout giving him 99.99 percent of the vote, yet he used elections to bolster the legitimacy of his dictatorship rather than promoting representative government.”\textsuperscript{80} Likewise, in Selma even the white moderates were thoroughly intimidated by the White Citizens’ Council, who would pay them a visit or blacklist them if they supported changing the status quo. Iraq’s elections have required a high level of security to ensure that the citizens feel safe participating in the political process, and this has encouraged successful elections.

The process of voting is also extremely empowering and provides a safe outlet for those who have been wronged or are hoping for a change. Some of the most hopeful scenes in Iraq were those showing the joy on citizens’ faces as they proudly displayed the purple ink on their fingers—a visible reminder that things were changing.

The new military nation building guidance discusses the challenges in a situation like Iraq:

> When conducting “high end” SSTR [Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction] operations, the most critical determinant of success will be convincing the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government and to actively support the government’s efforts to build a “new domestic order.”\textsuperscript{81}


\textsuperscript{80} Danchev and MacMillan, 147.

\textsuperscript{81} USJFCOM, 46.
Clearly, convincing citizens to believe in and support the government is the key to success in Iraq.²² If solid governance is in place but the population is too afraid to participate, the government may as well not be there at all.

It is important not just to vote in national elections, but also to have an impact at the local level. While much attention is given to voting for national-level issues, in Iraq it is important to encourage this process on a local level, too. This process would be more likely to encourage host nation participation if security is provided and intimidation of the moderates is quashed.

**Conclusion**

While peacebuilding primarily belongs in the realm of civilian and nongovernmental organizations, high threat environments will require the military to begin building a sustainable peace. The military guidance described this requirement:

> [I]n the opening weeks of military support to SSTR operations, especially when the environment is hostile and contested, the Joint Force may need to engage in early restoration of local governance activities.... Additionally, early governance reform activities must help set the trajectory toward the political end states established as both the mid-term goals and long-term vision associated with the SSTR operation.

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Whether the military likes it or not, even if they are only called to do this mission short term, they must understand it well enough to take actions that will be viable in the long term. To do this effectively, the military must prepare leaders to build peace by studying more than past military conflicts. Studying nonviolence may seem out of place at America’s military academies and war colleges, but it is necessary to augment the military’s warfighting capabilities.

The military’s initial actions can set the stage for the establishment of a nation’s rule of law. Once a reasonable level of security has been established, civilians who more fully understand these concepts must finish the job. The lessons learned from Selma are well applied in such situations. For example, Anglican priest Andrew White has worked to nurture political reconciliation in Iraq and has gathered Iraqi religious leaders to discuss Iraq’s future. Some of the statements made by the participants are striking both in the hope they represent and in their similarities to America’s divided history:

> Sheikh Dr. Abdul Latif Humayeem (Sunni): “We brought this [sectarian] crisis on ourselves. This shared cult of sectarianism booby-traps our society. Throughout history we have nurtured factionalism—first through differing interpretations of the Quran, then by making these differences sacred and inviolate. Then comes fanaticism and blind,

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²³ USJFCOM, 46.
unreasoned violence. It is urgent that we, the leaders of Iraq’s religious communities, lead a move away from this depraved culture of sectarianism toward a culture of unity as an Iraqi nation.”

Ayatollah Sayed Ammar Abou Ragheef (Shiite): “The only way we will overcome this history is to move from sectarianism to the rule of law. Realistically there is little prospect of our being able to enact a just framework of law until we—we clerics—establish a climate of mutual trust and respect between our two communities. In my judgment, the only way we can establish such a climate is by creating a series of concrete, confidence-building projects in which Sunnis and Shiites work together to improve the welfare of both communities.”84

These comments also highlight ideas on how to empower a local populace to feel they have a real voice when it comes to the rule of law. Perhaps having a nonviolent voice will help prevent one that uses violence, even if it does mean civil disobedience is used to bring about a form of governance that includes essential human rights. However, unless these methods are purposefully taught, how will a populace know there is any other way?

Ethnic challenges are not an exclusively foreign problem; many would say our own recent struggles with race have yet to be resolved. The difficulty of this challenge, however, does not excuse us from working to find solutions. Understanding and applying lessons from our past can help us understand how things can go wrong with peacebuilding today. Historic events such as Selma, and many others like it, can, and should, teach the importance and intricacies of establishing an effective representative government and the rule of law.

Table 1. Selma and Iraq: Similarities and Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Selma, Alabama</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security, Justice, and Governance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Outside party is involved – U.S. Federal Government</td>
<td>U.S. Government / Military involved plus United Nations and other nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitution and Federal control is challenged and requires Federal-level involvement to resolve.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KKK uses terror tactics to quell efforts to bring about change – bombing homes, kidnapping, lynching.</td>
<td>Al Qaeda terror tactics follow similar vein – suicide bombers, kidnapping, executions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKK funding and support comes from outside and sometimes unknown sources.</td>
<td>Al Qaeda and insurgents also receive funding from outside, often unknown, sources such as Iran.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The military played an important role in providing security for the social change effort by protecting the marchers as they made their way from Selma to Montgomery. (The Alabama Guard was called up in a Federal status to do this and their effort to sweep for roadside bombs, etc., was extensive.)</td>
<td>The American military has played an important role in providing security for the Iraqi people while the Iraqi security forces are trained.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The military’s ability to provide security was strictly confined to one area (i.e., the march route and the marchers), but local authorities were responsible for security the rest of the time. This did not always work out.</td>
<td>As Iraqi security forces are established, they will assume control of areas that the U.S. military will no longer secure. Yet breaches in security anywhere will still likely be viewed as American responsibility and will reflect poorly on our overall efforts to bring security to Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The legitimacy of the local police force was doubtful at best. The county sheriff was clearly on the side of the white supremacists.</td>
<td>The legitimacy of the local police force, especially the local militias which are formed of one ethnic group, poses a significant challenge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voting provided an important starting point to empower the minority group.</td>
<td>Voting provided an important beginning to show that all groups would have a voice in the new Iraqi government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Those who attempted to register to vote were threatened with physical and economic harm and some were actually beaten, killed, or fired from their jobs. Many were willing to take this risk anyway.</td>
<td>Terrorists told the Iraqi people not to vote and threatened violence. Thousands were willing to take this risk anyway.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting was open to all on the surface, but not actually available to everyone in practice.</td>
<td>Voting was open to all. Some boycotted at first, but more participated over time.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal laws were strengthened as a goal/result of the campaign.</td>
<td>Iraq may separate into ethnically divided autonomous regions – decreasing centralized power.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruling powers stayed in place and those who would not change were gradually voted out of office.</td>
<td>De-Baathification almost instantly removed most of the government from power.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The United States had a robust Federal legal system. It might have been slow, but it came around eventually. The Iraqi legal system is in the process of being re-created.

### Local Movement v. National Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>The disenfranchised group (African Americans) is not always unified in their social change efforts. Some are moderates willing to wait things out a bit, while others want more radical changes quickly.</th>
<th>Not all Iraqis are violent extremists; many are “understanders” and moderates. They cannot be viewed as one unified group, but a people with a variety of opinions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The American Civil Rights Movement was a municipal-level movement – not a national movement.</td>
<td>Iraq consists of provincial-level problems – the entire country is not experiencing the same levels of ethnic violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The “Ruling” group is not always unified in their desire to prevent social change efforts – many white moderates exist but are afraid to speak up for fear of reprisal.</td>
<td>Many moderate Iraqis do not have a safe forum to express their opinions and demonstrate unity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The local culture and the movement are heavily based in and motivated by religious beliefs – African American preachers were often the major form of leadership in the African American communities and they were extremely influential.</td>
<td>In Iraq, the Muslim religious leaders are also extremely influential informal leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Outside agitators” involved – white liberals from non-Southern states</td>
<td>“Outside agitators” include Al Qaeda and “freedom fighters” from Iran and elsewhere.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Dallas County, blacks were the majority group and they had not been in power.</td>
<td>Minority group (Sunni) had been in power and wielded it ruthlessly at times.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some extremists (on both sides) could not be won over.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several groups united efforts for this campaign and the overall failure to unify afterwards eroded the movement as a whole.</td>
<td>Iraq has failed so far to unify many disparate groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to the minority group leaders, members of the majority group also led integration efforts.</td>
<td>There are also Shiites advocating that Sunnis and Kurds have a voice in the new government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely informal leaders at the local level become highly influential in the movement’s success (for example, the involvement of teachers).</td>
<td>Local-level leaders will make the difference in bringing about change, which is why they are often targeted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Differences

| Our own nation was involved as a third party. | Outsiders involved as a third party. |

### Nonviolence and Information

| Similarities | TV played a significant role with events that could spark confrontation almost “staged” for the media – e.g., Selma was chosen like a Hollywood set with Sheriff Clark’s temper, the way he dressed, etc. | Insurgents frequently stage events specifically for media coverage, e.g., videotaping beheadings. |

---

TV cameras and coverage of violence key to turning America’s attention towards Selma.  

TV coverage of violence has focused America’s attention in Iraq.

Those in power (Sheriff Clark, segregationists, etc.) attempted to prevent the media from getting the story out.  

Those in power are clamping down on allowing free speech for journalists, and extremists have targeted the press for kidnappings and murder.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>More moderates on both sides were enticed to support the movement as the violence was made more public and U.S. leaders spoke out more vocally against it.</th>
<th>Muslim moderates are threatened by insurgents, but are not becoming more emboldened or unified.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

National “celebrity” (Dr. King) was brought in to help draw media attention and provide unifying leadership for local groups.  

While insurgents have celebrity-type leadership, strong national leaders outside the government who support nonviolence have not emerged.

SCLC and other groups conducted extensive training on nonviolent techniques – all ages were welcomed and some were not able to “pass” or participate.  

Not done.

Regular re-motivation during the heat of the campaign to remain nonviolent – weekly mass meetings with reminders and immediately after the Bloody Sunday attack, etc.  

Not done – conflict is most often responded to with a spiral of more violent conflict.

### Religion, Culture, and Society

#### Similarities

Many extremists (KKK, for example) saw the movement and this campaign as a Jewish conspiracy.  

Many extremists see this as a Jewish-Christian conspiracy.

Southerners greatly resented “outsiders” on their territory, trying to change their way of life. Merely the presence of outsiders exacerbated their anger.  

Extremists resent the very presence of Americans and other foreign forces on their soil.

Religion is used by both sides to both prevent and encourage the social changes. Many white Southerners interpreted the Bible to justify their defense of the status quo.  

The Koran is also interpreted differently by both extremists and moderates to justify their actions.

#### Differences

Culture and religion was predominantly Christian.  

Predominantly Muslim.
Horizontal Inequalities and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba*

Peacebuilding pertains to lowering conflict and raising prospects for high development and the liquidation of the structural and cultural contradictions that induce conflict (Ibeanu, 2006, pp. 1-3; Francis, 2006, p. 13; Best, 2007). Essentially, it seeks to achieve sustainable peace by tackling the root causes of conflict, which include the absence of development; domination, exploitation, deprivation, and struggle for access to natural resources; unequal access to assets; and value disorientation or distortion (Otite and Albert, 2001; Olokesusi, 1996; Murshed, 2007; Mathew, 2002).

Peacebuilding deals with conflict prevention, resolution, and post conflict management, and is predicated on a clear understanding of the objective conditions that trigger conflicts and knowledge of the particular conflict system (Bassey, 2002, p. 1). Thus, the misunderstanding of conflict, or failure to adequately capture the underlying causes of conflict, undermines peacebuilding. This paper draws attention to a seemingly neglected theme in the analysis of conflict in the Niger Delta and its implications for peacebuilding.

The literature blames the conflict in the Niger Delta on a number of factors that include Nigeria’s perverted federalism as characterized by the centralization of powers and national resources in the national government; fiscal imbalances; ethnicity-based political domination; and the politics of revenue sharing (Naanen, 1995; Okoko and Nna, 1997; Ikporukpo, 1996); oil-induced environmental degradation and the resultant occupational losses and disorientation; population displacement; and increased poverty (Ikporukpo, 2004; Ibaba, 2005; Opukri and Ibaba, 2008; Ikekere, 1991); human rights violations by the government and multinational oil companies (Aaron, 2006; Ibeanu, 2008); and the uncaring attitude of multinational oil corporations towards corporate social responsibility (Ikelegbe, 2008, Aaron, 2008).

