Problem of Evil Summary

 

So, here’s what we’ve learned. The Problem of Evil (the most famous argument against God’s existence) goes like this:

 

The Problem of Evil

 

1. An omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God doesn’t exist.

2. There is evil and suffering in the universe.

3. Any omniscient being will know about evil and suffering when, and even before, it happens.

4. Any omnibenevolent being will want the universe to be free of evil and suffering.

5. Any omnipotent being will be able to create a universe free of evil and suffering.

6. If an omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent being exists then there would be no evil or suffering in the universe.

 

                             3       +        4    +      5

                                        A       |                    

2 J                 +                      6

     B    |  J    

                        1

 

Because inference B and premise 2 seem fine, we decided to explore how someone might disagree with subconclusion 6. Toward that end, we examined six defenses of God against the Problem of Evil: the Test Defense, the Lesson-Learning Defense, the Punishment Defense, the Virtue Defense, the Free Will Defense, and the Epistemic Contrast Defense.

 

In order to be satisfactory, any defense must avoid anthropomorphism (that is to say, it mustn’t assume that God is limited in distinctly human ways) and must (perhaps in conjunction with other successful defenses) account for all of the evil and suffering in our experience.

 

We decided that the Test Defense, the Lesson-Learning Defense, and the Punishment Defense were all anthropomorphic because they ascribed to God limitations which seemed distinctly human.

 

We learned, however, that some limitation on God’s abilities is appropriate. Specifically, not even an omnipotent being can do something that’s a contradiction in terms.

 

Exploiting this insight, we noted that the Virtue Defense, as well as a revised version of the Free Will Defense,  just might work. These defenses run as follows:

 

The Virtue Defense

 

1. God would permit the types of evil and suffering necessary for certain virtues in the world.

2. Any world with the virtues dependent upon evil and suffering is better than any world without those virtues.

3. God had a choice between making an all-good world in which we didn’t have the virtues dependent upon evil and suffering, and creating a world with evil and suffering in which we did have those virtues.

4. God can’t give us the virtues requiring evil and suffering without permitting evil and suffering.

5. It would be a contradiction in terms to give us the virtues requiring evil and suffering without permitting evil and suffering.

6. An omnipotent being can’t do something that’s a contradiction in terms.

 

                                    5          +          6

    C     |                                                          

4

    B     |

                        2          +          3

     A    |

                                    1

  

The Free Will Defense

 

1. God would permit the types of evil and suffering necessary for worthwhile free will in the world.

2. Any world with worthwhile free will is better than any world without it.

3. God had a choice between making an all-good world in which we didn’t have worthwhile free will, and a world with evil and suffering in which we did have worthwhile free will.

4. God can’t grant us worthwhile free will without permitting its misuse, and the consequent evil and suffering.

5. It would be a contradiction in terms to grant us worthwhile free will and control how we use it.

6. An omnipotent being can’t do something that’s a contradiction in terms.

 

                                    5          +          6

    C     |                                                          

4

    B     |

                        2          +          3

     A    |

                                    1

 

Both of these defenses are open to criticism at their preference premises (premise 2), but neither or them is anthropomorphic, and taken together they may account for all of the evil and suffering in the world. (The Worthwhile Free Will Defense wouldn’t explain the suffering caused by natural disasters, but the Virtue Defense might. Although no human being causes a hurricane, the suffering caused by hurricanes may allow for virtues like compassion and generosity.)

 

We were unable to come to any final decision about the Epistemic Contrast Defense because we weren’t able to decide whether “We can’t recognize good without experiencing evil” is a logical or merely psychological truth.

 

The fact that there are at least two defenses which might work (provided their preference premises are justifiable) implies that subconclusion 6 in the Problem of Evil may very well be wrong. Perhaps the existence of an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent being is not incompatible with evil and suffering.

 

But subconclusion 6 is exactly that – a subconclusion – and we can’t reject a subconclusion without finding something wrong in the supporting argumentation. So what’s wrong with the reasoning in support of 6?


If the defenses work, they demonstrate that premises 4 and 5 in the Problem of Evil can’t be jointly satisfied. Any universe that an omnibenevolent being will want to create (thanks to the preference premises favoring virtue and free will over their absence) contains evil and suffering that an omnipotent being can’t eliminate (thanks to the fact that a world containing virtues and free will but no evil or suffering is a contradiction in terms). I’ll represent this incompatibility by placing a frown between premises 4 and 5.

 

The Problem of Evil

 

1. An omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God doesn’t exist.

2. There is evil and suffering in the universe.

3. Any omniscient being will know about evil and suffering when, and even before, it happens.

4. Any omnibenevolent being will want the universe to be free of evil and suffering.

5. Any omnipotent being will be able to create a universe free of evil and suffering.

6. If an omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent being exists then there would be no evil or suffering in the universe.

                                                         L

 

                               3       +      4    +      5

                                        A       |                     

2 J                 +                      6

     B    |   J   

                        1

 

Of course, if the Problem of Evil is to work, both premises 4 and 5 need to be true at the same time, so it turns out that the Problem of Evil isn’t quite the philosophical slam-dunk that it might appear to be at first. (It’s interesting to speculate that the popularity of the Problem of Evil may be due, in part, to the fact that it takes much less philosophical sophistication to give than to refute.) Atheism is certainly rational, but it isn’t rationally compulsory.

 

Let’s think a little about where we are. We’ve seen that the Cosmological Argument for God’s existence might not work, and we’ve seen that the Problem of Evil against God’s existence might not work either. So, what should we do? Should we decide to remain agnostic, neither believing nor disbelieving in God? Pascal thinks not. Let’s see why.