Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)
Kant is a notoriously
difficult philosopher to read. To make it as easy for you as I can, I’ve
selected some of the most important passages from Kant, inserted section titles
of my own (in square brackets), highlighted the most significant parts, and
interspersed the text with some of my explanations.
Certain concepts, and the
relationships between them, are especially important for Kant – so
important, in fact, that understanding Kant just is understanding these
concepts and the relationships between them.
To help you do this, I will note these concepts and their relationships
in red. So,
be brave! Let’s go.
Selections from GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
[1) THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD WILL]
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION
FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
Nothing can possibly be conceived in
the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification,
except a good will. Intelligence, wit,
judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or
courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly
good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become
extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and
which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the
same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the
general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called
happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to
correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the
whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end....
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and
may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but
always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly
have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good.
Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation
are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the
intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called
good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised
by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become
extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more
dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he
would have been without it.
Do you see
what Kant is getting at in the preceding paragraphs?
Essentially,
his point is that there are many things that we consider to be good, including
intelligence, courage, power, and self-control. However, all of these things
can be bad if enjoyed by someone who has a bad character, or a bad will.
A smart villain can do more harm than a stupid villain. A courageous
evil doer can do more evil than a cowardly evil doer. A powerful
corrupt person is more dangerous than a weak corrupt person. And a
sociopath with self-control is far more hazardous than a sociopath who
can’t sublimate his own immediate desires for the sake of a greater, long term,
evil plan.
Consequently,
the most we can say is that things like intelligence, courage, power, and
self-control are good if they are combined with a good will, or a good
character. To that extent, none of these things are good without
qualification. A good will, or good character, itself, however, is
good without qualification. It doesn’t need to be combined with anything else
to make it good. This is an important idea for Kant.
A good will
= The only thing that’s good without qualification.
A good will is good not because of what
it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed
end, but simply by virtue of the volition;
that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much
higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination,
nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that,
owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a
step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its
purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there
should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the
summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine
by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its
usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this
value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the
more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of
those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true
connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
Here, Kant
maintains that a good will is valuable apart from any consequences it brings
about, and so makes a complete break from consequentialist theories of ethics.
There
is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the
mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding
the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must
arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and
that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the
governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of
view.
Kant
recognizes that some people might be put off by the idea that a good will is
valuable apart from its consequences, and so he promises to give an argument
against utilitarianism. This argument is found in the next two paragraphs. Do
you best to understand this argument, and I’ll diagram it after we’ve taken a
look at Kant’s statement of the reasoning.
In
the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted
suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be
found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a
being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its
conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit
upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry
out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a
view to this purpose [the attainment of happiness. D.W.], and the whole rule of
its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that
end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by
reason. Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature
over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy
constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and
to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject
its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the
purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should
not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its
weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means
of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the
ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both
to instinct.
And,
in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with
deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more
does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises
in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology,
that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most
experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they
derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but
even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the
understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on
their shoulders. rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying,
rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the
guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their
conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgment of those who would very much lower the lofty
eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and
satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means
morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that
there lies at the root of these judgments the idea that our existence has a
different and far nobler end [than the attainment of happiness D.W.], for
which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must,
therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of
man must, for the most part, be postponed.
Kant’s
argument against utilitarianism
1. The proper goal of our actions is not the attainment of
happiness.
2. The function of reason is to guide our actions.
3. In every living thing, any “organ” will serve the function for
which it is best suited.
4. The proper goal of our actions must be that which we can best
achieve by being governed by reason.
5. We cannot best achieve happiness by being governed by reason;
instinct would be better for that.
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But, if the purpose of reason isn’t to increase our happiness,
that what is its job? Kant is about to tell us.
[3) THE
For as reason is not competent to guide
the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all
our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which
an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless,
reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have
influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the
distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true
destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something
else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and
complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even
of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing
inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the
reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in
many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second,
which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to
nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes
the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in
attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper
kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined
by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to
the ends of inclination.
Kant’s
argument for the True Purpose of Reason
1. The purpose of reason is the production of “a will, not merely
good as a means to something else. but good in itself, for which reason was
absolutely necessary.”
2. Reason guides our actions.
3. The will decides upon a course of action from among an array of
possibilities.