The issue of ethnicity-based political domination interests this paper, given its close association with horizontal inequalities (HIs) and the dominant place it occupies in the analysis of conflict in the region. The major argument in the Niger Delta blames the conflict in the region on the major ethnic groups in Nigeria (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) who have been accused of using their control of the Nigerian state to deprive the Niger Delta (inhabited by politically powerless ethnic groups) of a fair share of the oil wealth that is produced in the region. It is noted in this view that the revenue allocation system and oil laws have been used to transfer ownership rights and oil monies for the benefit of the ethnic homelands of the dominant ethnic groups, leading to HIs characterized by uneven development and control of the state apparatus.

This viewpoint is predicated on changes in the revenue allocation system that coincided with the ascendance of oil as the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. From 1960, when Nigeria gained independence, to 1970, agricultural products such as cocoa, groundnut, and palm oil, *

* Dr. Ibaba Samuel Ibaba is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. His research interests include poverty reduction, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. He is the author of Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis (2005) (Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Amethyst and Colleagues Publishing), and has published several articles on the Niger Delta in international refereed journals.
produced in the homelands of the majority ethnic groups, were the pivot of the Nigerian economy. Available data shows that the highest peak of oil exports during this period was 1966 when they recorded 32.4 percent of total exports (Opukri and Etekpe, 2008, p. 138). Significantly, the allocation of revenue in this period was principally based on the place of derivation, which was fixed at 50 percent. This meant that the regions then (now states) received 50 percent of the proceeds from resources exploited or produced in their lands.

But in 1970, which marked the displacement of agriculture as the mainstay of the economy by oil with 57.6 percent share of total exports, place of derivation was reduced to 45 percent. This was later slashed to 20 percent in 1975, 2 percent in 1980, 1.5 percent in 1984, and later raised to 3 percent in 1992, and finally to 13 percent in 2000 following protests by the people (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide, 1999; Jega, 2007). This pattern is linked to ethnic politics which are also responsible for the enactment of laws that have alienated the Niger Delta ethnic nationalities from the oil resource and the oil industry (Nna, 2001; Ibaba, 2005). I agree that the major ethnic groups have used their privileged control of the state to pursue their ethnic interest and that this has resulted in the neglect and deprivation of the Niger Delta. However, identity politics and uneven allocation of state resources are not limited to the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria.

The fact is that, in Nigeria, power is used for the benefit of those who exercise state power at all levels (federal, state, and local government). This is a consequence of the privatization and personalization of the state and its subsequent use for the pursuit of individual and sectional interests (Aaron, 2006). A major outcome of this has been uneven development among the different ethnic groups, a reality that has become an instrument of ethnic mobilization. I argue that because political power in the Niger Delta is used to pursue individual and sectional interests in the same manner as at the national level in the country, it has created HIs that have induced conflict.

The paper explores the thesis that the reduction of horizontal inequalities created by contradictory and conflicting inter-group relations in the Niger Delta is a fundamental requirement for the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. The remaining part of the paper is divided into three parts. The first section analyses the linkage between horizontal inequalities and conflict in the Niger Delta. The second examines the policy issues required for the reduction of horizontal inequalities, while the third section concludes.

**Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) and Conflict in the Niger Delta**

The link between inequality and violence is not new to conflict literature, and central to the analysis is income inequality, noted for the fueling of social tensions and socio-political instability (Cramer, 2005; Nafziger, 2006, p. 15). Cramer (2005, p. 8) has noted that inequality undermines growth through the distortion of the human capital market, and the undermining of capital and investment through reduction in profits and political instability. This impedes development, and as Ibeanu (2006, p. 11-12) has noted, the absence of development induces conflict.

Inequality is vertical when individuals or households are the units of measure, and horizontal when inequality is measured among groups. Essentially, vertical inequality applies to a homogenous group, while horizontal inequality deals with culturally defined heterogeneous
groups (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, p. 3; Murshed, 2007, p. 5). The literature has emphasized horizontal inequality more than vertical inequality in the analysis of conflict. Ukiwo (2008, p. 118) attributes this to the fact that horizontal inequalities are easily used for mobilization due to the cultural bond among members. But Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart (2007, p. 4) link the importance of horizontal inequalities in conflict analysis to the role of HIs in group mobilization, the strengthening of ethnic consciousness and ethnic conflicts, and the constraining of growth and poverty reduction.

Although conflicts are motivated by economic and political gains, the perception of domination or deprivation of one group by another results in conflicts championed by people who fight on the basis of loyalty to a group (Stewart, nd, p. 2). The understanding of HIs is enhanced when it is located in its multidimensional context. Ukiwo (2008) has identified three perspectives. The first is socio-economic inequality measured with the per capita income and human development index of different cultural groups. The second view is political inequalities, based on the relative share of political appointment and public service offices, while the third pertains to cultural inequalities, characterized by the dominance of the cultural symbols of particular groups.

Similarly, Murshed (2007, p. 5-6) has highlighted three dimensions of HIs as discrimination in public spending on socio-economic infrastructure and taxation, high asset inequality, and struggle for access to natural resource rents. A critical analysis of the conflict in the Niger Delta shows that the dimensions of political inequality, discrimination in public spending, and the competition for natural resource rents are highly pervasive. This makes HIs a useful perspective for the explanation of conflict in the Niger Delta. But the use of this paradigm has neglected the role of HIs among the ethnic nationalities of the region, and instead has concentrated on the ethnic majorities in Nigeria and the Niger Delta ethnic minorities. One such study concludes:

Socio-economic injustices and political grievances are at the roots of the insurgency...To keep peace and restore hope in the Niger Delta; these inequalities need to be tackled. Tackling these inequalities that afflict the Niger Delta would begin with dismantling the present structure of federalism whereby the Federal Government pockets the greatest share of oil revenue. A corollary of this would be the equalization of all laws on mining to ensure that all regions and states are in charge of resources and remit taxes to the federal government as is obtainable in other federations. (Ukiwo, 2008, p. 185)

I agree with this perspective but note that it only addresses one aspect of HIs. It is noteworthy that the use of state power for the pursuance of private and sectional interests by Niger Delta leaders has created HIs within the region. Because the Nigerian state is privatized, access to the state bestows wealth, status, and power on the individual and by extension his ethnic group (Ake, 2001, Aaron, 2006). Consequently, unequal representation in political offices becomes a deliberate tool for denying other groups access to the state. The objective of ethnic domination is further enhanced through discrimination in the provision of development infrastructure and social services, and the actual sharing of state revenue. This situation also
applies in the Niger Delta, and its neglect in the peacebuilding process is a danger. I note, for instance, that inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts in the region are consequences of HIs.

The Niger Delta is not a culturally homogenous geo-political entity. It is made up of over 20 ethnic groups and 800 communities (Okoko and Ibaba, 1997), categorized into five major linguistic groups: the Ijo, Yoruba, Edo, Igbo, and the Delta-cross (NDES, 1997). Although oil production is not a criterion for the description of the Niger Delta, the nine oil producing states of Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers are now seen as components of the region for purposes of administrative convenience (UNDP, 2006). The relationships among these groups have been characterized by perceptions of domination and exclusion. Despite the view that these states share a common destiny defined by perceived oppression by the majority groups in Nigeria, they engage in discriminatory practices that have created HIs.

For example, discriminatory spending and allocation of projects have characterized development agencies established by the federal government to intervene in the development of the Niger Delta. One of these establishments was the presidential committee created to disburse the 1.5 percent oil derivation fund. I noted earlier that the derivation component of revenue allocation was reduced to 1.5 percent in 1984. However, the federal government referred to it as a “mineral producing areas development fund” and established a special presidential committee to commit the funds to the development of the oil producing states. That committee was popularly known as the “1.5 percent committee.” The committee embarked on infrastructure development, and between 1988 and 1992 it executed a total of 1,207 projects in the following distribution: Abia State (55); Akwa-Ibom State (8); Bayelsa State (48); Delta State (720); Edo State (24); Imo State (80); and Rivers State (271). See Table 1 for details.
Table 1
Projects of the Presidential Committee on the 1.5 Percent Oil Producing Area Development Fund 1988 – 1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Number of states</th>
<th>Total number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Road/Drainage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Electricity</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Water</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Share Projection/ Landing Jetty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Building/Equipment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Basic Health Centres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Administrative block</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Classroom blocks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Cottage hospital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Nurses quarters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Doctors quarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Market stalls</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Science blocks/ assembly hall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Principal quarters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Share of Project</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from OMPADEC Quarterly Report, 1993, p. 15-44.

* At the time the committee executed its projects, Abia and Bayelsa states were not created. Similarly, Edo and Delta states were together as Bendel state. However, the share of projects for each state was determined through their locations. These projects were later inherited by the OMPADEC which was created in 1992.

The crude oil production share of the oil producing states at the time these projects were executed indicate the following percentage share: old Rivers State (54 percent); Delta State (29.4 percent); Edo State (7.4 percent); Imo State (3 percent); Abia State (2.2 percent); Akwa-Ibom State (2 percent); Cross River (1 percent) and Ondo (1 percent) (OMP ADEC Quarterly Report, 1993, pp. 12-13). Based on equity, it is expected that these states will receive corresponding shares or numbers of projects. However, this was not the case as old Rivers State received 26.4 percent of the projects, Delta State, 59.7 percent, Imo State, 6.6 percent, Edo, 2 percent, and Abia State, 4.6 percent. Ondo and Cross River got zero allocation of projects. Why? The use of public office for the pursuit of sectional interests is the most likely reason, given the coincidence of the group or state that benefited most and the group or state affiliation of the head of the committee. The most likely reason for the large share of projects given to Delta State (59.7 percent) is the fact that the chairman of the committee that disbursed the 1.5 percent fund, Brigadier Paul Omu, retired, was an indigene of the state.

At another level of analysis, evidence points to the fact that even within the states, some sections were neglected or marginalized. For example, Bayelsa State produced more than half (about 28 percent) of the oil production quota of old Rivers State, but received just 48 (15 percent) of the projects allocated to the old Rivers State. See Table 2 for details.
Table 2
Projects of the Presidential Task Force on the Disbursement of the 1.5 Percent Oil Producing Areas Development Fund, Indicating Projects Allocated to Old Rivers State and the Share of Bayelsa State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Number of Rivers</th>
<th>Number of Bayelsa</th>
<th>% Share of Bayelsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shore protection/ landing jetty</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Buildings:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Basic Health Centre</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Administrative blocks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Classroom blocks</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Cottage hospital</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Nurses quarters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Doctors quarters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Science block/assembly hall</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Principals quarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>319</strong></td>
<td><strong>271</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: OMPADEC Quarterly Report, 1993, pp. 15-44.*

The Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), which was established in 1992 also to intervene in the development of the Niger Delta, was likewise guilty of discriminatory spending. Although the operational guidelines require the commission to ensure equity in the allocation of resources, its activities violated the principles of equity. The operational guidelines of the commission stated in part that:

To ensure the fair and equitable distribution of projects, services and employment of personnel in accordance with recognized percentage production... the sums received by the commission... shall be used for the rehabilitation and development of the oil mineral producing areas on the basis of the ratio of oil produced in particular state, local government area or community (OMPADEC Report, 1993, p. 13).

To promote the development of the communities, the OMPADEC adopted a two-way approach – physical resource development and human resource development. Physical development commenced with the execution of over 1,000 projects inherited from the presidential committee on the 1.5 percent fund. As noted earlier, projects allocation by that committee was skewed in favor of some groups. Thus, OMPADEC strengthened the marginalization of the communities that were earlier deprived by the 1.5 percent committee. Worse, the Commission could not correct this in the allocation of projects it initiated. OMPADEC projects benefited some communities, states, and local governments far more than others, irrespective of their oil production status.

