Truth or Utility

What should we take as an end in itself, the acquisition of true beliefs or the acquisition of useful beliefs?

Our study of Bentham, Mill and Kant shows us that an interestingly analogous question arises in the context of ethics. Some philosophers (such as Kant) believe that an action is good if it conforms to the moral law, regardless of its consequences. This is similar to the position (held by Descartes and others) that we should want our beliefs to be true, regardless of their utility. Other philosophers (among them Bentham and Mill) believe that an action is good if it maximizes happiness, or if it conforms to a rule which, if generally practiced, maximizes happiness. This is similar to the position (held by Locke and Pascal) that we should want our beliefs to be useful.

And even more interesting parallels disclose themselves the deeper we look. Locke, who granted considerations of utility influence only over ways of acquiring beliefs and not over the acquisition of specific beliefs themselves – counseling us to trust our sense because this general practice will be more useful to us that the alternative – is analogous to a rule utilitarian, who allows considerations of utility to distinguish between good and bad ways of acting in general rather than assessing the utility of each action directly. Pascal, who argued that we should adopt belief in God because it’s in our best interests to do so, is analogous to an act utilitarian, who would have us determine whether or not to perform a specific action by assessing the probable consequences of that particular action.

No analogy is perfect, of course, and there are important differences between belief and action. Nonetheless, we might allow our intuitions about ethics to inform our thought about the Question. If we find a particular version of utilitarianism to be the most attractive ethical theory, for instance, we might ask ourselves whether similar considerations nudge us in the direction of utility as an epistemological objective. Similarly, if we have some affinity for Kant, we might see if the same sort of thinking would argue in favor of truth as an epistemological objective.

Questions for Consideration

· Do you prefer act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, or Kantian ethics? What would be the analogous epistemological objective? Do the reasons supporting your preference for one ethical theory over another also support your preference for the analogous epistemological objective? If you can’t decide upon one ethical theory over another, are you undecided about the proper epistemological objective for the same, or similar, reasons?