4. Reason molds and governs the will.
5. In every living thing, any “organ” will serve the function for
which it is best suited.
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Now we know
something else about the good will. Not only is it the only thing that’s
unconditionally good, a good will is completely governed by reason. This is
another very important idea.
A good will = A will subjegated to (i.e.
governed by) reason.
But it would be nice if we could say something more substantive
than this about a good will. What does a will that’s subjegated to reason look
like? What will it have us do, and what will it keep us from doing? In short,
what is this good will that Kant’s been talking about so much? Kant is
about to flesh out this notion for us, albeit very slowly.
[4) DUTY
We
have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed
for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which
exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be
cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions
always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In
order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a
good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances.
These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather
bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.
Kant says
that in order to understand the notion of a good will, we should look to the
concept of duty. Duty is a very important notion for Kant! After all,
Kant is a deontologist, not a consequentialist. Deontology says that an
action is good if and only if it is motivated by duty, regardless of the
consequences.
But what
exactly is the connection between a good will and duty? Kant is about to tell
us.
I
omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty,
although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the
question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even
conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty,
but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are
impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily
distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or
from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action
accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. For
example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an
inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent
tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a
child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this
is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and
from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the
question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct
inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should
give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither
from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
Kant wants
to locate the morality of an action in its motivation.
The
motivation for an action is the reason that it was done. The same action can be
done for different motivations. One person might give to charity in order to
benefit the less fortunate; another might give to charity in order to get a tax
write off, and still another might give to charity in order to impress his
boss.
Kant
distinguishes between inclination and duty. Your inclination is
basically what you feel like doing, or want to do, whereas your duty is
what you should do.
Sometimes,
actions are motivated by inclination and conflict with duty; by doing
what you feel like doing, you do what you shouldn’t do. Perhaps you go
to a party because you want to even though you should be at home
studying.
Sometimes,
actions are motivated by inclination but conform to duty; by doing what
you feel like doing, you also happen to be doing what you should do. Perhaps
you visit a friend in the hospital because you feel like it, and it just so
happens that visiting your friend is what you should be doing anyway.
Sometimes,
actions are motivated by duty but conflict with inclination; by doing what you should
do, you don’t do what you want to do. Perhaps you help your friends move one
morning because you know you should, even though you would rather have slept in
late.
On
the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone
has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care
which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral
import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because
duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have
completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in
mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for
death, and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or
fear, but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth.
Kant says
that to be genuinely moral, an action needs to be motivated by duty, and not merely
conform to duty. It’s the motivation for an action that grants
the action moral worth.
The general
idea is that we don’t praise people for doing the right thing out a natural
inclination, just because they “feel like it” or don’t even think about it at
all; we praise people for doing the right thing only insofar as they act from
the motive of duty.
This is
another important point from Kant.
A good will = being motivated by duty, not
by inclination or by consideration of the consquences.
To
be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so
sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or
self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take
delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I
maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however
amiable it may be, bas nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with
other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily
directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and
consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For
the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty,
not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were
clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of
others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress,
he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now
suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the
action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his
action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little
sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright
man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others,
perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of
patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires, that others should have
the same - and such a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature
- but if nature had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not
still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth
than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in
this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably
the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but
from duty.
Kant asks us
to imagine two people. The first helps others because he cares for them, is
pained by their suffering and finds pleasure in their happiness. The second is
unmoved by the suffering of others, but helps them because it is his duty.
According to
Kant, the actions of the first person have no moral worth, although they may be
pleasant to us or benefit others, because those actions are motivated from
inclination, not duty. The actions of the second person, however, do have
moral worth because they are motivated by duty.
So far we’ve
seen that a good will is the only thing that’s good without qualification, that
it is a will subjugated to reason, and that it consists of being motivated by
duty. But will still don’t know what our duty is. This is what Kant
considers next.
…
Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law… Now an action done
from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every
object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except
objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and
consequently the maxim[1]
that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.
The notion
of a “moral law” is a very important one in ethics. A moral law is supposed to
be similar to a law of nature. If moral laws exist, then they, like natural
laws, disclose objective facts which hold independently of what people might
believe or want. The law of gravity holds whether or not you think it does and
whether or not you want it to. Similarly, if there are moral laws, some things
are ethically right and others are ethically wrong whether or not you know it
or like it.