A major instrument of the OMPADEC in the area of human resource development was the OMPADEC Assisted Mass Transit and the OMPADEC Small Scale Trading Loan schemes. The
disbursement of funds for the two schemes shows a wide discrepancy in the oil production status of states and local governments and the value of their awards. It is noteworthy that out of 232 recipients of the OMPADEC Small Scale Trade Assistance Loan Scheme as at October 1993 in the old Rivers State, only 46 (19.8 percent) of the recipients came from the present Bayelsa State, thus out of the total sum of USD 90,833.33 which was disbursed, Bayelsa State received only USD 17,500.00 (16.2 percent). Also, of the 70 beneficiaries of the OMPADEC Assisted Mass Transit Scheme in the former Rivers State as at October 1993, Bayelsa State got 24 (34.3 percent) beneficiaries, giving her only USD 42,000.00 (19.5 percent), of the USD 215,581.73 that was disbursed. (OMPADEC Report, 1993, pp. 49-51). Again, the high benefits derived by Rivers State can be attributed to the fact that the first chief executive of OMPADEC, Chief A. K. Horsefall, is an indigene of the Rivers State.

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which was created to replace OMPADEC in 2000, has also encouraged discriminatory spending and allocation of resources. In 2004, available data show that the NDDC has completed 327 projects. The breakdown of the distribution indicates thus: Abia (40); Akwa-Ibom (53); Bayelsa (47); Cross Rivers (4); Delta (97); Edo (38); Imo (31); Ondo (31); Rivers (17) (ANEEJ, 2004, p. 23). It is noteworthy that the first chairman of the NDDC, Chief Onyema Ugochukwu, hails from Abia State, while the second, Ambassador Sam Edem, is an indigene of Akwa-Ibom State. Similarly, the first two managing directors of the NDDC, Engineer Godwin Omene and Honorable Emmanuel Aguariavwodo, are indigenes of Delta State.

Discriminatory provision of development infrastructure and social services has also taken different forms in the Niger Delta states. The personalization of the state and the resultant patron-client politics has led to the deprivation of groups that lack access to state power. The appointment of kinsmen into strategic political offices, the siting of projects in the homelands of the custodians of power, and the creation of local governments and the location of local government headquarters in the homes of governors and other political actors have become accepted practices. It is important to note that not all communities in the Niger Delta produce oil. Similarly, the volume of production is not the same among the producing communities. Meanwhile, non-oil producing communities whose sons and daughters control state power have received greater share of government spending and infrastructure development than oil producing communities.

A classic example is the location of the Bayelsa state government-owned Niger Delta University at Wilberforce Island. Wilberforce Island has a number of settlements, including the paternal and maternal homes (Amassoma and Ogbiri respectively) of the first elected governor of Bayelsa state, Chief D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha, whose government established the university. The location of the university at Wilberforce Island where oil is not produced by a governor who hails from the place has been linked to ethnic considerations by the other oil producing groups. A number of reasons account for this perception. First, it was not the best location given the fact that there are other communities that had the advantages of road access and better infrastructure. Second was the construction of the first state government urban-rural link road in the area because of the university. The establishment of the university has accelerated the growth and development of the Amassoma community that is host to the original campus, making it more developed than communities that hitherto had the same level of development. It is noteworthy that in the 1980s Dr Ambrose Ali, the governor of the defunct
Bendel state (now split into Delta and Edo states) established the Bendel State University (now Ambrose Ali University) and located it in his home town Ekpoma.

The uneven development which follows such ethnically determined state policies has resulted in perceptions of domination, ethnic antagonism, and conflict. Nafziger (2006) argues that ethnic antagonism is not the cause of conflict, but only emerges during conflict. But I argue that HIs induce ethnic antagonism that triggers violence. The exclusion of other nationality groups from having a fair share of state resources necessarily creates antagonisms that have become a basis for ethnic mobilizations, geared towards the struggle for access to the state and resources. This provides conditions for violence to erupt. Further, conflicts are not the same, and thus, even if ethnic antagonism emerges in a particular conflict, the antagonism can create and sustain other conflicts.

Ethnic and group based antagonism is a fundamental source of conflict in the Niger Delta, and inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts in the region can be located in this context. The inter-ethnic violence between the Ijaw and Itsekiri of Warri in Delta State is a good example. Warri is inhabited by three ethnic groups (Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo), but colonial policies such as differential integration of different groups and the recognition of the Itsekiri monarch (Olu) as the head of Warri, the creation of Warri division by the post-colonial Western Regional Government in 1964, and the stipulation of the Itsekiri as the only group to represent the Warri Division established Itsekiri domination, as all political appointments and even employment went to the Itsekiri. For example, in 2005, all the 413 staff of the Warri North Local Government Council, made of the Ijaw and Itsekiri, were Itsekiris (Imobighe, Bassey, and Asuni, 2002; Ukiwo, 2007).

This has pitched the two ethnic groups against each other, and the consequence is the perceived domination of one group by another, leading to the Ijaw demanding separate local government and declaring that the Itsekiri monarch is not the paramount ruler of Warri, but only of Itsekiri. In 1997, the military government of General Sanni Abacha created the Warri South Local Government, made of Itsekiris and Ijaws, but sited the headquarters at Ogbe-Ijaw, an Ijaw community. But months after, the headquarters was relocated to Ogidigben, an Itsekiri community. Because of the ethnic antagonism and palpable hatred between the two ethnic groups, the Ijaw saw the relocation of the local government headquarters from the Ijaw homeland to the Itsekiri homeland as oppression and deprivation by their Itsekiri neighbours, who they perceive, have always used their advantage in education and access to power, enhanced by the influence of the Itsekiri monarch (the Olu of Warri), to exclude them from a fair share of national and state resources. The outcome was months of killings and destruction (Opukri and Ihiba, 2006, pp. 40-41). It is noteworthy that the Urhobo and Itsekiri have also been pitched against each other for similar reasons.

This situation also applies to communities where antagonisms have led to inter-community conflicts. The struggle for power, access to resource rents, employment, contracts, and land disputes has triggered conflict among communities. Significantly, loyalty to the group and perceptions of exclusion and domination have always been the rallying point of mobilization for a fight against each other. Table 3 provides some examples of inter-community conflicts.
Table 3
High points of Inter-Community Conflicts in the Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bayelsa State</th>
<th>Delta State</th>
<th>Rivers State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Okpoama vs. Ewoama</td>
<td>(i) Evwreni vs. Ughelli</td>
<td>(i) Emohua vs. Obagkiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Twon-Brass vs. Okpoama</td>
<td>(ii) Oleh vs. Olomoro</td>
<td>(ii) Okirika vs. Alesa-Eleme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Liama vs. Beletiama</td>
<td>(iii) Isama vs. Gbarigolo</td>
<td>(iii) Bille vs. Ke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Emadike vs. Epebu Egweama vs. Beletiama</td>
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<td>(v) Ogbolomabiri vs. Bassmbiri</td>
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<td>(vi) Opuama vs. Ofonobiri</td>
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These conflicts have contributed to the violence and instability in the Niger Delta, characterized by the destruction of lives and property, hostage taking, and armed combat between security operatives and militia groups. It is clear that HIs are a critical factor in the conflicts in the Niger Delta. However, current policies on peacebuilding have neglected Niger Delta based HIs. Significantly, reduction or elimination of these HIs is a fundamental requirement for sustainable peace in the region. The next section examines policy issues on HI reduction.

HIs: Policy Issues and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta

It is clear that the personalization of the state and its use for the pursuit of sectional interests is the primary source of HIs in the Niger Delta. This implies that the use of the state for the promotion of common or collective interests is the most likely option to reduce HIs. A number of policy options based on political representation, decentralization of governmental institutions, equitable distribution of government revenue, and the respect for human rights can be adopted to achieve this objective.

First, the most disadvantaged groups need to be identified and clearly defined in order to give them special development attention. The identification should be based on socio-economic indicators such as poverty, literacy, access to basic social amenities, school enrollment rates, level of infrastructure development, and representation in political institutions and the bureaucracy. Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart (2007) see these issues as fundamental concerns of HIs. Tackling them is therefore crucial to peacebuilding.

One policy option that is crucial for the reduction of HIs is affirmative action. In Nigeria, this has been captured by the federal character principle, a national integration policy that seeks to bridge bureaucratic inequality and unequal representation in government by preventing the predominance of one ethnic group or sectional group in the composition of government or state bureaucracies (Ekeh and Osaghae, 1989). But it has failed to guarantee adequate representation of minority nationalities in states with heterogeneous ethnic groups (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart, 2007). What is obtainable is a zoning system of appointments that seeks to ensure that all ethnic groups are represented in the bureaucracy and polity. At the national level, Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones (South-West, South-East, South-South, North-West, North-East, and North-Central). Each state of the federation is also divided into three senatorial zones. Based on the quota system and the principles of rotation which
reserve positions for each group, these zones are used as the basis for political representation, appointments into ministries, departments, and agencies, and the distribution of infrastructure projects and social services.

But the federal character principle is abused in that the ethnic groups that control the zones take more of the quota of appointments and projects allocated to it. Sensitive ministerial positions such as finance, economic planning, works and transport, and education are permanently reserved for some ethnic groups. Because of nepotism, employment vacancies are hardly advertised, thus skewing employment opportunities in favor of those in the corridors of political power. The refocusing of the federal character principle is clearly essential for the reduction of HIs. Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart (2007, p. 7) have noted some policy options that would be appropriate. These include the use of merit to select the beneficiaries of the quota of appointments for each group; the use of urban-rural criteria in a state for the determination of potential appointees; proportional representation based on ethnic nationalities; and transparency and accountability in the appointing procedures. These measures will reduce HIs and help to erase the perceptions of nepotism, domination, and deprivation that create antagonistic relations among the ethnic groups.

Education is also an instrument that can help reduce HIs. It is not in doubt that unequal access to education is a source of HIs in the Niger Delta. Accordingly, educational policy should be refocused to give more education to the disadvantaged groups. Scholarship programs can promote this goal. Similarly, special grants can be given to tertiary institutions in the region that give admission to individuals from these minority groups. It is important to note that, without education, such groups cannot use their privileges adequately.

Equity lies at the root of HIs reduction policies in the Niger Delta. This requires that the volume of oil and gas produced by each ethnic group should determine its share of government spending. To achieve this, Delta and Ondo State governments have established oil mineral producing area development commissions. These commissions are charged with the responsibility of developing the oil producing communities with 50 percent of funds derived by the states from the 13 percent oil derivation fund. The judicious use of funds by these commissions, guided by the principles of equity in project allocation, will enhance the reduction of tensions associated with HIs. Decentralizing the bureaucracy of these commissions through the establishment of offices in each of the senatorial zones of the states can strengthen this.

The achievement of these goals is, however, predicated on a new vision of governance that pursues the aspirations of the people, in addition to guaranteeing fundamental human rights. The proper use of oil revenues through accountability, transparency, and frugality in the management of resources can hardly be achieved without the protection of human rights, particularly the right to development and the right to choose those who govern. The reactivation of existing legal and social frameworks for the protection of human rights in conflict situations is necessary for the peace and development of the Niger Delta (Ibeanu 2008, p. 106).

Human rights are essential components of the rule of law that checks the abuse of governance. Importantly, the abuse of governance, which manifests as the use of political power for the pursuit of sectional interests, is a fundamental cause of HIs in the Niger Delta. The institution of good governance as defined by inclusive political participation, the promotion
of common interests, equitable distribution of state resources, and transparency and accountability are crucial for the reduction of HIs and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta.

Conclusion

This paper has established that whereas HIs are a fundamental cause of conflict and violence in the Niger Delta, the analysis of the conflict has been one-sided. Attention has focused mainly on the inequality between the Niger Delta ethnic nationalities on one hand, and the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria on the other hand. This paper has drawn attention to Niger Delta based HIs and the role they have played in the raging conflicts.

The paper notes that reduction in Niger Delta based HIs are crucial to peacebuilding. Accordingly, policy issues that center on equity in resource distribution, inclusive political participation, decentralization of oil wealth distribution institutions, and respect for human rights are suggested for implementation. However, the success of HIs reduction policies is predicated on the willingness of the political leadership to commit “symbolic suicide” by subordinating their personal interests to the common interest (Wilmot, 1980, p. 148). This will enhance the capacity of the state to pursue public good, development, and the establishment of credible institutions and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

References


Can Sri Lanka Achieve Durable Peace with the Tamils After Defeating Tamil Tigers?

Siri Gamage*

Sri Lanka is a multiethnic, culturally and structurally pluralistic society. The majority of the population is Sinhalese (74%). There are significant Sri Lanka Tamil (12.7%), Indian Tamil (5.5%), and Moor (7%) populations with a long history of habitation in the island¹. Over the decades, politicians, intellectuals, journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others have emphasised the pluralistic nature of Sri Lankan society. However, since 2006 there has been a tendency in the southern electorate to advocate and reinforce Sinhala-Buddhist identity, nationalism, and associated claims with the overt and covert support of those in power to the relative exclusion of legitimate claims by the Tamil and Muslim populations. This situation emerged due to the intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and its unwillingness to take part in peace negotiations unconditionally. The government’s sincerity in seeking a political solution rather than a military solution was also questionable. The acceleration of military attacks by the government forces on LTTE targets resulted in the deterioration of the security of citizens and their civic and human rights.

As the intellectual, ideological, and political gap between the two conflicting parties, i.e., the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), widened considerably since the election of President Rajapakse in November 2005, and the trust between the two conflicting sides and their respective constituencies moved further apart, it is necessary to examine the recent developments.

Between 2002 and 2006, Sri Lanka experienced a semblance of peace after decades of civil war. This was due to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the GoSL and the LTTE. The aim was to prepare the ground for political negotiations by creating a climate devoid of armed hostilities and violence. The respective forces remained within the demarcated lines, while European monitors kept a check on the violations of the truce. No major armed conflict took place during this period. However, the election of Mahinda Rajapakse to be the president changed the political climate as well as the approach to the conflict. The first few months of his incumbency were unremarkable in that he showed to the world and the Tigers that he is a man of peace. The parties met in Geneva once in 2006, though the meeting did not yield any tangible result. Rajapakse appointed an All Party Conference (APC), which in turn appointed an All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to look into ways and means of resolving the conflict with the LTTE by way of sharing power. The Tigers started attacking GoSL armed forces in late 2006, which they continued into 2007. Several attacks on civilians also took place. The

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* Siri Gamage, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer, Faculty of The Professions, School of Education, University of New England, Armidale, Australia. He is also course coordinator for the Graduate Diploma in Education and Master of Teaching, and coordinator of the Master of Education (international schooling, education, and development). He is a member of the Australian Migration Research network.

¹ Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka internet web site, (http://www.populstat.info/Asia/srilank.htm, accessed 22 June 2007). However, the 2001 Census shows a decline in Sri Lanka Tamil population partly due to the fact that some divisions in the Northern and Eastern provinces were not covered by the census. A slight drop in Indian Tamil population was also recorded.

government forces started to react to these and such reactions accelerated by early 2007\(^2\). This conflict became intense in places such as Vakarai and Sampur in the Eastern province. By May 2007, the GoSL forces continued their so-called “defensive operations” against the LTTE occupied areas, displacing close to 200,000 more civilians in the Eastern province alone. The Tigers did not respond in kind with the same vigour that they displayed in the previous years to such operations. Instead, they were forced to vacate the areas where the GoSL forces made incursions. By May 2007, the voices that argued for a military solution to the conflict gained the upper hand and the media—with a few exceptions - also publicised feature articles, news reports, and commentaries with a similar stand.

By mid 2007, the interpretation of the conflict between GoSL and LTTE was based on the notion that the conflict was about sharing of power between the two protagonists. Even though there are other equally important dimensions to the conflict—the international dimension, the nature of the political system to be implemented in the conflict areas after a resolution, human freedoms and rights, significant reforms to the political in the rest of the country, the welfare of those affected by decades of war—the focus of political parties, both government and opposition, has been on the power devolution exercise spearheaded by the APC. Correspondingly, the government military attacks in the conflict areas accelerated, along with the deteriorating human rights situation in the South. By the end of 2008, the armed forces wrestled back control of northwestern side of the Northern province from the grip of the LTTE.

However, this concept that the conflict is due to a disagreement over power sharing alone is flawed because it is too narrow. For durable peace in Sri Lanka, a more holistic approach to conflict resolution and peace is required, and other dimensions must be embraced. Political and civic problems in the country, particularly in the conflict areas of the north and east, are not solely due to the lack of power sharing. They have much to do with the hegemonic nature of the state and the ethnically biased interpretation of nation, as well as with the promotion of majority ethnic identity and interests to the exclusion of other identities.

**Nationhood, Statehood, Violence, and Conflict**

A report by the European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit on a Conflict Assessment Mission to Sri Lanka in 2002 (ECCAM) describes the key dimensions of the conflict in the following words:

An understanding of the conflict in Sri Lanka requires insight into a complex structure of inter-linking factors. These factors are the origin and character of the Sri Lankan State, the issue of defining the political status of the Tamil people living predominantly in the Northeast, and the problem of reconciling mutually exclusive claims to nationhood and statehood. (ECCAM Sri Lanka 2002, 1)

\(^2\) Who attacked first is a contentious issue as there are claims and counter-claims on both sides. Reports by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) appointed to monitor violations of the ceasefire violations are an independent source to evaluate the validity of these claims.
What are these mutually exclusive claims to nationhood and statehood? What is the nature of this complex structure of inter-linking factors? More importantly what attempts are being made to address these conflicting claims and by what means? Later in the paper these questions are addressed in some detail.

Qadri Ismail, who critically reviews anthropological and historical writings on Sri Lanka, rejects the dominant ethnocentric account of the country produced by the Western academy: that it is a place of violence caused by culture not by politics (Ismail, xvii). Rethinking Sri Lanka from a minority perspective, he rejects the Western conceptualisation of the conflict as between two antagonists, the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority (Ismail, xxvi). To him, those approaching the conflict in Sri Lanka from a leftist perspective have to “read the world as structured hierarchically” and “confront, contest and combat hierarchization, oppression and exploitation” (Ismail, xiv). Ismail is critical of the works of Kingsley de Silva and Alfred Wilson for their “conceptualisation of a peaceful Sri Lanka or Sri Lanka and Eelam that does not anticipate, or desire, an end to domination or call for mutual participation” (xiii). “The question of peace...is a politico-epistemological problem... Sri Lanka demands, perhaps desperately, the formulation and deployment of ‘new concepts.’ The current, rather narrow debate needs to be broadened” (Ismail, xiii-xiv). Peace cannot be conceptualised in terms of Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms, as de Silva and Wilson argue, because nationalism always produces exclusivist notions of community. Nationalism might be understood as a structure of dominance. Ismail is critical of history and social science analyses that contribute to the maintenance of hegemony, hierarchy, and domination. He calls for imagining the country in new ways (Ismail, 179).

According to a peace researcher who conducted her research in Sri Lanka, “The conflict was constructed around notions of threatened identities (Sinhalese as well as Tamil), historical suffering, and a struggle to safeguard and protect one’s own identity against the threat posed by the ‘Other’. War is conceptualised as normal and inevitable. This constructed wartime logic has to be deconstructed and challenged to make it possible to think, talk and act differently” (Orjuela, 262). The report of the ECCAM to Sri Lanka in 2002 states that the conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be reduced to a question of cosmetic reforms. The solution “lies in articulating a vision of a democratic pluralist social order and entrenching this vision within political institutions that respect the fundamental equality of all the national and ethnic identities and religious traditions and which provide them with dignity and justice as equal and integral partners of the state” (ECCAM Sri Lanka 2002, 1). This report further points out that, “The lack of a genuine bi-partisan commitment and approach by the political establishment represented mainly by the two major parties, the UNP [United National Party] and the SLFP [Sri Lankan Freedom Party], has been the single-most important obstacle in achieving a negotiated political settlement. This is accounted for by the longstanding struggle for power by both parties” (ECCAM, ii).

These are a sample of viewpoints and positions among hundreds of similar arguments and positions that one can find in the recent literature concerning the conflict in Sri Lanka.

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3 This is not only a Western construct. Such a construct is the result of political and ethno-religious discourses within the country, particularly advocated and promoted by more chauvinistic or extreme elements in each ethnic community.
These are based on different world views and knowledge systems on the subject of how to create social justice, equity, and security in multiethnic societies.\(^4\)

There are fundamental differences between the conceptual frameworks and principles of the two sides to the conflict. They go beyond the issue of power sharing between a Sri Lankan state composed and functioning as it is, and the aspirations of the LTTE presented as if they were the aspirations of the oppressed Tamil people in the north and east of the country. Simultaneously, from the point of view of GoSL, there were concerns about the nature of the political system in operation in LTTE-held areas as well as the one to be implemented if the LTTE gained further control either via peace negotiations or by the use of force. It appeared at the time that without acknowledging and addressing these key differences between the positions of the two protagonists, it was futile to talk about a power sharing formula as if it were an ahistorical, technocratic/bureaucratic solution to a complex conflict.

Being aware of the epistemological, political, and ethnic or majority-minority dimensions that are applicable to the conflict, this paper examines the above-mentioned issues in detail and comments on the need to identify and promote a national framework for reconciliation, peace, and stability based on commonalities among ethnicities rather than specificities. The focus is on the political dimension of the framework. This was also the key focus of the APRC’s deliberations that looked at various proposals for resolving the conflict. The paper aims firstly at a critical examination of the weaknesses in the governing structure, institutions, procedures, and political culture; secondly at the epistemological bases of the claims and counter claims of contending parties to the conflict at the time; and thirdly, at an examination of the potential solutions for conflict resolution on a durable basis. As the government security forces defeated Tamil Tigers in May 2009, the contents of the paper have been updated to reflect the aftermath of this defeat.

**Background: Changing Nature of Governance Structure and Political Culture**

This section basically, but not exclusively, involves how power is conceived, defined, achieved, exercised, abused, and monitored in Sri Lanka. In the decades following independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has changed its constitution twice, in 1972 and 1978. Amendments were also introduced: for example, the 13th amendment was introduced after the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987.\(^5\) During the post-independence period, a Westminster-style democratic governance structure existed in the country with a first-past-the-post election system. There was a second chamber called the Senate. With the changes introduced in 1978, an executive presidential system of governance was introduced, along with a proportional representation method of electing parliamentary representatives with two different national elections, one to elect the president directly for a six-year term and the other to elect the members of parliament (MPs) for the legislature for a similar period. Since the early 1990s, the

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\(^4\) Lionel Bopage points out that the positivistic approach/paradigm that uses population ratios, land distribution ratios, etc., dominates the thinking of Sinhala nationalists rather than the others (personal communication, June 20, 2007). However, I believe that a similar mentality also prevails among the more articulate and not so articulate segments of the Northern Tamils.

\(^5\) This established Provincial Councils in the country. However, weaknesses at the implementation level have become points of contention since their inception.
major parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and United National Party (UNP), need the support of minor parties – some ethnicity based – to govern the country by way of establishing coalitions. The LTTE did not join any of the coalitions. However, those members of parliament elected under the banner of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) from the Northern and Eastern provinces where there is a significant Sri Lankan Tamil population, were widely known to be sympathetic to the LTTE cause. In the national media the latter were referred to as the proxies of the LTTE.

The parliamentary democracy that existed in Sri Lanka after independence in 1948 to about the mid-1970s was by and large a representative democratic system of governance where the voices of people’s representatives were expressed in the parliament and the cabinet. The presidential system of governance introduced in 1978 changed all this. It made a single person elected by the people the supreme authority holding executive power. The pivot around which power concentrated shifted from the prime minister to the president. The former continued to exist in a lesser role with reduced powers. Hierarchical thought and behaviour patterns, norms, and expectations, and the role model of follower rather than “empowered citizen” were reinforced by the implementation of this presidential system. It became the supreme hierarchy in the country wielding political and executive authority under which all other hierarchies functioned – either in parallel or in subordinate status. The Tamils in the north were not willing to accept a rigid hierarchical system of governance led by – in their view – the Sinhalese leaders, together with a strong patronage system that favoured the majority community.