Although, at
this point, Kant has not told us what the moral law is, he believes in
it and thinks that our duty consists in obeying it. This is another important
idea.
Duty = Obeying the moral law.
[6) THE MORAL LAW – UNIVERSALIZABILITY]
Thus
the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor
in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this
expected effect. For all these effects - agreeableness of one's condition and
even the promotion of the happiness of others - could have been also brought
about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the
will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional
good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore
consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly
is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the
expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present
in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear
first in the result.
This is
another rejection of utilitarianism, which Kant truly hates. An action
is good, Kant says, if it stems from a good will. A will is good if it is
motivated by duty. And duty involves acting out of respect for the moral law.
Thus, an action is good if it is motivated by respect for the moral law. The
consequences of the action are ethically irrelevant.
But
what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will,
even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that
this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have
deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to
any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to
law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than
so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here,
now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any
particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its
principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and
a chimerical notion.
Okay, so an
action is good if it is motivated by respect for the moral law. But what is the
moral law?
Kant does
something very clever here. He notes that any law, in virtue of being a
law, must be universalizable. It doesn’t makes sense to say that a law applies
to me but not to you. If a rule were specific in this way, then it wouldn’t be
a law. This insight enables Kant to articulate and defend his famous
Principle of Universalizability. Here’s one way of understanding Kant’s
argument:
Universalizability
1. The moral law is “always act from motivations, or maxims, which
we could rationally want everyone else to follow as well.”
2. Moral laws, by their very a nature as laws, must be
universalizable. They must be the sort of thing that we could rationally
want everyone to follow.
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Kant’s
Principle of Universalizability is very important and we’ll see it
again.
Moral law
(The Principle of Universalizability) = Always act from motivations, or maxims, which you could rationally
want everyone else to follow as well.
[7) EXAMPLES OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY]
The
common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this
and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for
example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep
it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the
question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a
false promise? The former may undoubtedly of be the case. I see clearly indeed
that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of
this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter
spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free
myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so
easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than
any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether
it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and
to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it.
But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the
fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from
duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case,
the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case,
I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it
which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond
all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be
very advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and
an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying
promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Should I be content
that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should
hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I be
able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he
finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I
can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law
there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my
intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this
allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own
coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would
necessarily destroy itself.
Universalizability
tells us that we shouldn’t make promises we don’t intend to keep. How? It works
like this:
Want to know
whether or not you should break a promise?
Ask yourself
two questions:
1) “What maxim, or principle, would I be following if I did this?”
and
2) “Could I rationally want everyone to follow this maxim,
and act in a similar way?”
The maxim
you’d be following would be something like “Break a promise in order to get out
of trouble.”
Could you rationally
want this to be a rule for everyone?
In answering
the second question, “Could you rationally want “Break promises” to be
rule for everyone?” Kant hunts for a logical inconsistency. And he finds
one. If “break promises” were a rule for everyone then there would be no
promises to break since the very notion of a promise implies they aren’t
usually broken. Thus, “break promises” is a logically inconsistent rule, and
because it’s irrational to want a logical inconsistency, nobody can
rationally want this rule to hold for everyone. That’s why you can’t
universalize the rule “break promises” and so it’s morally wrong to break
promises.
This
understanding of univeralizability is another important point in Kant.
Rationally
wanting every to follow maxim M = Perceiving that there is no logical contradiction involved in
everyone following M.
I
do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to
do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of
the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask
myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not,
then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from
it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into
a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect
for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is
based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that
it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is
recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect
for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive
must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself,
and the worth of such a will is above everything…
Again, Kant wants us to ensure that we
act only on the basis of maxims, or principles, which we can or rationally want
to be universal laws.
We’ve seen that Kant would have us ask
two questions when deciding whether or not an action is ethical:
1) “What maxim, or principle, would I be following if I did this?”
and
2) “Could I rationally
want everyone to follow this maxim, and act in a similar way?”
If you think that this sounds a lot like
rule utilitarianism, good for you. They do sound a lot a like, but they
are, nonetheless, very different.
Both the rule
utilitarian and the Kantian start by asking the question “What maxim or
principle would I be following if I did this?”