The provincial council system of regional governance introduced after the 1987 Indo-Lanka agreement merged the Northern and Eastern provinces into a single province, fulfilling a demand by the LTTE. However, the council for the Northern and Eastern provinces was not operational due to lack of government sanctioning. Instead, a governor appointed by the president was in charge of these two provinces. As a result of a decision taken by the Supreme Court in 2007, the two provinces were legally de-merged. On behalf of the central government, two governors were in charge of them. As the two provinces were highly militarised with politically motivated armed groups operating – some opposing the government and others supposedly supporting it – the civilian administration in the two provinces came under considerable stress, causing considerable difficulties for the civilians. During 2008, the armed forces achieved success in liberating the Eastern province from the LTTE, and an election was held for the provincial council. The elected chief minister is a Tamil representing the breakaway faction from the LTTE. The governing coalition of parties supported the chief minister’s party platform during the elections. The war against the LTTE continued into early 2009 in the Northern province, shrinking the areas held by LTTE month by month. This aspect is dealt with in the latter part of the paper, especially the postscript.

Under the norms of democratic governance by which Sri Lanka was formerly ruled, the political party (or coalition) that secured a majority of seats would form the government. This system operated somewhat smoothly until 1978 when the executive presidential role was introduced with drastic changes to the constitution. The entry of the executive president, in place of a prime minister corresponding to the Westminster system of governance, complicated the government operations for several reasons. These included further centralisation of power
in the hands of a single individual, diminution of the collective powers of the cabinet\textsuperscript{6} and the wider legitimacy of the legislature, the greater influence that the president acquired in controlling the resources and making crucial decisions in regard to the national issues, and the general deterioration of democratic institutions and practices in the country.

Majoritarianism continued with regard to the operations of the legislature, but the president, as someone immune from prosecution by the judiciary and not answerable to the parliament, operated with a high degree of independence and controlled the party system by offering incentives to retain the parliamentary majority. He/she invited minor parties and members of parliament to form a grand coalition of one sort or another. Crossovers from one party to another, or indeed from the governing coalition to the opposition and vice versa, became a regular event to the extent that some intelligentsia started to treat the parliament and the prevailing system of governance almost as a joke. The current coalition government includes about eighteen members of parliament who have broken from the opposition party, the United National Party. Members of this faction have been critical of their former party and keep demanding democratic reforms within it.

The international players, whether foreign governments, international bodies such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, or international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), do business with the elected government without being overtly sensitive to party politics driven by a system of patronage. This in a sense gave legitimacy and resources to the same system even though there were significant sections of the country, including the media, who were critical of increased corruption and misuse of government funds by ministers and MPs. Thus, one could see a deterioration of democratic norms, institutions, and practices along with the civic rights of the population at large while party politics, the patronage system, and corruption increased alarmingly. The system of governance in place after 1978 contributed to this situation\textsuperscript{7}. The Tamil militancy in the North and East also contributed to the worsening situation, as the government response to this emerging threat was to reinforce and expand the military establishment\textsuperscript{8}.

After a short period of relative peace between 2002 and 2005, the country’s ruling class reconnected with the war economy and the patronage system, leading to further deterioration of civic and human rights, as reported by reputable human rights agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as a few media outlets (local and international).

\textsuperscript{6} Cabinet members are now selected and appointed by the president. Under the previous arrangement, elected members of the political party with a majority of seats in the parliament elected the prime minister. The prime minister in turn selected the cabinet. However, if he/she did not have the support of the majority in the cabinet and parliament, he/she could be removed from office either by bringing in a no-confidence motion against the government or defeating government-sponsored bills. Even now, this is possible but the same does not extend to the office of the president who is also the head of the cabinet.

\textsuperscript{7} Often in the literature, this political culture and system of governance are labelled by the LTTE as Sinhala-dominated. Such a characterisation does not really capture the complex nature of the political culture and system of governance. A culture and system of governance built around a patronage system, reinforced by the politicisation of the administrative bureaucracy and other government institutions, can hardly be characterised as Sinhalese only as it includes members of other ethnicities.

\textsuperscript{8} Before the signing of a 2002 ceasefire agreement, there were critical books and other publications that focused on the downside of the war economy. In a climate of war, where those opposing the war for a variety of reasons, not only sympathy towards LTTE, were marginalised, critical work of this nature was hard to find.
that were not affiliated with the government or the LTTE, including University Teachers for Human Rights–Jaffna. The civil monitoring committee of Sri Lanka documented human rights violations between 2006 and 2007 and reported them to the UN Human Rights Committee.

The atmosphere created by the return to “undeclared” war and then to “open war” in the country was not a positive one in terms of durable peace and stability. There were attacks and counterattacks between the two warring parties, the GoSL and the LTTE. The GoSL justified its attacks on LTTE concentrations in the Northern province by saying that they were limited operations to downgrade LTTE militarily and to compel it to come to the negotiation table. However, the LTTE rejected this rationalisation, and it called on the government to stop these attacks. It also didn’t like the terrorism label that the government was using to characterise what it termed as the Tamil national liberation struggle.

Political parties in government and in opposition played a crucial role in directing the course of the country toward what it is today, including the shaping of the conflict for a few decades. Nonetheless, no party takes responsibility for the policy failures. Instead, all the blame was directed at the LTTE, a convenient ploy to play ethnicity-based identity politics rather than nation building based on a multi-ethnic mosaic concept for the future. The general public conveniently believed such a tactic because the government propaganda was the main avenue of information for most citizens. There was less direct people-to-people contact between the Northern and Eastern provinces and the rest of the country except via the security forces drawn from the South, which were operating in these two provinces.

Since the early 1980s, governments adopted a heavy-handed military approach. When this was not succeeding or there was pressure from the international players, they adopted a twin-track approach, meaning attempting negotiations while conducting military operations against the LTTE. The government led by Wickramasinghe of the UNP during 2002-2004 adopted a peace approach cautiously, but it ended with the president at the time taking over key ministries and dissolving the parliament. Wickramasinghe’s experiment and its outcomes are being still debated. Some say that the cease fire agreement allowed the LTTE to reinforce its status and resources rather than lead to a final political solution. Others say that the environment created by the lack of open warfare could have been used to negotiate a deal with the LTTE at the time. A not so widely known view is that the cease fire agreement led to weakness of the LTTE in terms of its split engendered by Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Government (RAW) and the UNP, and the development of the international safety net by the UNP (Bopage, 2007). Since the end of war in May 2009, however, focus has again shifted to the need for extra vigilance to prevent the re-emergence of LTTE or any of its offshoots. The opposition led by the UNP is struggling to achieve relevance and popular appeal against a popular president who defeated one of the most lethal and anti-government terrorist organizations in the world.

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9 By the end of 2008, as the military campaign gathered momentum, the government started to demand that the LTTE lay down arms before any ceasefire talk as demanded by Tamil Nadu politicians. The military was confident of its ability to defeat the LTTE.

10 By 2008, significant bans were imposed on the media by the government when reporting about military operations in the North, their successes or failures and the casualties.
Politics of Ethnicity and Different Claims on Nation and State

The two mutually exclusive claims to nationhood and statehood during the period of conflict have their origins in the structure of the modern, post-colonial nation state. However, these competing claims derived their logic of articulation with reference to ancient history, and the discrimination of the minority by the majority after independence. These articulations have had a decisive political effect in forming the character of the modern state as well as the conflict. To understand the ensemble of complex issues relating to the conflict and to define the principles for a sustainable political settlement, one has to acquire an in-depth understanding of all these dimensions.

In the literature dealing with Sri Lanka’s conflict between the state and the LTTE since the early 1980s, there is reference to questions such as universal citizenship rights vs. specific group rights. There is also reference to respect for ethnic identity, the use of ethnic identity as the basis for political decision-making, and methods to accommodate ethnic diversity in a liberal democratic political system. There are also contested notions and approaches regarding the nation and state. Such questions include: What sort of power should ethnic minorities be given in comparison to the numerical majority? Can the numerical majority that gains more power in a liberal democracy be trusted to look after the interests of numerical minorities? If not, what alterations to the political system and the constitution are required? Is it desirable to create a distinctive (separate or affiliated with the Sinhala Buddhist state in the South) state for the Tamils only in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country?

As with any conflict situation in multi-ethnic societies, there were differing views about the merits and demerits of the existing system of governance, political culture, and human rights depending on whether one represented the disenfranchised minorities of various sorts or the empowered strata of society, such as the clergy, upper classes, upper castes, political class, and the majority ethnicity.

The way the nation and state have been conceived by political parties and other main bodies representing various ethnic, religious, and community organizations in Sri Lanka created a highly problematic situation. It contributed to the construction and maintenance of the conflict situation rather than to inspiring legitimate and widely acceptable solutions.

Majority Sinhala-Buddhist Conception of State and Nation

To the pro-majority Sinhala-Buddhist parties and forces, the state has to reflect the primacy of the Sinhala-Buddhist identity, culture, history, and aspirations. By and large, it cannot be conceived as a pluralistic, multi-ethnic body. A desire to assimilate and dominate governs this position. As the president usually comes from the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, this group tends to tolerate the executive presidency, even when power is concentrated in this position. The Sinhala-Buddhist constituency, mainly its upper echelons, have access to the top leadership circle by virtue of their positions, professional and personal links, and networks.

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11 As Sri Lankan society is organised on the basis of several powerful hierarchies, those at the top echelons criss-cross their territories in various ways, forming a privileged circle. Some call this circle elites. Others call it the ruling class. Most recently, this circle is referred to as the political class, involving not only professional politicians
There are several minor political parties whose political platforms are constructed on the basis of a perceived marginalisation of the Sinhala or Tamil people located at the lower rungs of society. However, their successes and failures are closely linked to the movements of the major parties.

The Sinhala-Buddhist organizations and political parties tend to conceive the nation and state as Sinhala-Buddhist, while acknowledging the need to accommodate Tamils and Muslims as ethnic minorities. These tendencies are visible in the proposals submitted to the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) by various political parties as well as the expert panel associated with it. To some of these political parties and organizations, the “nation” encompasses the whole of the country, but Sinhala-Buddhist community interests and the maintenance of the hierarchically organised, centralised political system are its primary defining principles. When it is necessary, they acknowledge that minority interests, rights, and needs have to be addressed, particularly with a reasonable devolution of power to the provinces, not only to the Northern and Eastern provinces. They go as far as to advocate equal treatment of the ethnic minorities. However, when other parties, particularly Tamil and Muslim parties, and organizations propose substantive measures to address these concerns, those supporting the Sinhala-Buddhist conception of state and nation tend to object, fearing the loss of their existing privileges. The two main political parties, SLFP and UNP, are also aware of these majority sentiments. Their leaders cannot afford to lose this important voter base and thus devise their political platforms, rhetoric, and policies to appease the majority electorate. If the governing mainstream party has to deviate from this practice, it obtains the support of communally based Tamil and Muslim parties by establishing a coalition and offering ministerial roles and material and symbolic benefits to their members.

**Minority Conceptions of State and Nation**

From the point of view of minor parties representing Tamil and Muslim ethnicities (not including the LTTE, which fought for an independent state not power sharing) and intellectuals supportive of a state embodying the aspirations of ethnic minorities, the story is different. The nation and state must include their identities, interests and aspirations as a matter of priority, not as an appendage or within an assimilationist framework. They tend to argue for a

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12 There is a strong bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie element also intertwined with this majority desire and the consciousness that creates such a desire. For example, the desire to expand the Sinhala-Buddhist dominated state to North and East could be interpreted as a desire to expand the neo-liberal development paradigm that gives sustenance to a bourgeois state, also. The fact that both the Sinhala-Buddhist majority and the ethnic minorities tend to view such an expanding state as an ethnic one underscores that this project is a Sinhala-only one. If expanded, many in the ethnic minorities will want to work within that paradigmic context as they are already doing in other parts of the country. On the other hand, the government’s desire to develop the North and East with the assistance of foreign aid is ostensibly presented as a project to assist the people in the two provinces. However, in reality, who makes money out of the development projects funded by foreign agencies is open to question and debate. Certainly the lower classes will benefit marginally in such expanding capitalist economies and enterprises. But the benefits to large multinational corporations and the local investors and politicians behind these enterprises are far greater.
pluralistic, multiethnic nation within either a unitary state with a substantial devolution of power or a federal framework of governance. Particular focus in these arguments and demands is on the Northern and Eastern provinces, which are considered by Tamils to be traditional areas of inhabitancy. Concepts such as “self-determination” and “Tamil nation” figure prominently in their claims. For more on these aspects, see Kadirgarmar (2007), O’Duffy (2003), Premaratne (2003), Rae (2007), Scott (2000, 1999), Senanayake (2006). The bibliography prepared by Wenche Hague Institute (2003) is also useful.

The upcountry Tamils of Indian origin have also made certain demands, such as Indian Tamil cultural regions within a unitary framework of governance. However, such demands are framed within the mainstream, majoritarian political system. They didn’t proceed along the violent and aggressive path of the LTTE, which sought a greater share of power, autonomy, and resources for the so-called Tamil homeland encompassing the two provinces. Now that the LTTE has been defeated comprehensively, there is a vacuum in the political system of the Northern and Eastern provinces in terms of Tamil representation and advocacy. In the coming years, it will be filled by those closely aligned with the ruling coalition and the opposition led by the UNP. Limited room will exist for the emergence of independent candidates or parties during elections at the local, provincial, and national levels. Given the way elections are conducted, those not affiliated with the mainstream parties will have limited chance of success. In this context, growing frustrations among Tamils may lead to the revival of “communal politics” yet again.

Democratic Vision of a Pluralistic Sri Lankan Community

Qadri Ismail questions whether democracy is a form of egalitarian government or a structure of dominance. “Sri Lanka poses an intellectual and political problem for the theory of (representative) democracy for its justification of majority rule as ethical” (2005, 18). He argues that representative democracy in Sri Lanka is elitist. It works upon the majoritarian principle (2005, 229). The alternative to this can be consociationalism, which implies mutual participation (2005, 228-230). There is a substantial difference between the norms and practices associated with liberal democracy, especially based on Western conceptualisations and traditions, and those advocated in the Sri Lankan context by its leaders. As stated before, the practices and their justifications rely on the local needs and conditions to some extent, even though in the judicial system, Western law and precedents are often cited on constitutional matters, including the fundamental rights of citizens.

Ismail emphasises the need to renegotiate the political contract “from one that enables domination to one that guarantees equality.” He says, “all they ask, now, is to exercise the right of every nation, that of self-determination” (2005, 105). However, the concept of self-determination is not well understood in the Sri Lankan context. Some associate it with separatism. Agreeing with Scott, Ismail states that a basis must be found for politics other than

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13 The position of the LTTE was different. It advocated an ethnically based exclusivist conception of nation (and, to a degree, state) by using concepts such as self-determination. While the concept of self determination has currency in other parts of the world as well as among policy makers and intellectuals, the LTTE’s concept of self determination was generally viewed by the Sri Lankan establishment as extreme because of the LTTE’s utterances about its long-term agenda for a separate state for the Tamils only.
Sinhala nationalism (2005, 164). Nationalism is a structure of dominance, hence it should be opposed\textsuperscript{14}. It is incompatible with the peace that he describes (2005, 167). Here again, one has to make a distinction between an extreme form of nationalism and more moderate nationalism. Referring to the novel by Sivananda, \textit{When the Memory Dies}, and Macintyre’s play, “Rasanayagam’s Last Revolt,” he says both these imagine a multi-ethnic, non-exclusivist Sri Lankan community (2005, 179). They criticise the politics of identity and emphasise the need to disrupt history. “History does not offer the leftist reader a stable intellectual ground from which to conceptualise peace” (2005, 178). This is because mainstream historians, particularly the ones reviewed by Ismail, reflect ethnic nationalisms contrary to their claims of objectivity. Remarkably absent from the Sri Lankan historical literature is the “multi-ethnic history,” stressing the ways and means of ethnic co-existence. A major risk in writing history after the defeat of LTTE is the possibility that it will be written from the viewpoint of the victor only.

Referring to earlier work by Uyangoda and seeing parallels between their conceptions of peace, Ismail refuses to find significance in numbers; by considering all ethnic groups equal – as opposed to constituting a majority and minorities – he advocates mutual participation. He asks whether it should be individuals or ethnic groups who are constituent agents of the political contract (2005, 233). How could a denial of ethnicity resolve the conflict? Can ethnicity be shed so easily? Is it ethical to argue for eradication of difference\textsuperscript{15}? My view is that even though these differences will not be paramount for a decade or so in political terms, they could re-emerge in the future unless a participatory and truly representative model of government that is accountable to the people is developed.

Christine Bigdon discusses the claims of different identity groups vs. universal citizenship (2003, 3, 30-31). “As democracy is often understood and practiced as rule of the numerical majority it leaves open disputed questions regarding the issue of minority representation” (2003, 3). Quoting Uyangoda (2000, 9), she says, “Numerically weak minorities resent the majoritarian essentialism inherent in this understanding of democracy” (2003, 3). Surely, Sri Lankan political and civic leaders need to engage in critical dialogue about “responsible democracy,” where even after elections civilians who face discriminatory and unjust governance practices can seek redress without having to go to the courts all the time. This requires accessible complaint mechanisms as well as resolution processes. Parliament also needs transparent and credible committees of inquiry on public matters of interest.

Referring to Fleiner’s conception of the liberal nation-state as an exclusive body in relation to group rights (Fleiner, Kalin et al 2002, 230), Bigdon further writes:

The implementation of liberal democratic institutions, which would have been the basis of a politics of tolerance for all citizens, was only partially successful. The permanent double structure of administrative and elected executive institutions, as well as the patronage relations between the national politicians

\textsuperscript{14} Scott and Ismail ascribe the failure of the Donoughmore experiment introduced in 1930, where the voting citizen became the key pillar of democracy, to two different phenomena: Scott to the hegemonic project of Sri Lankan nationalism, and Ismail to the larger project of enlightenment.

\textsuperscript{15} Scott argues that difference should be “embraced,” not disavowed, for there to be peace in Sri Lanka (Ismail 2005, 234). To Scott, minority rule is not the only alternative to majority rule (2005, 235).
and the local representatives and citizens, are examples which emphasize this argument. Nevertheless, minority groups, as they get no recognition within the existing hierarchical and power structures, seem to be even more affected by the general shortcomings and therefore feel marginalized, a fact that might lead to the fuelling of ethnic chauvinism as propagated by some national parties. (Bigdon 2003, 30-31).

Even though it may be possible to ignore the ethnic minority concerns in the shorter term with the euphoria prevailing in the country after the defeat of LTTE, it is wise for the leaders to pay attention to how the existing hierarchical governance structures marginalise ethnic minorities (and for that matter masses of all ethnic groups) and institute creative ways of overcoming such marginalisation, and, more importantly, implement avenues of representation as well as solutions to daily issues confronting the civil society.

Minority perspectives and some of the progressive writings from the North (other than from LTTE) and the South seek to restructure the Sri Lankan state to be a truly multi-ethnic one with democratic freedoms for all citizens. Commenting on this aspect, Shanmugaratnam stated, “The problem with the state is that it is not just a unitary state but a communalised, desecularised, majoritarian unitary state. We cannot build a truly democratic Lankan society without restructuring the state to make it ethnically neutral (i.e., truly multi-ethnic) through an elaborate arrangement for autonomy and power sharing in a united Lanka” (Shanmugaratnam 2006, 6).

Even in western societies, multi-ethnicity has been somehow linked with the concepts and practices of liberal democracy, even though in individual countries there are variations in the way this is achieved. Ethnicity is generally subsumed under the rights and obligations of citizenship. There is no reason why Sri Lanka cannot have its own variant of liberal democracy so long as the citizens from all ethnicities can enjoy the rights and privileges on an equal basis. It is this aspect that needs to be scrutinised and strengthened for sustainable peace, along with the development of necessary constitutional and institutional provisions. Thus there is a range of positions developed by various players over the decades since independence on the questions of how to govern the country, what rights and privileges should the Tamil and Muslim ethnic populations have, and what governing formulae should be adopted.

Notwithstanding these articulations and arguments, it has been the practice of governments to interpret the conflict as one essentially limited to the Northern and Eastern provinces, and to seek legal and constitutional or administrative remedies to address the concerns of affected parties without much success. The limitations of this approach have been highlighted elsewhere in the paper.

Reducing complex ethno-nationalist conflicts to a mere issue of power sharing which can be achieved by half-hearted administrative and constitutional changes was at the core of Sri Lanka’s conflict. Even if power is shared between the centre and the provinces, the centre would have wielded substantial power, including in the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. Without substantial reform in the central body politic, including political culture, it is not possible to think about Sri Lanka’s future in terms of maintaining a mutually acceptable division of power among different ethnic communities.
It is not necessary to deny ethnicity in articulating a vision for a new Sri Lanka. What is important is to make citizenship the key concept for making state decisions, while leaving the promotion of ethnicity in the hands of respective leaders and civic institutions in each ethnic community for cultural and literary purposes. The process of new nation-building should not be a matter of ethnicity bashing, then leaving nothing to replace ethnicity. The links between citizens of all ethnicities and the state must be conceptualised in innovative ways, and an all embracing system of governance based on sound principles and institutions of representative and participatory democracy put in place with necessary checks and balances.

Conclusion

At the core of Sri Lanka’s conflict were the issues of ethnicity-based politics, deficiencies in democracy and governance, centralised state power, majoritarian nation-building, and money-based power politics, all complicated by globalisation, corporatisation, international aid, and their linkages with the ruling political class. The ruling political class attempted to designate the conflict not as an ethnic one, while the LTTE did designate it as an ethnic one. Whether it is ethnic or non-ethnic (i.e., terrorist), major international players insisted that the government find a political solution rather than a military solution. The government after 2006 followed a two-pronged approach, taking defensive military actions against the LTTE while trying to develop a Southern consensus via the All Party Conference (APC). A situation of anxiety and uncertainty for the civilian population emerged as a result of abductions, disappearances, threats to journalists, and bomb attacks in the capital city and elsewhere. The All Party Conference was proceeding as if there was no urgency to evolve a solution even as Sri Lankans were living in abnormal times. It appeared later in 2008 that the government was determined to find a military solution to the conflict, and it did so early in 2009.

As discussed earlier, the conflict started as a result of polarised opinions and the segmented politics of ethnicity – majority and minority – based on mistrust between the two main ethnic communities, leading to mutual hatred. As the conflict expanded, the armed attacks and reprisals started to destroy the social cohesion of the society, particularly the social organisation in the Northern and Eastern provinces. In the late phase of the military campaign, where the government was hell bent on a military solution and a large section of the polity and the masses supported it in the South, the ethnic polarisation deepened. Forces and

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16 There are important aspects of ethnicities that need to be preserved and nurtured, such as social and religious values (precepts that advocate prevention from killing, intoxication, stealing, etc.,) literature, arts, music, knowledge of history and community, and links with the environment. No government policy can or should attempt to deny ethnic heritage and identity as they go against fundamental human rights. However, the government has to function a step away from promoting one ethnicity over another. Lack of such distance has contributed to the feelings of alienation and frustration among minority ethnicities.

17 There were mixed views about the purpose and potential success of the APC process. Some argue that it was a device for delaying a solution because in the end it would not have been an easy task to arrive at so-called Southern consensus. They believe that it was the responsibility of the government of the day to come up with credible proposals to resolve the conflict, not leave it in the hands of an all-party committee. After the war ended, the APC process has ground to a halt, and talk of political solutions are hard to find. There is a prevailing view that the “problem” has been resolved (militarily) and by default politically, too.
mechanisms whereby the two communities could be brought together were sidelined and their voices muted by the fear psychosis that enveloped the country.

It is well known that the emergence and growth of Tamil nationalism and militancy was a result of a similar tendency that existed in the early 1980s. Unless those in power invest in ways to reaffirm a genuinely pluralistic national polity based on the recognition of commonalities among all citizens rather than specificities within each ethnic group, and an equitable sharing of power and resources, it is difficult to envisage how continuing peace and stability can dawn on Sri Lanka in the long term.