The rule
utilitarian goes on to ask “Would this maxim or rule maximize happiness?” The
Kantian goes on to ask “Is this maxim or rule even consistent?” Kant
doesn’t worry about happiness. Essentially, a Kantian worries whether or not
the rule will get us into logical problems whereas a rule utilitarian
worries whether or not the rule will get us into psychological problems.
For instance (and this is a bit
of an oversimplification, but it makes the point)…
A rule
utilitarian and a Kantian might both wonder whether or not they should lie to
get out of attending a certain social gathering. Both would ask “What
general maxim or rule would I be following if I did this?” and both
would answer “I’d be following the maxim
or rule “Lie.”
Here’s where
they would differ. A rule utilitarian would ask “Would the rule ‘Lie’
maximize happiness?” The answer to this would be “No. Generally speaking,
people would be happier if people told the truth than if they lied.” That’s why
the rule utilitarian would decide that he shouldn’t lie to get out of the
social gathering. A Kantian would ask “Is the rule ‘Lie’ a consistent
rule?” The answer would be “No. If the rule ‘Lie’ were true then it couldn’t
even be stated without contradicting itself. If the rule were true, and you
truthfully told someone ‘Lie,’ then you aren’t lying so you’re breaking
the rule! See? The rule is inconsistent!” That’s why the Kantian would decide
that she shouldn’t lie.
See the difference?
Suppose a rule
utilitarian and a Kantian knew that they could read their best-friend’s diary
without getting caught and they’re wondering whether or not they should do it.
Both would ask “What general maxim or rule would I be following if I did this?”
Let’s suppose that they both answer “I’d be following the rule ‘Read other
people’s private writing.’”
How would the
rule utilitarian continue to think about this?
How would the Kantian
continue to think about this?
[8) THE MORAL LAW: THE CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE]
SECOND SECTION
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
…Everything
in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of
acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles,
i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires
reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines
the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively
necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to
choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as
practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not
sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective
conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the
objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely
accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions
which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and
the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation,
that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not
thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational
being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of
necessity follow.
Kant is
continuing to think about the moral law. He notes that the moral law must be a
reason for acting which is equally binding on all individuals,
regardless of what they happen to want (just like gravity is equally binding on
everyone, no matter how much some people might wish otherwise). That’s what
Kant means when he says that the moral law is “objective.”
As a matter
of fact, of course, people don’t always obey the moral law, even if they
recognize it. This is because there are many other considerations that
affect an individual’s decisions, including the individuals particular desires.
Kant calls these things “subjective” considerations. I might recognize that the
moral law demands that I tell the truth (an objective fact about morality) but
my desire for a day off (a subjective fact about me) could still prompt me to
lie about being sick.
It’s exactly
because people can be swayed from the moral law like this that the moral law
exerts upon them certain obligations, where “obligation” is the recognition
that an individual objectively ought to do what he might not
subjectively want to do. It’s because I want so very much to stay home
that I can think to myself, “No. I really ought to go to work.”
The
conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will,
is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an
imperative.
An imperative
is a statement of obligation. It tells you what you ought to do.
All
imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate
the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective
constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that
something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which
does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is
practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the
conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but
objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as
such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will
only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the
sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for
every one.
Once again:
Because we don’t always want to obey the moral law, the moral law exerts
upon us certain obligations which are expressed as imperatives.
This makes
sense. It’s not the case that a rock morally ought to obey the law of
gravity because, as a matter of fact, rocks just do obey the law of
gravity. People, however, don’t automatically obey the moral law like rocks
automatically obey natural laws. That’s why we say that people ought to
obey the moral law, and that’s why we express the moral law as an imperative,
saying “You really should call your mother,” or “You oughtn’t cheat on that
exam.”
…
Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former
represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something
else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The
categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary
of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.
There are
two kinds of imperatives, or “ought” statements.
Hypothetical
imperatives tell you
what you ought to do to achieve a certain result that you might want.
For example,
“If you want to buy a new car, you ought to save your money.” “If you want to
get to
Categorical
imperatives tell you
what you ought to do regardless of what you happen to want.
Since
every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account,
for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all
imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to
the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only
as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is
conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle
of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.
…
Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for
some purpose, possible or actual…. The categorical imperative which declares an
action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose,
i.e., without any other end, is valid as an apodeictic (practical) principle.