Even though the APC was operating on the basis of an underlying belief that the conflict was about the nature of power and its decentralisation within a sovereign, centralised, unitary or federal state, the same thought did not prevail in the pro-LTTE camp. For the latter, it was a question of self-determination within a linguistically, culturally, territorially and politically contiguous unit, i.e., the Northern and Eastern provinces as a merged entity. Narrowing the conceptual gap between these two positions was a major challenge facing peace negotiators as well as the APC before the end of military phase of the conflict. Today, it is even more necessary to search for long-term peace for all communities rather than an enforced peace by the mere use of force.

The words of Orjuela on the role of the peace movement are quite applicable even today:

The role played by the peace movement in Sri Lanka was to formulate and promote alternative discourses about peace and conflict resolution. Through statements and practical local activities, peace organizations showed that dialogue across ‘enemy lines’ was indeed possible. This production of alternative discourses also included a challenge of the nationalist identities and notions which formed part of the war logic. (C. Orjuela 2004, 262)

In the current context, it is necessary to revisit these alternative constructions of the conflict and associated discourses about peace and conflict resolution before indefinite military engagement becomes the norm.

Sinhalese hardliners as well as some moderates argued that it was not possible to adopt an approach other than war because of the intransigence of the LTTE. There is a high degree of credibility in this argument. However, the LTTE also raised similar arguments concerning the repeated failures of Sri Lankan governments to provide a just solution to the Tamil national issue. Though muted at the present time, such arguments can reinforce the war logic and lead to further confrontations, resulting in continuous cycles of distrust, death, and destruction unless a long-term vision to ethnic divisions is found. I have argued in this paper that such a vision can be built by recognising multi-ethnic histories, universal citizenship rights, representative democracy, and a common national identity to which each citizen can relate.

A vision for a united Sri Lanka, which is lacking in the present mainstream political discourse, should certainly be the motivator for thinking outside the box. Thinking outside the box is quite different from thinking within one’s own ethnic, religious, or political framework, shaped by exclusionist discourse and corresponding politics. Adopting a pro-peace position
gives the government a greater moral authority in the eyes of the country’s population as well as its international friends. Military victory can be an appealing proposition to the population if the state strengthens universal citizenship rights and makes the state more democratic, transparent, and accountable in the aftermath of such a victory. Otherwise, a hegemonic state that entrenches the supremacy of an already privileged political class, bureaucrats, and defence forces can emerge and the powerlessness of the masses of all ethnic communities can continue and even deepen.

While there are possibilities for the reformation of the existing nation-state from its unrepresentative nature (of the Tamil minority in the two provinces) to a more representative one with better power sharing, the Sinhala-Buddhist leaders should take up that challenge, provide leadership, and move the process of reform forward. Harking back to the traditional notions of leadership – inherent right to rule, supremacy of the majority over the minority, supremacy of Buddhism and Sinhala language over other religions and languages, etc. – may not help the country remain as one entity in the long term without having to use force on a continuing basis. It is the acceptance of concepts such as democracy, citizenship, equal opportunity, justice, and fair play for all citizens, and the laying of a foundation for a truly Sri Lankan identity that can move the country forward among the developing nations in the region.

Postscript

In May 2009, the government security forces defeated the LTTE after a sustained military campaign focused on the so-called “no-fire zone” declared by the government. As the security forces moved closer to this zone near the northeastern seaboard which had been denominated a safe zone for civilians caught up in the fighting, the size and the shape of the conflict started to diminish. The government declared complete victory over the LTTE after either killing or capturing the senior leadership. Prabhakaran, the leader, was killed and his body was shown in the media. Prior to this, thousands of civilians crossed the battle lines via a lagoon located on the land-side of the no-fire zone. They became internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were then housed in large-scale camps set up by the government in the Northern province and elsewhere in the island. Screening took place to isolate the hardcore LTTE fighters and associates who were then detained in high security facilities. Various national and international media reports claimed human rights abuses prior to this victory and afterwards. An attempt by countries such as the United Kingdom and France to convince the UN Human Rights Council to set up an investigation failed, as other countries such as China, Russia, and Pakistan opposed such an investigation.

Since then, the LTTE has become a spent force within the country. During the last phase of the war, the Tamil diaspora launched highly visible demonstrations in Western capitals asking governments and the UN to intervene and prevent a bloodbath. Although the UN Secretary-General and the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom met with the president, no tangible change in the government’s hardline approach to the LTTE occurred. Over 300,000 IDPs were estimated to be in the government camps in fall 2009. The government had promised resettlement of most of them within six months.
Consequently, the government does not face a political opponent by way of an armed military outfit such as the one possessed by the LTTE. However, Tamil parliamentarians from the Northern and Eastern provinces who aligned with the LTTE earlier continue to issue statements about the sufferings of Tamil IDPs in the camps and the need to return them to their original homes. They have been making representations to the Indian government also from time to time. There are signs that the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) may adopt a more conciliatory approach to governance in the absence of its de facto backer, the LTTE. The government’s view is that the areas have to be cleared of mines and houses rebuilt with outside support before the IDPs can be resettled. The process of re-settlement continues at a slower phase.

Activities of the All Party Conference (APC) have come to a predictable halt. Political leaders are no longer talking about a sustainable political solution by way of power devolution. Instead, they say the need of the hour is to develop the war-affected provinces economically by following a Sri Lankan model, in which agricultural development is given prominence over industrial. They claim it is different from Western models. Anti-Western rhetoric keeps appearing in speeches given by leaders. During the war, most Western governments criticised the Sri Lankan government for not halting the war and for human rights issues faced by journalists and others. The country has developed good relations with India, China, Pakistan, Iran, and Middle Eastern countries. All this suggests that the kind of racial equality or indeed the dominance that the LTTE espoused will no longer influence political activity for some years or even decades to come. All citizens, irrespective of race, will be treated equally in theory and political rhetoric. Most members of racial minorities will be treated as minorities, however. The political system whose foundation is patron-client relations between the ruling class and other elites in society (e.g., military, political, religious, educational, business, bureaucratic, and media) will continue. Substantial political reform may not occur for a long while. The military victory has given the ruling alliance much needed political and cultural capital. In particular, the president and his family are enjoying unprecedented commendation by the public.

Most Sri Lankans and their friends are relieved to see the end of the LTTE and the violence that characterised the country over the last three decades. Political resistance can emerge in other forms in coming years as the cost of living is high and various forms of malpractices in government are brought to notice. However, Sri Lanka is a country where those resisting the government are displaced and put in camps, while those who are seeking a peaceful existence leave for the Middle East and elsewhere for education, employment, and settlement. Those who have left continue to send remittances in the billions of dollars a year. A significant Sinhala and Tamil diaspora has been established in many parts of the world including Italy.

Peace has been restored at a very heavy cost. The extent to which people from all ethnic communities will enjoy political and civic freedoms along the lines of a democratic participatory governmental model is an open question. Market forces and the private sector will drive the economy and government institutions, while the state will reinforce its status without a challenger. The formal political opposition is in disarray. The government is recruiting another 100,000 soldiers to the armed forces to keep a lid on any re-emergence of LTTE-type resistance from the North.
It is the author’s view that for sustainable peace in Sri Lanka, democratic reforms in the political structure and process, as well as the bureaucracy, are essential. The leaders will claim they exist already. However, the voices of civilians tell a different story, if and when they are heard independently. A new vision for the country along multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, respect for one another, peaceful co-existence, and a common Sri Lankan identity for the nation and the people are necessary. While there is respect for each other’s religion, language, and customs, the centralised power structure is not conducive for a multi-ethnic society like Sri Lanka to secure lasting peace and consensual governance. It only creates a semblance of peace achieved through the use of force.

References


**Abbreviations**

APC All Party Committee
APRC All Party Representative Committee
CFA Ceasefire Agreement
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGOs International Non-Government Organisations
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MPs Members of Parliament
RAW Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Government
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TNA Tamil National Alliance
UN United Nations
UNP United National Party

Aldo Capitini (1899-1968) was an Italian scholar and advocate for nonviolence who published over forty books and numerous essays, letters, pamphlets, poems, and articles on various subjects: religion, nonviolence, antifascism, philosophy, education, historiography. Capitini founded the center for nonviolence in Perugia and promoted the Vegetarian Society, the East-West conferences, the first Italian Peace March from Perugia to Assisi on 24th September 1961 from which the Italian Consultation for Peace was founded, as well as the Nonviolent Movement for Peace, which is still active. This champion of nonviolence is not very well known outside Italy because his books have not been translated into English.

This book by Rocco Altieri, a lecturer on nonviolence at the Peace Studies program at the University of Pisa, provides a valuable English introduction to Capitini’s thought. Aldo Capitini was active in organizing antifascist groups in many different parts of Italy. He was twice sent to prison for opposing fascism and for his advocacy of independent religious life. In contrast to the daily glorification of violence and of war under fascist rule, which went unopposed by many intellectuals and Catholics, he took from Gandhi the idea of nonviolent opposition based on non-collaboration; from St. Francis of Assisi, the return to the original Christian values; and from modern thinking, that which he called the most serene application of the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Capitini was opposed to the violence of the status quo. He tried to instil Gandhian principles in the Machiavellian world of Italy, where politicians opposed evil with force. Capitini argued that spiritual principles point to the higher morality of non-killing. Faith and politics became linked together as individuals commit to nonviolence and societies embrace the principles of love in action.

The strength of nonviolence lies in the possibility it gives, to the few or the many, to withdraw their consent and support from an oppressive system. Non-cooperation gives strength to conscience which, faced with injustice, professes the superiority of its own moral law. It is not a cowardly choice that allows you to escape from the consequences of violence, for it requires you to testify your fidelity to the principle of non-mendacity and non-killing, even to the sacrifice of your own life (Altieri, 2008, p. 47).

Nonviolence provides an individual a set of principles upon which to base moral beliefs, and, in the political realm, a set of strategies based upon noncooperation that challenge authoritarian rule. Capitini looked to a merger of religious and political values to create a better society.

Similar to Tolstoy, Capitini advocated a new religious life based upon a critical reading of those sections of the New Testament that promoted pacifism. Nonviolence is
the infinite openness of the soul. It is cosmic love that embraces both humanity and, in the Franciscan spirit, all of nature. Capitini denounced the sharp divergence between the nonviolent principles found in the Sermon on the Mount and the papal encyclicals. In 1956, one of his books, Open Religion, was condemned by the Church and put on the Index (a list of books Catholics were not supposed to read).

Liberalism for Capitini became a religious and spiritual pursuit of freedom that opposed the dogma both of the church and the fascist state. Faced with the injustices of capitalism, a deep spiritual and political transformation needs to take place. Education can help create a moral conscience that promotes a decentralized socialism based upon self government and collaboration among the oppressed that leads to a fairer sharing of the world’s resources. “Jesus is not a king, but a brother who stands by our side” (Altieri, 2008, p. 95). Education has the responsibility to develop this new political consciousness based upon ethical and religious goals.

Capitini opposed world government. He saw that nonviolence is a third way between capitalism and communism. He advocated for a more active form of democracy. He argued for the establishment of “Social Orientation Centers” where citizens could discuss their common problems and advocate for nonviolent solutions. Such centers would be “the fortresses of nonviolence and the catacombs, places where democratic, anti-despotic solidarity is formed” (Altieri, 2008, p. 67). In these centers, people can experience the power of grassroots democracy. Without a new public space, people’s assemblies built upon Social Orientation Centers, the state risks falling into a new oligarchy. Bottom up reform, not top down reform, gives power to local citizens and authorities. In this way, Capitini’s nonviolent strategies resemble those of Danilo Dolci (1924-1997), another Italian adherent to nonviolence who worked among the peasants in Sicily and promoted community development in order to counter the oppression of the state, the church, and the mafia.