Hypothetical
imperatives say that an action is good if you want to achieve a certain result.
Saving money is good if you want to buy a car. Taking highway 51 south is good
if you want to get to
Categorical
imperatives say that an action is good no matter what you might happen to want.
It describes an action as good period.
…
Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately,
without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This
imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its
intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result;
and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the
consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of morality.
When I say
that you ought to save money if you want to get a new car, or that you ought to
take highway 51 south if you want to go to
This is
another really important idea in Kant.
Categorical
Imperatives = “Ought”
statements that goven everyone, no matter what they happen to want. Moral
Duties or Moral Laws are expressed as Categorical Imperatives.
[9) CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE:
UNIVERSALIZABILITY]
…Now
arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? This question does
not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment of the action which the
imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will
which the imperative expresses.
Kant wonders
how we can make sense of imperatives. What makes an imperative true?
…"Whoever
wills the end, wills also (according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the
indispensable means thereto which are in his power."
It’s
relatively easy to make sense of hypothetical imperatives. If you want to
achieve a certain goal, then (everything else being equal) it’s true that you
ought to do what you need to do to achieve the goal.
…On
the other hand, the question how the imperative of morality is possible, is
undoubtedly one, the only one, demanding a solution, as this is not at all
hypothetical, and the objective necessity which it presents cannot rest on any
hypothesis, as is the case with the hypothetical imperatives. Only here we must
never leave out of consideration that we cannot make out by any example, in
other words empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all, but it is
rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may yet be at
bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is: "Thou shalt not
promise deceitfully"; and it is assumed that the necessity of this is not
a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so that it should mean: "Thou
shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it become known thou shouldst destroy
thy credit," but that an action of this kind must be regarded as evil in
itself, so that the imperative of the prohibition is categorical; then we
cannot show with certainty in any example that the will was determined merely
by the law, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to be
so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also obscure dread
of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the will. Who can prove by
experience the non-existence of a cause when all that experience tells us is
that we do not perceive it? But in such a case the so-called moral imperative,
which as such appears to be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be
only a pragmatic precept, drawing our attention to our own interests and merely
teaching us to take these into consideration.
Here, Kant
wonders how a categorical imperative is even possible and considers the
question of whether what appear to be categorical and moral imperatives
are actually hypothetical, and practical, imperatives grounded in
self-interest. Maybe, “You ought not to cheat on the exam,” is just short for
“If you don’t want to risk getting caught and failing the class, you ought not
to cheat on the exam.”
How is it
possible that we ought to do some particular thing regardless of what
particular ends we wish to achieve?
…In
this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of a categorical
imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the formula of it, containing
the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative...
Kant
suggests that we can figure out what the categorical imperative must be by
thinking about the general characteristics of a categorical imperative, in much
the same way that we determined what the moral law must be by considering the
very nature of a law.
When
I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what
it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a
categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative
contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims[2]
shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it,
there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action
should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the
imperative properly represents as necessary.
There is therefore but one categorical
imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.
Since the
categorical imperative must be binding on everyone, regardless of what they
happen to want, it must be universalizable. Thus, we’ve already seen
the categorical imperative!
We will be
seeing two versions of the categorical imperative, so I’ll call this…
Kant’s
First Version of the Categorical Imperative = “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law.”
[10) MORE EXAMPLES OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY]
Now
if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from
their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty
is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we
understand by it and what this notion means…
All duties
can be derived from the categorical imperative. Kant’s about to demonstrate
this with a few duties.
1.
A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but
is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it
would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he
inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of
nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten
my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than
satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on
self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the
very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life
would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature;
hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and,
consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all
duty.
“Because I
love myself, I am going to kill myself in order to shorten my suffering,” can’t
be willed to be a universal law because the purpose of love is to improve life,
not destroy it. Thus, we have a duty to not commit suicide.
2.
Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he
will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him
unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make
this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is
it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this
way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his
action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I
will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do
so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps
be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, "Is
it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law,
and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal
law?" Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of
nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a
universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his
promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that
one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was
promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
“In order to
get something I want, I’m going to make a promise I have no intention of
fulfilling,” can’t be a universal law because it would make all promises, and
the ends that they achieve, impossible. Thus, we have a duty to not lie.
3.
A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might
make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable
circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in
enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether
his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his
inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then
that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although
men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to
devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species-
in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a
universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct.
For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed,
since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible
purposes.
“In order to
slack off, I am not going to develop my talents” can’t be willed to be
universal law because we rationally perceive that our talents are given to us
for many purposes. Thus, we have a duty to develop our talents.
4.
A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with
great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is
it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make
himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to
contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now
no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might
very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone
talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into
practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights
of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a
universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is
impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of
a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,
inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and
sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own
will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.
“I won’t
help people in need” can’t be willed to be a universal law since we may need
help ourselves some day. Thus, we have a duty to be charitable.
These
are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which
obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We
must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This
is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions
are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even
conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we
should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not
found, but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to
the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself.
It is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty;
the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown how
all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of
the action) on the same principle.
There are
two reasons why we might be unable to rationally want a maxim to become a
universal law:
1. We might not be able to rationally want a maxim to
become a universal law because its universal application contradicts itself. It
simply doesn’t make sense to think of everyone acting in accordance with
it.
2. We might not be able to rationally want a maxim to
become a unversal law, because its universal application contradicts our own
will, or what we want with respect to our own case. Although it makes sense to
think of everyone acting in accordance with the maxim, we wouldn’t want everyone
to act that way. We want to make a special exception for ourselves. Kant talks
more about this below.
If
now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall
find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for
that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should
remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception in
our own favour or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination.
Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view,
namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own will, namely,
that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law,
and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions. As
however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will
wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the
point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any
contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason,
whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality…
Kant says
that if we think of a time when we did something wrong, we can recognize that
what we did failed the principle of universalizability. We can see that we were
making a special exception for ourselves, thinking “Although I don’t want other
people to do this, I’ll do it anyway, just this once.”
We
have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is
to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only
be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have
also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every
practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must
contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all...
A quick
review: We’ve learned that doing our duty is obeying the moral law, that the
moral law is the categorical imperative, and that the categorical imperative is
the principle of universalizability.
[11) THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE – MEANS /
ENDS]
.…The
will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance
with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in
rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its
self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it
must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely
contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the
end, this is called the means.
…Supposing,
however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute
worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite
laws; then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible
categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.
Let’s see if
we can get another handle on this categorical imperative.
Hypothetical
imperatives tell us what we should do to achieve certain ends which may be
wanted by particular rational being but not by others.
The
categorical imperative tells us what we should do regardless of what we, as
particular rational beings, happen to want. In other words, it isn’t aimed at a
particular goal or end, but rather at a goal or end that must be shared by
all rational beings. So, what is valued by all rational beings?
Kant’s going to tell us.
…If
then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a
categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception
of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in
itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as
a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature
exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as
being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But
every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same
rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an
objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will
must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be
as follows: So act as to
treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every
case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now inquire whether
this can be practically carried out.
Here, Kant presents us with an argument
for another version of the Categorical Imperative. The argument goes like this:
Ends in Themselves
1. The categorical imperative is “act as
to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in
every case as an end withal, never as means only.”
2. The categorical imperative can’t be
directed at a goal which may or may not be valued according to an individual’s
particular inclinations. (If it were so directed, it would be a hypothetical
imperative). It must be directed at something that all rational beings value.
3. All rational beings value themselves
as ends in themselves.
4. The categorical imperative must be
directed at valuing rational beings as ends in themselves.
2 + 3
|
4
|
1
Kant’s Second
Version of the Categorical Imperative
= “Act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.”
[12) EXAMPLES OF MEANS / ENDS]
To
abide by the previous examples:
Kant is
about to show that all of the cases he addressed with the universalizability
principle can be addressed just as well with the principle of treating people
as ends in themselves.
Firstly,
under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should
ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as
an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful
circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition
up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something
which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always
considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a
man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs
to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all
misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve
myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This
question is therefore omitted here.)
Secondly,
as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He
who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he
would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at
the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to
use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him
and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation
of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in
examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear
that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others
merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought
always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of
containing in themselves the end of the very same action.
Thirdly,
as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that
the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it
must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater
perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to
humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be
consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with
the advancement of this end.
Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if ever