Like Dolci, Capitini advocated fasting and other forms of civil disobedience. He saw that violent revolutions, such as the Bolsheviks in Russia, end in wickedness that leads to despotism of a leader, party, or army:

If I use violence against violence, violence continues to reign in this world, and so humanity loses the hope of freedom. If I take revenge, another will take his revenge. We have to open up the tools of violence, of revenge, of justice, remembering that there we have a person whom we want to be united with us for eternity. And we want that person to find good within, since good is in all of us if we look for it (Altieri, 2008, p. 83).

People can look to each other to find power and not hand over their authority to unjust rulers. Individuals need to commit themselves to a Gandhian search for truth, not in a library but in the communities and neighborhoods they inhabit. Capitini emphasized that conflict is not to be avoided but rather stirred up in order to change unjust situations. In every person there is always the capacity for overcoming wrong and committing to the truth. There is good and evil in each of us.
This small, one-hundred-and-eighty-page book provides an intellectual biography of Aldo Capitini. The Nonviolent Revolution should have included bibliography of Capitini’s published works, so they could become more accessible to the reader who would like to pursue his thoughts in greater depth. It also could have used a more concise chronology of Capitini’s life. As it is currently written, profound philosophic statements are interwoven with events in a way that makes it unclear as to where Capitini is located. At one point, the reader is aware that Capitini is participating in the anti-nuclear movement in the 1960s. At another point, Capitini is in jail in fascist Italy. But the events in his life are not clearly tied to the developments of his thinking. This valuable text also lacks an index. Aside from these shortcomings, this is an important book because it gives the reader access to one of the past century’s more dynamic nonviolent thinkers.

Ian Harris, Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

This book is available from the International Gandhian Institute for Nonviolence and Peace (IGINP), CSC, Majagram, Kadavur, Madurai 65014, TN, India. Cost is $10.


I will first point out three ways in which this book may disappoint expectations. The blurb at the back cover describes it as “an accessible introduction to the diverse and wide-ranging ethical aspects of war and peace.” As an introductory text, it is deficient because the discussion of the two thousand years old just war tradition of ethical thinking about war is compressed into only one chapter out of eight. Second, although Nigel Dower is a philosopher and the title casts the book as concerned with ethics, much of the content is really about theories of international relations rather than moral theory, strictly speaking, and this partly explains the reduced attention given to the just war theory. Third, Dower clearly has an agenda in writing the book, namely to redirect ethical thinking away from an ethics of war to an ethics of peace. His advocacy of a form of cosmopolitan pacificism takes up a good half of the book. Thus, he will disappoint those looking for an update on current issues in the ethics of war, in particular how a just war theory formulated for armies fighting on battlefields applies to unconventional warfare and weapons.

For the reader who sets aside the above expectations, the book does provide a worthwhile read. It is particularly good at setting out distinctions between the terms used to classify a variety of views on what should or should not be permitted in war. It provides an insightful articulation of what a more fully developed anti-war or pro-peace position may entail, and how it relates to a morality of non-violence.

Dower begins the book with a classification of positions in the first chapter. In the ethics of war, there is a division of approaches among realism, just war theory, and pacifism. Another set of positions is found in the theory of international relations, namely realism, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism. Dower warns the reader against matching each member of one division with a single one of the other. For instance, some cosmopolitans are pacifists while others favor humanitarian interventions. Dower also adds the further categories of militarism and pacificism, positions that cut across the other two divisions and that exert pulls in opposite directions for just war theorists, some of whom are positively in favor of war whenever just cause and other criteria are satisfied and others who are committed to making war a rare occurrence.

The remaining chapters of the book are organized around these various positions. There are chapters on realism and militarism; internationalism and cosmopolitanism; just war theory; pacifism and non-violence; and pacificism. The penultimate chapter examines five issues that relate to war and peace in the modern world, namely nuclear weapons, contemporary warfare, terrorism, humanitarian intervention, and security arrangements for persons and states. The conclusion presents proposals for limiting war and promoting peace.

As mentioned, in the scheme of the book, the ethics of just war gets short-changed while theories of international relations are given equal or greater attention. But a problem I have with Dower’s classification is his attempt to cast the ethical stance on war as deriving from the outlooks of a realist, an internationalist, or a cosmopolitan. This ignores the historical origins of the ethical views, in particular the just war theory which originated before the rise of nation-states and an international order, continuing its development after the Westphalian system was instituted, and could well outlast the demise of the system. The truth is that the law of nations is actually a secularized offshoot of the just war doctrine formulated by Christian
theologians in the early middle ages, not the other way round as Dower implies. Similarly, the earliest Christians were pacifists, long before the idea of global citizenship was first conceptualized.

Nigel Dower labels his own position as “non-dogmatic pacificist cosmopolitanism.” The non-dogmatic aspect lies in the recognition that peace can be promoted without imposing any one religion or set of values on all peoples. Rather, he sees a variety of ways of living and a variety of world-views that can each support the common ethical framework of pacifism. It does not matter so much why people believe in promoting peace, provided that they share this ethical belief and act on its basis. Dower also points out that a pacifist may consider nation-states and international institutions as the most realistic structures for promoting peace, so he need not be a cosmopolitan. However, he believes that global citizenship and cosmopolitan law are necessary for the kind of durable and just peace (going beyond the mere absence of war) that is a good to be promoted. In his own words, “pacifism in its full-blown version is really a cosmopolitan thesis” (149).

I believe, after reading Dower’s book, that pacifism cannot escape a tension that may well be fatal to the position. The main difference between pacifism and pacifism is that those who hold the latter view are not satisfied with personal non-violence or an international arrangement under which states might maintain armies without going to war, but are obligated to take steps to make peace permanent and a positive benefit. This ultimately requires a move away from nation-states to a global government. Pacifism is active whereas pacifism is passive. But if peace is to be actively promoted, and if all other means have been tried without success, would war be justified to achieve the goal of pacifism? Suppose a well-armed nation refuses to join in with the efforts to eliminate state armies and transfer power to a global government. Would it be justified to use war as a means to eradicate future wars and to promote peace? Now it may be thought that the believer in the good of peace would be opposed to war. The pacifist may well believe this and oppose war. But the pacifist is by definition active in promoting peace. If peace is so good, then perhaps even the evil of war can be outweighed by the value of the ultimate end. The commitments and activism of the pacifist who seeks to convert the international order to cosmopolitanism may well result in as much violent conflict as the maintenance of the present order under the rules that derive from just war theory.

To rule out this possibility of peace being promoted by non-peaceful means, Dower has to combine his pacifism with pacifist limits on the means (145). He says of the pacifists who are not pacifists like him that they are pessimists and skeptics. I would say instead that they recognize that given human nature and the power of ideas, the commitment of the pacifist to actively promote peace may well be corrupting and lead to the use of violence.

David K. Chan
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point
Ever since the end of the Cold War, the humanitarian intervention debate has been a battleground on which governments, scholars, and political movements have clashed over concepts, principles, and ideology. With so many agendas in the mix, the discussions sometimes risk losing sight of the central question: how to respond to mass atrocities. Using sources from a number of different disciplines and discourses—and resisting being confined within any single field—Michael Newman of London Metropolitan University aims to untangle key strands of the debate in his new study, *Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions*.

The book is methodical and thorough, but also infused with a sense of connection to “live” issues that affect people and the interplay of arguments and perspectives. Through a very clear and direct writing style, Newman makes his own line of argument quite easy to follow. He also roots his analysis in reviews of key cases such as Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, drawing insights and lessons from leading scholarly works.

As Newman sees it, one fault line of the intervention debate—between so-called “muscular humanitarians” and “anti-imperialist absolutists”—especially serves to confuse the matter. The former view themselves as righteous upholders of democratic principles; the latter are dedicated to unmasking the West’s drive for domination. What the two camps share is that:

neither is normally anxious to draw a distinction between humanitarian intervention and regime change: muscular humanitarians celebrate the extension of ‘freedom,’ while ‘anti-imperialist absolutists’ are so hostile to any possible expansion of Western influence that they sometimes lose sight of the victims of atrocities.

Newman has indeed identified significant and problematic blind spots in the debate. For hair-trigger interventionists who feel justified in ousting any undemocratic government, the problem gets subsumed into a larger category (and becomes a huge moral hazard); while for their counterparts, the problem is effectively wished away.

The author sees both sets of pitfalls, yet admits to his affinity with the West’s critics. As he wrestles with the problem of the proper response to mass atrocities, an inner leftward-leaning voice helps spur the author to ethical rigor in ensuring that military intervention is reserved for situations when it is absolutely necessary. And though Professor Newman adds some important context and considerations to deal with future situations, it seemed to this reviewer that parts of his analysis were ensnared by the limits of the left-wing perspective. [In the interests of disclosure, my own background includes (and biases reflect) work alongside Western and indigenous relief workers as well as membership in the Washington establishment that gives me sympathy for the dilemmas of policy makers.]

Newman is particularly insightful regarding the nature of humanitarianism and its relation to the political realm of power competition, both internationally and within conflict situations. Starting by noting that humanitarian ideals and victims’ urgent needs cannot be
considered on a higher plane that is separate from politics, Newman offers a rich discussion of the cases and tries to put the questions into a much bigger context.

Maintaining conceptual clarity at every step of his argument, Newman actually draws on highly pertinent concepts from the discipline of peace studies that support his efforts but also point toward some difficulties. Noting the distinction between the negative peace of the absence of violence and the positive peace of a just socio-economic order, Newman argues that international responses should be held to the higher standard of positive peace.

It is certainly true that the comprehensive, multi-layered, and holistic perspective of positive peace is the approach best suited to preventing the outbreak of conflict and stabilizing societies after conflict. And Newman’s review of the cases draws apt lessons regarding how the various post-conflict reconstruction efforts could have taken longer-term and sustainable approaches. Applying this as the ethical standard, though, presents a number of problems.

Here, for instance, is how Newman links crisis outbreaks to a wider concept of humanitarianism:

> [T]he notion of humanitarian action in response to an ‘emergency’ implies that tragic events just arise from time to time ... If consideration of the impact of the structure and operation of the international system on poorer regions is regarded as an integral part of humanitarianism, additional questions are raised: in particular, could a different kind of effective action have been taken much earlier? And what has been the impact of international structures and processes on local situations?

On the one hand, I agree that local, regional, and global economic conditions are, in the aggregate, important risk factors for conflict around the world. Taking this kind of strategic perspective is a compelling argument, among others, for the leading industrial powers to invest more effort and resources in development. But for me, these same complexities of multi-dimensional challenges mean that systemic realities cannot be viewed as posing the same moral imperative as genocidal eruption. Extreme poverty is a moral challenge, but it is a different sort of moral challenge than stopping one group of people from killing another group.

A related concern is the implied assignment of blame for such crises with the Western powers themselves. To paraphrase the first quoted passage above, Newman’s expanded humanitarian concept loses sight of the perpetrators of atrocities themselves. The author addresses this concern directly and says that he does not mean to imply that the global North is responsible for the crises of the South, but given how Newman lays the stress of his argument, the implication is difficult to avoid.

As the author would surely acknowledge, the hard question of humanitarian intervention arises when conditions of positive peace are absent. But while Newman is sensitive to the urgent negative-peace challenge of halting violence during a crisis, he could have delved more deeply into the associated trade-offs. For instance, a key point in Newman’s analysis of the Bosnian case is that the negotiation and enforcement of the Dayton Accords left important remnants of ethnic division in place. That’s true, but it wasn’t due to Western preference or ignorance, but to the limits of Western leverage. Notwithstanding Newman’s critique of a supposed mono-dimensional reliance on military force, the United States used
limited force in Bosnia. Unable therefore to impose settlement on their terms or replace ethnic political leaderships, U.S. mediators achieved a “least bad” solution.

Professor Newman concludes his volume on two appropriate notes of hope. He rightly finds optimism in the positive lessons drawn from the experiences of the past twenty years and the political pendulum swing away from the simplistic moral clarity of the impulsive interventionists. It’s just as important to temper this optimism, though. President Obama indeed brings a more holistic approach than his predecessor. But given the uncertainties about what it would take to spread positive peace globally, we should be careful about potentially self-defeating standards or expectations.

David Shorr is a program officer with the Stanley Foundation in Muscatine, Iowa. His most recent co-edited volume was Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World.